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ABSTRACT 
Zimbabwe was beset by militarised politically-inspired violence between 2000 and 2008. 
How that violence has been imagined in terms of its causes, memorialisation and impact 
has been far from conclusive. As a derivative of this huge question that forms an 
important component of the framing for this dissertation, and to “visibilise” the 
subaltern, so to say, and to visualise “history from below”, I ask how the women of 
Shurugwi conceptualise it. This question has also polarised Zimbabweans into two, 
broadly the human rights and the redistributive, camps. But I ask, what do either of 
these frameworks enable or eclipse in the further understanding of the violence? 
Deploying genealogical and ethnographic approaches centred on the rural communities 
of Shurugwi that analyse the historical, socioeconomic and political factors that have 
engendered human rights abuses from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
moments, the dissertation problematizes both discourses and invites a much more 
troubled analysis.  
As a way to complicate the reading and to attempt to open the analysis of the violence 
further, I draw on the theoretical insights from Michel Foucault’s theory on the 
relationship between power and war. Inverting Clausewitz’s aphorism of war as politics 
by other means, Foucault argues instead that politics is war by other means. This 
inversion allows for a nuancing of the connections between the violence and the 
Chimurenga trope in Zimbabwe. In this way, the labelling of farm takeovers and other 
force-driven indigenisation modes in the new millennium as the Third Chimurenga, I 
demonstrate, was not a mere emotive evocation, but was meant to situate the violence 
as the final stage in a sequence with, and in the same category of importance as, the 
earlier zvimurenga, that is the First and Second Chimurenga that targeted to uproot the 
colonial project. I thus argue that the violence represented, in a significant way, the 
continuation of war for ZANU-PF to retain power amid dwindling electoral returns. This 
mode further illuminates the deployment of the spectacles of punishment for the public 
disciplining of citizens to achieve their passivity. 
Throughout the dissertation the central and animating question is to what extent were 
women the invisible victims of the violence? This question attempts to interrogate the 
political role of women in the violence. I attend to this question by privileging the 
narratives of women. Also, by articulating an Africanist feminist discourse that contests 
the dominant western one which atemporalises, universalises and fixes victimhood with 
females, this dissertation invites a re-looking of the violence in a way that locates 
agency at the site of performance. In this way I show that women were not perpetual 
victims, but were also important political actors whose actions, however small, greatly 
extended the violence.  
To conclude, I propose the adoption of the “traditional” Shona practice of kuripa ngozi 
as a transitional justice mechanism to help stamp out the culture and cycles of violence 
and impunity that have scarred Zimbabwe especially from the late colonial to the post-
colonial eras.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE MILITARISATION OF VIOLENCE. 
 
In July 2009 President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy 
Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, the Principals in the Government of National Unity 
(GNU), dedicated three days, 24-26 July 2009, as days of national reconciliation and 
healing1 following almost ten years of unprecedented politically-related violence. At the 
same time there were three co-ministers of Reconciliation and Healing in the GNU. This 
showed the seriousness of the problem of violence in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 
2008.  
Worldwide too, no subject, arguably, has been more dominant since the turn of the new 
millennium than violence. It has been expressed frighteningly as terrorism or as War 
against Terror in the liberal West, and, generally, in the Muslim world. But there are 
various other genres of violence witnessed since 2000. It has, for example, been 
manifest in the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Russian-Chechnya war and 
the Russia-Georgia war. In Africa, this has been exhibited through the seemingly 
unending Horn of Africa crises, the violent uprisings in the black townships of South 
Africa in the xenophobic attacks of 2008, and the recurrent service delivery protests. In 
Zimbabwe what has been called “the crisis”2 was largely an exhibition of state violence 
spearheaded by the military and semi-military bodies. 
 
WHAT IS VIOLENCE? 
According to the World Health Organisation, violence “is the intentional use of physical 
force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a 
                                                 
1 See Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009. 
2 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 
eds, Becoming Zimbabwe, Jacana, 2009, p 201, for a nuanced discussion of the crisis. 
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group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, 
death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation”.3 A more gendered 
definition has been given in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women, which says violence is “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is 
likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or private life”.4 From the definitions, we can see that violence is 
caused from the outside, can be verbal or actualised, is injurious either psychologically 
or physically and it leads to, or is intended to produce, an involuntary action.  
Psychological violence as separated from physical violence is not easily deciphered and 
it includes verbal abuse, maltreatment, personal abuse, detentions, solitary 
confinements, brainwashing and misuse of education.5 Besides this, violence, as shall be 
discussed especially in Chapter One, and in many other sections of this thesis, operates 
under different discourses, including structural, instrumentalised and emancipatory, 
among others. 
Stanage says violence is normally associated with the following words: “abuse, break, 
cease damage, defeat, desecrate, dishonour, disagree, disobey, embarrass, erupt, 
excite, fear, force, harm, humiliate, impair, impede, injure, insult, interrupt, kill, 
maltreat, mar, murder, obstruct, perturb, prevent, punish, resent, spoil, stop, torture, 
thwart and wound.”6 These key words imply that violence leads to a violation of basic 
human rights, such as the right to: life, liberty, security, to be protected from torture, 
cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment, protection of the law, freedoms of thought, 
conscience, religion, opinion, and expression.7 We must be careful, however, not to limit 
violence to the human rights and legal discourses suggested by the terms above. These 
terms, however, suggest connotations that are harder to define but which provide 
                                                 
3 http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/evophp-URL_ID=36790&URL  
4 Ibid. 
5 Johan Dagenaar, “The concept of violence” p 76. 
6 Stanage quoted in Johan Dagenaar, “The concept of violence” p 74. 
7 http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/evophp-URL_ID=36790&URL 
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useful insights with regard to my research. They also render the possibility of a more 
complex analysis of the violence in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008, which is why I 
devote a large section of Chapter One to theorising violence. 
 
VIOLENCE, POWER AND STATE FORMATION 
In this section I intend to briefly introduce the discussion on the relationship between 
violence, political power, change and state formation. This is to situate the problematic 
of the Zimbabwean political violence in the broader context of worldwide history of 
nationalism, nation formation, and political change epitomised by the French and 
American revolutions, colonialism and decolonialisation. The overall aim is to show that 
while violence seems to be in the negative, it nonetheless can, and has played, a 
significant political role in the history of mankind regarding power and state formation. 
The thesis of this section is encapsulated by Karl Marx’s dictum that violence is “the 
midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one,” and violence is the midwife of 
“all change in history and politics.”8 
Regarding state formation and under the “war makes states” theory, Sparling forcefully 
posits that “[i]n medieval Europe, the primary cause of state formation was the violent 
expansion of empires and territories. The threat of wars compelled ‘would-be’ states to 
develop strong state apparatus’ so as to avoid defeat.”9 
Following from the above, there is little disagreement that the process of European 
colonialism which resulted in the altering the political-social-economic geography of 
most of the Third World and the creation of new polities was a violent process. In this 
regard, the dispossessions, territorial conquests and economic expropriation were 
                                                 
8See Karl Marx, quoted in John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Law and disorder in the postcolony: an 
Introduction”, in Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, eds, Law and disorder in the postcolony, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2006, p 2. 
9 Laura Sparling, “Death and taxes: The role of violence in the development of European and African 
state”, Undercurrent, 2(3), 2005, P 37. 
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supported by force.10 In terms of political administration, Mamdani asserts that 
colonialism was buttressed by the violent bifurcation of people in the colonies. The 
indigenous people were classified under tribes while the non-indigenous were classified 
as races.11 The distinction went further at law where the indigenous groups were 
governed by customary law as opposed to the races who were governed by civil law, 
which determined these groups’ claims to the state: that is customs and rights, 
respectively.12 Similarly, the process of decolonisation that brought independence to the 
colonies was also underwritten by the force of arms, violent protests and other various 
forms of coercion against the colonialists including economic embargoes and diplomatic 
isolation. 
In this thesis, I grapple with the significance of violence in the reformulation of the 
Zimbabwean nation, especially in the new millennium. To what extent was it 
emancipatory or progressive, and, to what extent was it also a project of the violation of 
human rights and aimed at the sustenance of ZANU-PF in power? These two questions 
largely frame the debate on the human rights and redistributive explanations for the 
violence that are frequently resorted to in explaining the 2000-2008 violence. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Throughout the large body of this dissertation I deploy the analysis enabled by Michel 
Foucault’s theory of power to try to unravel the mystery around the state-sponsored 
violence in Zimbabwe. According to Foucault, power, in Nietzsche’s hypothesis 
constructed in the mode of “relation of forces”, is a condition of “struggle, conflict and 
                                                 
10 I will expand on this point in Chapter One when I discuss “Emancipatory violence”. See for now, Franz 
Fanon, The Wretched of the earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963. 
11 Mahmood Mamdani, “Political violence and state formation in post-colonial Africa”, in 
idc.open.ac.uk/files/Resources/20090911_031601_2992.pdf, Accessed 13 February 2013, p 4. 
12 Ibid, pp 4-8. 
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war.”13 In an inversion of Clausewitz’s notion of “war as a continuation of politics by 
other means”, he says politics can instead be understood as being subservient to war 
needs and as the continuation of war by other means. In his words, “power is essentially 
war, a war continued by other means.”14 In this modality, power reinscribes existing 
relations in “social institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies 
themselves of each and everyone …”15 Thus power sanctions and upholds the 
disequilibrium played out during war. More importantly for this study, under this genre 
of power, all political struggles and all conflicts for power, with power and over power 
as well as peace have to be interpreted in the mode of the continuation of war.16  
I also seek to connect this understanding of power to the broader analytical lenses of 
pre-modern spectacles of punishment17 and “passive revolution”18 that also inform the 
larger dissertation. In this regard, and in short, by treating the violence in Zimbabwe in 
the first decade of the new millennium as rooted in the Foucauldian notion of power 
relations enhances the understanding of the “spectacles of punishments” used for 
publicly “disciplining” citizens meted out in order to make them “passive.” 
For me, this theory of power is crucial in the face of mounting evidence of ZANU-PF’s 
deliberate articulation of its politics of legitimacy to rule Zimbabwe in terms of its 
historic mastery of, control of, and “degrees in violence” mustered from the Second 
Chimurenga. It is moreover in the face of mounting evidence of the MDCs’ retaliatory 
and intra-party violence that helped fashion their political engagements. So for this 
research, the larger question is: to what extent is this understanding of power as a tool 
of war, and in the violence of war, as advocated in the ZANU-PF’s controversial Third 
                                                 
13 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, edited by Colin Gordon, Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshal, 
John Mepham and Kate Soper, Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, pp 89-90. 
14 Ibid, p 90. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage 
Books, New York, 1998, pp 16-34. 
18 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971, pp 59 & 106-114. 
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Chimurenga19 discourse, helpful in the understanding of the Zimbabwean violence in the 
new millennium?  
Broadly, I contend that the militarisation of the state and the construction of farm 
takeovers as the Third Chimurenga was a deliberate ploy to justify the use of violence 
for the elimination of critics both within and without ZANU-PF and to settle scores.20 
The brutal tactics adopted were then crucial in the creation of conditions necessary for a 
Gramscian “passive revolution”. As is now widely known, this process was led by the 
militant war veterans who forcefully occupied farms and led in the intimidation 
campaign against all critics both within and outside ZANU-PF. Thus through this terror, 
fear, subjugation, elimination and submission were achieved. Through these brutal 
tactics, while the quasi-military institutions committed most of the violations, the 
military assumed a king-making role over who assumes political office.  
Additionally, and as in true war situations, the rule of law was suspended. Regarding 
this, the cases against the invasions brought up by white farmers could not be upheld 
because of a combination of an uncooperative police force, an intimidated judiciary, a 
deliberate disregard of the court rulings, and a changed law on land matters.21 There 
was therefore a “total strategy”22 of sorts against the white farmers. Besides this 
multifaceted onslaught the violence also allowed, in another dimension, for the 
primitive accumulation of wealth by the well-connected, starting, firstly, with the land 
grabs,23 and the subsequent industrial and firm invasions.24 Thus through the sanctified 
                                                 
19 I say controversial because some would not perceive the violence of the period as such. The human 
rights discourse, which I articulate in Chapter One, for example speaks to this. As such, while I constantly 
use the term, I do not do so unproblematically.  
20 See also Lovemore Madhuku, “Law, politics and the land reform process in Zimbabwe”, in M Masiiwa, 
ed, Post- independence land reform in Zimbabwe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare, 2004, p 137. 
21 See Lovemore Madhuku, Ibid, p137. See also, Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”, p 
100 & p 104. See also Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in 
Zimbabwe”, p 156. 
22 I borrow the term, and not the meaning, from the apartheid’s multi-pronged strategy against African 
nationalists, to denote the coordinated efforts by the state against the farmers (and the opposition). 
23 Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, p 218, who contends that the best farms 
expropriated went to top ZANU-PF/government/military elites. 
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violence of the Third Chimurenga, another facet of passive revolution was achieved, that 
is, “accumulation from above” by the political elite, senior civil servants, and businesses 
aligned to ZANU-PF.25 This is however notwithstanding the “progressive” aspects of the 
land redistribution that ensued, including correcting the historical colonial racial land 
imbalances.26 Correspondingly, this should not undermine the historical struggle for 
land by communities before and after independence, which had led to farm invasions 
since independence.27 
 
BACKGROUND: MILITARISATION OF VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE, 2000-2008 
Between 2000 and 2008 Zimbabwe saw an increase in the prominence of the military in 
the state. Zeff Sithole encapsulates this scenario very well by stating that by 2008 there 
was an army general running the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA); the head of the 
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) was a former Brigadier; two High Court Judges 
were former soldiers; one of the ten provincial governors was a former soldier; a 
Permanent Secretary in the ministry of Transport was a Colonel; military personnel also 
headed the Grain Marketing Board (GMB); the Prison Service, the National Railways, the 
Sports and Recreation Commission; plus there were four ex-senior army officers in 
government as either ministers or deputy ministers. In addition, there were army 
officers at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, while other army officers headed civilian 
operations such as Maguta and Garikai.28 Moreover, former military chiefs led the 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 See Patrick Bond and masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, neoliberalism 
and the search for social justice, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, Weaver Press and The Merlin 
Press, Scottsville, Harare and London, 2003, pp 132& 141. 
25 See Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 23. 
26 See Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state” for a condensed summary of the history of 
land grabs and desires in the post-independence era by the landless to acquire land. 
27 See Henry V Moyana, The political Economy of land in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984. See also 
Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe”, in Amanda 
Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business, pp 156-157, for more 
on this. 
28 See Zeff Sithole “Is the army taking over?” in www.afrika.no/Detailed/12358.html, Accessed 12 March 
2009, for an in-depth discussion of the pervasiveness of the military in the state. 
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Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe 
(MMCZ), and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife.29 Furthermore, there were 
some senior military officers who teamed up with politicians and ZANU-PF aligned 
businessmen and engaged in the mining of gold, platinum and diamonds.30 Related, the 
commanders, together with senior ZANU-PF leaders, obtained huge tracts of land under 
the jambanja and FTLP.31 Over and above there was formed the Joint Operations 
Command (JOC) that is credited with running a “deep state” and fomenting violence 
against the opposition.32  
Thus by 2008, Zimbabwe’s political-military alliance had reached praetorianism,33 and  
resembled the 1978 to 1980 Rhodesian state with the prominent role of the army and 
quasi-military organs, such as the Selous Scouts, the District Assistants and the 
Auxiliaries of Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa.34 Other parallels include the 
glorification of the security or “coercive institutions” like the army, police, prison and tax 
administrators as well as the harnessing of the “ideological institutions” like schools, 
churches, boy scouts, radio, media and other information agencies,35 for the benefit of 
the state. However, the main difference was that in the 1978-80 case the Rhodesian 
state was at war against the nationalist forces, while between 2000 and 2008 there was 
no war in Zimbabwe. In this regard, as Sachikonye says, the Rhodesian JOC, formed in 
1966, coordinated the efforts of the army, police, intelligence and air force against the 
guerrillas. In contrast the post-1999 JOC sought to protect ZANU-PF interests that were 
                                                 
29 Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs” in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The military Factor in zimbabwe.pdf, Accessed 02 July 2011, p 
19. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Roger Southall, “Too soon to tell?: Land reform in Zimbabwe”, in Africa Spectrum, 3, 2011, p 93, in 
hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewPDFInterstitial/.../487,Accessed 18 June 2012. 
32 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 47. 
33 See Francois Vrey, “Strategic culture of Southern African Development Community: Militarised 
pathways to Security” in African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol 9, No1, 2009, p 67, The African Centre 
for Conflict Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), who says praetorianism is achieved when civilian and 
military structures collapse into one and the army becomes the “de facto ruler” 
34 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 223, for a more elaborate discussion. 
35 Horace Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation, David 
Philip, Cape Town, 2003, p 18. 
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entangled with theirs.36 However, both JOCs were meant to prop up unpopular regimes 
threatened by an ignominious ending. 
In addition to the above, war veterans and National Youth Service Graduates or Green 
Bombers terrorised the rural areas together with ZANU-PF youths in a highly charged 
political campaign that was targeted at weeding out MDC supporters and the creation of 
“patriotic citizens”. This included, firstly, training youths in patriotism in national youth 
centres commonly referred to as Border Gezi centres37 and then unleashing them on the 
population. Related to this, patriotic history had been introduced formally at Teachers 
and Technical colleges as a compulsory subject.38 Informally, however, this version of 
distorted history had been started in the 1980s when ZANU-PF sought to downplay the 
contributions of ZAPU, Nkomo and more generally Ndebele-speaking people in the 
liberation of Zimbabwe.39  
In serious ways patriotic history evoked the Foucauldian “discourses of truth” in the 
power-knowledge discourse. Here, there are “manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power 
cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse.”40  Overall, the 
truth is produced by power, where “[the powerful] must produce truth as we must 
produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first 
                                                 
36 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 48. 
37 Border Gezi is a late minister of Youth who was credited with the re-emergence of National Youth 
Training Centres in the post 2000 era, and in time both the trainees and the training centres were 
categorised in the public sphere as Border Gezi youths or centres respectively. 
38 Patriotic history was largely an essentialised and narrowed version of Zimbabwean history that focussed 
on the teleology of African resistance against colonisation from 1896-7 wars, but especially the Second 
Chimurenga and the centrality of ZANU-PF in the attainment of independence. See Terence Ranger, 
“Historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the struggle of the past in Zimbabwe” in 
http://cas1.elis.rug.ac, accessed 12 May 2009. 
39 See James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing silences: Ethnicity in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1980-2007”, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 7, Number 2, 2007, p 284. 
40 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings: 1972-1977, edited by Colin 
Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, Pantheon Books, New 
York, 1980, p 93. 
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place.”41 In this regard in Zimbabwe, the state pushed for an essentialised and narrowed 
version of the country’s history centred on ZANU-PF and the Second Chimurenga.42   
The close alliance between the security forces and the ruling party was unhealthy for 
Zimbabwe’s democracy and gave ZANU-PF an edge over its opponents, especially the 
MDC. Basically, as Finer asserts, the army has three distinct advantages over civilians. 
These are: it has a superior organisational unity; a highly emotional symbolic status; and 
it has superiority in the means of applying force.43 All these advantages, which relate to 
the efficient application of organised violence, were thus turned into ZANU-PF 
advantages against the opposition parties. One ought to state too that the military are 
trained in the use of violence to solve problems. Thus their pervasiveness in the state in 
Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 overexposed citizens to this attribute and 
profoundly altered perceptions. This is so because, as Catherine Lutz says, it leads to the 
invention of “societal beliefs and values” that legitimate “the use of force, [and] the 
organization of large standing armies ...,” and the resurgence of militarist nationalism. In 
addition, it leads “to the less visible deformations of human potentials into the 
hierarchies of race, class, [and] gender […], and to the shaping of national histories in 
ways that glorify and legitimate military action.”44   
On the whole it epitomised what Franz Fanon described as the “pitfalls of national 
consciousness,” where  
the incoherent mass of the people is seen as a blind force that must be 
continuously held in check either by mystification or by the fear inspired by the 
police force. The party acts as a barometer and as an information service. The 
militant is turned into an informer. He is entrusted with punitive expeditions 
                                                 
41 Ibid, pp 93-94. 
42 See Terence Ranger, “Patriotic history”. 
43 Finer, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military alliance and the fate of democracy in 
Zimbabwe”, p 53. 
44 Catherine Lutz cited in Ismael Lagardien, “The space of militarisation that haunts the US” in 
http://www.thoughtleader.co.za, accessed on 19 April 2009.Regarding Zimbabwe, see Horace Campbell, 
Reclaiming Zimbabwe, for an in-depth development of repressive militarism in Zimbabwe. 
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against the villages. The embryo opposition parties are liquidated by beatings 
and stonings.45   
One can add that this resort to using the army for political gains signified the abuse of 
power by Mugabe as Commander-In-Chief of the defence forces and also the abuse of 
the military structures for the same ends. It also greatly extends the Foucauldian notion 
of politics as a continuation of war by other means. In this regard, based on its control of 
the army, and other state security arms, ZANU-PF, literally, waged a war on the 
opposition through these arms fomenting violence on its behalf. What is more, this fed 
into the institutionalisation of the violence where state institutions orchestrated 
violence in the service of the political agenda of ZANU-PF. As Sachikonye says, these 
state institutions “conducted acts of commission (harassment and arrests) and omission 
(refusal to prosecute in cases brought to them by opposition parties).”46  
What should also not escape mention here is that ZANU-PF and the senior army 
structures shared a common political-military history rooted in the Second Chimurenga 
in which the senior military officials were simultaneously high-ranking ZANU officials.47 
This is hardly surprising when one looks at the fact that during the Second Chimurenga 
ZANU guerrillas acted as both military cadres as well as political commissars of their 
party, and at times were found in quasi-administration in the rural areas where they 
abrogated themselves the right to, for example, kill witches and sell-outs.48 This 
conflation was carried into the post-independence era with several high-ranking security 
service chiefs openly declaring their membership of ZANU-PF and also threatening a 
                                                 
45 See Franz Fanon, The wretched of the earth, p 182. 
46 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 19. 
47 See Knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Defence force from 1980-2005” in Martin 
Rupiya (ed), Evolution and Revolution: A contemporary history of militaries in Southern Africa, Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005, p 354, who says that besides being war veterans, senior army officials 
were also members of high ranking ZANU-PF structures like the Politburo and the Central Committee, in 
blatant violation of the constitution, which states that soldiers may only be ordinary card carrying 
members without taking any office in political party structures. 
48 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-military alliance and the fate of democracy in Zimbabwe”, p 
55, and Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, pp 93 & 108, for an in-depth discussion of 
this. See also Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing silences,  Heinemann, Sandton, 1997, p 22. 
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coup d’état in the event that ZANU-PF lost power.49 A recent study on violence by 
Sachikonye has established that one of the key factors driving violence against the 
opposition is the presence of a large number of ex-guerrilla cadres in the state security 
organs of the army, police and CIO who were schooled in intolerance of dissenting 
voices and are cultured in their reverence for Mugabe.50  
With this close strategic alliance it was therefore little surprise that the military was 
used as the primary instrument of policy as opposed to it being the last resort. Also, the 
army, to some serious degree, began to direct the national and political goals of 
Zimbabwe. This was amply demonstrated by the “big brother” pronouncements by the 
senior security officers in 2002 and 2008 on the suitable presidential candidates, and 
the infamous utterances by Brigadier-Generals in 2011, cited above.  
The militarization project drew its authorizing ideology from ZANU-PF’s triumphalist and 
aggressive nationalism that projected its central role in the Second Chimurenga. The 
ideology, also referred to as Mugabeism,51 essentialised the centrality of the land 
problem as the raison d’être for the Second Chimurenga and African nationalism, that is, 
as the “first and only issue.”52 However, nationalism, as Alexander, Mcgregor and 
Ranger have argued, in addition to the restoration of land, also embodied other ideals 
                                                 
49 See Martin Rupiya, “Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 and beyond” in 
Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political reconciliation, Institute for 
Justice and  Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004, p 81. See also The Standard, 29 May 2011, “Brigadier throws 
ZANU PF into crisis”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/29820-brigadier-throws-zanu-pf-into-
crisis.html, Accessed 1 June 2011. See also The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba 
responds to Tsvangirai”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13369:generals-respond-to-
tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 June 2011. See again Zimbabwe Independent, 
21 July 2011, “All eyes on the military ahead of Zim elections”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31762-all-eyes-on-military-ahead-of-zim-elections.html, 
Accessed 25 July 2011.  
50 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 13. 
51 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “The meanings of Mugabeism in the postcolonial African present: Beyond 
the polemics” Unpublished paper presented at the Re-Imagining Postcolonial Futures: Knowledge 
Transactions and Contests of Culture in the African Present Colloquium, organised by the Centre for 
Humanities for Research of the Western Cape, and The Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies of 
the Open University, UK, 8-11July 2009, UWC, Cape Town, especially p 14. See also Sabelo Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, pp 236-298. 
52 See Ezra Chitando, in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 275. 
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such as freedom, democracy, and equality.53 In addition, nationalism, for others, as 
Kriger and Nhongo-Simbanegavi have amply demonstrated, represented an opportunity 
to fight battles that were rather personalised. These included class, age and sex 
differences.54 Further, others joined because of failed marriages or to escape parental 
controls.55  
In the same vein guerrilla violence against the Rhodesian state was valorised as the only 
strategy to independence.56 While military confrontation was primary, it nonetheless 
depended on the active support and sacrifices of the “masses” who not only bore the 
brunt of Rhodesian state agencies’ excesses, but also helped the guerrillas with 
provisions and information in a true role as the “water” in the Maoist strategy.57 
Regional and international geo-politics were again paramount in the attainment of 
independence. To this degree, South Africa’s policy of détente that was actively 
supported by the United States of America and Zambia, as well as the pressure on the 
Rhodesia state from Mozambique, Zambia Botswana, and Tanzania, the Organisation of 
African Unity, Britain and most Scandinavian countries, as well as the church and certain 
business organisations, coerced in a significant way the belligerents to negotiate for 
majority-based rule.58 As Brian Raftopoulos has advanced, this narrowing “entailed the 
flattening of [other] issues.” And, this narrowing too paved the way for the exclusion, 
marginalization and deployment of violence against ZANU-PF’s “enemies in the form” of 
“farm workers, urbanites ‘without totems’, women and members of the opposition” in a 
bid to reclaim back the lost electorate between 2000 and 2008.59  
                                                 
53 Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory, p 6. 
54 See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war, p 177. 
55 See Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better or worse, p 32. 
56 See Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: Exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism 
and the search for social justice, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003, p 74. See also Brian Raftopoulos, “The state 
in crisis: Authoritarian nationalism, selective citizenship and distortions of democracy in Zimbabwe” in 
Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking 
land, the state and nation in the context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare,2003, p 217.  
57 See Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980”, p 155. 
58 Luise White, The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p 18. 
59 Brian Raftopoulos, “The state in crisis”, p 217.  
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Related to this, Bond and Manyanya argue that this resort to essentialism and violence 
came because by 2000 ZANU-PF was faced with an expired national appeal against the 
background of increased hardships and an emerging opposition60, which led to its defeat 
in the February 2000 constitutional referendum. Thus, as they say,  
in desperation Mugabe resurrected ZANU’s most virulent strain of nationalist 
demagoguery, attempting as time ran out to simultaneously ‘solve’ the long 
standing land redistribution problem, terrorise supporters of the opposition and 
pass the buck for his own failings to the country’s small white population, foreign 
countries, imperialism in general and the IMF in particular.61 
More than this, the suffusion of the language of war with triumphalism created, in Allen 
Feldman’s argument, spaces in which “claims of power are made and practices of power 
are inscribed.”62 These practices targeted the passivity of the citizens because of the 
threats to return to war. For many people the devastating memories of war were still 
vivid from the Second Chimurenga and, for parts of the Midlands and Matebeleland, 
from the gukurahundi. 
Mugabeism, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni continues, was a complex formulation. On the one 
hand, it was formulated as a party and government under siege from foreign 
imperialism led by Britain and the United States of America. Because of this, it called for 
“sacrifice, courage, ability to fight, valorisation of war, manifestation of anger, 
preparedness to shed blood and defiance of the West.”63 On the other hand, it 
incorporated resonant Pan-Africanist and Third World and internationalist doctrines 
including Garveyism, Negritude, Marxism, Stalinism, Maoism, Nkrumahism, Nyerereism, 
Pan-Africanism and African neo-traditionalism.64 Because it incorporated strong anti-
imperialist, and third-world discourses, it had a large appeal generally among those who 
                                                 
60 Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, p 74. 
61 Ibid. 
62 See Allen Feldman, Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern 
Ireland, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991, p 9. 
63 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 280. 
64 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “The meaning of Mugabeism in the post-colonial African present: Beyond 
Polemics”, Unpublished paper presented at the Re-emerging post- colonial futures: knowledge 
transactions and contests in African present, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 9-11 July 2009, 
p 4. 
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challenged the increasingly controversial, ambivalent and warlike Anglo-American nexus 
under Tony Blair and George Bush.65 The Bush-Blair nexus or “Atlantic emporium”, while 
presenting its project as the “arbiters of human rights,”66 was perceived to have had 
selectively embarked on an ambivalent agenda.  
Locally, Mugabeism was targeted against the opposition MDC that was characterised as 
a sell-out party and an extension of Western Imperialism. The MDC’s articulation of the 
human rights discourse in a language similar to that of NGOs and the West, which in 
more ways than one, seemed in favour of the propertied whites and against the ZANU-
PF mode of violent redistribution, brought this characterisation to bear. It then was 
linked with the regime change agenda of the Atlantic Emporium. In addition, the NCA, 
the MDC parent organisation, was funded by the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung,67 and the MDC 
was also supported financially by the large-scale white commercial farmers who were 
opposed to the ZANU-PF-sponsored land reform,68 as well as by foreign governments 
and aid agencies.69  
Together with articulating militarism and restructuring the state into a quasi-military 
one, Mugabeism also incorporated various repressive masculinities. Speaking in 2000, 
President Robert Mugabe, for example, called for “amadoda sibili” in cabinet to fight 
the Third Chimurenga.70 Primarily, amadoda sibili were characterised as those who were 
brave, those who were prepared to suffer and sacrifice the ultimate gift of their lives for 
the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. Horace Campbell states that this was generally part of 
ZANU-PF’s deformed masculinity, which led it to enter the DRC war, engage in violence 
in farm takeovers, and initiate virginity tests, among others.71 Interestingly, the 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Brian Raftopoulos, “Sanctions regime strengthens Mugabe’s hand”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, 15-
22 March 2012, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/international/34623-sanctions-regime-strengthens-
mugabes-hand.html, Accessed 20 March 2012. 
67 Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 206. 
68 Ibid, p 210. 
69 Ibid, p 218. 
70 President Robert Mugabe speaking in 2000, see Sabelo Ndlovu- Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 158. 
71 Horace Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation struggle, 
Africa World Press, Trenton, 2004, p 18. 
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participation in the DRC war also led to the refashioning of this brand of masculinity. 
This was by way of adapting the brutal war tactics employed against their opponents in 
the DRC war in the suppression of dissenting voices in Zimbabwe, where they “brutally” 
suppressed riots and the opposition and engaged in the “primitive accumulation” of 
wealth.72 According to Sachikonye, this occurred because the army began to perceive 
itself as a “part of the state establishment as well as part of a political hierarchy whose 
major qualification to rule was participation in the liberation struggle.”73  
Under these oppressive and repressive masculinities which demanded that the state 
leaders seek opportunities to demonstrate that they were amadoda sibili or “real 
men”74,   ZANU-PF embarked on pre- and post-election violence against the MDC 
structures. These attacks were meant to offer pre-emptive or intimidatory violence and 
witch-hunting or retributive violence,75 respectively. On the whole, these attacks were 
in the form of “land invasions, violence, virginity tests, aggressive homophobia, and 
denial of citizenship.”76 As a result, women, students, peasants, farmers, workers and 
generally opposition supporters were persecuted in an effort to re-establish the power 
base ZANU-PF had lost. This too speaks to Foucault’s discourse of power as a 
continuation of war by other means. In this regard, ZANU-PF sought force to reclaim lost 
ground by employing the military and quasi-military structures from around 2000, to 
stifle the rise of the MDC. The apogee of this was represented by the security chiefs’ 
announcement on the suitable presidents and ruling parties in 2002, 2008 and in 2011 
in which the army promised force if their preferred choices lost. 
 
 
                                                 
72 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, 
Jacana, Auckland Park, 2011, pp 22-23. 
73 Ibid, p 23. 
74 Horace Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe, p 18. 
75 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 19. 
76 Ibid, p 23. 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
MAPPING THE CRISIS, VIOLENCE AND GENDER  
The militarisation of the violence largely emerged out of a crisis that engulfed Zimbabwe 
following the February constitutional referendum in 2000.77 The crisis, however, had 
long term historical, political and structural underpinnings.78  It was precipitated 
because the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), in 
power since independence in 1980, faced a potential demise, prophesied by its loss in 
the constitutional referendum to a coalition of civic organisations fronted by the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), and the rise of a powerful opposition, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).79 The impending parliamentary, local 
government and Presidential elections, all within the next two years, compounded 
ZANU-PF’s precarious existence,80 threatening an ignominious end for ZANU-PF’s hold 
on the government. Indeed, the MDC won 57 of the 120 parliamentary seats, and made 
a strong showing in the Presidential election, where Tsvangirai got 40 percent of the 
vote to Mugabe’s 56 percent,81 and in the Council elections, albeit under adverse 
conditions. The harmonised elections in March 2008 nearly spelt this inauspicious end 
for ZANU-PF, which lost the parliamentary majority to the MDC, while its leader, 
President Mugabe lost the first round of the Presidential ballot. He was only able to 
reclaim office following the deeply disputed and bloody 27 June 2008 re-run. 
These political problems were exacerbated by an economic collapse that was triggered 
by the failures of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) from the mid-
1990s.82 The major side-effect of ESAP was deindustrialisation which led to massive job 
losses and a decline in living standards.83 It also led to reduced government-provided 
                                                 
77 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, p 201.  
78 Ibid, p 202. 
79 Ibid, p 203. 
80 See Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, p 74.  
81 See http://www.ascleiden.nl/library/webdossiers/Zimbabwe.aspx, Accessed 23 May 2012. 
82 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 219. 
83 See David Moore, “Zimbabwe’s triple crisis: Primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and 
democratisation in the age of neo-liberal globalisation”, in African Studies Quarterly, 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a2.htm, Accessed 19 May 2012. See also Brian Raftopoulos, Ibid, p 
14. See also Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, pp 27. 
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social services, diminishing student support, collapsing urban infrastructure, reduced 
wages and standards of living, increased state repression, and corruption.84 In the rural 
areas, ESAP also contributed significantly to a collapsing infrastructure, increased 
demand for land, and other resources by those who had been brought to the rural areas 
as they lost their urban employment.85  Politically ESAP contributed to the rise of the 
MDC. The ZCTU managed to drum up a huge urban and to a small extent rural support 
base, largely by articulating the widespread grievances caused by the ESAP to mobilise 
diverse interest groups. These challenges also provided the ZCTU with the opportunity 
to coordinate workers’ strike actions and stayaways, and link students and women’s 
struggles and strikes to ESAP. Importantly, the ZCTU forged a discursive link between 
these problems and moribund governance. Following this it played a crucial role in the 
formation of the NCA that campaigned for a new constitution, and more boldly, its 
leaders spearheaded the formation of the MDC.86   
The economic gloom was worsened by the awarding of gratuities to war veterans in 
1997, totalling about Z$ 4,5 billion, which triggered a 75 percent depreciation of the 
local currency on the “Black Friday”.87 In the long term, the loss of value of the local 
currency aggravated the rising the cost of living.88 The situation was further 
compounded by the involvement of Zimbabwe in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) war that bled the country of up to US$25 million dollars per month.89 In addition, 
                                                 
84 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 
eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, Weaver Press and Jacana, 
Harare and Auckland, 2009, p 189 &p 194. 
85 Ibid, p 189. 
86 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the crisis”, in David Harold-Barry, ed, 
Zimbabwe: the past is the future, Weaver Press, Harare, 2004, p 10. 
87 See David Moore, Ibid. See also, Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: Exhausted 
nationalism, neoliberalism and the search for social justice, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003, p 38, who put the 
percentage at 74. 
88 See Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, p 38. 
89 See Zachary Tambudzai, “Zimbabwe’s military expenditure, 1980-2003: A study from the comparative 
SADC perspective”, in Africana Bulletin, No 53, 2005, p 139, in 
www.wgsr.uw.edu.pl/pub/uploads/ab05/7Tambudzai.pdf, Accessed 20 May 2012.  
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recurrent droughts of the 1990s compounded the economic collapse, further worsening 
living standards.90 
Following the constitutional referendum, which was taken in ZANU-PF as an 
inauspicious event, a series of events began to unfold. Most of these bordered on the 
adoption of coercive mobilisation, intimidation, threats, and compulsive reallocation of 
resources. The first of these was that ZANU-PF blamed the defeat on “imperialist 
forces”, that is white farmers, the whites, the MDC, and other “enemies” of the state for 
the defeat.91 The other response was the ZANU-PF sponsored “spontaneous” farm 
invasions, generally called jambanja, led by war veterans and “land hungry” peasants.92 
These were later formalised under the nonetheless chaotic government sponsored 
FTLRP.93 Under the latter model, land acquisition was compulsory, and legislation to 
control it involved rush amendments to the Land Acquisition Act. Thus there were 
immediate and rush occupations, an unclear policy of compensation for farm 
developments, a partisan selection of beneficiaries, and the process was characterised 
by fever-pitch emotions.94 At another level, occupiers were at times removed and 
relocated to pave way for the “chefs” in government, ZANU-PF and the security 
service.95 The oxygen and currency of the land reform was violence and threats of 
violence, which enabled the “invaders” to takeover and sustain themselves on the 
                                                 
90 See Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, p 27. 
91 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe”, p 13. 
92 While it is still a hotly debated matter over who was actually behind the farm invasions, it is widely 
accepted that ZANU-PF planned the invasions, but projected the war veterans as leading the process 
while it provided them strategic and material support at times using state instruments. See interesting 
discussions in Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in 
Zimbabwe”. See also Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent 
politics, 1980-1987, Cambridge, University Press, Cambridge, 2003. 
93 See Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme, 2000-2002 (The Utete Report), p 30. 
94 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance: Tenure reform and visions of 
progress in Zimbabwe”, In Amanda Hammer, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s 
unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation in the context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 
2003, p246-247 and p 251. 
95Ibid, p 247. 
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farms. Simultaneously, similar violent-based methods were also employed by the 
farmers and farmworkers to retain and at times to reclaim their farms.96   
Over the years the coercive-inclined redistributive tactics were extended to non-
agricultural spheres, like industries and firms, as well as to urban and rural communities 
for the political profit of ZANU-PF.97 This was largely through the use of heavy-handed 
technology to disrupt workers, students and women activists’ demonstrations. 
Alongside the reorganisation of the judiciary, the period also saw the conversion of the 
state-controlled media into a hegemonic arm of the ruling party, which was employed 
to advance the politics of ZANU-PF and caricature the MDC especially its leader. Fear 
was entrenched into people’s hearts to the extent that they began to police themselves 
through the same media apparatus.98  
Specifically, these acts of actual and threatened violence were targeted against known 
or suspected MDC supporters, workers organised under the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU), women’s organisations, especially WOZA, the student union 
ZINASU, and NGOs working on human rights issues.99 These abuses, while continuous, 
were more concentrated around election times, especially towards the June 2000 
parliamentary elections, the February 2002 Presidential, and the 2008 harmonised 
elections. On the whole, besides the violence, the other facets of the crisis included “[…] 
steep declines in industrial and agricultural productivity; historic levels of hyperinflation; 
the informalisation of labour; the dollarization of economic transactions; displacements; 
and a critical erosion of livelihoods.”100 
However, to treat this violence as a completely discontinuous process would miss its 
long term influences and complexities.  A genealogy of the instrumentalisation of 
                                                 
96 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe”, in 
Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking 
land, the state and nation in the context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare,2003, p 170. 
97 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 218. 
98 See a similar argument in Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land growth and governance”, p 245. 
99 See Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, pp 19 and p 23.  
100 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The state in crisis”, p 202. See also, Zachary Tambudzai, “Zimbabwe’s military 
expenditure”, p 136. 
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violence for political ends from pre-colonial to post-colonial Zimbabwe has been 
established.101 Revisionist historians have also reimagined the Second Chimurenga 
violence as not only between the nationalists and the Rhodesian state, but as embracing 
intra-nationalist violence. To this extent, violence has been viewed as one of the main 
currencies for nationalist mobilisation between ZANU and ZAPU, to settle jealousies 
between supporters, to fight opponents within the movements, and generally to repress 
dissenting voices.102  
Following in the same trend, politically motivated violence in the service of ZANU-PF to 
“reclaim lost political ground”,103 has been extensively used in the post-colonial era. To 
begin with, it was used in the gukurahundi, 1982-1987, to subjugate if not annihilate 
ZAPU.104 In the 1990s, it was deployed against other opposition parties including the 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and Forum Party in the 1990s.105  It was also 
deployed against workers led by the ZCTU, students and even peasants.106 Externally, 
violence was also employed in the Mozambique civil war to safeguard the Beira corridor 
and simultaneously to prop up ZANU-PF’s ally, the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) threatened by South African sponsored RENAMO. The DRC war, 
1997 to 2003, was much more complex. As well as being a show case for ZANU-PF-
military complex and repressive masculinity, it was used to prop up an ally, Laurent 
                                                 
101 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist, manuscript, p 190. See also, Jocelyn Alexander, 
Joann Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory: One hundred years in the ‘Dark Forests ’of 
Matebeleland, James Currey: Oxford, Heinemann: Portsmouth, David Philip: Cape Town, Weaver Press: 
Harare, 2000, p 1. 
102 See Terence Ranger, ed, “Introduction to volume Two”, The historical dimensions of democracy and 
human rights in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, democracy and human rights, University of Zimbabwe 
Publications, 2001.  See also Norma Krieger, Zimbabwe’s guerilla war: peasant voices, and Josephine 
Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better or worse. 
103 Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 10. 
104 See Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn Mcgregor, “Democracy, development and political conflict: Rural 
institutions in Matebeleland North after independence”, in Terence Ranger, ed, Historical dimensions of 
human rights, vol 2, p 122. 
105 See John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the smokescreen: The politics behind the 1995 
General elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2000, for a detailed discussions. 
106 See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist? p 200. 
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Kabila.107 The same war was simultaneously a project for the “primitive accumulation” 
of wealth for the senior military- ZANU-PF cohort.108  
The purpose of this dissertation, which is centred on an in-depth study of Shurugwi, is to 
establish the context for, and connections between, the 2000-2008 violence with these 
other earlier moments of violence. Shurugwi district has suffered its own cycles of 
violence. As argued in Chapter Three, Shurugwi suffered numerous rounds and 
continuous threats of Ndebele raids in the pre-colonial era.109 Shurugwi also suffered 
the violence of British colonialism that led to land expropriations from the 1890s. 
Specifically this was from the Orders in Council of 1898 that extended “reserves” across 
the country.110 Importantly, the Orders in Council besides creating land shortages for 
the Africans, engineered structural inequalities and structural violence. This was 
compounded by the imposition of the policy of “centralisation” that Alvord piloted in 
the district. This exerted tremendous labour demands as well as a lot of physical land 
usage and social reordering in its desire to “improve African agriculture” through 
intensive farming based on crop rotation and the use of agricultural demonstrators.111  
Centralisation also involved the consolidation of all village crop lands into large arable 
blocs and the creation of communal village grazing areas. A row of houses separated the 
                                                 
107 See Zachary Tambudzai, “Zimbabwe’s military expenditure”, p 142. 
108 See Horace Campbell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of liberation 
struggle, Africa World Press, Trenton, 2004, p 18. See also Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its 
citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, Jacana, Auckland Park, 2011, pp 22-23. 
109 See JoAnn Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology: An historical study of 
woodland use in Shurugwi communal area, Zimbabwe”, Doctoral thesis, Loughborough University of 
Technology, September 1991, in https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/, Accessed 14 March 2012, p 78. See also, a 
discussion on Ndebele raids in neighbouring areas such as Chivi, in David N Beach, Zimbabwe before 1900, 
Mambo Press, Gweru, 1994, pp 57-58. 
110 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation: reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s land and 
war veterans debate” in Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Vol 9, No 1, May 2000, Accessed 1 March 
2011. 
111 See National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), Alvord, E.D, “The gospel of the plough or guided destiny”, 
Unpublished Autobiography of Emory D Alvord Unpublished 1950, cited in Eira Kremer, “A clash of 
economies”, p 91. See also Chapter Two of this thesis for an in-depth discussion of this policy and its 
ramifications for the people of the district of Shurugwi. 
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grazing lands from crop farms per village.112 Among the residents of Shurugwi, as in 
other communal areas where centralisation and its successor the Native Land 
Husbandry Act of 1951 were implemented, were perceived as attempts by the state to 
create “numerous petty rules and associated punishments.”113 Later, Shurugwi was 
engrossed in the violence of the anti-colonial struggle during the Second Chimurenga. 
Besides the Rhodesia state versus nationalist violence, violence also included intra-
nationalist conflicts between the two main nationalist movements, ZAPU and ZANU. 
Lastly, it was afflicted by the post-1999 militarised political violence.  
On the whole, however, I attempt a two-tier analysis of the new millennium violence in 
Shurugwi. First, the thesis analyses the violence as a part of this continuous trajectory 
with the other earlier moments, particularly the Second Chimurenga. I contend that the 
Second Chimurenga fertilised and nurtured, among the nationalists, the ideals of the 
repression of dissenting voices.114  In addition to the thread of intolerance, in the 2000-
2008 period there was also a revival of Second Chimurenga traits in the form of 
pungwes, bases, and a ZANU-PF language that depicted a country at war.115 In the same 
vein, the thesis contends that the there was a continuous thread in the skewed resource 
allocation, especially land, that had caused pre- and post-independence land invasions 
throughout the country which had a strong influence on entrenching structural 
inequalities and on producing structural violence.  
In the second tier, I try to look at the 2000-2008 violence as a discontinuous era distinct 
from other episodes. This is meant to enable a pithy study that disaggregates history 
into its specific and peculiar parts, and to contest the trope of the “inevitable-ness” of 
                                                 
112 See NAZ, Alvord, E.D, “The gospel of the plough or guided destiny”, Unpublished Autobiography of 
Emory D Alvord Unpublished 1950, cited in Eira Kremer, “A clash of economies”, p 91. 
113 See Wilson, cited in Michael Drinkwater, “Technical development and peasant impoverishment: Land 
use policy in Zimbabwe’s Midlands province” in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 15, no2, Special 
issue on the politics of conservation in Southern Africa, p 295, in http://www.jstor.org/stable2636804, 
Accessed 14 February 2011. 
114 See also a similar contention in Terence Ranger, ed, “Introduction to volume Two”, The historical 
dimensions of democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, democracy and human rights, 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2001, p 2. 
115 See chapter by Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”. 
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the resort to violence by ZANU-PF that the former teleological model proffers for the 
post-colonial period.   
Broadly, the major distinguishing features of the 2000-2008 violence have been 
intensity and extensiveness. In this regard, up to 1 000 people were murdered, and 
unlike the other episodes such as the gukurahundi, millions more witnessed it, spurred 
it on, or were victimised across Zimbabwe.116 In addition to this, as already highlighted, 
was the prominent role played by the military and semi-military bodies in the planning, 
fomenting, committing of the violence and in the abrogation of the political king 
maker’s role. This latter feature has led many to regard it as militarised violence. Faced 
with this evidence, the question that informs the thesis is: what was the impact of the 
militarisation of the state on the 2000-2008 violence? The contention of this thesis is 
that the militarisation of the state and government structures had a huge effect because 
it “normalised” coercion through extending the reach of military-inspired coercive 
tactics, repressive politics, as well as command-based economic management.  
The understanding of this violence has also split academics into two polar, totalising, 
grand narratives. These are based on the human rights approach and the school of 
thought that advances the positive attributes of the violence, and articulate it in 
redistributive and emancipatory terms. Sketchily, the redistributive paradigm argues 
that the violence was necessary to correct colonial inequalities in land and other forms 
of resource allocation.117 On the other hand, the human rights discourse contends that 
the violence was used in a repressive way that violated human and property rights.118  
Using empirical research from Shurugwi, the dissertation troubles this binary polarity. In 
sum, it avers that while both schools are illuminating and have laid important 
                                                 
116 See Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 87. 
117 See arguments by: Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Picador, New York, 2008, p 1; and 
Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe” in London Review of books, 04 December 2008. 
118 See for example: Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: 
Rethinking land, state and nation", p 1, Amanda Hammar, et al, eds; Zimbabwe’s unfinished business, 
Harare, 2003; Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe, 2009, p201; and Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 
60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, Jacana,  Auckland Park, 2011, p xviii. 
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 
foundations to imagine the violence and have laid the groundwork for further studies on 
violence, on their own, they nonetheless are rather simplistic as readings of the 
violence. Thus, as Hegel would perhaps say, both should be “respected” and 
simultaneously “despised.”119  I hope to respect and despise them through taking a long 
term perspective of the violence in Shurugwi. First, I analyse the impact of the collision 
of the genuine long term structural inequalities that produced structural violence that 
demanded redistribution. These were largely around skewed land and other resource 
ownership. In addition, I intend to address the short term political objectives of the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme, other indigenous modes and the military-style 
operations that resulted in serious human rights violations in producing the violence. 
The major focus will be to explain the impact of the collision of the long term and 
“genuine” with the conjunctural “politically-inclined” programmes from 2000. By doing 
this, I hope to proffer a more inclusive depiction, a sort of Homi Bhabha “third space”120 
of the violence, that in the language of Woodward, Hayes and Minkley, is one that “… 
recognise[s] … complexities and, as it were, other routes beyond binarisms.”121 
This thesis also tries to historicise the gender dimensions of the violence in Zimbabwe by 
looking at the debates on pre-colonial forms of African governance and the position of 
women. Added to this, I also intend to look at the importance of the Second 
Chimurenga in entrenching the oppression of, and violence against, women. This thread, 
I contend, continued into the post-independence conflict eras. On the whole, I intend to 
trouble the universalised and atemporal victimhood of women in Zimbabwe as set out 
in much of the western feminist discourse. Rather, I argue along the lines of emerging 
                                                 
119 See Hegel, cited in Theodor W Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965, edited by Rolf 
Tiedmann, Trans by Rodney Livingstone, Polity, 2006, p 93. 
120 See Homi Bhabha, cited in Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, “Introduction”, p xxx. 
121 See Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, eds, “Introduction”, Deep HiStories: gender 
and colonialism in Southern Africa, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, 2002, p xxv. 
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Africanist feminism and contend for a more temporally and spatially-based gendered 
femininities and masculinities.122 
 
THE CHOICE OF SHURUGWI  
Shurugwi district was selected for this research because, firstly, it was one of the eighty-
one constituencies that witnessed immense violence in the period 2000-2008.123 
Secondly, the district provided conditions for a historical analysis of the violence. It has 
an old communal area that faced a number of problems, including especially acute land 
problems124 that existed tendentiously alongside large tracts of land under commercial 
farms. In addition to this, the district also underwent a lot of violence ascribed to the 
reordering in terms of land ownership, in the 2000s.   
Related to this, political conditions in the district continued to be influenced by the 
strong emotions emanating from the conflicting legacies of the late heads of the 
Rhodesia Front government and armed forces, Ian Smith, and the late ZANLA supremo, 
Josiah Tongogara, who both hailed from the district. Thirdly, I was born, brought up, 
worked, and still live in the district. It was especially during my teaching days in 
Shurugwi rural district, between 2000 and 2003, that I witnessed some violence. This 
added to my interest to try to dig deeper to understand that violence, but from the 
perspective of women who, as shown in Chapters Three and Four, constituted not only 
the bulk of the residents, but also the bulk of the victims and perpetrators of, the 
violence. As such I combine personal interest, lived experience and research curiosity as 
a basis for my interest into the violence.  
                                                 
122 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body: Western theories and African subjects”, in Oyeronke 
Oyewumi, ed, African Gender Studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005. 
123 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth? Vol 
2, 2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 
2011, p 13.  
124 See Eira Kramer, “A clash of economies: early centralisation efforts in colonial Zimbabwe, 1929-1935”, 
in ZAMBEZIA, XXV, (i). 
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What also struck me was that despite witnessing so much violence, many human rights 
reports did not record much from Shurugwi. Instead they focused on Matebeleland and 
Mashonaland areas. Politically Matebeleland had a special appeal because it had 
witnessed the murderous gukurahundi in the 1980s, while rural Mashonaland’s shifting 
political allegiance from ZANU-PF to the MDC attracted their focus.  
As an insider, the above familiarity provided valuable background knowledge about 
situations, places and people which assisted in avoiding areas of trouble, both political 
and ethical. It thus helped me to define what Pete Shirlow’s calls the “spaces of fear”.125 
As Nils Zurawski says, “spaces of fear” are “spaces that hold a threat to life, or simply 
unsafe to go.”126 It also assisted me in overcoming potential problems related to the 
feasibility of carrying out the fieldwork, and accessing interviewees for such a sensitive 
topic. Under the dangerous conditions of incomplete political transition, and in an 
atmosphere of suspicion in the immediate aftermath of (and recurring violence), I could 
undertake the research as I “socially” interacted with friends and relatives without 
arousing unnecessary suspicion. Familiarity was also necessary for an intimate study of 
the violence that I sought to undertake. I was aware of what was acceptable and taboos 
in the district, which were very crucial for me as a man trying to research on the 
experiences of women in, around, the militarized political violence.  
 
ADMINISTRATION OF SHURUGWI DISTRICT 
Shurugwi (formerly Selukwe), district is one of the eight districts of the Midlands 
province. It is an old district that was settled before colonisation of Zimbabwe in the 19th 
century. Although there are controversies about who settled in the district earlier, it is 
generally accepted in oral accounts that Mabedzenge and his people were the first to 
                                                 
125 See Pete Shirlow, cited in Nils Zurawski, “I know where you live’- Aspects of watching, surveillance, and 
social control in a conflict zone (Northern Ireland)”, in Surveillance and society, 2 (4), p 502, in 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org, Accessed 28 May 2012. 
126 Nils Zurawski, Ibid, p 502. 
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settle when they migrated from Chivi in the south in the early 18th century. Mabedzenge 
later on invited his more powerful uncle, Nhema, to settle in the area and in time (he 
Nhema) established his supremacy over Mabedzenge.127 Currently the Mabedzenge 
house operates as one of the eight headmenships under Chief Nhema.  
Administratively, Shurugwi is divided into two: urban and rural. Of the two, the rural 
part is larger and spatially covers almost 98% of the district and a population of 69 954, 
with Shurugwi urban area consisting of the small Shurugwi town with a total population 
of 16 866 people.128 Shurugwi rural is administered by the Tongogara Rural District 
Council (TRDC) housed at Tongogara Growth Point. It is a district that is divided into 
twenty-four wards, with a councillor representing each ward.  
Following the 2008 elections, twenty wards were won by ZANU-PF and four by the MDC-
T. In terms of gender representation twelve wards have women councillors and another 
twelve have male councillors. An interesting aspect is that all the twelve female 
councillors are from ZANU-PF.  This in part stems from the ZANU-PF policy of setting 
aside certain wards for female candidates during its primary elections. Many of these 
wards were not contested by the MDC in the harmonised elections.129 However, there 
are some female candidates who won from non-female wards such as from wards 13, 
14, 16 and 19. 
The district is represented by two members of parliament who sit in the House of 
Assembly. These are equitably represented in terms of gender, with Shurugwi South 
having a female MP, and Shurugwi North a male MP. The Senator for the Upper House 
of Parliament, the Senate, is however a man. In terms of female representation at the 
political level, Shurugwi fares way above the other parts of the country. Generally, there 
                                                 
127 In addition to oral accounts gathered for this thesis, there is also cross-referencing with information 
from the Colonial records, see for example, NAZ, S2929/7/6, Delineation Reports General: Selukwe 
District. Although not directly related, but more in reference to the controversies around the start of the 
Nhema chieftaincy, see also Joann Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology”, p 98.   
128 Governement of Zimbabwe, CSO, 2002 Population Census. 
129 In some of these wards the MDC-T did not field candidates, either indicating its preoccupation with 
higher positions of MP and Senator in the district. It might also point to the fear by its supporters to take 
risks for such lowly positions. 
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is only an 18 percent female representation at the national level,130 despite women 
constituting 52 percent of the total population. 
In terms of traditional administration there are three chiefs namely Nhema, Ndanga and 
Banga. These are supported by twelve headmen namely Mabedzenge, Mupangayi, 
Mudzengi, Tinhira, Chiworise, Pisira, Nyahwa, Mazivisa, Mapendere, Makonese, 
Mhangami and Mupanduki. By 2011, there was only one headwoman for the Mudzengi 
house. The collateral system of assuming these positions is patriarchal and operates 
against women. In most cases women are excluded by tradition from the right to 
inheritance let alone the inheritance of leadership.  In this extended family succession 
system the positions are reserved for the “eldest sons” within this larger extended 
family. The fact that women are excluded from inheritance was underscored at the 
national level by the case heard at the Supreme Court in the case of Magaya versus 
Magaya, which upheld the notion that daughters come second in terms of inheriting the 
family estate.131  
Chiefs and headmen in Shurugwi, like their counter parts elsewhere in Zimbabwe, have 
amassed a lot of power and influence since the turn of the twenty-first century. Outside 
of their traditional roles they have acquired political roles in ZANU-PF, and have also 
been given the role of distributing relief food and inputs like ploughs, harrows and 
scotch carts.132 As already discussed above, women in the district seem to have found 
compensation in politics. However, this attainment has not emerged organically, as it 
were, but mainly derives from ZANU-PF party policy directives. 
What is striking from the discussion is the ambivalence between the political role of 
women as MPs and councillors on the one hand and their absence from the revitalised 
and increasingly powerful traditional authorities. The gender equality found in the 
                                                 
130 See COPAC, 29 July 2010, “Women - Raise your voices in the Constitution Outreach!”, in 
http://www.copac.org.zw/news/166-women-raise-your-voices-in-the-constitution-outreach.html, 
Accessed 26 June 2011.  
131 See Mail and Guardian, 10 June 1999. 
132 Based on an Interview with a headman. 
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political arena in Shurugwi is not matched clearly in the chiefly and headmen structures. 
Another ambiguity lies in the fact that ZANU-PF is a highly patriarchal organisation, but 
one seen here as seriously promoting gender equality. Its national top brass contains 
only one female as second vice secretary, and all the other positions of First Secretary, 
the other Second Secretary and Chairperson, that constitute the Presidium, are 
occupied by men.133 The District ZANU-PF hierarchy is also very patriarchal. Patriarchy, 
as noted by Lisa Gilman,  
produces gendering of power structures in which men fill a majority of 
leadership positions in local and foreign based institutions, relegating most 
women to subordinate roles. In some, such as political parties, the majority of 
women play roles of supporting and legitimating, at least symbolically, those in 
leadership positions.” 134 
 
MAIN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
In Shurugwi the mainstay economic is peasant agriculture done in communal areas. 
More than half of the district’s population depends on peasant agriculture. However, 
the district can also be broadly divided into four zones, that is, communal, resettlement, 
small scale and large scale farming areas. Wards 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 24 
make up the communal areas, while wards 1, 2, 6, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 23 are in 
resettlements. Small scale farms are found in wards 3, 4 and 22, and large scale farms 
are in wards 17 and 18. Thus on the whole agriculture, in its various forms, peasant, 
small scale farms, resettlement and large scale, constitutes the backbone for most 
livelihoods in Shurugwi.  
Recently the rural landscape has undergone serious transformation as witnessed by the 
establishment of semi-urban activities, especially mining, which has resulted in the 
                                                 
133 ZANU-PF uses socialist terminology and secretary is actually the leader of the party, thus Joyce Mujuru 
is the only lady in the top brass, which includes the First and Second Secretaries, Political Commissar, 
Secretary for administration and secretary for Legal Affairs. The only other top position for a woman is 
Secretary for Woman affairs. 
134 Lisa Gilman, The dance of politics: Gender, performance, and democratisation in Malawi, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 2009, p 16. 
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district benefitting from two major mining ventures by Unki Platinum and Todal 
Platinum. Besides altering the settlement patterns through resettling families from 
these mining sites, these major mining concerns have also transformed the economic 
worth of the district. Simultaneously, the political value of the district at the national 
level has also been enhanced because of these high value platinum mines. In fact, one 
of the big mines, TODAL that is being set up, is alleged to be owned by some top ZANU-
PF leaders.  
Another economic activity, albeit illegal, which has helped to sustain the district is gold 
panning. Gold panning gained prominence in the district around the early years of the 
new millennium as the economic situation of the country worsened. It was largely done 
around the Boterekwa Mountains and in the nearby Mutevekwi river although other 
pockets of gold panners could be found scattered across the breadth of the district. In 
March of 2000, there were reportedly about 15 000 gold panners around the Boterekwa 
Mountains.135 Many more thousands were located in other portions of the district. This 
was however, before the peak of the economic crunch and periods of acute food 
shortages in 2002-2003 and between 2006 and 2008 that produced more panners in the 
district as a result of the combination of droughts, economic crisis and political 
meltdown. There are also a lot of small-scale chrome mines in the district. These small 
scale miners operate open pit mines in their claim areas and sell the chrome ore to 
ZIMASCO or to some Chinese merchants who resell it abroad. 
 
THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN SHURUGWI 
According to the 2002 population census Shurugwi rural has a population of 71 573 
people. Of these 37 146 were females and 34 409 were males. Put differently, women 
and girls constitute 51.9% of the total population. However, these women are not a 
homogenous group, rather they are heterogeneous. In fact this diversity can be 
                                                 
135 See The Daily News, 1 March 2000, which says there were about 15000 gold panners around the 
Boterekwa escarpments. 
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explained according to location, occupation, social status, and educational levels, among 
others. Broadly, however, the majority are poor peasants from the communal areas,136 
who are generally vulnerable due to their low social status that is mediated by their 
patriarchal culture, which places them under their male spouses.137 While the women in 
Shurugwi do not lack political representation at the council level and at the national 
parliament, this has not yet been fully translated into tangible benefits because they still 
suffer from a general lack of land ownership rights, education, and are used as voters 
without many rights.  
There are other women found in other sectors, such as in commercial agriculture, where 
some work as farm workers or happen to be wives of farm workers. In addition, there 
are professional women especially in government service as teachers, nurses and 
agricultural extension workers. Of note is that there are fewer professional women than 
men even when there are more females in the district. This inverse relationship is amply 
demonstrated in the study by the National AIDS council (NAC), for example, which 
reveals that there are 566 female teachers in both primary and secondary schools out of 
a total of 1137 teachers, and in the health sector, out of a total of 82 workers, only 24 
were females.138  
                                                 
136 See Government of Zimbabwe, 2002 Population Census Preliminary Results. That there are eleven 
wards, nearly half the number of all wards, in the communal areas also testifies to this. 
137 The majority of the inhabitants are Shona of the Karanga dialect, and a minority are Ndebele found 
around Dlodlo School. Both sets are patriarchal. Robert Mugabe, p 71 best describes “traditional” Shona 
and Ndebele patriarchy, where men headed families, gave blood to the children and where married 
women were expected to change their surnames and their husbands’ praise names. See also Mickias 
Musiyiwa and Memory Chirere, “The nature of fatherhood and manhood in Zimbabwean texts of pre-
colonial and colonial settings” in Kizito Muchemwa and Robert Muponde, eds, Manning the Nation, p 156, 
who say that the colonial masters, the British, in addition to the Shona and Ndebele were patriarchal Also 
due to marriage, women are expected to move from the public domain into more domesticated spaces of 
the home. See Patricia Mcfadden “Democratising citizenship” for a more nuanced description of 
patriarchy and impact of the payment of lobola that sanctions marriage in Zimbabwe. In addition, other 
practices that negatively impact women are still common in the district for example polygamy, with both 
old practice of keeping more than one wives in the same homestead and the more modern concept of the 
small houses, prevalent. 
138 National AIDS Council, Tongogara District AIDS Action Committee, Second Quarter Report, April-June 
2005. 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 
The disparity in the professional employment should be seen in the unequal educational 
opportunities between boys and girls. As FAWEZI (Forum for African Women Educators 
Zimbabwe) reported in March 2000, there was a gender gap in education in Africa with 
about fifty two million children of school going age in Sub Saharan Africa not in school 
and out of these seventy percent were girls. The report goes on to say that the majority 
of women in Africa were illiterate, despite constituting the majority of the populations 
of their countries.139 Explaining the imbalances, the former Minister of Education in 
Zimbabwe, Gabriel Machinga, posited that this was as a result of unfavourable 
conditions for females at home, in the community and at school.140 
There are also twelve female councillors in the district, all from ZANU-PF. Eight of these 
benefitted from ZANU-PF setting aside their wards as female candidates’ wards. The 
other four, in wards 13, 14, 16 and 19, however, won against male opposition at the 
party primary elections. This equality in gender representation at the council level must 
not be misconstrued for a greater decision-making power for women. There is fifty 
percent representation for the women, but most of the duties of councillors have been 
transferred to the traditional leadership. The transfer of most basic political duties that 
used to be performed by councillors to the chiefs and headmen has helped to reduce 
the influence of councillors among the populace. In an interview with a female 
councillor, she lamented this transfer of duties to chiefs and headmen, which has left 
councillors as mere figure-heads. In her words,  
We councillors do not have much to do. Our work has been taken by chiefs and 
headmen. Chiefs and headmen have taken over the distribution of agricultural 
inputs, relief food and they are also better paid than us.141  
What cannot be denied, however, is that the fifty percent representation that the 
females have achieved is a very big leap from only three female councillors in the 
previous twenty- three member council.142 
                                                 
139 See The Daily News, 7 March 2000. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Interview with a female councillor, 23 May 2010. 
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The female councillors and other women leaders generally face stigmatisation, 
rejection, resentment and at times open hostility. In interviews with men, many 
expressed reservations about the councillors and the female MPs. They tended to 
question their fidelity. Most often they suggested that these women are of questionable 
morals.143 If not of loose morals, such females are thought of as “submissive, not very 
sharp, or otherwise weak”.144 A female professional based at Tongogara Growth point 
summarised best the concerns in the district:  
Women tend to change behaviour once in power and become freer and loose 
morally. The more they rise politically the looser they become. Some rise on the 
back of their association with powerful men. Politics is very close to prostitution. 
Sometimes politicians are required to attend meetings at night, and naturally 
husbands do not like it.145 
In my view this questioning of the morals of women and setting decorum for them in 
politics at times has more to do with men feeling challenged in “their domain,”146 and 
the naturalisation of the patriarchal notion that ascribes political leadership to men and 
passivity to women. At another level, Zimbabwean politics, dating back to the liberation 
struggle, has been an arena that has been dominated by men. This is notwithstanding 
the strenuous attempts by women to use nationalist politics to escape various 
entrapments linked to “culture” that sought their domestication.147 Still however, men 
strive to keep their women domesticated and themselves in the frontline positions, 
albeit in the face of constitutional amendments that have theoretically sought the 
amelioration of the position of women in the post-colonial Zimbabwean setup. This 
                                                                                                                                                 
142 See National AIDS Council, Tongogara DAAC, Second Quarter Report, April- June 2005,  p 23. 
143 My findings were that very few of the councillors were married. Some were widows, while others were 
divorced or single parents. The female MP was also not married, which seemed to affirm the notion that 
politics is not for married women. 
144 See Gisela Giesler, “troubled sisterhood”, p 571. 
145 Interview at Tongogara Growth Point, 22 April 2010. 
146 See for example, Kwanele Ona Jirira, “Gender, politics and democracy” in Patricia Mcfadden, ed, 
Gender, Politics and Democracy, SAFERE, Volume 1, no2, 1995, p 3, who avers that politics is seen by men 
as public space and therefore a male space, which seeks to entrench the “dominant male” and 
“subordinate female”. 
147 See compelling arguments by Norma Krieger, Zimbabwe’s guerilla war: peasant voices; and Josephine 
Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better or worse, for pithy enunciations of this ambivalence, especially during 
the Second Chimurenga. 
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perception is akin to the Foucauldian notion of regimes of truth,148 and sometimes to 
what Hobsbawm has called “invented traditions”.149 Regimes of truth are powerful 
discourses about events or belief systems that are made to function as the basis of 
relations and which in time become part of the “social truth” that is widely accepted as 
part of customs and are also taken as primordial. In terms of regimes of truth, I 
established that in Shurugwi, married women with  husbands and “steady” families 
were not expected to be vying for political leadership positions, and those who were in 
politics were not positively evaluated by both men and women hence were called 
different names. 
In Shurugwi the fact that there is only one female in the fifteen traditional leadership 
houses helps to support these “cultural” arguments that women should remain 
domesticated in the home. As a result few women even participate in leadership roles in 
the traditional courts of chiefs and headmen set up to adjudicate issues. This represents 
masculinised traditions that are aimed at keeping women under the control of men. 
Through politics, albeit aided by male politicians and in lowly councillor roles, women 
are able to challenge and confront these norms. However, even in the political arena 
women still suffer prejudices. The words by the late Vice President Dr Joshua Nkomo, 
best encapsulate these and the general male societal feeling. He said:  
What again is the role of women in the party? The role is to fulfil the objectives 
of the Party through the Women’s League, but the Party would like women to 
take their role as mothers seriously because mothers have an important 
responsibility of moulding characters of children from birth […]. The Party 
                                                 
148 Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, p131, cited in Kwanele Ona 
Jirira, “Gender, politics and democracy”, p 3, to refer to discourses that are disseminated and made to 
work as “social truth” especially to serve a particular purpose. 
149 See Eric Hobsbawm, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The invention of tradition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p1, who among other things defines inventing traditions as “a set of 
practices […] of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour 
by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.” 
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therefore expects mothers to inculcate those values which are constructive and 
will strengthen the nation because children are the leaders of tomorrow.150 
It would not be very wrong to say therefore that women are supposed to play a 
subordinate role in politics akin to their “submissive” role in the home.151 Many were to 
be restricted to the home while being called upon to legitimise men during election 
times as voters. What is more is that such pronouncements feed into what Dale Spender 
terms “man-made language”, which among other things normalises inequalities, 
domestication, discrimination and abuse of women.152 The words are also informed by 
the gendering of spaces in Western societies where politics, a public space phenomenon 
is constituted as a male sphere, while “domesticity, caring and the body” that make the 
private arena, are a preserve of females.153  
The dissertation builds on the impact of the inequalities between the sexes in 
understanding the impact of the home and social disparities on the political. Broadly, I 
argue that the inequalities that lead to the domestication of women contributed 
significantly to the exposure of women to political violence. Because men were free and 
not tied to the home, they left during times of crucial political and economic crisis, 
leaving women to fill the political void. In the process of assuming these manly duties, 
women then began take over roles that would cause them to be victimised or to cause 
the extension of the process of the victimisation of other women or even men. 
 
                                                 
150 Joshua Nkomo speaking at the ZANU-PF 1994 Women’s League conference cited in Kwanele Ona Jirira, 
“Gender, politics and democracy”, pp 12-13. Although made at a ZANU-PF women’s congress, these 
words can be extended to most men in Zimbabwe on their perception of women. 
151 See Gisela Giesler, “Troubled sisterhood: Women and politics in Southern Africa: Case studies from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, in African Affairs, vol 94, No 377, October 1995, p 547. 
152 See Dale Spender, Man Made Language, cited in Robert Morell, “Silence, sexuality and HIV in South 
African Schools”, in The Australian Educational Researcher, Vol 30, No1, April 2003, cited in 
http://www.aare.edu.au/aer/online/30010e.pdf, accessed 28 February 2011. See also Nancy Duncan, 
cited in Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, “Introduction”, p xxii, who says that this 
“spatial restructuring practices … [have been used to] … construct, control, discipline, confine, exclude 
and suppress gender and sexual difference” for the purpose of maintaining “traditional patriarchal and 
heterosexist power structures.”  
153 Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, “Introduction”, p xxii. 
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Methodology 
The cornerstone for this research are oral testimonies provided by the rural women of 
Shurugwi, as well as interviews with politicians from ZANU-PF and the MDC, coupled 
with some NGO personnel who had worked in the district, that were gathered over a 
total period of eleven months.  These interviews were carried out between December 
2009 and July 2010; in December 2011, and during repeat visits from mid-January to 
mid-February 2012. I sought to prioritize the first-hand accounts by the rural women 
whose personal experiences and encounters with violence inform the direction of the 
thesis. By using these oral testimonials, I hoped to disrupt the invisibility of women and 
a general reticence around the occurrence of violence in Shurugwi.  As Alexander, 
Mcgregor and Ranger would say, this silence contributes to “a profound sense of 
exclusion from national memory.”154 This silence is even worse regarding the rural 
women therein. 
While acknowledging the areas of weaknesses of oral history, such as the dynamism of 
memory which sometimes results in empirical inaccuracy about specific events in favour 
of “psychological truth”, the researcher believes this method enables the voice of the 
women to be heard.155 Oral accounts have also been successfully used in bringing out 
state atrocities during the Gukurahundi massacres in Zimbabwe.156 In adopting oral 
testimonies, l am also in agreement with what Bukenya (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni) says, 
                                                 
154 Jocelyn Alexander, Joann Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory, p 1. 
155 I hope to use oral traditions positively and in a manner as explained by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
“Giving Africa voice within global governance: oral history, human rights and the United Nations (UN) 
Human Rights Council”, Unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Human Rights 
and Social Justice: Setting the Agenda for the United Nations Human Rights Council, 23-25 February 2007, 
University of Winnipeg, Canada, who says by deploying oral traditions in strategic-instrumentalist terms, 
they can be emancipating for the oppressed by affording them the opportunity to relate their experiences 
that are usually part of “hidden histories” and are shrouded in “secrecy” (p 12) and also that they provide 
“one of the few democratic ways” to capture the subaltern voices who do not have an archive (p 15). I 
also believe oral traditions can be a credible source of history by borrowing from Jan Vansina, Oral 
Tradition: A study in Historical methodology, University of Wisconsin press, Madison, 1965. 
156 See the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Rights Foundation (LRF), 
Breaking the silence, Building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands 
1980-1988, CCJP and LRF, Harare, 1995. 
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that oral histories and traditions when carefully used can help to overcome 
marginalization and voicelessness.157  
By using the questioning technique, further probing, repeat visits where possible, and 
gaining the confidence of the interviewees, the researcher attempted to go beyond the 
surface of bias, deliberate untruths, and unconscious half-truths. After establishing 
strong rapport and having gained the confidence of some respondents, I was led to 
other women victims of the violence. This however did not mean an automatic access to 
their testimonies. At times some would refuse flatly to share these, while for others, 
they only told me in bits and pieces as they also gathered confidence in my research. 
Repeat visits were also made to major centres and many social gatherings and 
ceremonies, and social sites where it was easy to chat with people without raising too 
much suspicion.  
However, the strategy for me was to engage in many interviews and informal 
discussions, sixty in all, with women, and twenty others with other actors, that is, with 
the local political, NGO, and traditional officials to enable a wider set of discourses to 
emerge, for the purposes of critical analysis. From them, I particularly recorded common 
names, patterns and structures that were repeated by the respondents in the 
commission of the violence. This also helped to sift through the testimonies. Commonly 
repeated stories, names and patterns were taken as more credible, while less common 
ones were put through thorough scrutiny to check their validity.  In addition, I also 
contested these testimonies against each other and cross-checked them, which enabled 
me to drop unsupported ones, and to merit others as credible. 
However, I also appreciate the controversies around attempts to give a “voice” to 
women, including the colonial othering and recovery debate, the debate around the 
gendering of voice and silence as male and female preserves respectively, as well as the 
                                                 
157 A. Bukenya, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Giving Africa voice within global governance”. 
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debate around the superiority of voice over silence.158 The dissertation took notice of 
the tensions around whether “subalterns can speak”, as ably discussed by Gayatri 
Spivak,159 or whether this would not only result in the “invisible” merely being “much 
more seen than heard.”160 On the whole, as Woodward, et al posit, I do not take the 
categories of silence versus voice or visible against invisible as given, but as fluid, 
unstable, and needing problematisation.161 Still, I followed in the mode employed in 
ways that erudite works such as Terence Ranger’s, Peasant Consciousness and guerilla 
warfare; and Norma Kriger’s Zimbabwe’s guerilla war: peasant voices achieved with 
some success for Makoni and Mutoko districts, respectively, in their “recoveries” of the 
“hidden histories ‘from below.’”162 
Heeding the call, so to say, by Scott Straus, for detailed “micro-level, social scientific 
investigation[s]”163  and following on Ranger’s and Kriger’s suggestive genealogical 
framework, I adopted a local area study of violence in Shurugwi district. Through this 
ethnography, I hoped to get an in-depth understanding of the violence, especially at 
personal and village levels, as well as how it descended into the ordinary everyday 
sphere.164 This augments and at the same time troubles, the human rights reports that, 
while offering useful insights into human rights abuses on a larger scale, tend to offer 
generalisations of the violence, and are policy-oriented. As Shari Eppel has pointed out,                                                                           
[h]uman rights reports are not intended to document history as it unfolds in all 
its nuanced realities, but to be the sledgehammer that may change world 
opinion, that may make it easier for refugees abroad to get asylum, that will give 
a voice to the voiceless and raise funds for medical and legal aid for those at the 
                                                 
158 For a summation of these controversies, see Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, 
“Introduction”, especially pp xxi-xxv. 
159 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the subaltern speak?” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds, Marxism and 
the interpretation of culture, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1988, pp 271-313, especially p 287. 
160 See Wallace, cited in Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, “Introduction”, p xxiv 
161 Ibid, p xxxii. 
162 Ibid, p xxvi. 
163 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, 2006, p 40, in Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “A space for genocide: Local Authorities, local 
population and local histories in Gishamvu and Kibayi (Rwanda), Unpublished PhD dissertation, University 
of the Western Cape, September 2010, p 13. 
164 I borrow the phrase from Veena daas, Life and words. 
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receiving end of state violence, and that will keep the record that may one day 
contribute to redress and prosecution or compensation.165 
I wanted to get the dynamic nuances of the violence as it was extended over time, and 
played out at the lowest levels. Towards 2008, the violence became rather 
decentralized, intimate, and involved close relations: the extended family, neighbours, 
villagers and workmates. I sought to examine these in greater detail, because the how 
with which this violence was played out helped me to explain why it happened that way. 
I also wanted to get the intricacies around the blurring of people’s innocence and guilt. 
This enabled me to understand the complexities of the violence. Some of these 
complexities I examine include inter alia, how political violence affected social violence, 
(domestic and family violence) and social relations; the role of local economic 
inequalities; the impact of the local on the national, and vice versa at the local level. As 
explored in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, while the planning and coordination lay with 
the centre (in Harare), the execution of the violence was mediated by local conditions 
and relations, which determined the targets, direction, depth and unevenness of the 
violence.  
By extension, I also wanted to understand the perceptions of justice at these lowest 
levels, which I suspected differed from the normative of statist Western notion of 
justice, which is retributive compared to the traditional conceptions of restoration that 
is central for the communal relations in the district. This led me to explore the possibility 
of the adoption of a TJ based on the concept of kuripa ngozi.   
Largely because the nature of the research was rather sensitive, and the politics of fear, 
intimidation, and suspicion were omnipresent throughout the fieldwork, face-to-face 
interviews were preferred to alternatives such as questionnaires or telephone-based 
interviews. The dangerous atmosphere coerced me to do the research surreptitiously, 
to do a rather random sampling of the informants and most of the time to engage in 
more informal discussions rather than formal interviews. This was however done with 
                                                 
165 Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates”, p 1. 
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the view to incorporate narratives from across the district especially by women 
respondents. In some cases, however, I visited already known victims, in their homes or 
at social gatherings or gathering places. The first move was to gain their trust by 
engaging them in unrelated conversations, slowly introducing general political issues. 
When the respondents were led into deeper political issues we would then introduce 
questions related to the past violence. To avoid raising unnecessary fears and 
suspicions, research equipment such as tape recorders and notebooks were not used in 
the direct interviews. Immediately after the discussions I would record the notes of the 
major issues and key names raised.  
Besides oral accounts, written sources were also used intensively and extensively to 
engage with the controversies around the subject. These sources were crucial in the 
verification and cross-referencing of statistics, dates and for comparing events in other 
parts of the country with what obtained in Shurugwi. In addition, they were also 
important in providing connections between the violence in Shurugwi to the national 
violence from which the district level violence was derived. They also help in the 
validation of or comparison with, the oral stories which form the foundation for this 
work. In addition alternative professional and or independent research opinions were 
obtained from written sources, which helped to unlock complex sets of events that were 
encountered.  
While the dissertation is informed by the desire to produce a historical account, it is also 
situated at the intersections with ethnography and anthropology disciplines. As 
Hamilton suggests, “these disciplines” together with history and linguistics, “provide the 
essential background against which oral history can be re-evaluated.”166 And, “in such 
hands”167 “oral history certainly can be a means for transforming both the content and 
purpose of history”.168  
                                                 
166 CA Hamilton, “The study of Southern African pre-colonial history: ‘Bantustan propaganda’”?, p 7, in 
www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/remay82.6/remay82.6.pdf, Accessed 03 June 2012.  
167 Ibid. 
168 See P Thompson, in CA Hamilton, Ibid. 
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CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In order to do justice to the complexities of the past ten years, Chapter One focusses on 
the discussion of the relevance of theories of violence to the Zimbabwean case. Chapter 
Two looks at the peculiar historical conditions that contributed to violence in Shurugwi 
district. The Third chapter foregrounds the narratives of the rural women of Shurugwi in 
the reconstruction of meaning of the 2000-2008 violence. Chapter Four discusses the 
distribution of political power and how this enabled the agency by the women of 
Shurugwi. The Fifth chapter addresses the conditions in the “post-violence” era 
between 20009 and 2011. It broadly argues that whilst the GNU interregnum brought 
political and economic changes these are not adequate to prevent a recurrence of 
another bout of violence. To conclude, Chapter Six proposes the adoption of a 
“traditional” transitional justice mechanism of kuripa ngozi to end the cycles of violence 
and impunity by making individual perpetrators responsible for restitution to their 
victims for violations and losses.  
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CHAPTER ONE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 2000-2008 
VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE.1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This chapter begins by looking at the theories of violence. It focusses primarily on the 
two theories moulded first around the abuse of human rights and second on 
redistribution which have been used in many accounts in the (re)construction of 
violence in Zimbabwe. More than this, these two paradigms have provided the poles, 
especially concerning the methodology for the redistribution of land and other 
resources as well as the timing to implement this, around which the debates on the 
crisis have coalesced.  
The chapter also concerns itself with the debates on the relationship between the 
victimisation of women and gender. First, this emanates from the assumption that I held 
at the start of the research that women were the invisible victims of the 2000-2008 
violence. There were many human rights reports that portrayed women as such. 
However, as I will explore more in Chapter Four, their relationship with violence is much 
more complicated and was much more differentiated. Second, gender and violence 
discussions are not mutually separable. The conventional Western feminist theory that 
has historically dominated has universalised femininity with the victimhood of women. 
There is, however, a new set of African literature that is emerging and is challenging this 
conventional Western feminist discourse. Instead, this later school emphasises local 
situations and conditions in its analysis.  
Broadly, by looking at the different historical epochs that are profound in fashioning my 
discussion, the pre-colonial and the Second Chimurenga eras, and the intellectual 
reformulation from the emergent Africanist feminist theory, I argue that femininity 
transcended biological sexualities. Importantly, along the formulation of Africanist 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to Professor Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni for his stimulating suggestions and for opening me 
up to take this as the starting point for my thesis and for availing his manuscript of Do Zimbabweans 
exist? 
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feminist construction, women’s victimisation and victimhood are contextual, temporal 
and spatial, and cannot be taken as the historical-universal descriptions of Shona-
speaking women in Zimbabwe (and Shurugwi).  
 
VIOLENCE AS A PRODUCT OF STRUCTURE 
A very common way to look at violence has been to see it as a product of structure. 
Generally this discourse sees violence as rooted in politico-historical terms of 
inequalities found in national and international political, social and economic structural 
relations. One can moreover say that this discourse deploys at its centre the Marxist 
economic model of power in the maintenance of class distinctions and oppression found 
in the “forces of production.”2  
Slavoj Zizek, a key theoretician of this discourse, conceptualises violence as taking three 
basic forms. These are subjective violence and the two forms of objective violence, that 
is, symbolic and systematic violence.3 He describes subjective violence as that which is 
visible, for example crime and terror, while symbolic violence is rooted in language and 
its forms like racism, hate speech and discrimination. Systematic violence is found in the 
economic and political systems of the world.4 Most importantly, he posits that there is a 
link between subjective and objective violence. To him, what may be perceived as 
irrational (subjective) violence could be rooted in the objective forms of violence which 
are not easily decipherable. For him, systematic violence operates like “a notorious 
‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all too visible subjective violence.”5 Thus, 
systematic violence underwrites subjective violence. As such, even when systematic 
violence cannot be easily deciphered, it should be assumed and taken into account in 
order for subjective violence to make sense. 
                                                 
2 See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pp 88-89. 
3 Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Picador, New York, 2008, p 1. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, p 2. 
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Crucially, Zizek finds a direct correlation between capitalism and objective violence. 
While capitalism may not have initiated systematic violence, it has worsened it and has 
given it a new meaning, impetus and direction. Citing Karl Marx, Zizek theorises that 
capitalism is exploitative and feeds like a “parasite” on humans and the environment, 
which has overhauled relations between workers and the owners of capital.6 He 
continues to say that global capitalism was responsible for the 16th century deaths in 
Mexico, and the 20th century massive deaths in the Belgian Congo. For him this was due 
to “an ‘objective’ process, which nobody planned and executed and for which there was 
no ‘capitalist manifesto’”7 In total, Zizek argues that capitalism through worsening the 
exploitation of workers and other resources, has widened inequalities and injustices. 
However, “inequalities, exploitation and injustice” of capitalism are “naturalised” and 
“hidden” as reflective of cultural differences.8 Consequently, it has given a new and 
extended meaning to objective violence. 
For Zimbabwe, Moyo and Yeros similarly see the 2000 to 2008 violence as having roots 
in the capitalist structures that were introduced with the colonisation of the country and 
perpetuated under neo-colonialism that led to racialised class exploitation.9 This 
engendered structural violence. To them, this violence cannot end unless neo-
colonialism itself is eradicated. Besides the racialised capitalist structure introduced 
during the colonial period, they likewise perceive the class structure emanating from the 
former liberation movements of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU as having contributed to the 
post-independence violence in the country. For them, the violence in the 1980s 
gukurahundi massacre, for example, was rooted in the “petty-bourgeoisie ethnic 
divisions in PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF.”10 They also maintain that the 1990s attacks on the 
students, workers and the peasants were ZANU-PF bourgeois violence in defence of the 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p 12. 
7 Ibid, p 14. 
8 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist? p 193. 
9 Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe and the dilemma of the Left”, p 12, argues that in order to rid the violence, it is 
also necessary to rid the country of the neo-colonial hangover.  
10 Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Intervention: The Zimbabwe question and the two lefts” in Historical 
Materialism, 15, 2007, p 199. 
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failing Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) were class-based.11 They also 
see the post 2003 violence in a similar way, where the bourgeoisie in ZANU-PF began to 
launch “quick-fix, military-style operations” against both the urban and rural dwellers.12   
Whilst we may agree with them on the long term structural underpinnings of capitalism 
on the Zimbabwean violence, they seem to take away the central political agency of 
ZANU-PF lower level structures in fanning the violence of the beginning of the third 
millennium. ZANU-PF was on a knife edge, where it was faced with its biggest political 
threat in the form of the MDC. Because of this, and in order to “reclaim lost political 
ground”,13 it “democratised” the technology of violence to ensure its survival. In 
addition, Moyo and Yeros deliberately omit to discuss the human rights and governance 
dimensions of the 2000-2008 violence on the society. In fact they are very clear that 
they do not wish to do so.14 
 
EMANCIPATORY VIOLENCE 
Following in the thread of the structural inequalities and attendant injustices introduced 
by the twin processes of colonialism and capitalism we find an emancipatory discourse 
that valorises violence as vital in contributing to the freedom of the oppressed classes or 
races. A deeper analysis of this discourse reveals that violence is perceived in some 
                                                 
11 See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist? p 200. 
12 See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe ten years on”, and Zeff Sithole, “Is the military taking over?” 
in www.afrika.no/Detailed/12358.html for a detailed discussion of the different military style operations 
between 2003 and 2008. 
13 Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos,“Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 10. 
14 Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe ten years on”, state that the suspension of the rule of law was a 
necessary prerequisite to the attainment of fuller democracy in the country.  They say that  
“The issue of democracy is intrinsic to both the agrarian and national questions; one issue can only be 
enhanced by the other’s advance. Let us recall that in Zimbabwe democracy itself was an historical 
conquest against settler colonialism. But this democracy fell far short of attending to the historical 
demands of social justice; instead, the newly independent state began to defend privilege in the name of 
rights and to criminalise demands for justice through the rule of law. Thus when the deep antagonisms of 
this society escalated, civic organisations and ordinary citizens were faced with a confounding dilemma; 
either to tolerate the suspension of the rule of law and go for a historic breakthrough; or defend the rule 
of law and defend perpetual inequalities and backwardness.” 
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sense as necessary and unavoidable to the process of change. This borrows and 
strengthens the Marxian contention on the integral part that violence plays in any 
transformation. As Marx puts it violence is “the midwife of every old society pregnant 
with a new one,” and violence is the midwife of “all change in history and politics.”15 
Franz Fanon, who may be regarded as the prophet of revolutionary African nationalist 
violence from the 1960s against European imperialism, together with Jean-Paul Sartre, 
in The Wretched of the earth, glorifies the necessity and emancipatory power of 
violence.16 Their starting point is that colonialism and its antithesis, decolonisation, were 
violent processes. The process of colonisation depended on violence. In the same way 
violence was required in the decolonisation process. As such, as Sartre says, 
No gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy 
them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler 
through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost 
innocence and he comes to know himself in that he creates his self. Far removed 
from his war, we consider it as a triumph of barbarism; but of its volition it 
achieves, slowly but surely, the emancipation of the rebel for bit by bit it 
destroys in him and around him the colonial gloom.17 
What is crucial is that the violence by the natives achieves independence for them as 
well as a reassertion of their humanly status. As Fanon puts it, “the ‘thing’ which had 
been colonised becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself”18, a 
violent process described by Sartre as killing two birds with one stone, that leaves a 
dead European and a free man.19 Furthermore, as Fanon says, by decolonisation the 
biblical adage of “the last shall be first, and the first last”,20 will be achieved. 
                                                 
15See Karl Marx, quoted in John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Law and disorder in the postcolony: an 
Introduction”, in Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, eds, Law and disorder in the postcolony, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2006, p 2. 
16 See Franz Fanon, The wretched of the earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963, and Jean-Paul Sartre 
“Preface” to the same book. 
17 Ibid, p 21. 
18 Ibid, p 37. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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In his further valorisation of violence, Fanon argues for the unifying role of violence for 
the oppressed. In his words “violence is in action all inclusive and national. It follows 
that it is closely involved in the liquidation of regionalism and of tribalism [….] Caids and 
the customary chiefs”21, which are impediments towards the unity of the locals. The 
unity achieved will bring together especially the peasants, who constitute the 
“revolutionary class”, and the lumpenproletariat, who will provide the “urban 
spearhead” or leadership of the violence.22 In a nutshell, he avers that through engaging 
in this violence people lose their individuality for a group and national cause and begin 
to form parts of a greater chain. As a result it is “in and through violence” that the 
colonised and oppressed will find their freedom.23 
Related in some sense to this, Dipesh Charkrabarty, an Indian post-colonial scholar says 
that violence provided “the undemocratic foundations of ‘democracy’” in the modern 
world.24 He gives the example of the developments in the medical field in India that 
relied on physical force where research was done on prisoners. He also cites the forced 
immunisations in the 1970s to eradicate smallpox in rural India.25 For him the successes 
of the campaigns in acquiring new drugs through the forced tests on the prisoners and 
the eradication of smallpox in the rural areas means that violence was a blessing in 
disguise. 
Zizek too discusses the necessity for revolutionary violence, which he terms divine 
violence. Divine violence deals with independence, where the killing is beyond personal 
hatred, crime, and religion.26 From the above, divine violence, besides being 
emancipatory, is also necessary, legitimate and morally justified. To him, the 1792-94 
Jacobin Revolutionary terror  in France and the 1990s Rio de Janeiro mobs from the 
                                                 
21 Ibid, p 94. 
22 Ibid, p 129. 
23 Ibid, p 57. 
24 See Dipesh Charkrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000, p 44. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, p 198. 
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favelas who stormed the supermarkets in the rich sections of the city, exemplify divine 
violence.  
The notion that violence has a liberating role cannot be underestimated in Zimbabwe. 
This is the discourse around which ZANU-PF has constructed its metanarrative. As 
already mentioned, the farm takeovers were construed as part of the Third Chimurenga. 
Drawing on its role in the Second Chimurenga, it construed itself as a vanguard against 
Western imperialism led by Britain and the United States of America, and their “local 
face”, the MDC in redistributing land and other resources to the blacks. In line with this, 
its history has been construed as representing the history of struggle against these 
forces. Tying its participation in the Second Chimurenga to the biography of the 
independence struggle, it has privileged its role in the Second Chimurenga from which it 
also claims its legacy to continue to rule.  
The official history of the country is likewise written in masculine terms of the 
continuum of struggles, set in a teleology from the First Chimurenga, through the 
Second Chimurenga to the Third Chimurenga.27 Ngwabi Bhebe sums up this view 
succinctly. Linking the Second Chimurenga to the first, he wrote that it was “the 
culmination of a long process dating as far back as 1893 and which over the years had 
developed through various distinct stages.”28 Crucially, ZANU-PF is portrayed as heir to 
this tradition, and hence as eternal heir to the throne. In a similar notion that Gerald 
Mazarire has soundly challenged, the history of pre-colonial Zimbabwe has been 
imagined in the masculinity of war as the sequence of the rise and fall of empires; 
running from the Great Zimbabwe, to the Mutapa, to the Rozvi and finally the Ndebele. 
According to Mazarire, this was a part of an Africa-wide construction of history to serve 
African nationalism. The tendency was to appropriate a version of history to link and 
                                                 
27 See Terence Ranger, “Historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the struggle of the 
past in Zimbabwe” in http://cas1.elis.rug.ac,  accessed 12 May 2009, on the impact of patriotic history, 
and how he tries to separate it from Nationalist historiography, which also valorised violent African 
resistance to European settler colonialism in Zimbabwe. 
28 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU AND ZANU guerrilla warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1999, p 10.  
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enhance the position of nationalists as heirs of the great traditions.29 He also argues that 
ZANU-PF’s resort to “assertions of sovereignty, reclamation, restitution, the return to 
tradition, and even anti-imperialism” in the post-1999 era was part of the general 
essentialisation of the pre-colonial past.30 It is widely accepted in this regard that 
Terence Ranger’s Revolt in Southern Rhodesia marked the start of such a genealogy in 
Zimbabwe’s African nationalism.31  
In this discourse of the rise and fall of states there is an unambiguous central role of war 
and the heroism of the different pre-colonial avatars from which ZANU-PF draws a 
legacy. A connection was also made between ZANU-PF and the three zvimurenga, that is 
the First, Second and Third. This was illustrated in songs and speeches that were 
broadcast on state media: the Zimbabwe Television (ZTV), and four state radio stations, 
and was correspondingly printed as advertisements in newspapers. Some of these 
portrayals depicted how ZANU-PF had acquired “degrees” in the field of violence32 and 
how the violence was necessary to deliver economic independence under the Third 
Chimurenga. Through these advertisements and jingles ZANU-PF’s “heroic” deeds and 
graphic war illustrations from the Second Chimurenga were literally forced on the 
population at regular intervals. In a way, this provided an important means of 
disseminating a hegemonic ZANU-PF discourse, in the Gramscian sense,33 on the 
population, many of whom did not have an alternative media to the state media, 
especially in the rural areas and amongst the majority in the townships.  
                                                 
29 See Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, “Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe, c.850-1880s”, in Brian 
Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, 
Weaver and Jacana, Harare and Auckland Park, 2009, p 1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See the emergency and development of this genealogy in Brian Raftopoulos, “Problematising 
nationalism in Zimbabwe: A historical review”, Zambezia, Vol 26, No 2, 1999, pp 115-134. 
32 The decade from 2000 witnessed a fierce campaign by ZANU-PF in the media portraying itself as not 
only the sole agency that brought about the liberation of the country, but also that it had mastered the 
art of violence. The jingles by musicians like Tambaoga and Cde Chinx need no reminder. ZANU-PF 
spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira once remarked that his party had “many degrees in violence” cited in 
Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge: exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism and the 
search for social justice, University of natal Press, Weaver Press, and The Merlin Press, Scottsville, Harare 
and London, 2003, p xiv.  
33 See Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of hegemony in Selections from the prison notebooks, edited by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Orient Longman, 1998. 
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One can furthermore draw parallels with Foucault’s theory of power as a continuation 
of war.34 The labelling of the process of farm takeovers (and other indigenisation 
modes) as the Third Chimurenga, was not only an emotive evocation, but was meant to 
situate the process in a sequence with, and in the same category of importance as, the 
earlier zvimurenga. The First Chimurenga of the 1890s was fought against white 
settlement, while the Second Chimurenga culminated in independence in 1980. The 
Third Chimurenga was supposed to be “the final phase of the nationalist, anti-colonial 
revolution,”35 “revolutionary and righteous violence meant to end all forms of colonial 
violence.”36 In this trope, “nationalism”, in Ignatieff’s argumentation, is constructed as 
“an ethic of heroic sacrifice” hence “justifying the use of violence in the defence of one’s 
nation against enemies, internal or external.”37 Portraying it this way thus provided 
some justification for the use of the technology of violence against the white farm 
owners and the MDC supporters in general.  
Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros argue along these Fanonian lines regarding the violence in 
Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008. For them, the state-led violence between 2000 and 
2003 was necessary because it was “in defence of the landless and against the forces 
allied to the white agrarian monopoly and Western interests.” In addition, from 2003, 
although largely used “in defence of narrow class interests” the violence was still used 
“against the forces allied to the West.”38 On the whole, they justify the violence of the 
new millennium Zimbabwe as a necessary part of the redistributive project to complete 
the independence of the country through the transference of economic resources to the 
black majority.   
A similar contention is shared by Mahmood Mamdani. For him, the violence of between 
2000 and 2003 marked the final death of colonialism in Zimbabwe, surpassing the 
                                                 
34 See General introduction for a pithy discussion of this theory. 
35 Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 11. 
36 Sabelo Gatsheni Ndlovu, Do Zimbabweans exist? p 214. 
37 See Ignatieff, cited in Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 26. 
38 Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe Ten Years On: Results and Prospects” Pambazuka News, 419, 
2009. 
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formal handover of independence in 1980, which he characterises as “qualified majority 
rule” that served to perpetuate the privileges of the whites.39 He further argues that the 
new millennium violence was revolutionary because it resulted in “the greatest transfer 
of property in Southern Africa since colonisation” over a relatively short period of time, 
leading for example to the addition of more than one hundred and twenty thousand 
(120 000) new small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe.40 In addition, he says there was little 
violence to the whole process, which he attributes to the role of traditional leadership, 
war veterans, security officials, ZANU-PF officials and local government officials.41 
Sadomba argues similarly and attributes the “low levels” of violence to the rules that 
were laid down for the war veterans and other farm occupiers.42 He blames the 
apparent breakdown of the rule of law on the farms to unruly and criminal elements 
that took advantage of, or hijacked, the movement. However, research by Nelson 
Marongwe contests this. While there were set rules, these were in most cases broken, 
or local socio-political dynamics took precedence over rules, leading to extensive 
violence on these farms.43 
Justifying the ZANU-PF state-sponsored violence in this way recalls Levinas’s 
conceptualisation of the connections between violence, the state and justice. To him, 
violence is embedded in the state, and, crucially, that “violence can involve justice”,44 
                                                 
39 See Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe” in London Review of books, 04 December 2008, he       
contends that the independence obtained in 1980 did not alter the structure of the Zimbabwean society. 
He cites the willing buyer-willing seller land clause and the racial constitution that reserved for the 5% 
whites a 20% seats in parliament in the Lancaster House Constitution as major drawbacks to unqualified 
independence. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Wilbert Z Sadomba, “War veterans in Zimbabwe’s land occupations: complexities of a liberation 
movement in an African post-colonial settler society”, Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Waganigen University, 
2008, pp 16-17. See also Wilbert Z Sadomba, “Challenging the limits of the state’s market-based land 
resettlement programme in Zimbabwe: War veterans as the catalyst of the land movement”, Unpublished 
paper presented at the Market-oriented changes in land policies in developing and transition countries: 
Understanding the varied views and reactions “from below”, International Conference on Land, poverty, 
social justice and development, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 9-14 January 2006.  pp 16-17. 
43 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers”, p 170. See also Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig 
Jensen, “Land, growth and governance”, p 252. 
44 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: Thinking of the other, Translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara 
Harshaw, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p 106. 
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and “there is a measure of violence necessary in terms of justice.”45 In this way the state 
embodies this violence in the name of justice. Levinas goes further to argue that the 
question of justice emerges when there is "a third". "If there were two of us in the 
world, there would be no problem." However, the presence of the third creates a 
complex world of reciprocal citizens. It creates the need for justice, since we are all 
responsible for one another.46 A certain amount of violence is, therefore, necessary for 
justice (although a merciful attitude towards the neighbour who perpetrates crime or 
injustice is preferred). The state is the third-party arbiter who dispenses justice. 
In this role, the violence of the state that leads to the killing of its own people is often 
justified as an act of justice. The state is morally bound to protect its people, to aid their 
development. All threats to the security of the state are a threat to its people, to justice. 
In this moral economy of justice, the state can kill, injure, maim, all those that it 
identifies as enemies or threats: internal enemies and external enemies, those who 
oppose development, those “citizens” who side with the external enemy (the MDC, in 
the case of Zimbabwe) those who are terrorists, who are secessionists, and more 
broadly “enemies of the nation”. 
Of interest in the analyses by Moyo, Yeros, and Mamdani is the casting of the violence in 
the form of a “foundational” mode.47 By placing the emphasis that violence was greatest 
between 2000 and 2003, they not only sanctify the violence, because this violence is 
necessary in inaugurating and establishing authority,48 but they also ignore the 
“reiterative” or the repetitive dimension of the violence.49 In this regard, they pay scant 
attention to the violence that continued to plague the nation up to 2008, and even 
beyond. Of significance in the formulation by Mamdani and Sadomba is the apparent 
                                                 
45 Ibid, p 105. 
46 Ibid, p 106. 
47 See Jacques Derrida, “Force of law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfield and David Gray Carlson, eds, Deconstruction and the possibility of justice, Routledge, New York 
and London, 1992, p 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Jacques Derrida, cited in Uppendra Baxi, “Preliminary notes on transformative constitutionalism”, 
BISA Conference: Courting Justice 11, Delhi, April 27-29, 2008, p 9. 
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downplaying of the magnitude and extent of the violence that is the central theme of 
the critique by the human rights paradigm. Mamdani, for instance, underrepresents 
important issues such as the collapse of the rule of law and agricultural production, the 
miserable plight of farm workers, the urban poor, women and children to mere 
casualties of the violence. Other issues of cronyism have too been deliberately silenced 
in the discussions by these leftist scholars.50 On the collapse of agricultural production, 
Mamdani, for example blames it more on the West’s targeted sanctions. Other scholars, 
however, point to the unholy alliance of the war veterans, traditional leaders, ZANU-PF 
officials and the Youth militias, in fomenting, steering and fanning the widespread 
violence that precipitated the collapse of agricultural production.51 
Broadly, however, questions have been asked whether the violence that rocked 
Zimbabwe was purely emancipatory. There is no denying to the hitherto historical and 
structural difference in terms of land ownership and control of other resources way into 
2000.52 This provided an imperative demand for an accelerated programme of reform to 
transfigure land and other resources allocation and ownership patterns in Zimbabwe. 
Thus, to this extent there is little contestation about the progressive nature of the 
outcome of the jambanja especially if one considers the thousands of peasants who 
accessed land as a result.  
While this was largely not in dispute, academics and political players, however, 
questioned the simultaneous strategic deployment of a violent project targeting the 
opposition alongside jambanja giving credence to its instrumentalisation. This led 
Michael Neocosmos, for example, to argue instead that what happened should be 
categorised as a form of state nationalism, advanced by the state to articulate problems 
                                                 
50 Issues of cronyism in land allocation have been an important factor in the land redistribution process in 
Zimbabwe, and they call for more space than hitherto given in the Leftist scholarship. Moyo and Yeros, 
“Zimbabwe ten years on” refer to it but do not pursue it to any length. 
51 See Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent politics, 1980-1987, 
Cambridge, University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 196. 
52 See compelling researches by Robin R Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Zimbabwe, Heinemann, 
London, 1977, and also by Henry V Moyana, The Political economy of land in Zimbabwe, for further 
insights. 
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in order to get short-term electoral support.53 Brian Raftopoulos additionally sees the 
paradoxical twin deployment of a liberatory propaganda and violence against the 
opposition as a disorientation. To Raftopoulos, this was  
… an ‘anti-imperialism’ built on widespread coercion and diminishing electoral 
support […] Therefore the ‘sobering fact’ that has to be kept in mind … is not just 
the massive changes on the land, but the widespread state attack on the 
citizenry of the country that has been the modality of the politics of land.54 
In the end the main victims of the violence turned out to be mainly the peasants, rural 
civil servants and women, who should have benefitted from the land reform, the 
harbinger of the violence. To this extent therefore, while admitting to the 
transformation in land ownership patterns, violence seems to have been deployed more 
to bully the electorate and maintain ZANU-PF hegemony.55 More than this, the violence 
enabled a localised “primitive accumulation” or what Sachikonye refers to as naked 
expropriation or coercive accumulation.56 Besides accessing some of the best farms, 
appropriating farm produce or farm equipment, and privileged access to urban houses, 
the looting by the ‘chefs’ extended to the mining sector, especially in diamond mining.57 
However, officially, this was represented as a part of the indigenisation process.   
This violence that was deployed alongside the land acquisition feeds into Foucault’s 
notion of power as a relation to war in the sense that the violence was heavily 
militarised. The army, police, secret agents, as well as the quasi-military organ, the war 
veterans, who had been made into a reserve army, actively led the invasions and or 
                                                 
53 See Michael Neocosmos, “Reflections on Human rights Discourse and Emancipation in the Twenty-First 
Century”, in http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-agreement-as-a-passive-
revolution/, Accessed 02 June 2011. 
54 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Response to the Mamdani debate” in Concerned Africa scholars, Bulletin No 82, 
Summer 2009, p 58. 
55 See Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in 
Zimbabwe, Jacana, 2011, Auckland Park, p 33. 
56 Ibid, pp 37-40. 
57 See a condensed discussion in Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political 
and electoral affairs”, p 19. 
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protected the occupiers.58 In addition, as we have already mentioned, serving and ex-
serving military personnel headed key government departments and parastatals.59 In 
true fashion as the leader of the Third Chimurenga and as Commander-In-Chief of the 
army, President Mugabe led the ideological battle, constantly encouraging these 
invasions in statements made in the press at rallies or in Inside the Third Chimurenga.60 
Symbolically, President “Mugabe donned combat fatigues and spoke of enemies of war, 
veterans occupied farms and held pungwes” and “white farmers reverted to their agric-
alert security systems and were killed …”61  
At another level, ZANU-PF began to churn out jingles that portrayed a nation at war. 
Regarding this, such jingles as “Chave Chimurenga” or “It’s now a war”, began to be 
played on both radio and TV.62 In this modality, there was created a “hierarchy of 
citizenship and security that elevate[d] those directing the forces of brutality to the 
highest status beyond the reaches of the law, and those conducting acts of violence to 
the status of ‘war heroes.’”63 Crucially therefore, those at the top echelons set the tone 
of the ensuing “revolution”, either through essentialising the history of the country that 
enabled them to carve their place in that trajectory or through the repressive, coercive, 
violent or deformed masculinity that was cascaded to the lower echelons of society to 
intimidate opponents. 
In Shurugwi, this was the dominant discourse, and mode of operation, mainly because 
of the joint work of war veterans, ZANU-PF youths, Green Bombers, and state media. 
The hegemonic role of the state media cannot be overemphasised because it was the 
dominant media source for the majority of the people in the district who had limited 
                                                 
58 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and farm occupiers”, especially pp179-182. See also, Brian 
Raftopoulos, “The state in crisis”. See also Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”, p 101. 
59 See Martin Rupiya, “Evaluating the security sector as the Repressive Instrument for the state in 
Zimbabwe”, Paper prepared for the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2006, cited in 
Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe” p 215. 
60 See Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Inside the Third Chimurenga, Department of Information and Publicity, 
Harare, 2001. 
61 See Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”, p 99. 
62 See Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 27. 
63 Ibid, p 28. 
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access to alternative media sources. This contrasted with Shurugwi town, for example, 
where many residents had alternative media sources. I observed during the fieldwork 
that most households in urban Shurugwi had satellite dishes that beamed news items 
especially from Botswana and South African channels, as well as the more international 
channels like CNN and BBC, among others. Furthermore, many had access to the 
internet, which added to the variety of access to information compared to the rural 
inhabitants of Shurugwi.  
In contrast, I established that there were fewer, I would say, less than ten percent of all 
households in rural Shurugwi which had satellite decoders installed.64 In other informal 
interviews, I was informed that certain newspapers that were perceived to propagate 
“anti-ZANU-PF” news items were banned. Some of these newspapers were the now 
defunct Daily News, the Zimbabwe Independent and the Financial Gazette. I was, 
however, made aware of and witnessed some rural residents who secretly relied on the 
banned Voice of America radio station as an alternative source of news. 
 
VIOLENCE AS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 
Another way that the violence has been perceived is through the human rights analysis. 
This looks at the violence in Zimbabwe as having been aimed at intimidating the 
electorate to vote for ZANU-PF and the elimination of a strong opposition to ZANU-PF 
and to President Mugabe. The construction of the effects of the violence in this way was 
rooted in the liberal conception of the relation between the individual with rights and 
the state. On the whole the relation is constructed in terms of domination and 
repression, and power is perceived as “a mechanism of repression” and not so much a 
relation of war.65  
                                                 
64 See also a similar estimate by The Sunday Mail, 04-10 March 2012, “SABC blackout coming soon” that 
says about ten percent of Zimbabwe’s rural households owned free-to-air decoders that broadcast foreign 
channels.  
65 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p 90. 
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In Zimbabwe, this is the discourse that is proffered differentially by NGOs, the MDC and 
the Western liberals opposed to the violence of the state. In sum, this school of thought 
has categorised the violence that plagued the country as a constitutive component of 
the Zimbabwean “crisis”.66 In the “crisis” period violence was used broadly as an 
“instrument of dehumanisation,”67 as well as “a method of political competition, and for 
seeking and maintaining power …”,68 with the overall goal being to gain political 
“dividends.”69 For Kriger, the violence of between 2000 and 2001, which can be 
extended to 2008, was formulated by ZANU-PF as a “systematic campaign of 
intimidation aimed at crushing support for opposition parties …”70 In another 
dimension, the state-sponsored land invasions are perceived by the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) as an attempt by the state to “forestall major 
constitutional reforms that [would] offer greater scope for democracy and political 
reform.”71  
At another level, the paradigm argues that targeted sanctions imposed by the USA, the 
European Union, Australia, and Canada were “invited” by the human rights violations by 
the ZANU-PF government and the state.72 Based on these targeted measures, there was 
a freezing of aid, not only for balance of payments, but crucially for the support of the 
Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP).73 On the whole, violence is 
                                                 
66 See Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: Rethinking land, state 
and nation", Amanda Hammar, et al, eds; Zimbabwe’s unfinished business, p 1. See also Brian 
Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming 
Zimbabwe, 2009, p 201, for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon as well as a list of writings that 
argue along these lines. 
67 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens,  p xviii. 
68 Ibid, p 1. 
69 Ibid, p 2. 
70 Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post war Zimbabwe: symbolic and violent politics, 1980-1987, 
Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 196. 
71 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance: Tenure reform and visions of 
progress in Zimbabwe”, in Amanda Hammer, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s 
unfinished business, p 246. 
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perceived to have “been institutionalised to build an authoritarian state that [was] 
contemptuous of citizen rights.”74 
Brian Raftopoulos, a key authority in this discourse argues that the crisis period, from 
1998 to 2008, that was underlain by both political and economic collapse, “exploded” at 
the time of the entrance of the MDC that seriously threatened the fortunes of ZANU-
PF.75 As he continues, the crisis was exhibited in multivalent ways, including:  
confrontations over land and property rights; contestations over history and 
meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of critical civic society 
organisations campaigning around trade union, human rights and constitutional 
questions; the restructuring of the state in more authoritarian forms; the 
broader pan-African and anti-imperialist struggles in Zimbabwe; the cultural 
representations of the crisis in Zimbabwean literature; and the central role of 
Robert Mugabe.76 
According to Raftopoulos, by the late 1990s the state was confronted by an economic 
collapse that was triggered by the failure of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP), corruption, the gratuities to war veterans and the cost of the 
involvement in the DRC war.77 This increased the “imbalance between growth and 
equity, domestic growth and export promotion, and the declining possibility of 
developing a social contract between the state, capital and labour” which led to an 
“impasse over future development strategy.”78 Because of this, the ZANU-PF 
government “retreated into repression, isolation and a strategy aimed at the support of 
an economic elite close to the ruling party, using the state to eliminate barriers to its 
expansion.”79 The process of repression and the elimination of barriers was initiated 
from 1998 against the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)-led food riots, 
strikes, collective action, and stayaways through security agents and through harsh 
                                                 
74 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, 
Jacana, Auckland Park, 2011, p xviii.  
75 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, pp 201-202. 
76 Ibid, p 202. See also Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe’s unfinished business”, p 3. 
77 Ibid, p 219. 
78 Ibid, p 203. 
79 Suzanne Dansereau, “Between a rock and a hard place: Zimbabwe’s development impasse”, cited in 
Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 203. 
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legislation such as the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Labour Regulations of 
1998.80 
However, other scholars, while agreeing with Raftopoulos on the repressive effects of 
the ZANU-PF state from the 1990s trace this thread of the history of state repression in 
post-colonial Zimbabwe to the gukurahundi era in the Matebeleland provinces and parts 
of the Midlands.81 To them, the “government intervention took the form of a campaign 
of grotesque repression in which violence was used indiscriminately against civilians and 
more selectively against party activists.”82 And, these “excesses of the state” had 
“devastating effects.”83 For Sachikonye, the repression even affected the children of the 
victims’ access to citizenship.84 Werbner cited in Sachikonye, points to property (cattle) 
violations by the army, in the violence that eclipsed that imposed by the Rhodesian 
forces.85 Others perceive the abuses of the state during army integration as having 
contributed to the gukurahundi.86 In total, the gukurahundi violence is represented as 
being state-led repression that as much targeted ZAPU as it aimed at ethnic (Ndebele) 
cleansing that was framed in a language along the lines of “wipe out the people in the 
area” or “kill anything that was human.”87 
Following the rejection of the draft National Constitutional Commission (NCC) 
constitution in February 2000, violence and repression were spread to the rural areas 
beginning on the farms that were invaded as punishment against white commercial 
farmers who were opposed to the government land reform as enunciated in the draft 
                                                 
80 Brian Raftopoulos, Ibid, pp 204-206. 
81 See Jocelyn Alexander and Joanne Mcgregor and Terence Ranger Violence and Memory: One hundred 
years in the dark forests of Matebeleland, James Currey and Baobab Books, Oxford and Harare 
respectively, 2000.  
82 Ibid, p 15, see also chapter 9 of their book for a pithy description of this. 
83 Ibid, p 8. 
84 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 17. 
85 Richard Webner, cited in Lloyd Sachikonye, Ibid, p 16. 
86 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Nationalist-Military Alliance”, p 64, see also Horace Campbell, Reclaiming 
Zimbabwe, p 51, and Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans, pp 68-71. 
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institutions in Matebeleland North after independence”, in Terence Ranger, ed, Historical dimensions of 
human rights, vol 2, p 122. 
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constitution. The white farmers were also accused of mobilising their workers against 
the draft constitution, and for providing financial and material support for the emerging 
opposition party, the MDC.88 Of significance is the fact that the constitutional 
referendum loss had a larger significance in that it marked a “first major political defeat” 
for ZANU-PF89. As well, it served as an inauspicious event, heralding, so to say, a warning 
to ZANU-PF that the defeat could be replicated in the forthcoming June 2000 and March 
2002 parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively.90 To Bond and Manyanya, 
the defeat was symptomatic of expired national appeal against an emerging coalition 
opposition from labour, church, the bourgeoisie and students.91 Faced with the 
possibility of such an apocalypse, President Mugabe aligned himself with the militant 
war veterans to violently expropriate farms, a process called the jambanja and later 
formalised as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).92 
While the war veterans played a significant lead in the farm invasions, and there were 
significant continuities with previous invasions, the post-2000 invasions differed 
significantly from the earlier ones. First of all, many of those who participated were 
ZANU-PF youths who were forced to join because of “grassroots initiatives and 
centralised coercion and violence.”93 Secondly, the central ethos was “the need to 
contain, coerce and demobilise the structures and support of the opposition.”94 Thirdly, 
as Alexander suggests, the land reform started in 2000 was based on the populist mode 
of the Second Chimurenga nationalist mobilisation rather than the technical or scientific 
                                                 
88 Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 210. 
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90 Ibid, p 211. 
91 Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s plunge, p 74. 
92 Lovemore madhuku, “Law, politics and the land reform process in Zimbabwe”, in M Masiiwa, ed, Post- 
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models of the first two decades of independence derived from the models the colonial 
governments had used in communal areas.95  
The other major differences, as noted by Nelson Marongwe, included the massive 
intensity and scale of the 2000 onwards invasions.96 An aspect that Marongwe also 
refers to, and one that feeds into the “passive revolution” the land grabs instituted, was 
the central role the war veterans played in leading the processes of identifying farms, 
occupying them, strategizing how to occupy them, in terms of protecting the occupiers 
and in terms of assuming leadership positions for the resettled communities.97 
Moreover, the structure of leadership established at the occupied farms as well 
reflected similarities “with the military and party command structures of the national 
liberation struggle.”98 Because these structures were formulated at a juncture of “war”, 
exigencies meant that they did not allow for much criticism.99  
At another level, the state was reorganised in more authoritarian and racial ways. In 
terms of ZANU-PF ideology, the problems of the state, some of which were markedly 
due to its failings, were explained in a discourse that blamed the MDC, whites, and more 
generally Western imperialism.100 Regarding this, there was created a clear distinction 
between those who belonged and those who did not that is, citizens and non-citizens. In 
this way, the MDC, urbanites and civic societies and whites, were cast as “enemies of 
the nation”, “outsiders” and “Western surrogates”,101 or as totemless people.102 
Because they were cast in the language of war, as “enemies”, they were to be crushed. 
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Thus, they suffered forced dismissals from work (especially rural civil servants and local 
government officials), disenfranchisement, threats, exclusion, physical assaults, 
displacement, and property destruction, among others. The above, as Masipula Sithole 
would possibly say, was a carryover from the Second Chimurenga’s “warlike” 
“commandist nature of mobilisation” where opponents were viewed “as enemies, and 
therefore illegitimate.”103 
Other developments included the violent reorganisation of the judiciary to ensure that it 
became pro-ZANU-PF arm, the enactment of repressive legislation namely POSA and 
AIPPA that proscribed the operations of the opposition parties, the militarisation of the 
state, and the increased deployment of violence against the opposition at election 
times.104 In urban areas, the state increasingly violated the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 
29:15) to not only violate the rights of the urbanites, but to try to wrestle control of 
urban councils from the MDC that had consistently won the right to control them.105 In 
addition, the state also stifled the democratic space for urban-based groups such as the 
Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA), women, pressure groups to 
demonstrate against the state excesses by violently suppressing any attempts to show 
discontent through for example strike actions, demonstrations or even prayer sessions 
for good governance.106 
The construction of Zimbabwean politics around insiders-outsiders recalls Carl Schmitt’s 
link between the “political” and violence in his work The concept of the political. In the 
treatise, he posits that violence is embedded in the political,107 which is hinged on the 
enemy-friend binary.108 For Schmitt, the state, and hence the political are inherent in 
                                                 
103 See Masipula Sithole, cited in James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian 
Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe, p 176. 
104 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, pp 213-215. 
105 Ibid, p 225. 
106 Ibid, pp 226-7. 
107 The “political”, according to Carl Schmitt is different from politics. The political defines the state in 
terms of friend/enemy, which help to define its internal security as well as external threats. It is thus the 
source of politics, but not the equivalent of it. See Carl Scmitt and G. Schwab, The concept of the political, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007, p 19. 
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nature (this view of sovereignty is directly opposed to the Hobbesian sovereignty where 
states are formed for protection). Because they are inherent in nature, and are 
undergirded by the friend-enemy binary, the politics that emerge from them are also 
fraught with these tensions. When further extended this friend-enemy binary leads to 
further binaries, that is, good or bad; which ultimately become life or death, because it 
is through this binary that “societies are formed, maintained, progressed and 
destroyed.”109  
That the “political” is constructed in terms of violence needs not be emphasised in 
Zimbabwe. The discourse of ZANU-PF has always been one rooted in what Ranger terms 
a “doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’ leaping from Chimurenga to Chimurenga,”110 
which is a “doctrine of violence because it sees itself as a doctrine of revolution.”111 It is 
also from this discourse of participation in violent revolutions that ZANU-PF claims its 
legitimacy to continue to rule in the face of diminished support at the ballot.112 A closer 
scrutiny of what has become patriotic history or Mugabeism113 further underscores 
Schmitt’s binary found at the root of the “political”. In it the friend-enemy binary in 
ZANU-PF is constructed in patriot-sell-out terminology.  
The increasing resort by the government to military-style operations to redress 
problems of the state has again been constructed in this repression-domination in the 
human rights framework. In this regard, operations such as Murambatsina, Maguta, 
Garikai and Chikorokoza chapera, have been understood as a part of the larger project 
aimed not only at retaining ZANU-PF in power, but additionally to browbeat the 
opposition support base. More broadly, they have been taken as punishment for those 
constituencies that had voted for the MDC in a retributive fashion of violence. Regarding 
                                                 
109 Michael O’Meara, “Carl Schmitt’s The concept of the political” in http://www.toqonline.com/blog/carl-
schmitts-concept-of-the-political/, Accessed 06 June 2011. 
110 See Terence Ranger, “The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe”, Paper presented at the Skinning 
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Operation Murambatsvina that visibilised a country-wide government terror, Anna 
Tibaijuka,114 Lloyd Sachikonye,115 Solidarity Peace Trust,116 among others, have cast it as 
representing the cruelty of the ZANU-PF regime against an urban constituency that had 
persistently voted for the MDC. Its impact, that of displacing about 700 000 urbanites, 
and indirectly affecting over two million people, is portrayed in monumental terms akin 
to those of a tsunami.117 This was to describe terms of its seismic negative effects on the 
people’s livelihoods, access to jobs and basic rights as citizens. This, however, 
contrasted the official discourse that claimed the operation was meant to restore order 
to urban areas.118 
Alongside these scholars were numerous human rights NGO reports that provided 
detailed accounts of alleged human rights violations by the ZANU-PF led state. Amongst 
those that provided reports of “evidence” of serious abuses were: Solidarity Peace 
Trust;119 the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP),120 Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum;121 Zimbabwe Election Support network and Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
Human Rights Independent Constitution Monitoring Project ZZZICOMP;122 Research and 
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Advocacy Unit;123 Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network; and the Zimbabwe Peace 
Project.124 
 
PROBLEMATISING THE HUMAN RIGHTS NARRATIVE: TOWARDS A “THIRD SPACE” 
Having analysed the redistributive paradigm and having spelled out the human rights 
discourse on the violence between 2000 and 2008, I now turn to address the critique of 
the human rights narrative. My aim is to conceive ways to imagine it alongside, and not 
averse to, the historical structural inequalities that have been evoked by ZANU-PF at a 
time of loss of support. As Raftopoulos says, we should not dismiss too quickly the 
redistribution agenda simply because of its closeness with the diatribe of the besieged 
ZANU-PF,125 and neither should we be quick to dismiss the human rights claims because 
of their apparent closeness to the “regime change” agenda.126 In doing so, I seek to 
project an instance of Homi Bhaba’s “Third space.”127 A third space, as Woodward et al, 
suggest, is one that recognises the currency in polar views with a view to finding “other 
routes beyond binarisms.”128 This might generate “a new idea”129 in which to imagine 
the problematic of the new millennium displacements, farm and firm takeovers, 
emotional and physical torture, and the stifling of the democratic space in Zimbabwe. 
The central theme of the critique of the human rights project is neatly captured in the 
words of Shivji, who stated that:  
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ed, Zimbabwe: The past is the future, Weaver Press, Harare, 2004, p 1. 
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Human rights discourse has succeeded in marginalising concrete analysis of 
society. Human rights ideology is the ideology of status quo, not change. 
Documentation of the human rights abuses, although important, in its own right, 
by itself does not help us to understand the social and political relations in our 
society. It is not surprising that given the absence of political economy context 
and theoretical framework, much of our writings on human rights, rule of law, 
constitution, etc, uncritically reiterate or assume neo-liberal precepts. Human 
rights is not a theoretical tool of understanding social and political relations. At 
best it can only be a means of exposing a form of oppression and, therefore, 
perhaps, an ideology of resistance.130  
Wendy Brown concurs with Shivji and posits that the discourse of human rights is 
situated in a complex paradox of emancipation and domination, and protection and 
regulation.131 In her words:  
Historically, rights emerged in modernity both as a vehicle of emancipation from 
political disenfranchisement or institutionalised servitude and as a means of 
privileging an emerging bourgeois class within a discourse of formal 
egalitarianism and universal citizenship. Thus, they emerge both as a mode of 
protecting against arbitrary use and abuse by sovereign and social power and as 
mode of securing and naturalising dominant social power- class, gender, and so 
forth. Not only did bourgeois rights discourse mask, by depoliticising, the social 
power of institutions such as private property or the family, they also organised 
mass population for exploitation and regulation, thus functioning as a mode of 
what Foucault termed ‘biopower.’132  
The key in these arguments is that the human rights discourse might not capture the full 
scale situation of inequalities in societies and may serve to entrench the oppression of 
the weak classes.  
With reference to the land issue in Zimbabwe, the language of human rights seems to 
be wanting in addressing the impact of the colonial heritage in promoting racialised land 
and other resource inequalities, hence it is not sensitive enough to appreciate the 
impact of structural violence that also engendered social and economic inequalities. To 
this extent numerous accounts have been produced regarding skewed land distribution 
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132 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
 
 
patterns in Zimbabwe since colonisation in 1890.133 These historic imbalances have 
constantly [re]produced tensions, and intermittent land invasions, in both the colonial 
and post-colonial state.134 Some of the highly recognised tensions include the Tangwena 
people’s struggles to remain on the Kaerezi ranch, the Ndau claims over Chirinda 
forests, as well as the Chief Manhenga’s claims over the Gambuli farm.135 It is also 
beyond debate that land imbalances were a key grievance of the liberation struggle and 
it was also a deal breaker that stalled the negotiations at Lancaster in 1979.136 The 
Lancaster logjam was only unlocked with the financial aid promises for equitable land 
redistribution from the USA, British and other European countries.137 Elsewhere, the 
government had to use force to evict land occupying communities on government or 
private farms in the 1980s and 1990s.138 
Shurugwi district shares in some of these struggles over access to land by the local 
communities. These include the 1920s disputed relocation from the Tokwe ranch by 
people under Chief Banga.139 To show land shortages in the reserve they were driven 
into, and their desire to remain in the Tokwe ranch, some went back to Tokwe ranch as 
rent-paying settlers, while others slipped in as “invaders.”140 The land shortages in the 
district are summed up in the words of the Native Commissioner for Selukwe (Shurugwi) 
who wrote that: “from the figures relating to the population and stock on the reserve at 
any disposal it was apparent to me that under the system in vogue the reserve was 
overcrowded- in fact I marvelled that so large a number of people were able under the 
conditions to be self-supporting.”141 In fact, based on some calculations, Shurugwi fared 
worse than most reserves because she had a higher population density. On average a 
                                                 
133 See Robin Palmer, Land and Racial domination and Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and 
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134 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers”, p 157. 
135 Ibid, pp 172 and 186. 
136 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land, pp 22-23. 
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138 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, pp 182 & 190. 
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person, for example in 1934 had access to only 9 acres of land,142 compared to the 
national average of 30,49.143 It was because of the acute land shortages in Shurugwi 
reserve that the district was selected to pilot the “centralisation” programme, a 
technical-scientific method meant to maximise production from the land and 
simultaneously conserve it.144  
The land shortages in Shurugwi and other communal areas continued largely unresolved 
right up to the start of the jambanja in 2000. However, this was due to a concoction of 
the government receiving marginal farms for resettlement, the corrupt allocation of 
acquired farms to “chefs”, shortages of finances and capacity for the land reform, a rise 
in population, the impact of ESAP, donor fatigue, and, the government’s involvement in 
other programmes.145 Because the land problem remained unresolved, it remained an 
emotive political issue. It was certainly on the basis of this that ZANU-PF rode on this 
emotion to instigate the jambanja, and later the FTLRP. 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows therefore that the human rights paradigm, 
while important, nonetheless has to factor in politico-historical inequalities that were 
ushered in by the moment of colonisation and the embedded structural violence rooted 
in the racially skewed legislation and policies. This makes it imperative to tie the 
understanding of human rights for any particular group to the understanding, and even 
the redressing, of historical wrongs. As Gayatri Spivak says, “the groups that are 
dispensers of human rights must realise that the natural Rights of Man were contingent 
upon the historical French Revolution, the Universal Declaration upon the historical 
events of the Second World War.”146 In Zimbabwe, the starting point should be 
                                                 
142 Based on population and size of the reserve calculations. See also NAZ, S235/505-508, Reports of 
Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe, 1934. 
143 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land in Zimbabwe, p 47. 
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colonisation and the attendant project of land alienation, and other policies of racial 
discrimination in the economic and political spheres that reverberated across to other 
facets of people’s lives which also introduced and sustained inequalities between races. 
Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos have also alluded to such a need, which projects the 
structural inequalities running back to colonialism for such human rights projects not to 
be seen as merely Western liberal extensions.147  
It is also pertinent to think through Karl Marx’s critique of the human rights discourse 
and liberalism in general to understand the limits of this paradigm. In On the Jewish 
Question, he warns that this discourse has the potential of obscuring the emancipation 
of the real human by instead liberating the abstract substitute, which he says leads to 
the return to the “old society.”148 To him therefore, rights in this situation remained at 
the transcendental level that has to be reached via a medium, and they mostly remain 
inaccessible. This was largely rooted in the nature of the hierarchical relationship 
between man and human rights, which always required an intercessor as in the religious 
sphere. The analogous relationship he made with Christianity brings out this clearly. He 
writes:  
[R]eligion is simply the recognition man in a roundabout fashion; that is, through 
an intermediary. The state is the intermediary between man and human liberty. 
Just as Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all his own divinity and 
all his religious bonds, so the state is the intermediary to which man confides all 
his non-divinity and all his human freedom.149 
On the whole the need to attain the abstract, transcendental state, where individual 
human rights are respected and observed by all has the potential to obscure inequalities 
                                                                                                                                                 
7294%28194710%2F12%292%3A49%3A4%3C539%3ASOHR%3E2%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0, Accessed 21 January 
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and inhibit the emancipation of the lower classes. This therefore means that human 
rights are not always found in the practical sense, but in the Hegelian “political state”, 
abstracted from reality. As such inequalities remain because many citizens do not have a 
direct access to them.  
In the Zimbabwean case, and in relation to our discussion, among others, is the issue of 
farms as private property that has been violated. The flip side is that offered in ZANU-PF 
discourse, which argues that the majority of the citizens of Zimbabwe needed to also 
access to the land. As such this brings to issue two important views on rights that are 
difficult to balance. These are contestations ultimately on what constitutes 
emancipation. Is it the protection of the “negative rights” or redistributive rights? In 
other words, is freedom for the majority to be found in the land redistribution, 
indigenisation and other affirmative actions, for which the violence is explained in 
ZANU-PF discourse or in the protection of rights in the liberal sense? This is a complex 
question, which begs for a more nuanced analysis. However, the short of it might be 
that both discourses have relevance and truths which cannot be ignored and which have 
to be put together to formulate a more meaningful and inclusive discourse for 
Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, however, they have been strategically deployed to solicit 
certain emotive and political reactions, and not impartially used and understood.  
The discussion around human rights is a crucial one for Zimbabwe. At play one sees a 
clear bifurcation of views on the subject by the two groups in the equation of power. 
Broadly, ZANU-PF stresses “positive” notion of rights while the MDC, the NGOs and the 
West in general emphasise the upholding of the “negative” notion of freedom.150 Under 
“negative” freedom individual liberties, such as property rights, freedoms of; 
movement, religion, speech, and association among others, should be jealously guarded 
                                                 
150 These two views of freedom were popularised by Isiah Berlin, in his essay “Two concepts of Freedom”, 
1958. In it he says negative freedom centred around individual-liberal view of human rights against 
intrusion by other individuals and by the state. On the other hand he says positive human rights were 
based on rationale and they looked for what was right especially for the group and not the individual, 
although the individual’s desire for self-growth were incidentally catered for. 
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from interference by the state.151 These are the first generation rights on the civil and 
political claims that guarantee individual liberty. On the other hand “positive” freedom, 
that is freedom to, is mainly concerned with the group interests that are supposed to 
dominate and individual rights are supposed to play second fiddle to these group rights 
that are to lead to higher attainments for the society/group, that is, self-mastery, self-
determination and self-mastery.152 These are rooted in the second generation rights 
that stress equality of treatment and equality of conditions leading to economic 
freedom of groups.  
ZANU-PF‘s emphasis on redistribution, indigenisation and national sovereignty points to 
“positive” freedom where it claims that the farm invasions under the fast track land 
reform programme were aimed at completing the independence of Zimbabwe by 
ensuring that the majority blacks also participate in the economy of the country.153 As 
Isaiah Berlin has said, the danger in the “positive” version of freedom is its compatibility 
with authority, where the wonderful ideals of taking control, self-mastery, self-
determination and self-realisation may end up being adulterated to promote the goals 
of the leaders while oppressing the desires, aspirations and individual liberties of the 
ruled.154 At play at some serious level is the question of which rights to articulate first, 
the individual or the group? ZANU-PF seems to be following the Kwame Nkrumah adage 
that says: “seek ye the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you”,155 by its 
articulation of the language of sovereignty and indigenisation. There is also a clear 
tension over which rights to follow first between the civil or political on the one hand 
and the cultural, economic, or social rights. 
As The Scrutator in the Zimbabwe Mirror newspaper also stated, by emphasising human 
rights and democracy issues, the MDC was doing little justice to the “National 
                                                 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 See ZANU-PF election manifestos between 2000 and 2008. 
154 Isaiah Berlin, “Two concepts of liberty”. 
155 See Ali Mazrui, “Seek ye first the political kingdom” in Ali Mazrui and C. Wondji, eds, General History of 
Africa: Africa since 1935, UNESCO, Paris, 1993, p 105. 
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Question”.156 As such on its own the human rights language might prove inadequate to 
articulate a solid discourse. In the Zimbabwean situation, therefore the human rights 
discourse has to take into account the peculiarity of the land issue and colonialism and 
not to discuss it in the universal version of the discourse, which tends to idealise issues.  
Notwithstanding the value of the arguments against the human rights paradigm in the 
Zimbabwean crisis, it should be stated that such issues should not also be relegated to a 
secondary role. The need for the observance of political and civil rights was certainly not 
at the bottom of the issues that coalesced into the nationalism that challenged and 
dethroned the settler regime by 1980.157 On the whole, however, one finds that ZANU-
PF has portrayed itself largely as a victim of Western conspiracy, as a revolutionary 
opposition party to Britain and America, and also as a party that has failed to transform 
itself from a liberation movement into a governing party by continuously articulating the 
notion of liberation against the former coloniser, Britain.  
The project of critiquing the human rights discourse is not again to demean their 
essence and importance in shaping Zimbabwe history. As Michael Neocosmos, cited in 
Raftopoulos says, “such interventions are meant to contextualise the current import of 
the human rights debate, and to take note of its limitations and disabling elements in 
the interpellation of people as juridical rather than more broadly political subjects, and 
as part of the language of the new form of imperialism.”158 Also, notwithstanding the 
arguments against the human rights discourse, we need to state that in the current era 
                                                 
156 The Scutator in the Zimbabwe Mirror, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe crisis and the challenges 
for the left”, Journal of African Studies, vol 32, No2, June 2006, p 6. But, the unresolved question is what is 
the national question? Is it land in Mugabe and ZANU-PF terminology?  And, who also defines that? 
157 In this regard, human rights organisations such as the CCJP fought tooth and nail to highlight and 
publish human rights abuses by the colonial state in the 1970s. See also Terence Ranger, ed, The historical 
dimensions of democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, vol 2, University of Zimbabwe Publications, 
2003, p 9. 
158 See Michael Neocosmos, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a ‘Passive 
Revolution’: Notes on the contemporary politics in Zimbabwe”, in The Round Table, in 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-agreement-as-a-passive-revolution/, 
accessed 02 July 2011. 
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of the domination of Western liberal thought, the idea of a citizen is constructed by 
access to basic rights, both first and second generation. 
 
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE MILITARISATION OF VIOLENCE AND RURAL WOMEN 
IN ZIMBABWE 
There is no consensus on the origins of the militarisation of violence and its negative 
impact on women in rural areas of Zimbabwe. Some scholars like Sabelo Ndlovu-
Gatsheni argue that violence has been endemic in Zimbabwe running in a continuum 
under different names from the pre-colonial, through the colonial and post-colonial 
Zimbabwe. Others, like Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi and Norma Kriger, locate it in 
the Second Chimurenga. On the whole, they posit that nationalist movements of the 
Second Chimurenga were patriarchal and generally intolerant and oppressive to the 
cause of not only women, but other interest groups like workers and students, for 
example, in the name of the common good of the African struggle against colonialism.  
Yet on the other end of the scale Ngwabi Bhebe, Joyce Kazembe, and Terence Ranger, 
under nationalist historiography, have described the Second Chimurenga, in rather 
celebratory terms, as being a moment that liberated Zimbabweans in many spheres, 
including women who confronted and escaped the entrapments of gender and colonial 
oppression. In this regard they posit that women acquired new roles, and became more 
liberated from “traditional” male-based oppression and control. 
From the above, one can say that the rise and development of African nationalism in 
Zimbabwe offered an ambiguous terrain where both gains and losses were 
decipherable, proving a paradox in terms of the advancement and the emancipation of 
women. This section tries to [re]present these different views on the origins and impact 
of the nationalist-based violence on rural women, with a view to also position the 
militarisation of violence in Shurugwi district in some perspective of the broader 
nationalist-based violence. By pitting the nationalist perspective against the revisionist 
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one on the impact of the Second Chimurenga on the emancipation of women, I seek to 
push for, and portray an ambivalent reading of the liberation war. Through this I intend 
to locate the entrenchment of gendered inequalities against the backdrop of the 
liberation movements’ claims of strong inroads towards gender parity. The thesis of this 
section is that while there could be other points of origin for the violence between 2000 
and 2008, the evolution of African nationalism from the 1940s, and especially its 
crystallisation into the Second Chimurenga in the 1960s and 1970s, fertilised and 
intensified the process of gender oppression.  
This genealogy is important because ZANU-PF is a party rooted in African nationalism of 
the Second Chimurenga that officially acknowledged, but practically suppressed, 
sectarian interests, including those of women, under the notion of the “common good” 
of nationalism. It still had (by 2008) the same leadership nucleus, from its days as a 
guerrilla nationalist movement, which was still averse to diversity and that still 
harboured intolerance to the opposition. Furthermore, during 2000 to 2008 it was 
increasingly resorting to Second Chimurenga coercive mobilisation methodologies. Chief 
of which were the resuscitation of the pungwes, militarist nationalism, the wearing of 
military fatigues by President Mugabe during campaign rallies and the re-emergence of 
bases.159  
I intend to sketch these debates, not to so much to affirm or deny any, but in order to 
provide a background for the understanding of the 2000-2008 violence in Shurugwi. I 
also seek to contend that the Second Chimurenga was the moment that nurtured the 
ideals of “passive revolutions” led by the party leadership. These would be through the 
identification of “common good” notions during the war, and in the post-millennium 
dispensation, the land invasions of the Third Chimurenga, the harbinger of the 2000-
2008 violence. 
But the contention remains: Can we solely locate the origins of politically inspired and 
gendered violence in Zimbabwe in the Second Chimurenga? In what other episodes of 
                                                 
159 See chapter by Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”, pp 99. 
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the country’s history can we also locate the strengthening of gender oppression? Sabelo 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides an interesting view of the history of violence in Zimbabwe. He 
perceives violence as being a lingering feature in the course of Zimbabwe’s history. To 
him violence has characterised relations firstly between those groups later identified as 
Shona-speaking and between the Shona groups and the Ndebele-speaking group before 
colonisation; between the whites and Blacks during the colonial period; between blacks 
during the first decade of independence; and the controversial violence in the first 
decade of the new millennium. In his words: 
One of the common problems running through the continuum of Zimbabwean 
history across the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs is that of 
violence, its memory and impunity. This violence has been given names and 
justified through various euphemisms that cast it as a positive attribute of 
human progress… Forms of violence that have afflicted… [Zimbabwe]….have 
ranged widely from raiding and conquest in the pre-colonial period; civilising 
mission/whiteman’s burden/conquest/pacification of barbarous tribes under 
imperialism and colonialism; African resistance/First Chimurenga/Second 
Chimurenga/Liberation war under African nationalism; various military style 
operations such as Gukurahundi, Chinyavada, Murambatsvina, Mavhoterapapi 
and Chimumumu under the post-colonial state.160  
Thus, violence in the above regard was used in a rather instrumentalised way at various 
intervals. In this manner, strong tribal chiefs, colonialists, and the post-colonial 
government all used violence to nullify opposition and also to intimidate people to 
submit to their administrations. There is little denying that Ndlovu’s argument opens us 
to the institutionalised notions of violence, which had a bearing on the new millennium 
violence. As Sachikonye says, ZANU-PF has transformed state institutions into partisan 
institutions. Because of this, state institutions like the police, the army, intelligence, 
local state administration structures, judiciary, war veterans and the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, became actively involved in acts that spurred the violence against the 
                                                 
160 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist, forthcoming, p 190. 
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opposition.161 Ndlovu-Gatsheni further widens our scope on the effects of impunity and 
the instrumentalisation on the recurrence of violence.  
However, it would seem he wants to naturalise violence and portray a sense of its 
inevitability in seeking power. This presupposition needs to be put to some contest. This 
approach takes away the need to closely examine the different contexts, the nature and 
the extent of these violent episodes especially that which ZANU-PF has used in the post-
colonial period, and more importantly in the period 2000 to 2008. In addition, it does 
not illuminate sex-based violence. This leads us to engage with the pre-colonial and 
Second Chimurenga debates on the oppression and or liberation of women. 
 
PRE-COLONIAL ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND GENDER 
There has been a tendency to project features of pre-colonial African political systems 
as negative. Thus it is not uncommon to read of them as anachronistic, 
unrepresentative, autocratic and patriarchal. This was based, partly, on early colonialist 
prejudices and deliberate exaggerations to justify the European colonisation of Africa by 
denigrating the African past. These were generally captured under the “whiteman’s 
burden” or mission civilizatrice,162 because they were static, barbaric and therefore in 
need of salvation. In addition, pre-colonial chiefs were said to have wielded all 
governmental duties, that is legislative, executive and judiciary.163 Thus there was no 
separation of powers. What made it worse was the fact that most of the governing 
codes were oral and not codified. Outside these Eurocentric perceptions are some 
                                                 
161 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, 
Jacana, 2011, Auckland Park, pp 30, 34, 40. See a similar perception in Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), 
“When the going gets tough the man gets going”: Zimbabwean women’s perceptions on politics, 
governance, political violence and transitional justice, Harare, November 2010. 
162 http://www.codesria.org/links/conferences/generalassembly11/papers/tangie.pdf, Accessed 12 
November 2009, also Immanuel Kant, Physische geographie, (Vol II), Konigsburg, 1802, p 15, who 
posited that Africans (Negroes) together with the Red Indians were lower than the Whites, and 
GWF Hegel, Lectures on the philosophy of history, Translated by J Sibree), Bell and Daldy, London, 
1872, pp 95-103, who wrote to say that Africa did not have a history but darkness only.  
163 See T W Bennett, “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, in Transformation, Vol 22, 1993, p 
32.  
 
 
 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
Africans who are also guilty of misrepresenting the past. Most notable of these was 
Mathieu Kereku, the former President of Benin, who tried to justify his long hold to 
power by evoking the notion that traditionally African leaders did not retire. In his own 
words “have you ever heard or seen a retired King in Africa?”164 In Zimbabwe, there 
were allegations that Ndebele state rulers “ruled by the spear”,165 basically implying 
that they ruled based on coercion and little consent and cooperation.  
By 2009 Africa was also beset with numerous cases of long term serving Presidents and 
heads of government. These included, among others, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, 
Muamar Gaddafi of Libya, Theodore Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Eduardo dos 
Santos of Angola. The above are clear exaggerations of following in the warped 
appropriation of traditional African governance. Without exaggerating and exalting the 
pre-colonial African systems that exhibited autocratic and patriarchal tendencies, they 
nonetheless were also largely stable, viable, and they also incorporated some 
democratic principles, where chiefs ruled in consultation with advisory councils and in 
accordance with religious checks of their areas. At another level, there were rules and 
legal systems, albeit, not codified that governed conduct, both for the rulers and the 
ruled. They also had kinship-based ways that helped to prevent the abuse of women. 
Studies across Africa, by Mamdani in his survey of Africa,166 White for the Zulu state,167 
Hammond-Tooke, in the Transkei,168 the Khoisan,169 and Aletum in Cameroon,170 have 
revealed that by and large pre-colonial African chiefs were not absolute dictatorships. 
True, some wielded enormous political and economic power on the surface, but on the 
                                                 
164 Mathieu Kereku, quoted in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Who ruled by the spear?: Rethinking governance 
in the Ndebele state”  in African Studies Quarterly, vol 10, nos 2 & 3, 2008, p 87. 
165 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Who ruled by the spear?” 
166 See Mahmood Mamdani’s survey of the pre-colonial African governance in Citizen and subject: 
Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1996. 
167 See J.D White cited in http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/zulu-shaka.htm. 
168 WD Hammond-Tooke, “Chieftainship in Transkei political development”, in Journal of Modern African 
Studies, vol 2, 1964. 
169 See http://exploringAfrica.matrix.msu/edu/students/curriculum/m10/activity2.php.   
170 M.T Aletum, cited in http://africanhistory.about.com/od/kingdoms/Precolonial-Africa.htm, and M.T 
Aletum, Political Sociology, Yaoundé, Pator Publishers, 2001. 
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whole some subjects were allowed to participate in the power, especially the elders, 
queen mothers, lesser chiefs, and different councils.171 At worst there were reciprocal 
obligations that rulers shared with their subjects. Thus, elements of participatory politics 
are decipherable, although they may not have been fully developed. However, as 
Mudenge established for the Mutapas the advisors and advisory councils were more 
often hand-picked by the rulers to assist them and served at the mercy of their 
appointers.172 Of significance from these studies is the possibility of upward mobility 
allowed of women and the senior positions they ended up occupying in society. 
Regarding women, the major debate has been on the impact of the patriarchal practices 
in engendering the abuse of women. This position is aptly presented by Bennett who 
says that they were not allowed to sue for divorce, did not have the right to the child 
custody or  guardianship, were not entitled to hold or dispose property, and did not 
participate in governance.173 In addition, women suffered the added weight of 
polygamy.174 For those in monogamous marriages the weight of lobola still demanded 
their subordination to their husbands.175  
This argument, no doubt, is undergirded by the Western feminist discourse that has 
rigidified gender relations in terms of the binary male-female sexuality. In it, femininity 
is ascribed to women while masculinity to men.176 As a consequence, the “universal 
social and cultural inferiority of women was a foregone conclusion.”177 However, the 
                                                 
171 See a detailed discussion of the various court officials in the Mutapa state by Stanslaus IG Mudenge, A 
political history of Munhumutapa, pp 84-110. 
172 Stanslaus IG Mudenge, A political history of Munhumutapa, p 85. 
173 TW Bennett, “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, p 32. 
174 Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, “The politics of the womb”: Women, politics and the environment in pre-
colonial Chivi, Southern Zimbabwe, c1840-1900”, in ZAMBEZIA, XXX,(I), 2003, pp 42-43. 
175 See Monica Matavire, “Interrogating Zimbabwean traditional jurisprudence and the position of women 
in conflict resolution, A case for Shona tribes in Muzarabani district”, in International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, February 2012, p 220. 
176 See Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, in Alexandra Shepard and Garthine, 
eds, Gender and History, Vol 20, Issue 3, November 2008, p 559. 
177 See Ifi Amadiume, cited in Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, p 565. 
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conditions in the rather decentralised Shona178 states, the position women occupied 
and power they exercised requires a troubled re-reading of this phenomenon. And, like 
Ifi Amadiume suggests, while female and male existed as distinct categories, femininity 
and masculinity fractured these. This ensured that some women enjoyed raised 
statuses.179 
Among the pre-colonial Mutapa and Rozvi Karanga groups, research by Beach and later 
by Schmidt discount the pervasiveness of polygamy.180 To Beach, the Shona were by and 
large monogamous because of the near equality in the sex ratio which necessitated the 
demand for the payment of bride price. He suggests that the bride price that was 
wanted, while in simple payments such as in hoes, iron products, cloth beads and cattle, 
was considerable and could only be afforded by the wealthy members.181 
An important view of pre-colonial African state system, however, is that they were 
largely kinship-based. Because of their lack in the creation of centralised state systems, 
most depended primarily on relations of a different nature that were rooted in the 
family.182 For those who would from the 19th century be known as the Shona, these 
were based on dynasties.183 As such communities became larger extended families of 
sorts, and these relationships, and inter-relationships, as Bennett posits, “provided for 
all the individual’s material, social and emotional needs.”184 In addition, the governing 
code was the common good of the communities, which put the need for one’s duty to 
society above their individual rights.185 This code also instructed chiefs and other 
                                                 
178 There is still huge debate on the validity of using the term Shona to refer to pre-19th century Zimbabwe 
states. See arguments around this in Stanslaus I.G Mudenge, A political History of Munhumutapa c 1400-
1902, James Currey, Zimbabwe Publishing House and Heinemann Educational Books, London, Harare and 
New Jersey, 1988, pp 33-34.  
179 Ibid. 
180 David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1980, pp 89-90. See 
also Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders and wives, p 5. 
181 David Norman Beach, Ibid, pp 89-90.  
182 TW Bennett, “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, p 32. 
183 See David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 93. See also Gerald Chikozho Mazarire’s 
interesting study of pre-colonial Chivi dynasties, in “The politics of the womb”. 
184 TW Bennett, “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, p32. 
185 Ibid. 
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leaders, who could face censure, be removed from power or even killed if they deviated 
from the goal of common good.186 In other instances subjects could switch allegiance 
from unpopular rulers.187 Among the pre-colonial Shona, in addition to the above, 
dissatisfied subjects could emigrate, and there were “elections” of sorts for village 
heads and sub-chiefs who were intermediaries between common people and chiefs.188 
Another check on the abuse of power of rulers among the Karanga was the mhondoros 
or spirit mediums,189 who also played a key role at succession.190 
The above gives credence to the notion that kings ruled through the grace of their 
subjects, for a King was not a king without subjects.191 Among the Shona of Zimbabwe, 
the above was captured by the idiom, ishe vanhu. The essence of this was that the king 
was supposed to be a servant of his subjects. This necessitated that leaders had councils 
that helped them to govern, adjudicate and ensure that the community goals were 
adhered to. Common people, especially adult males, participated at the community 
assembly meetings.192 It was again on the basis of these strong kinship bonds that 
vulnerable groups, including women and children, had community-based protection. 
Particularly referring to women, Bennett has suggested that, while they were in effect 
treated like minors, without property rights, without legal rights to sue or to seek 
divorce, and did not have child guardianship rights, they had protection from the 
extended family.193  
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
187 See Edward Kofi Quashigah, “Legitimate governance: The pre-colonial African perspective” in EK 
Quashingah and C Okafor, eds, Legitimate governance in Africa: International and domestic legal 
perspective, Kluwer, The Hague, London, Boston, 1999, p 43. 
188 See David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 94. 
189 See Stanslaus IG Mudenge, A political history of Munhumutapa, p 65. 
190 Ibid, p 81. 
191 See Edward Kofi Quashigah, “Legitimate governance”, p 44. 
192 See FT Abioye, “Indigenous African institutions”, in upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-
1005201…/02chapter2.pdf, Accessed 04 June 2012. 
193 TW Bennett, p 32. 
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Regarding the Shona, it has been found that kinship relations in communities offered 
safety nets for women.194 Specifically on divorce, Beach and Schmidt suggest that while 
there were set grounds for divorcing women, such as infertility and infidelity, most 
relatives worked towards the preservation of the marriages especially in view of the 
need to restitute the lobola paid.195 The fact that divorces also impacted on the larger 
kin relations meant that relatives of feuding spouses worked to preserve the troubled 
marriages.196 On married women, those with sons were in positions of influence in their 
families because they controlled the extension of the patrilineages.197 Older women 
were also greatly respected.198 More than anything, this argument resonates with the 
rising body of Africanist feminist literature that troubles the Western feminist theory 
that pushes for atemporal and universalised subordination and powerlessness of 
women, simply because they were women.199 Rather, gendered differences are more 
“cultural and historical.”200 In this regard, “the body is not always enlisted as the basis 
for social classification.”201 Among the pre-colonial Shona groups procreation and 
seniority were important in raising the women’s worthiness.202 Over and above these, 
women who were possessed by spirits acquired more authority in these Shona 
societies.203 
To further illustrate the importance of extended family relations among the Shona in 
the traditional Zimbabwean societies, their welfare was largely the responsibility of the 
lineage elders even when they had husbands. Stoneman and Cliffe, for example, found 
                                                 
194 David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 93. See also Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, 
and wives, p 21. 
195  David Norman Beach, Ibid, p 90. 
196 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, p 22. 
197 David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 90. 
198 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, p 15. 
199 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body: Western theories and African subjects” in Oyeronke 
Oyewumi, ed, African Gender Studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005, p 11.  
200 See Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question”, p 564. 
201 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body, p 13. 
202 Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, pp 22-23. 
203 Ibid, p 25. 
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that marriage transactions were controlled by these elders.204 As a result of this, 
women, although they were married to a husband, they also belonged to, and were 
protected by, the larger society. The elders controlled the cattle used in marriage deals, 
negotiated the exchanges and in turn regulated the new wife in terms of her labour and 
her children, and offered her protection against abusive husbands who were too violent, 
demanded too much work from her, made her pregnant too often or initiated divorce 
without good cause.205 
Women themselves had rather informal ways, both public and private, to confront 
abusive husbands, mother-in-laws, co-wives, and leaders. To this extent, they could 
secretly engage their husbands behind closed doors. Alternatively, they could use child 
or dog-naming to register complaints. Or, they could use songs at social ceremonies, 
near the men-meeting point (dare), again to publicise their abuses or areas of 
concern.206 In more extreme and audacious cases, some women would physically fight 
their husbands or would escape back to their parents’ homes.207 More often than not, 
these led to change or for action from village elders to rectify the problem.  
With regards to pre-colonial Zimbabwe, studies on the Shona and Ndebele pre-colonial 
systems have also shown that some serious signs of common people’s participation and 
flexibility existed with women found in higher positions too. Among the Shona, as the 
Native Affairs Department established, chieftaincy was not necessarily permanent or till 
death, nor was it lineal. Instead it was adelphic collateral and passed from one house to 
the next or from one brother to the next as opposed to the primogeniture of father to 
son.208 A system of checks and balances was also operational to avoid permanency and 
                                                 
204 Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter Publishers, London 
and New York, 1989, p 72. 
205 Ibid, this is true, notwithstanding the fact that women were still regarded largely as minors, with 
limited property rights and rights over children. 
206 See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, pp 20-21, for a nuanced discussion of these 
techniques. 
207 Ibid, p 21. 
208 Appointment of successor to late chiefs letters: Chief Native Commissioner’s Office: 1915-1917, 
Government of Rhodesia Printers, Salisbury, 1917. See also stanslaus IG Mudenge, A political history of 
Munhumutapa, pp 62, who established the same for the historic Mutapa state that existed between 
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abuse of office. To this end it was not uncommon for abusive and autocratic chiefs to be 
quietly killed or to be asked to drink a poison called muteyo to avoid bringing shame to 
the chieftaincy.209 However, the replacement chief came from within the ruling houses 
and was not popularly elected.  
Still among the Shona groups, a certain amount of free speech was also guaranteed, 
which kept abuses by chiefs at a relative minimum. This freedom of speech was 
especially done by family friends called madzisahwira, who could mock abusive chiefs, 
say almost anything with impunity, and they could also sing in public against abuse of 
power or authority by the chiefs.210 While oral testimonies referring to this may not be 
conclusive evidence given the political context they were given, they open the 
possibilities of further research in that direction. 
As an affirmation to the respect that women were accorded in the pre-colonial Mutapa 
and Rozvi states, women were found in high-ranking positions in their states. In this 
regard, wives of chiefs were found to wield enormous amounts of power.211 Some 
women even had authority to govern parts of states, there was Nehanda who ruled a 
province in the Munhumutapa state in the 15th century.212 The same state also had a 
regiment entirely composed of female cadres.213 Still in the Mutapa state, other chiefs’ 
wives administered “their own houses, lands, and vassals”, while others in the Manyika 
and Mashonaland controlled vast territories.214 Also among the Shona, as in other 
                                                                                                                                                 
about 1450 to 1902. On p 81, Mudenge defines adelphic collateral as “brother succeeding brother until 
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“The politics of the womb”, p 43. 
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213 See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’ Guerilla war: Peasant voices, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1992, p 192. 
214 See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders and wives, p 29. 
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African states, Queen mothers played a key role in administration, for example, they 
could nominate or impeach chiefs.215 In other areas, women relatives were also 
responsible for choosing and installing new rulers.216 Continuing on the thread of the 
revisionist feminist discourse, one can then argue that the fact that their physicality as 
women did not inhibit the women from assuming higher social positions. Thus as 
Oyewumi would probably have said, the “social order requires a different kind of map, 
not a gender map that assumes biology as the foundation for the social.”217 
During my field research, between December 2009 and July 2010, I also established that 
chiefs and headmen in Shurugwi depended on advisory councils, composed of 
makurukota, who advise them and help them in the adjudicating over disputes. Besides 
the advisory role, they also acted as the eyes and ears of kings, as well as conveyors of 
the ordinary people’s concerns to the leaders. This concept is a carryover from the pre-
colonial past. A sizeable number of the makurukota are females. Moreover, women 
were also found as moral leaders of their states as well as to advise kings. As such, 
senior women were and are still tasked with the upholding of societal morals by 
encouraging virtues which were aimed at ensuring chastity, celibacy and, in the new 
millennium to check the spread of HIV and AIDS.  
It has, however, to be pointed out that the occupation of these high positions in Shona 
societies, as in many others on the continent, was frowned upon by some. Furthermore, 
one has to be careful not to take these few politically recognised women for the 
generality of women’s empowerment. To begin with, and in contest to the findings of 
Beach, above, Mudenge218 and Mazarire have posited an interesting argument that 
seeks to show that power was not equally shared by the wives of chiefs. To Mazarire, 
there were “class differences” between the wives. The first wife (Vahosi) had more 
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power followed by other married wives (varongo/vakaranga) and at bottom were the 
adopted wives (vakadzi venhaka).219  
Linked to the above, the age of a woman significantly determined her social status in 
many of the pre-colonial Shona states. Age was associated with wisdom, closeness with 
ancestral spirits and symbolised the woman’s productive and reproductive contributions 
to her married family.220 In this regard aged women with many children and 
grandchildren were better respected than young ones or those without children. Female 
fecundity in this respect was also associated with their contribution to the family’s 
production. Crucially, aging was associated with “drying out.”221 To this end,  
[a]t birth, children are considered to be wet. Soft and bloody, they are 
thoroughly human and lack all authority. Elderly people, who are virtually 
ancestors themselves, are hard, dry, and bony. In human life they hold the 
utmost authority. The ancestors, dry, brittle, and bloodless, are wiser and more 
powerful than people. They can cure illness, provide rain, and are omniscient 
concerning past and future events. Like infants and small children, young 
women, during menstruation and child birth, are also considered to be wet. 
Thus, it is only when they are post-menopausal, brittle, and dry that they possess 
a degree of authority. In other words, women acquire power when they are least 
women and most like men and the ancestors.222 
The Ndebele state has been previously described as an epitome of autocracy, with a 
rigid caste system, as warlike, and as a society that depended largely on raiding.223 
However, revisionist studies on the Ndebele have found that the state was not too 
centralised. Rather, the Kings ensured an equitable distribution of wealth among their 
Ndebele subjects. Political power was also decentralised and shared between the king 
and the izindunas (lesser chiefs) who controlled the districts. Importantly, the Ndebele 
kings also relied on advisors. The key having been the indunankulu yesizwe, who was the 
effective head of the government, as well as two councils: the umphakathi and 
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izikhulu.224 However, the two, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni laments, were made up of the 
wealthy members of the state.225 Additionally, the established hierarchy ensured 
effective communication between higher and lower echelons of power in the state.226  
In Zimbabwe, as in most other African countries, most societal systems were altered to 
suit the new demands of the colonialists. It was also found that the status of women 
suffered too under colonialism. This was because of the elevation of community elders 
and local chiefs to new status against other locals including women.227 Also, due to 
colonialism the migrant labour system was introduced which meant that lobola began 
to be paid in cash thus eliminating the elders from the marriage equation, and there was 
also a shortage of land which necessitated the young to move away in search of new 
areas.228 The above opened the women to more labour demands on the farms and 
generally to abusive husbands who were now liberated from traditional checks. Also 
because most sectors of the new economy favoured “single man” or “bachelors” over 
women, financial inequalities grew between men and women. Men got cash payments 
while females remained as unpaid labourers in the reserves.229  
Besides exerting increased labour demands on the women, colonialism was responsible 
for adding new forms of patriarchal controls. As Schmidt argues, in the end the 
“indigenous and European structures of patriarchal control reinforced and transformed 
one another, evolving into new structures and forms of domination.”230 Additionally, in 
agriculture, it introduced “male-dominated farming” through by encouraging ploughs, 
oxen, and new agricultural techniques, as well as cash crop production.231 At another 
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level, the Christian missionaries preached the gospel about patrilineal households in 
which women were subordinated to men.232 Moreover, customary law was created 
which gave undue powers of control to men, as did selective employment of women 
even in domestic service.233 
The above colonial labour demands contrasted with the labour requirements for women 
in 16-17th century Shona states. To this end, while the division of labour portrayed that 
women did most of the labour-intensive work like agriculture, mining, and weaving, 
some men also did these.234 In addition, the major pre-occupation of men was to 
protect their herds and to seek other avenues to mitigate the effects of famine 
(shangwa), through hunting and trading.235 
The above is important in illustrating that the suppression of women, which falls 
generally under repressive masculinities, has ambivalent roots in the pre-colonial past. 
While at times the women were commodified especially in marriage transactions and in 
war situations,236 treated as minors with limited property rights and at times subjected 
to forms of submission in marriage, they still had community-based protection against 
violations. These patriarchal tendencies that led to the suppression and domination of 
women were, however, worsened by new ones introduced by colonialism. As the 
discussion below attempts, the impact of the rise of African nationalism from the early 
1960s further worsened the situation of women.  
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THE SECOND CHIMURENGA AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE 
AND GENDER INEQUALITIES 
It cannot be contested that most rural areas of Zimbabwe were militarized during the 
1970s.  This was because most communal areas were used by the guerilla African 
nationalist movements in their Marxist-Leninist and Maoist strategies against the 
Rhodesia Front government forces,237 resulting in the deployment of Rhodesian troops 
in these rural areas. Brickhill advances a similar notion and says that by 1978 “guerilla 
war had reached most rural areas and had encircled the economic heartland of the 
country”.238 The same effect had been achieved in the large-scale farming sector. To this 
extent, nationalist guerrillas, as Bhebe says, were “harassing the enemy by attacking the 
farmers in their isolated homesteads, laying landmines on routes used by enemy troops, 
assaulting centres of colonial power such as district and police stations, blowing up 
railway lines and bridges and ambushing enemy convoys.”239 As a consequence, rural 
people were sandwiched between the two belligerent forces.  
Because of this, a number of negative effects befell the rural dwellers. Between 750 000 
and one million were put in keeps or protected villages and some were internally 
displaced to cities. Put together, these, according to Moyana, constituted a third of the 
total African population in the reserves.240 Others suffered beatings, arrests, torture, 
while others had their homes burned down.241  Yet others suffered from the effects of 
the Rhodesian chemical warfare that was aimed at poisoning guerrilla food, water and 
clothes, as well as from the effects of anthrax poisoning of cattle.242 Consequently, rural 
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dwellers were in the literal dilemma, between a rock and a hard place, so to say, 
regarding which of the two to follow. Either they had to support the liberation 
movements and risk the wrath of the Rhodesian forces, or vice versa.  
The effect of this contestation for and confrontation in the rural areas and on rural 
women is, however, still hotly disputed. What can, however, be little contested is the 
fact that rural areas were turned into theatres of both the political or ideological and 
military warfare, which meant that peasants were affected by the violence of the war in 
one way or the other.243 One dimension that is increasingly gaining currency is on the 
double use of violence by nationalist movements. Concurrently, they directed their 
violence against the Rhodesian state, and against the other nationalist groups, as well 
as, the peasants, women, and students.244  
In the nationalist historiography, the Second Chimurenga has however been generally 
explained as emancipatory to women. On the whole if women were not per se 
liberated, they were at least afforded the space for new opportunities divorced from 
their traditional gendered roles.245 Ranger, for instance, basing his argument on the 
Makoni district, says  
men in their fifties,….who were used to controlling a flock of dependent 
women…..now found that the initiative had passed to young men with guns. The 
young men called upon the unmarried women of Makoni to act as their cooks, 
informants and messengers and in these later two roles, teenage girls were able 
to exercise a good deal of power, for the first time in Makoni.246  
David Lan similarly contends that during the Second Chimurenga guerillas tried to 
“institute full scale democracy that would include women and unmarried men,” and also 
that female cadres “acquired practical experience of living alongside men as their moral 
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and intellectual equal”247. This view is correspondingly shared by Joyce Kazembe who 
maintains that women were liberated by fighting alongside men in the Second 
Chimurenga.248 On their part, Collin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe say that since the bulk of 
peasants were women, the guerillas had to rely more on women for war duties such as 
reconnaissance, in addition to domestic roles.249  
Attempts have too been made to portray the central leadership role women played in 
the independence struggle. Ngwabi Bhebe, cited in Tanya Lyons, glorifies the 
contribution of the 1961 protests against the racial-based constitution. To Bhebe, since 
the National Democratic Party was banned on 8 December 1961 immediately following 
the women’s protests, the actions of women catalyzed the transformation of the 
struggle towards militancy.250 While this may be acceptable, one may draw a counter 
from Nhongo-Simbanegavi’s argument that at times women’s activism was promoted by 
men because women received less harsh treatment from the Rhodesia security forces, 
and also men working in towns feared losing their jobs.251 
Both to illustrate the key role of women, and how unifying and liberating the Second 
Chimurenga was, nationalists drew on the mythical role the female spirit of Mbuya 
Nehanda played. The spirit was taken to express the equality of sexes and further to 
show the important role women played in rallying people to fight white oppression.252 
During the Second Chimurenga the medium of Nehanda was also taken to Mozambique 
for safety from the Rhodesians.253 The same reverence for the spirit of Nehanda is 
maintained for the First Chimurenga 1896.254 As David Beach however contends, the 
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role of religion, spirit mediums and more specifically that of Nehanda in the First 
Chimurenga have been exaggerated and should be revised.255 
Nationalist historians have in addition argued for the existence of a common 
nationalistic agenda against colonialism and that this thread bound the different 
sections together. These nationalist grievances were around the need to remove the 
repressive and oppressive Rhodesia state and correct the racial-based skewed land 
distribution.256 Other issues were on human rights and dignity for all in the state.257 At 
another level, it is assumed that the various forms of state repression conscientised 
peasants which meant that by the time the guerillas mobilised them, they were ready to 
support them.258  
Revisionist scholarship on the African nationalism has deconstructed this as an 
oversimplification and narrowing of African grievances and African nationalism. Norma 
Kriger for instance says that peasant participation in the Second Chimurenga was as 
much based on the desire to unsettle the Rhodesia state as it was meant to address 
peasant-on-peasant and class differences in the rural areas.259 As she says, there were 
struggles within the peasantry, for example, between the youths and the elders, the 
poor and more affluent peasants, and also between the common peasants and the 
traditional leadership.260 To this, Nhongo-Simbanegavi adds that peasants also did not 
have a choice in the face of guerilla force, which led to fear of ZANU, for example, 
before and after independence.261  
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Kriger also says the emancipation of women did not last long because of men and 
traditional leaders’ opposition to the open beating of men who abused their wives 
which was taken as interference in domestic affairs.262 For her again, the mere adoption 
of new roles by the women did not equate to their emancipation because after some 
time the women returned to being “controlled subjects”263. Mies, cited in Cawthorne, 
argues likewise and says wars by nature are “exceptional” situations that call for some 
changes in how things are done. As a result, women could be found in “unusual” roles. 
What is more, once the war ends, women revert to their “normal” duties.264 Similarly, 
Tanya Lyons contends that with the intensification of the war, the gendered roles of 
men and women were naturally “blurred” because there was “seldom time for 
gendered distinctions”.265 Importantly, following the end of the Second Chimurenga the 
female guerrillas were expected by the larger society to revert back to their submissive 
role and shade off their “independent” status of the war period.266 At another level, 
their demobilization went hand in glove with their depoliticisation.267 
In addition to the above, there is an increase in research “evidence” that associates the 
sexual abuse of women, to the rise of African nationalism and to the struggle for 
independence. Raftopoulos, for example, traces the genealogy of gendered violence to 
the formative years of nationalism in the 1950s. Citing the raping of women in the 
Carter Ladies Hostel in Mbare during 1956 Bus Boycott, he asserts that from its 
formative stages, African nationalism was beset by gender insensitivities and to some 
extent coercion to mobilize women’s support.268 Following in this trajectory, other 
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researchers argue strongly that there were extensive cases of the abuse of women both 
in the camps outside Zimbabwe and in operational zones inside Zimbabwe.269  
Again, Ruth Weiss, while acknowledging some semblance of advancement during the 
Second Chimurenga, highlights that women were sexually exploited by senior ZANU and 
ZANLA leaders.270 At another level, Luise White says that the issue of the turning 
guerrilla women, into “housemaids and concubines”, was at the heart of the causes of 
the Nhari rebellion.271 What was worse was that some female guerillas were forced to 
abort to save the image of the some high commanders.272 This is supported by Fay 
Chung, in Mtisi et al, who suggests that these sexual abuses by the military commanders 
drove many women cadres to join the Nhari rebellion.273  
There is also some perception that nationalist-based sexual violations were extended 
into the post-independence era gukurahundi crisis. However, the aim and scale differed 
significantly from the Second Chimurenga era ones. As Muzondidya argues, the 
gukurahundi sexual liaisons between state security officials and local women were a 
part of the battery of strategies in the fight against a complex opponent, who in time 
ceased to be merely the dissidents, but also ZAPU supporters and more generally 
Ndebele speakers.274 However, the turning of women into “bed fodder” was not limited 
to the nationalist movements as Rhodesia security forces also abused women especially 
in protected villages. Due to shortages of provisions, the camp guards used food rations 
as bait while at times the women offered themselves for better care.275 
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 Patriarchy and associated tendencies that stifled women’s development, liberation and 
advancement have also been ascribed to the liberation movements. Nhongo-
Simbanegavi describes it as a “legend”276 that the cause of women was advanced 
because ZANU failed to remove patriarchal practices such as lobola and polygamy in 
camps in Mozambique during the Second Chimurenga.277 This contrasted sharply with 
the official ZANU-PF policy espoused by the top party leadership, for example by Teurai 
Ropa at a women’s conference in Albania in 1978, and by Robert Mugabe at the ZANU 
congress at Xai Xai, Mozambique in 1978. Both illustrated the official position and 
highlighted significant steps towards the upliftment of women within the party. The 
same position was also repeated in ZANU’s newspaper, the Zimbabwe People’s Voice, 
which among others wrote that “the emancipation of women is a must and not an act of 
charity […] their struggle is part of society’s struggle for progress. Women should enjoy 
equal rights with their menfolk. No progress can be reached without the effective 
participation of women.”278 On the whole there was a dichotomy between official ZANU 
and ZANLA rhetoric on the one hand, and sad reality on the other, on how women were 
supposedly advanced in ZANU. 
Also as a result of gender inequalities, there were many trained women guerillas who 
were, however, not deployed on the battlefront, but were more often relegated to the 
provision of support services, such as, nursing, teaching, child minding; they were 
deployed in liberated or semi-liberated zones.279 This reduced their chances of 
advancement. It was thus little surprise that despite constituting more than a third of 
ZANLA guerillas there was only one female, Sheba Tavarwisa, in the ZANLA High 
Command out of twenty eight members, and in the Central Committee there were only 
two females, Sheba Tavarwisa and Teurai Ropa Nhongo (Joyce Mujuru).280 Kriger weighs 
in and she also says that “only 5% of cadres sent for special courses by ZANU abroad 
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were women, all ZANU representatives abroad were men; leadership selection was 
biased in favour of men.”281 Because most trained female cadres had not been deployed 
at the battlefront inside Rhodesia, they were moreover brought back as refugees and 
were thus not gathered at Assembly Points with other male guerillas.282 As a result 
many lost out on the benefits that accrued to their male counterparts, such as 
demobilization packages, or integration into the security or government sectors. The 
above notwithstanding, it would, however, be fair to highlight that in ZANLA there were 
up to 2000 “trained and fighting” women cadres, while there was also a brigade 
composed entirely of women in ZIPRA.283 
Nhongo-Simbanegavi has further established discrimination against women in ZANU, 
especially those who were pregnant or those who were menstruating.284 In most cases 
these women were sidelined from mainstream activities. What was worse was that in 
the camps in Mozambique, pregnant women were relegated to the infamous birth 
camps, such as Osibisa, where they were cut off from the rest of the guerillas, including 
from the men who would have made them pregnant.285  
However, one cannot underestimate the value of tradition in the slow pace of the 
promotions and abuse. In discussions with elders from Shurugwi, for example, I 
established that women could be excluded from some “traditional” rituals if they were 
either pregnant or having menstrual periods. To this degree, menstruating women or 
suckling mothers could be excluded from brewing beer for some ceremonies because 
they were considered wet and the milk and blood were thought to affect spirits because 
they competed with the productive and reproductive powers of the spirits.286 In the 
nationalist movements, it could have caused women to be viewed, and to view 
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“Osibisa” in On the road again, ZPH, Harare, 1986 to highlight the plight of pregnant women in camps in 
Mozambique during the liberation struggle. 
286 See also Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, pp 24-26, for a pithy articulation of a similar 
point. 
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themselves, as, inferior. The generally inferior education women guerillas had in 
comparison with male cadres too worked against their elevation to senior posts. In the 
traditional set-ups also women are supposed to be subservient to their men or 
husbands. Outside the traditional explanation, one however sees this lack of 
advancement for women stemming from their assigning to non-military duties in the 
movements, which determined promotions in the liberation movements. There were 
some efforts made in ZANU-PF towards the betterment of women through the creation 
of the department for women, in 1977. However, this Department for Women’s Affairs 
in ZANU was staffed by nationalist leaders’ wives.287 
The discussion on the abuses and inequalities that women suffered as a result of the rise 
and spread of African nationalism needs to be considered together with the brand of 
nationalism that emerged. Although targeting liberation, it was, inter alia, unitary, 
intolerant, despotic, and coercive. As Terence Ranger says, “by the late 1950’s with the 
emergence of mass nationalism it had come to be accepted that the nationalist 
movement must dominate all these other spheres” like religion, domesticity, education, 
gender, sport and work.288 This was akin to what Nkrumah stated, that “seek ye first the 
political kingdom and all shall be given unto thee”. 289 However, the question remains 
why it had to be this way. Terence Ranger attempts the answer and says:  
But perhaps there was something inherent in nationalism itself […] which gave 
rise to authoritarianism. Maybe nationalism’s emphasis on unity at all costs […] 
its subordination of trade unions and churches and all other African 
organizations to its imperatives- gave rise to an intolerance of pluralism. Maybe 
                                                 
287 Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better or worse,  pp 50-55. She says that this department was 
staffed by people like Teurai Ropa, Sally Mugabe, and Julia Zvobgo, all wives of senior ZANU leaders. 
288 Terence Ranger, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The State, NGO’s and Democratisation”, in Sam Moyo, 
John Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos, eds, NGO’s, the state and politics in Zimbabwe, SAPES Books, 
Harare, 2000, p 25. See also Terence Ranger, “Introduction to Volume Two”, p 5, who quotes Stanlake 
Samkange who stated that nationalist leaders sought to be “acknowledged by all as the leader and 
spokesman of Africans …” 
289 Kwameh Nkrumah cited in Michael Neocosmos, “Analysing political subjectivities: naming the post-
developmental state in Africa today”, Unpublished paper presented at The Social Theory Colloquium at 
The Centre for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape, 20-21 August 2009. 
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nationalism’s glorification of the leader gave rise to a post-colonial cult of 
personality.290  
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni weighs in and teases out the ambivalences. To him, the African 
nationalism was on the surface populist to win support across the spectrum, yet at the 
core it was largely “hegemonic and intolerant of diversity, internal criticism, and dissent. 
As a movement, it was basically sweeping in what it claimed and annihilatory in what it 
rejected.”291 Following in such a framework by Ranger and Ndlovu-Gatsheni helps to 
understand why even “progressive” formulations such as the March 11 Movement in 
ZAPU, the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), Nhari revolt, and Vashandi were violently 
suppressed292 under what David Moore calls “authoritarian militarism”.293 In the Nhari 
revolt, up to 155 persons were executed for “zig zagging” and for being “stumbling 
blocks” to ZANU.294   
Force was also deployed against those who “zig zagged” amongst civilians. Those 
suspected, as Norma Kriger, Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, Terence Ranger, and 
Horace Campbell, among others, say, suffered severe violence.295 While peasants 
suffered the largest of the wrath of the guerrillas in search of food, clothes, money,296 
labour, witches, rival nationalist supporters, and for forced attendance of pungwes, 
chiefs, headmen, teachers, church pastors, agricultural demonstrators, as well as 
families of Rhodesian police and military officers in the rural areas were targeted too. 
Furthermore, Africans who belonged to rival nationalist movements, successful peasant 
farmers, white farmers and their workers were targeted.297 Additionally as already said, 
                                                 
290 Terence Ranger, “Introduction to Volume Two”, p 2. 
291 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Putting people first: from regime security to human security: A quest for 
Social Peace in Zimbabwe, 1980-2002” in http://ecalib.uneca.org/ipac20/ipac.jsp, Accessed 07 July 2009. 
292 See Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980”, p 152. 
293 David Moore, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The Zimbabwean crisis and the challenges for the left” in 
Journal of African Studies, vol32, no2, June 2006, p 3. 
294 Luise White, The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, pp 28 & 40. 
295 See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war; Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better for worse; 
Terence Ranger, “Introduction to volume two”; pp 5-6; Horace Cambell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe, this 
violence involved the need for food, clothes, money, labour and forced attendance of all night rallies from 
peasants by the guerrillas’ as well as the desire for what Ranger, p 5, describes as “monolithic unity”. 
296 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land in Zimbabwe, p 19. 
297 See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war, pp 102 & 104. 
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women and students were not spared by this violence. What was worse was that in the 
Second Chimurenga, there was a sharp binary drawn between supporters and enemies. 
Those who did not share similar views or did not openly identify with the movements 
were openly castigated, physically assaulted or even killed. The essence of this is 
encapsulated in the words of Dumiso Dabengwa in the 1960s that:  “[a]ny African who 
remains independent and does not take part in the common cause is as bad as a sell-out 
as the so called moderates […] Those who are not with us are against us.”298  
As Bhebe says, this may have been due to the failure of these movements to gain 
unquestioned popular appeal and to eradicate setbacks that could expose them to the 
settler forces.299 One may add that the overall goal that was sought by these nationalists 
was power. As such the elimination of barriers was a crucial stage towards the 
attainment of power. However, it is necessary to take into account research that has 
established that some of the violence ascribed to nationalists was perpetrated by unruly 
mujibhas and youth collaborators300, and by mhondoro agents on people who worked 
on rest days or chisi.301 What, nonetheless, comes out from both the nationalist and 
revisionist discourses, is that nationalist politics involved an element of coercion.  
Further regarding intolerance, as has been widely documented, there was also a general 
antagonism between the two main liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU. Name 
calling, jealousy, street skirmishes, open competition for supporters and financiers, 
mistrust and lack of cooperation characterized the operations of these movements. In 
this instance, following the split of ZANU from ZAPU in 1963, under rather acrimonious 
and sometimes ethnic terms, there were open clashes by the rank and file of these 
parties.302 Added to these there was open sloganeering against the other party. For 
                                                 
298 Dumiso Dabengwa, the Chairman of the Bulawayo City League in 1961. He later became Intelligence 
Chief in ZIPRA and cabinet minister after the 1988 Unity Accord, quoted in The Bantu Mirror, cited in 
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Putting people first”, p 7. 
299 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, p 212. 
300 See Terence Ranger, Peasant consciousness, p 292. 
301 David Lan, Guns and rain, p 166. 
302 Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, p 12; See also, Terence Ranger, “Introduction to 
volume two”, p 6. 
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example, it was not uncommon to hear of slogans like “down with Nkomo”,303 or 
conversely down with Sithole and later Mugabe, when the two groups were supposed 
to be fighting for the same cause.  
Again, notwithstanding the occasional unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA, the two 
liberation armies often openly clashed. This was, for example at Mboroma in Zambia 
when ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI cadres fought each other,304 and also in Tanzania in the 
1970s, which was repeated in the assembly points inside Zimbabwe at the time of 
demobilization.305 According to Ranger, there seemed not enough room for plural 
nationalist political parties to co-exist. In his words: “under early colonialism there was 
room for only one church at a time, during the nationalist period there was room for 
only one political party at a time”, which accounted for violence and counter-violence 
between ZAPU and ZANU “that sought to establish “one-party regions.”306 The rupture 
of this intolerance was however to be in the gukurahundi in the early years of 
independence. In this conflict up to 20 000 people were killed.307  
While there are numerous discourses on the causes of gukurahundi, one dimension that 
has strong currency is that of perceiving the gukurahundi violence as a part of ZANU-
PF’s broader scheme to establish a one party system of some kind, “either a one party 
rule, or a single party constitution.”308 This resonated with the desire by African 
                                                 
303 See Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s guerrilla war, p 101.  
304 See Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980”, p 152. 
305 See Breaking the silence, p 45. 
306 See Terence Ranger, “Introduction to volume two”, p 7. 
307 There is no generally accepted figure of the casualties, but these range between 6000 and 20 000. See 
among others estimates Breaking the silence: A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland and the 
Midlands, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation, p xix, puts the 
figure at 30 000, while others give different estimates, for example, Terence Ranger, Voices from the 
rocks: Nature, culture and history in the Matopos hills of Zimbabwe, Baobab, Harare, 1999, Norma Kriger, 
Guerilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent politics, 1980-1987, and Richard Werbner, 
Tears of the dead: A social biography of an African family, Edinburgh  University Press, London, 1991. 
308 Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: politics, p 86. 
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liberation movements to want to be the “sole” and “authentic” representatives of the 
people.309  
The deployment of violence between ZANU and ZAPU in the 1970s and 1980s, again 
speaks to the Foucauldian notion of power as a relation of war in the sense that while 
there could have been an ethnic factor underwriting the split and the clashes, the 
violence was essentially meant to strategically advance the power goals and attain 
domination. Suffice it to say that both ZANU and ZAPU had in their rank and file 
members from the other ethnic groupings usually associated with the other.310 In this 
regard, for example, ZAPU although aligned with the Ndebele ethnic group contained 
some Shona, notably James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, and Joseph Musika, in key 
national positions. Conversely, there were also some Ndebele in influential positions in 
ZANU, such as Enos Nkala.  
Thus, the violence was meant as an instrument to drive up the support base. Initially, for 
ZANU it was meant to gain a foothold into the ZAPU strongholds, and for ZAPU, to retain 
its constituencies. Later, this inter-party nationalist violence was used for coercive 
recruitment of support, that is, to grow and better the one vis-à-vis the other that was 
crucial for future access to power. These were akin to “political struggles, the conflicts 
waged over power, with power, for power …” that Foucault outlines fought in 
“episodes, factions and displacements in the same war.”311 For the nationalist leaders, 
this was meant to “reinscribe through a form of unspoken warfare”312 the old relations 
of control by violent means. 
It is imperative to note, the “war” against opposition political parties, which started with 
the clashes between ZANU and ZAPU in the 1960s, whose legacy, as already discussed, 
was the deployment of violence on opposition party structures was reinvented against 
                                                 
309 Ibbo Mandaza, “The one party state and democracy in Southern Africa: towards a conceptual 
framework”, in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, eds, The one party state and democracy: The 
Zimbabwe debate, SAPES Books, Harare, 1991, p 27. 
310 See Luise White, The assassination of Chitepo, p 16. 
311 Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge, p 91. 
312 Ibid. 
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the opposition MDC in the post-1999 era.313 This was a way of fighting a larger and long 
running imperial battle, as already mentioned in ZANU-PF discourse, in which the MDC 
fronted a larger imperial force led by Britain, which ZANU-PF had defeated in 1980. A 
report of May 2010, by the IDASA, International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and 
the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), also established that intolerant politics were 
considered by ordinary women to be at the core of the violence in Zimbabwe.314  
At a crucial level, this hegemonic discourse legitimized ZANU-PF’s continued reign 
against a reduced support at the ballot based on its historic and heroic participation in 
the Second Chimurenga. This articulation sought, so says Foucault, to reify a “definite 
relation of forces that is established at a determinate, historically specifiable moment, in 
war and by war.”315 This sense of right to rule, so to speak, drawn from participating in 
the liberation war led the state security chiefs to abrogate themselves, as shown by 
their pronouncements on “suitable” presidential candidates in 2002 and 2008, the role 
of the arbiters of power in Zimbabwe. 
Another attribute of the nationalism that arose out of the 1960s and 1970s was the 
glorification of the leadership. Personalities like Nkomo and Mugabe became venerated 
and were addressed in highly celebratory names. In this regard, for example, Joshua 
Nkomo, was called Chibwechitedza (slippery stone) or Umdala wethu, “our leader and 
Father Zimbabwe).316 This hegemonic practice was also established in ZANU in which 
party slogans began to be closely linked with the personality of Mugabe.317 To this 
extent, all party slogans started with the declaration: Forward with comrade President 
Robert Mugabe, followed by Forward with ZANU.318 This was symbolic of the order of 
                                                 
313 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 62. 
314 See IDASA, ICTJ and RAU, Women, politics and the Zimbabwe crisis, May 2010, p 10. 
315 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p 90. 
316 Following his death in 1999, the national broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
Television (ZTV) churned out a lot of praiseworthy information about Joshua Nkomo even when he had 
been hunted down by ZANU-PF during the early years of independence. See Joshua Nkomo, The story of 
my life, for more on attempts at his life during the first decade of independence for being in the 
opposition. 
317 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist? p 255. 
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importance, first the leader, and the party second, which overall put the contribution of 
Mugabe at unparalleled levels in the liberation struggle.319 The tradition was carried into 
the post-independence era. While the order of sloganeering continued, Mugabe was 
elevated to the earthly sovereign “supreme leader”320 status in ZANU-PF songs and 
slogans. As an example, the Christian song “I will never cry if Jesus is there” was 
adulterated to “I will never cry if Mr Mugabe is there.”321 Further, the adaptation of 
religious songs as nationalist songs dates back also to the Second Chimurenga.322 It is 
necessary, however, to point out that the veneration of nationalist leaders was not 
limited to Zimbabwe, as it was the trend in many countries, including Nyerere, Kaunda, 
Kamuzu Banda, and Kwame Nkrumah who were constructed as divine kings of sorts. 
Despite the fact that African nationalism had many ills, we must, however, acknowledge 
that they incorporated emancipatory politics, which were crucial in the dismantling of 
settler colonialism in Zimbabwe. As Michael Neocosmos states, these emancipatory 
politics were centered on the universal notions of freedom, justice and equality, which 
were derived from pan-Africanism.323 Due to this universal appeal nationalist parties 
were then able to attract support that cut across the spectrum of gender, age, class, 
region, tribe and even race. Hence they became rallying points for an oppressed people. 
This is notwithstanding threats of violence or actual violence to force people to join.324 
The testimonies about how people were threatened into joining rallies and were 
sometimes forced to leave Sunday worship to attend nationalist meetings is evidence of 
this coercion.325 
                                                 
319 See Ezra Chitando, in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 275. 
320 See Kwanele Ona Jirira refers to this in “Gender, Politics and Democracy”, p 20. 
321 See Ezra Chitando, in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 275. 
322 See Maxwell, cited in Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-
1980”, p 158. 
323 See Michael Neocosmos, “Analysing political subjectivities: naming the post-developmental state in 
Africa today”, p 6, for a more detailed explanation of this.   
324 Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, “Introduction”, Becoming Zimbabwe, p 11. 
325 See Shimmer Chinodya, Harvest of Thorns, Heinemann, Oxford, 1989, pp75-76. Although his work is in 
a literary format, it provides a useful insight into the intolerance to competing though sometimes 
complementary institutions by the nationalist movements. 
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Broadly, by looking at the possible sources of the violence directed against women, I 
sought to emphasise the fact that the origins of the ill-treatment or violence against 
women in Zimbabwe cannot be located in one epoch. Neither can it be universalized or 
atemporalised. Rather it is situated in local and temporal conditions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The chapter has tried to sketch out the debates on the currency of the redistributive and 
the human rights violations discourses respectively concerning the militarized violence 
in new millennium Zimbabwe. Basically, I posited that overemphasising one over the 
other presents a narrowed, inadequate, and to some extent a misleading 
oversimplification of the violence.  By problematizing the two, I not only aimed to 
demonstrate their conceptual limitations, but I also wished to invoke a “third space” on 
the violence that is couched in more inclusive terms. In this regard, besides 
problematizing the two discourses, I integrated Foucault’s theory of power to further 
understand the militarised violence in Zimbabwe. Treating the contest for power in the 
first decade of the Third Millennium as the “continuation of war by other means” 
enabled the connections between the Second Chimurenga iniquities with the Third 
Chimurenga violence as it particularly affected women. This illuminated the 
construction of the MDC, workers, students and activist women as enemies of the 
nation who had to be eviscerated along war lines. This also shed more light on how  
ZANU-PF reverted to liberation war era coercive mobilisation tactics, such as the 
pungwes, bases, deployment of war veterans to spearhead election campaigns through 
farm and firm invasions, and also in the construction of the MDC and their supporters as 
a part of the larger imperial forces bent on the recolonisation of the country.  
Simultaneously, the violence of both the militarisation of the state and the land 
redistribution were constructed in ZANU-PF as part of the Third Chimurenga, hence 
were articulated as liberatory and emancipatory. In this register, the Third Chimurenga 
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representing the transfer of economic wealth and ownership of the means of 
production to the indigenous groups, marked the final stage in the liberation of the 
country following in the teleology of the earlier zvimurenga. It was thus supposed to 
deliver “mass justice”, in Mamdani terminology.326  
 
 
                                                 
326 See Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe.” 
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CHAPTER TWO: SHURUGWI AS A SITE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter tries to understand why Shurugwi witnessed so much political violence 
between 2000 and 2008, after it had managed to escape similar horrors that affected 
the other parts of the Midlands province in the earlier post-independence period.1 
Between 2000 and 2008, however, Shurugwi became one of the 83 constituencies that 
were engulfed in serious violence.2 The questions for me here include, firstly, why was 
Shurugwi a theatre of political violence when it had generally escaped these other 
episodes of post-colonial violence? Where did the violence take place? Sites of political 
violence included, but were not limited to, reinvented political bases, farms, gold 
panning sites, homes, bodies of women, and such public places as shopping centres, 
schools, police-camps, and village heads homesteads. Some of these sites are normally 
sacrosanct, but were turned into torture stations.  
 
Long term and short-term reasons coincided to produce the necessary conditions for 
this violence to happen in Shurugwi. The long-term reasons centre on the long-nurtured 
grievances over land shortages in the district, and these came to a boil when they were 
superimposed with the political opportunism of the fast track land reform programme 
(FTLRP). The FTLRP, I would like to argue, was a rather fortuitous and expedient political 
tool that led to much of the violence that was witnessed in the district. As will be 
                                                 
1 Other parts of the Midlands, notably Gokwe, Silobela, Zhombe and Lower Gwelo, together with large 
parts of the two Matebeleland provinces, witnessed the murderous gukurahundi episode between 1982 
and 1987. For details see Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Zimbabwe 
defence Force from 1980-2005”, in http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Evol_RevolOct05/Chapter13.pdf, 
Accessed 23 March 2011, especially p358, see also The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and The 
Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, Building Peace: A Report on the disturbances in 
Matebeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988, CCJP/LRF 1999. 
2 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth? Vol 2, 
2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011, 
p 119. 
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evinced it differed significantly from the other national moments of land invasions, not 
only in scale and intensity, but also in terms of the politics behind it. 
In addition to trying to understand why Shurugwi became a site for political violence in 
the post millennium period, this chapter also attempts to analyse the importance of pre-
modern spectacles of public punishments, in the Foucauldian sense, in the violence. By 
“pre-modern” I wish to denote forms of punishment that were used in previous 
centuries, as outlined by Foucault. These were torturing methods that focussed on the 
public display of corporeal punishment, such as chopping off hands, cutting out tongues 
or piercing them, breaking criminals alive and leaving them to die on the wheel, 
strangling, burning alive, having four horses pulling them in different directions, 
decapitation, floggings and branding.3 These differ from the more reticent and hidden 
forms that were developed from the start of the 19th century which, while causing 
bodily pain, were more aimed at punishing the soul.4  
As Foucault posits,  
from the point of view of the law that imposes it, public torture and execution 
must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its triumph. The very excess 
of the violence employed is one of the elements of its glory: the fact that the 
guilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a shameful side-
effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its force. Hence 
no doubt those tortures that take place even after death: corpses burnt, ashes 
thrown to the winds, bodies dragged on hurdles and exhibited at the roadside. 
Justice pursues the body beyond all possible pain.5  
 This public spectacle was necessary to dissuade the rest of the population from 
committing similar crimes in the future, because “men will remember [the] public 
exhibition, the pillory, [the] torture and pain duly observed.”6  In the violence that beset 
Zimbabwe, some of the “torture as techniques of pain”7 was employed, for almost the 
                                                 
3 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage 
Books, New York, 1998, p 32. 
4 Ibid, p 16. 
5 Ibid, p 34. 
6 Ibid, p 34, 
7 Ibid. 
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same reasons. For Shurugwi it was to dissuade people from identifying with and from 
supporting the MDC. By the public “display of violence or threat of violence” ZANU-PF 
sought to create “visible deterrence”, and to make the supporting of the MDC a part of 
the “spaces of fear”, in the sense argued by Pete Shirlow.8 Spaces of fear are defined as 
“spaces that hold a threat to life, or are simply unsafe to go.”9 Taken forward, the 
spaces of fear impact on everyday interactions and may lead to self-policing, and 
communal surveillance.10     
                            
THE LAND ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE11 
Land problems have undergirded the district since the colonisation of the country, and 
land remained a “lingering issue”, in Charles Kabwete Mulinda’s terminology.12 More 
                                                 
8 See Pete Shirlow, cited in Nils Zurawski, “’I know where you live’- Aspects of watching, surveillance, and 
social control in a conflict zone (Northern Ireland)”, in Surveillance and society, 2 (4), p 502, in 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org, Accessed 28 May 2012. 
9 See Nils Zurawski, Ibid, p 502. 
10 Ibid. Communal surveillance involves members of the community watching out for those that do not 
belong, that is, outsiders. 
11 Literature abounds on the issue of the historic inequalities in terms of land appropriations and 
inequalities of ownership between races for Zimbabwe. Key of these include: Robin Palmer, Land and 
Racial Domination in Zimbabwe, Heinemann, London, 1977. Despite this I wish to also draw on this to 
establish how Shurugwi district was affected. This is aimed at providing a useful background to the 
ecological factors that predisposed Shurugwi district to the post 2000 violence by looking at the 
connections between long term land problems and the post millennium violence. I also seek to transcend 
the binary discourses on land that have emerged, which have polarised, not only Zimbabwe’s politics, but 
also Zimbabwe’s academic circles. Broadly, these have been the school that is pro-redistribution and 
secondly, the school that tries to put individual rights violations at the centre. For Shurugwi, the violence 
between 2000 and 2008 was largely around land and fought also on a large scale on the farms where 
thousands sought to acquire a piece of resettlement land. Whilst the district might have escaped other 
post-independence era violence, like the farm invasions of the 1990s, for example, the Svosve case, it still 
shared in their problem of inadequate land. The key to this presentation is that the land problems faced in 
the district were not unique, but there were moments in them that made Shurugwi “special”. The most 
notable of this was the adoption of the policy of centralisation in the district from 1929. Noteworthy also 
is the fact that it was on the basis of land shortage and demands that the violence of the post 2000 was 
largely fought in Shurugwi district. 
12 See Charles Kabwete Mulinda, “A space for genocide: Local Authorities, local population and local 
histories in Gishamvu and Kibayi (Rwanda), Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of the Western 
Cape, September 2010.  
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importantly, land shortages fed into the structural violence against the locals.13 The 
racially-based, skewed land distribution patterns created structural inequalities and 
hence structural violence that demanded recourse in an equitable redistribution of that 
important resource. Building on the meaning of structural violence discussed in Chapter 
One, Assefa, cited in Nelson Marongwe, sums up the impact of this violence as leading 
to the generation of “repression, abject poverty, malnutrition and starvation for some 
members of society while others enjoy opulence and unbridled power.”14 Erin 
Mccandless also argues similarly and says:  
[t]he land tenure context upon which the land occupations [2000s] were 
predicated was one of extreme structural violence. In the absence of serious 
movement on land redistribution through willing-seller, willing-buyer 
approaches and numerous efforts to negotiate a way forward with both national 
actors and the donor community, it was only a matter of time before the 
situation would erupt into crisis.15  
As a result of this, time and again nationalist mobilisation has been around land 
shortages in the district, as in other many other rural districts of Zimbabwe. In this 
regard, nationalists consistently, and rightly so, hammered on the negative impact of 
white settler land expropriations most notably the creation of reserves, which have 
been described as having been unfit for human settlement.16 Besides their smallness, 
poor soils and low rainfall, the reserves were also set far away from railways and 
markets, with the result that they became factories for the rural poverty and the 
                                                 
13 For a pithy discussion of structural violence, see Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Picador, 
New York, 2008, pp 1-2, who says structural violence as violence rooted in economic, political and social 
systems of selective inclusion and exclusion. 
14 Assefa, in Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in 
Zimbabwe”, p 160. 
15 See Erin MacCandless, “Transforming and preventing polarisation by embracing strategy dilemmas: An 
outsider’s view on lessons from Zimbabwe”, in http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1042/transforming-
and-preventing-polarization/, Accessed 02 June 2011. See also Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and 
occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe”, p 157, for a similar argument. 
16 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1984, p 14. 
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proletarianisation of Africans.17 They also formed the earliest pillars for the economic 
and social differentiation in colonial Zimbabwe.18  
As shall be discussed below, the explosive issue of land in Shurugwi was epitomised by 
the selection of the district to pilot the centralisation scheme. This policy was extended 
to the rest of the reserves as the Native Land Husbandry Act in 1951. Basing on the 
annual Native Commissioners’ reports on Shurugwi in the late 1920s,19 it can be 
reasonably argued that the acute land problems led to the policy of centralisation. In 
turn, the introduction of centralisation provides an important genealogy for subsequent 
land-related problems for Shurugwi.   
The settler policy of creating “reserves” (hereinafter without quotation marks) dating 
back to the Gwaai and Shangani reserves following the defeat of the Ndebele in the 
Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893, engineered land problems for Shurugwi. This policy was 
extended to the whole of the country after the 1896-7 risings. For Shurugwi, it can be 
traced to the 1898 Orders in Council, which stated that “the Council shall assign to the 
natives land sufficient for their occupation, whether as tribes or portions of tribes, and 
suitable for agriculture and pastoral requirements.”20 As Chitiyo rightly points out, this 
was a euphemism for resettling Africans in reserves.21 These reserves, as Moyana 
advances, were mainly intended to absorb the excess African population that could not 
be accommodated in the European sectors.22 And, true to this, 60 reserves including 
Shurugwi were created by 1905,23 with their persistent land shortages.  
                                                 
17 Ibid, pp 16, 39, & 40-41. 
18 Ibid, p 51. 
19 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Reports of Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe, 1926, 1928, and 1929. 
20 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation: reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s land and 
war veterans debate” in Centre for Conflict Resolution, Vol 9, No 1, May 2000, in 
www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
21 Tapera Knox Chitiyo, Ibid. 
22 Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land, p 41. 
23 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”. 
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Because Shurugwi district faced acute shortages of land it was thus no coincidence that 
it was chosen to pilot the centralisation scheme in 1929.24 This followed the period 
between 1923 and 1928 which saw a dramatic rise in the population in the reserve of 
Shurugwi. In fact the African population more than doubled in these five years from 5 
400 to 11 400.25 By 1934, the population in the reserve had further increased by a 
further 32,5 percent to 16 889.26 This rapid growth of population followed the streaming 
of people into the reserve following the introduction of a land tax for Africans staying on 
European land from 1907,27 and the recommendations of the 1914-1915 Native Lands 
Commission/Reserves Commission that actually reduced the size of African reserves 
dramatically. 
This move has to be seen in the wider context of the failure by the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) to find the second rand-belt. It was also a part of the settler policy of 
coercive expropriation of the means of production. As part of the attraction to join the 
invasion group organised by the BSAC, the “Pioneer Column”, the settlers had been 
promised both free land and mining rights. With regards to land, they were promised 3 
175 acres of free land, and because of the failure to find the “Second Rand” many began 
to settle the land.28 As a result of this, some 4 737 white farmers had settled the land 
nationally by 191429, which necessitated the setting up of the 1914 Native Reserves 
Commission which recommended an ordinance to push Africans out of the European-
designated areas. From 1912 the BSAC also began to encourage white farmers to occupy 
their farms, and began to seriously enforce the one pound per year fee introduced in 
                                                 
24 See Eira Kramer, “A clash of economies: Early centralisation efforts in colonial Zimbabwe, 1929-1935”, 
in ZAMBEZIA, XXV (i), 1998, p 83, cited in msu.archive.ac.zw, accessed 11 February 2011. 
25 See JoAnn Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology: An historical study of 
woodland use in Shurugwi communal area, Zimbabwe”, Doctoral thesis, Loughborough University of 
Technology, September 1991, in https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/, Accessed 14 March 2012, p 83, where she 
cites the annual reports of the Native Commissioners; see Annual figures from Native Commissioner 
Selukwe, Annual Reports 1923 to 1928, ZNA, S235/500. 
26 See NAZ, S235/513, Report of the NC, Selukwe, 1934. 
27 See Eira Kramer, “Early years: Extension Services in peasant agriculture in colonial Zimbabwe”, 
ZAMBEZIA, XXIV, (ii), p162, cited in msu.archive.ac.zw, accessed 15 February 2011. 
28 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land in Zimbabwe, p 43. 
29 See Robin. Palmer, “Aspects of Rhodesia land Policy 1890-1936” in Central African Historical Association 
Pamphlet, Local Series, no22, p 7, for a nuanced discussion. 
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1907 on Africans who sought to remain on European land.30  The post-World War One 
depression also encouraged Africans settled on “unalienated” land to also move to the 
reserves because it was increasingly becoming uneconomic to continue paying the land 
tax against the backdrop of reducing maize prices.31 
For Shurugwi, this was the period when Chief Banga, who had been forced to abandon 
the Mashava area, that is the area that eventually became the Tokwe Ranch with his 
two headmen, Mhangami and Pisirayi, and about 2000 of his subjects, settled in the 
south-west part of Selukwe district, around 1924.32 Overall, this led to increased 
pressure on the reserve of Selukwe. In addition to this, fifty-four (54) small scale farms 
were also established for the successful Africans to the East and South-East of the 
district, in the Jobolinko-Rockford area and in the Gamwa area, respectively, following 
the Land Apportionment Act33 adding to the already worse population situation. I was 
also informed that due to the establishment of the Jobolinko small scale farms, chief 
Nhema’s subjects under headmen Mudzengi and Tinhira were relocated in the early 
1930s into areas formerly reserved for grazing, further congesting these areas.   
Centralisation, which was piloted in Selukwe reserve, was defined by Alvord, its chief 
architect and ideologue, as a system that consolidated and demarcated grazing areas 
from arable lands in the rural areas. These (grazing and arable lands) were to be 
separated by a line of homesteads.34 Under centralisation, “…people under headmen 
[had] to centralise their scattered crop lands together into large arable blocs and to set 
aside large stretches of other land to be used as communal grazing lands where cattle 
can graze freely during the growing season. Then, after the crops are harvested the 
cattle could graze freely in the arable areas to clean up crop residue for a month or two 
                                                 
30 See Eira Kramer, “Early Extension services”, p 162. 
31 Ibid, p 162. 
32 See NAZ, S2929/7/6, Delineation Reports General: Selukwe District, and also Macgregor, Ibid, p83. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Alvord’s official designation was Agriculturalist for the instruction of the Natives from 1926 to the mid-
1950s.  
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while the grazing land had a rest.”35 The basic stated and official aim of centralisation 
was to improve agricultural production, both cattle production and crop production. The 
African agricultural methods which at times were based on shifting cultivation, scattered 
fields, scattered grazing lands and dispersed settlement pattern were perceived as 
outdated, wasteful, and harmful to the environment.  
On the whole, centralisation ushered in wholesale and arbitrary alterations. First, it did 
away with dispersed settlement pattern with their emphasis on grazing and crop 
cultivation in close proximity. In its place fields and grazing were consolidated, while 
homesteads were put in single lines ending dispersed settlement. In addition, the 
emphasis on manuring and intensive crop rotation exerted tremendous labour 
requirements from the residents. In sum, its forced introduction ushered in radical 
social reorganisation of human labour and settlement patterns, as well as the reordering 
of access to land and land usage. 
However, the hidden aim was to “… avoid, as far as possible, the necessity for 
acquisition of more land for native occupation.”36 This was to be through promoting 
intensive crop cultivation, which entailed the use of agricultural demonstrators37, 
manure, and four-course crop rotation based on the Norfolk traditions; the adoption 
and extensive use of the plough; as well as allocating adequate pastures for the cattle. 
And, it was to be on this basis that “the foundation of permanent agriculture for the 
African [was to be] based”, that is, on cattle production and crop cultivation.38 Suffice to 
also say, at this point, that this policy of centralisation first tested in Shurugwi together 
                                                 
35 E.D Alvord, “The gospel of the plough or guided destiny”, Unpublished Autobiography of Emory D 
Alvord Unpublished 1950, cited in Eira Kremer, “A clash of economies”, p 91. 
36 CNC, Annual Report for 1932, cited in Michael Drinkwater, “Technical development and peasant 
impoverishment: Land use policy in Zimbabwe’s Midlands province” in Journal of Southern African 
Studies, Vol 15, no2, Special issue on the politics of conservation in Southern Africa, p 293, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable2636804, Accessed 14 February 2011. 
37 Demonstrators referred to African extension workers whose primary role involved imparting practical 
agricultural methods and skills. They had specific terms of reference, see NAZ, S138/72 “Appointment, 
duties and instructions in connection with Native farming demonstrators”, for more details. 
38 See NAZ, S2386, E.D Alvord, “Agricultural Position in Reserves, Selukwe Reserve-Report of the 
Agriculturalist for Natives”, 1943. 
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with its central, rational and rather impractical, ethos of improving techniques of 
farming by the Africans, instead of availing more land; was extended, modified and 
adapted to other districts under the Land Husbandry Act codified in 1951. It was also to 
be the central nervous system of all “Native” agricultural planning for the entire 
duration of the colonial governmentality, and arguably into the first two decades of 
post-independence.39  
Hence, like other settler policies, centralisation remained in its rational mode, especially 
as the African population in the reserve continued to grow, through natural increase 
and through inflows of those Africans ejected from European areas. Annual reports by 
the NCs illuminate the predicament. For example in 1926 an NC wrote: “[i]n this district 
the only reserve is, even today, very thickly populated and the present occupants 
complain of having insufficient ground for cultivation and grazing.”40 The same was 
repeated in 1929 when the NC stated again that “from the figures relating to the 
population and stock on the reserve at any disposal it was apparent to me that under 
the system in vogue the reserve was overcrowded- in fact I marvelled that so large a 
number of people were able under the conditions to be self-supporting.”41 It should also 
be said that it was on this basis that the NC also vociferously called for agricultural 
demonstrators to try to contain degradation in the face of overflowing population.42 
                                                 
39 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe”, p 
156. See also, Michael Drinkwater, “Technical Development and Peasant Impoverishment”, pp 289 and 
295, for a pithy discussion on the continuities between the colonial agricultural policies and those 
adopted in the post-independence period, especially during the “First Five Year Development Plan” from 
1986 to 1990. His discussion enables us to go beyond understanding “colonial law” simply as based on 
coercion and discrimination, but to also understand it also as functioning to represent the 
“transformation which occurred in the nature, role and power of the state.” He goes on to say “It left the 
state at independence as the dominant source of power in the country and its generally centralised 
institutions in the habit of exercising this power through purposive-rational action. Those who work for 
the state institutions are trained and socialised into the language of goals, policies, programmes and 
plans, and hence accept as normal that bureaucracies should function according to a purposive 
rationality.” (p 289). John L Comaraff, “Colonialism, culture and the law: A foreword”, in Law and Spring 
Inquiry, American Bar Foundation, 2001, p 4, weighs in and says colonial legal tools were also “…languages 
of practice; symbolic and ritual systems; abstract principles for the production of social order, citizenship, 
and subjugation; and immanent material realities. And a lot more.” 
40 NAZ, S235/504, Report of Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe, 1926. 
41 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1929. 
42 NAZ, S235/504, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1926. 
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Alvord also alluded to this fact when he wrote in 1928 that: “Selukwe Reserve at present 
is an old worn out Native lands, heavily populated and greatly overstocked with 
cattle”.43  
This situation was made worse by the consummation of the Land Apportionment Act of 
1930, which resulted in the second major streaming of Africans into the reserves. The 
Native Commissioner for Selukwe wrote: “Considerable number of natives reside on the 
alienated farms and crown lands in this district specified in schedule 5 of the act for 
whom provision will have to be made when the allotted time arrives for their removal 
from these areas.”44 This repeated an earlier similar observation by the Native 
Commissioner for Selukwe in 1921, who wrote that “a considerable amount of crown 
land has recently been taken over by European farmers and it is estimated that about 
50% of the Natives residing thereon moved to the reserves, the balance remaining on 
the farms.”45 This is the balance that continued to trek especially to the reserve and at 
times back to the European farms for either work or to seek settlement.  
On balance, Shurugwi reserve fared much worse compared to other reserves. The size 
of the reserve stood at 76 000 morgen,46 which translates to 152 000 acres. This was to 
be shared by about 19 889 people by 1934.47 This translated to about 9 acres per 
person. The above shows the seriousness of the land problem in the district when 
compared to the national average of 30,49 acres per person in the reserves.48 
                                                 
43 See NAZ, SRGI/INT4, Annual Report of Agriculturalist, 1928. 
44 NAZ, S235/508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1929. 
45 NAZ, N/1/24, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1921. 
46 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Reports of Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe, 1929. 
47 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Reports of Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe ,1934. 
48 See Henry V Moyana, The political economy of land in Zimbabwe, p 47. 
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To make matters worse, the reserve of Shurugwi was endowed with poor sandy soils, 
which derive from the parent granite rock.49 The Native Commissioner reiterated this 
when he wrote to the Superintendent of Natives in 1931:  
[t]he Selukwe Reserve, pure sandveld throughout, is far too small for the Natives 
settled therein, and this position is accentuated by the wasteful methods of 
Native agriculture. There being no more land available, we are obliged to meet 
the constant applications of these natives to settle elsewhere by endeavouring 
to cut down the wastage to an absolute minimum, and utilise every available 
yard of the reserve by an undertaking which to my mind is rendered possible by 
this scheme alone.50 
 In this report, the Native Commissioner highlights two important and related issues. 
These are, firstly, the poor soils in the reserve, and secondly, overcrowding. It is also 
crucial to point out that while the centralisation programme had a measure of 
temporary success in the district in terms of mitigating against land shortages, which it 
was supposed to solve permanently, it was nonetheless inadequate as a long term 
strategy. As Kremer plausibly argues, once the Land Apportionment Act was effected 
the ethos of centralisation, that of reducing land shortages, was defeated because “the 
carrying capacity of the reserves needed to be increased to accommodate all those 
entering them”51. Related also is the fact that as the population increased in the reserve 
the balance was lost because of the further subdivisions of the plots among the male 
children.52 Still Alvord remained completely fixed in his rational ideas that improving 
native agriculture would solve the attendant problems of overcrowding, land 
degradation and land shortage. As he would say in 1948 “[…] to give Natives now on 
                                                 
49 See Victor Madebwe and Crescentia Madebwe, “An exploratory analysis of social, economic and 
environmental impacts on wetlands: the case of Shurugwi district, Midlands province, Zimbabwe” in 
Journal of Applied Sciences research, 1 (2), 2005, p 229. 
50 NAZ, S1007/7, Miscellaneous, Selukwe Reserve, NC, Selukwe to Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 
3/2/31. 
51 Eira Kramer,“A clash of economies”, p 86.  See also  Eira Kramer, “Early extension services”, citing E. 
Tawse-Jollie, “Native land tenure in Africa”, American Geographical Society, Pioneer Settlement 
Cooperative Studies, 14, 1932, in “Early extension services”, p 163, points to the population pressure 
impact of the Land apportionment Act, that of squeezing a massive 300 000 Africans into the reserves 
after the act abolished rent and labour agreements between white farmers and African peasants in 
European land areas , which triggered a second massive exodus from the areas demarcated for white 
agriculture into the reserve. 
52 Ibid, pp 93-95. 
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Reserves more land at present would be most unwise. They would only ruin it and 
destroy its fertility in the same manner as they have already done on the land they 
already have. For them the solution is not to be heard in more land but in better farming 
the existing land.”53  
One could argue then that the actual basis for the implementation of centralisation and 
its subsequent rolling out in other districts of the country shepherded by Alvord during 
the years of the infamous Separate Development and Partnership/Cooperation of Prime 
Minister Godfrey Huggins,54 with their pillars the Land Apportionment Act, 1930, the 
1951 Land Husbandry Act, and the 1969 Land Tenure Act, was to deny Africans in the 
reserves more land based on an argument for unachievable scientific-technical 
standards of mixed farming. This comes out clearly in the words of the Prime Minister 
Coughlan who posited that “this [Rhodesia] is essentially a country where the white 
man has come and desires to stay, and he can only be certain of doing so if he has 
certain portions of the country made his exclusively.”55 Alvord also stated clearly that  
on the reserves we are trying to induce the people to centralise their arable 
lands and set aside permanent grazing lands for their cattle. It is not our 
intention to necessarily encourage greater production, but rather reduce the 
area under cultivation and to encourage better methods on smaller lands in 
order that people may grow sufficient for their needs and more land maybe 
available for grazing purposes.56  
It was on the basis of such fallacious thoughts therefore that the settler government at 
times turned to force and coercion to make Africans comply with the strict land use and 
conservation demands. This contrasted significantly with the policy regarding white 
farmers, who besides being allocated huge tracts of land, had the benefits of 
“experimental stations, free expert advice, credit facilities, provision of fertilisers, seeds 
                                                 
53 E.D Alvord, “The Progress of Native agriculture in Southern Rhodesia”, in The New Rhodesia, 15, 1948, 
pp 18-19. 
54 Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla war, pp 89-90. 
55 Prime Minister Coughlan’s contribution to the House of Assembly debates in 1927, cited in Victor EM 
Machingaidze, “Agrarian Change from above: The southern Rhodesia Native Land Husbandry Act and 
African Response” in The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol24, No3, 1991, cited in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/219092, accessed 14 February 2011, pp 558-559. 
56 NAZ, Report of Agriculturalist for the instruction of Natives to Chief Agriculturalist, 1/4/30. 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
 
 
 
and stock at subsidised cost, irrigation works” and better roads.57 Moreover, the white 
farmers benefitted from better prices at the market.58 
 In interviews, the elderly people have vivid memories of the nhamo yemakandiwa 
(enforced contour ridge regime) as a result of the 1951 Land Husbandry Act.59 One 
interviewee stands out on this issue when he told me that agricultural demonstrators 
asked the late interviewee’s father to lie across the contour ridge as a way to denote the 
width that was required of the contour ridge.60 Although he was possibly exaggerating, 
what I managed to figure out from this and other interviews is that the contour ridges 
had to be wide and meticulously maintained all the time, which exerted a great demand 
for manual labour from the Africans. Mcgregor has too established that one colonial 
Land Development Officer for Selukwe, Mr Fisher, required that the width of these 
contour ridges be wide enough for him to drive his land rover.61  
Crucially, the issue raised above feeds into a trans-Africa colonial land conservation 
regime that was based on skewed perceptions to arrest land wasting in African areas.62 
It also speaks to the humiliations that Africans suffered under some colonial authorities. 
These contour ridges and the deep ridging plough, which for Shurugwi were colonial 
“inventions”, represent at another level the deeper penetration of the environment 
which symbolised the deeper penetration of colonialism. This also showed the excesses 
of the exercise of state power.63 
                                                 
57 See Giovanni Arrighi, cited in Terence Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970, p 112. 
58 Terence Ranger, Ibid, p 112. 
59 Nhamo yemakandiwa is the common term used to describe the excruciating labour demands that 
people went through in the digging and preservation of contour ridges. One of Zimbabwe’s Chimurenga 
and anti-oppressionist singer Thomas Mapfumo has sung a song about “nhamo yemakandiwa”. 
60 Interview with Mr Shumba, 28 May 2010. 
61 See Joann Macgregor, “Woodland resources: Ecology, policy and ideology”, p 114. 
62 See Grace Carswell, “Continuities in environmental narratives: the case of Kabale, Uganda, 1930-2000”, 
in Environment and History, No 1, February 2003, in http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/3143. 
Accessed 15 June 2012, for a discussion on Uganda. 
63 See Joann Macgregor, “Woodland resources: Ecology, policy and ideology”, p 114. 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 
 
 
Besides altering the land tenure, the centralisation project also had far-reaching 
implications for the general culture of the people of Shurugwi. In this way, the need to 
survive on smaller, intensively worked areas demanded more labour per unit of 
production, manuring and crop rotation. Indeed, centralisation and other technical-
scientific policies like the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 reinforced wholesale 
transformations of the villagers’ lives. They reconfigured the physical landscapes 
through the strict observance of mixed farming, as well as introducing new relations in 
Shurugwi that entailed the ending of communal land ownership, the introduction of 
small individualised landholding,64 and compulsory destocking.65 The policy measures 
were also indirectly aimed at extracting African labour for the settler capital economic 
sectors, notably industry, mining, agriculture; as well as domestic labour needs.66  
By depriving Africans of adequate land, centralisation, in its various faces, transformed 
the relationship that African males had with land. All men were “traditionally” supposed 
to acquire their own piece of land upon marriage, and under conditions of limited 
access due to overpopulation, the young were “cut off from the possibility of ever 
owning land.”67 And, due to this fear of being cut off from the land that drove many to 
come back from towns into the already heavily populated areas or to engage in 
nationalist politics to confront the Rhodesian state.68 
Because of land problems, that is, shortage, degradation and poor quality, it was thus 
not surprising that the rallying point of African nationalism in Shurugwi, and the rest of 
the rural areas in colonial Zimbabwe, was the Land Husbandry Act of 1951. In Shurugwi, 
the basis of this was the resistance to centralisation by Chiefs Nhema and Banga.69 
There were also reports of “freedom ploughing” where residents went against the law 
                                                 
64 For a detailed discussion of this see also Willam Wolmer and Ian Scoones, “Agriculture: The mixed 
farming discourse in Zimbabwe”, African Affairs, (2000), 99, cited in 
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/99/397/575.full.pdf, accessed 12 February 2011. 
65 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 35. 
66 See Robin.R Palmer, Land and racial discrimination in Rhodesia, Heinemann, London, 1977, for a pithy 
discussion of this. 
67 See Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”, p 571. 
68 Ibid, p 571. 
69 See JoAnn Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology”, p 87. 
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to allocate themselves plots even in unsuitable or in crown areas.70 However, these 
chiefs were later “won over” to accepting it.71 Africans grew to realise that efforts at 
centralisation and the well-packaged project of the Land Husbandry Act were rooted in 
discrimination and coercion by the colonial state.72 This was so because whilst the 
colonial government provided monetary and other incentives to the white farmers to 
help improve their agriculture, black farmers met with various forms of coercion and 
punishments to solve the problems that emerged from their agricultural activities.73  
Coercion, which was meant to ensure compliance, was carried out by the various 
government officials including the demonstrators, chiefs, African police and 
messengers.74 In other words they (Africans) were supposed to miraculously make the 
concept of modernisation work in the absence of adequate land. The land size allocated 
to blacks as a variable remained unchanged, or was reduced due to natural increase in 
population, as the other variable, in the form of population growth, increased 
considerably. On land deprivations, Yudelman quoted in Machingaidze posited, for 
example, that about 70 percent of the 32 900 square miles in Rhodesia that comprised 
the area suitable for intensive production had been set aside for European agriculture.75  
This overall made the target of modernising African agriculture untenable, political and 
to some extent populist-rational talk. What instead happened was that the land in 
Shurugwi became so overworked and overextended that agricultural production 
became difficult. The settler government was aware of these problems, and was also 
particularly aware of the value Africans attached to their land. Another sign of the 
                                                 
70 See S235/505-508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1927. 
71 JoAnn Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology”, p 97. 
72 See Joann Mcgregor, “Conservation, control and ecological change: The Politics and ecology of Colonial 
conservation in Shurugwi”, in Environment and History, vol1, no3, October 1995, pp 257-279. 
73 Joann Mcgregor, Ibid, pp 257-279.  See also Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation” 
says coercion also included the forced construction of pasture furrows’ road contour drains, gully control 
measures, tree planting and fencing of area deemed critical. 
74 See Terence O Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and guerrilla war in Zimbabwe: A comparative study, 
James Currey, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985, p 30 See also comments of Alvord cited in Victor EM 
Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”, p 560 that called for the use of force to make African 
farmers fully comply with the tenets of the act. 
75 See Yudelman cited in Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”, p 559, for more details. 
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attachment the people of Shurugwi reserve had with the land came from the fact that 
some chose to seek employment only in the agricultural off season.76 This was mainly to 
raise the cash for the taxes. Alvord, ironically, was acutely aware of this and he wrote: 
“These people are essentially agriculturalists. They are of the earth, earthly. Agriculture 
to the Native is not an occupation or a trade- it is more of life.”77 Yet he still proceeded 
with the theme of agricultural modernisation as opposed to a programme that 
simultaneously also availed more land in the reserves. Thus while there was a basis for 
technical-scientific methods of farming, there was clearly a need for an increase in the 
size of land in the district. 
In interviews and discussions with residents of rural Shurugwi, I was made aware of land 
conflicts over both grazing areas and arable lands between villages and also between 
people from the same villages.78 For example, I heard of feuds between Mvura villagers 
and those from Mapfumo; Chivi village and those from Muguzumbi; as well as those 
from Gambe village fighting constantly those from Manungo village over grazing and 
arable lands. Of note is the fact that where a village’s arable land stopped, the 
neighbouring villages’ arable or grazing land started.79 Without properly fixed 
boundaries in the form of fences, but only physical landmarks, such demarcations 
became difficult to maintain.80  
There were also constant problems between villagers and white farmers whose farms 
were on village edges. In this regard, for example, some peasants lost cattle that strayed 
into neighbouring farms. People from Marira village told how they lost cattle and or 
                                                 
76 NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of the NC, Selukwe, 1928. 
77 See E.D Alvord, “Agricultural demonstration on Native Reserves”, Department of Native Development, 
Southern Rhodesia, occasional paper no3, 1931, p 5. 
78 Information obtained from interviews. This also accords with Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and 
compensation” established that “there were also serious boundary disputes between villages. The period 
1961-1968 saw an upsurge in land disputes brought before chiefs for mediation, as well as an increase in 
fights vetween individuals and families over land.” 
79 Based on personal interviews and discussions I held in the district between December 2009 and July 
2010.  
80 Interview with a Councillor. These also came up in several other discussions and interviews I had with 
elderly residents of Shurugwi. 
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goats that strayed into Muponda farm. If they did not lose their cattle or goats they 
would be thoroughly beaten by the farmer himself or his workers. At other times they 
said were made to pay hefty fines by Muponda. Eventually the villagers nicknamed the 
farmer Muponda, meaning murderer, because of the harsh way he related with the 
neighbouring villagers.   
As intimated above, the Land Husbandry Act had the unintended effect (on the 
government’s part) of stirring African nationalism in the early 1950s. The leading figure 
was Benjamin Burombo. Based in Bulawayo, Burombo was one of the founding fathers 
of Zimbabwean nationalism through the British African Voice Association (BAVA), which 
tried to combine rural and urban grievances.81 After the BAVA, the other urban-based 
movements also connected urban with rural grievances. These were the (United) African 
National Congress (ANC), and later the National Democratic Party NDP), the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In this 
regard African nationalists like George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, Edison Sithole, 
Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, among others, articulated combined urban and 
rural African grievances into the emerging African nationalism against minority rule in 
the then Southern Rhodesia.82  
Sarcastically summing the “positive” impact the Land Husbandry Act had on African 
nationalism, George Nyandoro said it had been “the best recruiter Congress (ANC) ever 
had.”83 The early successes of these movements against the Land Husbandry Act were 
seen in their banning as movements or their proscription from rural areas where they 
were accused by the colonial Native officials of undermining governance. To this end 
due to the conscientisation activities of these early movements rural people began to 
undertake various forms of passive resistance against government officers. In this 
                                                 
81 Ngwabi Bhebe, Benjamin Burombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-58, College Press, Harare, 1989, 
p 100; see also Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s 
land and war veterans debate”, in CCR, Vol 9, No 1, May 2000, accessed 1 March 2011. 
82 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The Zapu and Zanu Guerrilla Warfare, pp 10-11 , and also Victor EM Machingaidze, 
“Agrarian change from above”, p 580. 
83 George Nyandoro quoted in Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”, p 582. 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
 
 
 
regard it was reported that people would disrupt government officials meetings in rural 
areas, ridicule agricultural advisors, demonstrators and chiefs; engage in civil 
disobedience against government instructions; burn dip tanks and engage in “freedom 
ploughing”, which entailed cultivation in unauthorised places.84  
 Whilst these early nationalist movements of the early 1950s tried to link urban 
grievances with rural land grievances their impact in Shurugwi is not well documented. 
While there is this paucity in written accounts especially linking land problems in the 
district to the rise of African nationalism, it would be plausible to estimate that the 
district, one of the worst affected by land shortages going by the adoption of 
centralisation and reports of colonial officials, could not have escaped the connections. 
The “brutalising”85 effects of centralisation which were worsened by the Land 
Apportionment Act and its sequel the Land Husbandry Act should surely have conspired 
to generate some link. In fact the resistance by the chiefs Nhema and Banga to 
centralisation, that we discussed earlier, also strengthens such an assumption. 
It would appear, however, that there were other various forms of uncoordinated 
individualised resistance in the district, which nonetheless were centred on confronting 
land shortages. There was no widespread peasant consciousness in Shurugwi in the 
mode as explained by Terence Ranger.86  Instead, the locals confronted the colonial 
power through tax evasions, avoidance of labour,87  freedom ploughing which entailed 
“injudicious settlement and cultivation of lands”,88 and voluntary emigration to the less 
                                                 
84 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1927. See also, Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian 
change from above”, p581-583. Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”, also describes 
this phenomena at great length in this article. 
85 Henry V Moyana, uses the term widely in The political economy of land in Zimbabwe. 
86 See Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness  and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, A 
Comparative Study, London, James Currey, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1985, 
p177, who posits for a generalised peasant awareness and response to white settler colonial activities. 
Thus, while Shurugwi peasants were aware of their predicament, they nonetheless responded differently 
and there is no evidence of uniform forms of resistances. 
87 See Joann Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology”, p 83. 
88 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1927. 
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populated areas such as Gokwe, Silobela and Nembudziya.89 In yet other cases they 
loaned out their cattle under the system of kuronzera to avoid compulsory destocking 
that also accompanied the Land Husbandry Act.90 This is akin to what Gramsci has 
described as “negative rather than positive class position.”91  
Of note is that the Land Husbandry Act became the watershed of the centralisation 
policy, whence from it was universalised to all the other rural areas of the country. We 
ought also to recall that the Land Husbandry Act was invoked against the background of 
intensive post World War Two white settlement in the country which put further 
pressure on the land, and on the reserves. The policy of attracting European settlement, 
regarded as marking a “second colonisation” of Rhodesia, resulted in new annual settler 
figures of about 14 000 per year towards the end of the 1940s and early 1950s.92 As a 
consequence the white population rose dramatically, almost tripling, from 80 500 in 
1945 to 219 000 in 1960.93 Of more significance is that the population of white farmers 
in Zimbabwe nearly doubled in this period from 4673 to 8632.94 This resulted in about 
85 000 black families being pushed out of European areas, between 1945 and 1955, 
which put enormous strain on the reserves.95 This worsened the plight of the reserves 
and furthered the nationalist mobilisation.96 
                                                 
89 In interviews I gathered that there were individuals that relocated on their own accord to the less 
densely populated but inhospitable areas of Gokwe, Nembudziya and Silobela, for example. In an 
interview with Headman Mabedzenge, he told me that he moved to Gokwe in the late 1960s due to land 
shortage and also that the land he had inherited from his late father had become overworked. He only 
returned to Shurugwi in 1996 when he was allocated an A1 self-contained 56 hectare plot in the 
Mavhumasha area. I have also come to be aware that there are areas in Gokwe, Nembudziya and Silobela 
that contain significant emigrants from Shurugwi, and are generally known as MaSelukwe, to denote that 
they originated from Selukwe/ Shurugwi. 
90 Interview with Mr Ncube of Dlodlo kraal, 23 May 2010. This was also repeated in many other 
interviews. 
91 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971, pp 272-273. 
92 Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”, p 574. 
93 See Utete Commission Report, p 11. 
94 Ibid, p 11. 
95 See Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian Change from above”, p 561. The Utete Commission report, p 11 
put the figure of those displaced nationally at 100 000 Africans. 
96 See William Wolmer and Ian Scoones, “Agriculture: The mixed Farming Discourse in Zimbabwe”. 
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Regarding Shurugwi, the Native Commissioner for the district wrote to the Provincial 
Native Commissioner (Gwelo) that he had 289 African “persons” displaced from the 
European section of the district that he needed to settle but could not do so because 
there was no space in the reserve.97 Pendered and von Memerty sum up the situation 
best by stating that:  
…since 1902 the African population has increased fourfold and the cattle 
population has increased 35 times.  These factors working together have 
destroyed the system of shifting farming, and have increased the pressure upon 
the soil to such an extent as to endanger the natural resources and have, 
resulted in many areas, in the fragmentation of arable land down to uneconomic 
bits and pieces.”98  
They also noted that half of all the reserves were overpopulated.99 While the Land 
Husbandry Act was dissolved in the mid-1960s and replaced by the Land Tenure Act, its 
ethos was not abandoned and it was continued right up to independence where the 
concept of demonstrators continued to be used in African rural areas where people 
continued to eke out a living on the ever-shrinking arable lands. The opening up of 
demonstrator colleges like Makoholi and Henderson kept that spirit alive.100 
 Centralisation was not the only radical intervention that had a profound impact in 
worsening land problems in Shurugwi. The plough which was introduced in the district 
between 1910 and 1930 became widely used in the reserve,101 with serious effects. 
Because it enabled people to cultivate large plots, it brought an agricultural mini-
revolution to the district, as in other districts. Many in Shurugwi many began to cultivate 
large fields. In Shurugwi, by 1927 there was a widespread adoption of ploughs. As the 
NC, 1927, said, “following on the good results obtained at the demonstration plots the 
natives have acquired numerous implements. A fair estimate of which would be twenty 
                                                 
97 See Letter from Native Commissioner (Selukwe) to the Provincial Native Commissioner (Gwelo), 20/2/46, 
cited in Victor EM Machingaidze, “Agrarian change from above”,p 562. 
98 A Pendered and W. von Memerty, “The Native Land Husbandry Act of Southern Rhodesia”, in Journal of 
African administration, Vol 7, No3, London, 1955, p 99. 
99 Ibid, p 101, see also R Pamer, Land and racial discrimination, who says that 55% of all reserves were 
overpopulated by 1955. 
100 See William Wolmer and Ian Scoones, “Agriculture”, p 584. 
101 See JoAnn Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology”, p 78. 
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cultivators, fifteen planters, five harrows and four scotch carts for carting kraal 
manure.”102 No doubt, the figures rose dramatically with the implementation of the 
policy of centralisation from 1929.Whilst there are no direct accounts with figures on 
acreage in Shurugwi, Mcgregor says peasants elsewhere began to cultivate fields that 
ran into hundreds of acres.103 By extension therefore it can be possible that some 
peasants in Shurugwi began to also want larger pieces of land. However, in Shurugwi 
because of the acute land shortages discussed already and introduction of 
centralisation, it is plausible to argue that they would not have been able to satisfy this 
demand for larger pieces of land.  
Secondly the plough demanded that peasants abandon the cultivation of wetlands for 
the drier top lands.104 The wetlands had been more suitable for the simple hand held 
hoes, and also were more secure from the Ndebele raids of the 19th century.105 More 
importantly, the introduction and widespread use of the plough introduced shifting 
cultivation in the district106 (before centralisation), a method that requires a lot of land 
per person. The method was favoured by the locals for its higher returns on labour, that 
is, it demanded less labour; enabled the people to get fresh fertile soils; and it was also 
a way of evading the marauding striga asiatica or witchweed, a weed which could only 
be effectively controlled by constant field changes.107  
                                                 
102 See NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of the Native Commissioner, (NC), 1927. 
103 Mcgregor, Ibid, p 78. 
104 Joann Mcgregor, Ibid, p 78. The importance of the wetlands in Shurugwi pre-plough cannot be 
overemphasised as Chief Nhema is said to have taken over from the Boroma chieftaincy precisely to take 
over the wetlands. See Mcgregor, p 73. 
105 Joann Mcgregor, Ibid, p 78. 
106 Ibid, p 79. Mcgregor avers that shifting cultivation was not “traditional” to the district of Shurugwi, but 
was a method that was adopted by the peasants with the coming of the plough as from 1910 to 1930. As 
such the method has a short genealogy and was never a long term one. This contrasted the European 
administrators who regarded it as a long term method. In my fieldwork, my informants also told me the 
same. They said that the only form of migration involved the movement of the locals into the mountains 
together with their cattle and grain in cases of Ndebele raids. In an interview with Mr Mazivisa, 28 January 
2010, for example that his grandparents had continuously used the Shamba Mountains to avoid Ndebele 
raids. 
107 Joann Mcgregor, Ibid, pp 78-79. 
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As Chitiyo also says, the introduction of the deep ridging plough had a disastrous effect 
on land degradation as compared to earlier more traditional hoe, which only loosened 
largely the top soil hence causing minimum damage to the soil.108 Deep ploughing, it 
also has to be added, encourages leaching of nutrients, which made the soil less fertile, 
and less productive and consequently more expensive to work. As such this desire for 
shifting cultivation, which required more land, and which was economic in many ways to 
the peasants, put them in direct conflict with the state authorities who sought to limit 
African access to land as seen by the creation of reserves following the end of the First 
Chimurenga, the adoption of the policy of centralisation in 1929, and the passing of such 
legislation as the Land Apportionment Act, the Land Husbandry Act and the Land Tenure 
Act. It ought also to be noted that it was on the basis of shifting cultivation, among 
others, that the colonial authorities hinged their policy of centralisation, the harbinger 
of more discriminatory and coercive agricultural legislation and policies, discussed 
earlier. On the whole the adoption of the plough in the district came with it increased 
demand for land by the Shurugwi rural residents.  
The introduction of the plough too introduced techniques of “male-dominated farming” 
that were centred on the use of ox-drawn ploughs, oxen and cash crop production.109 
The overall social impact was to worsen the domestic plight of women from whom 
increased labour demands were exerted.110 Women also suffered increased patriarchal 
exploitation as men began to migrate in search of larger plots, as well as paid labour to 
pay taxes,111 which freed them from kins-based regulatory controls regarding their [ill-
]treatment of women. 
Land degradation due to poor conservation worsened the land shortage problems. 
Primarily, land degradation was a function of both residents of Shurugwi and colonial 
                                                 
108 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”, for an in-depth discussion of the 
negative impact of the plough. 
109 See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives: Shona women in the history of Zimbabwe, 1870-
1939, Heinemann, Baobab, James Currey, Portsmouth, Harare and London, 1992, p 5. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe, p 72. 
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capitalist ventures, especially mining. For the locals the practice that contributed most 
to land wastage was vlei cultivation or wet land cultivation. Vleis were largely utilised for 
the growing of rice, where seasonally wet and permanently wet lands were utilised.112 
The mining concerns that operated in the district in the early years of the 20th century 
also significantly led to environmental degradation through the chopping of trees for 
the mines. This was the era before the use of coal and other forms of power for the 
mines. In Shurugwi these mines were mostly chrome and gold mining concerns.  
 
POST-INDEPENDENCE RESETTLEMENT  
At independence the situation of inadequate land among African farmers had not 
improved much qualitatively. Despite the fact that the Land Tenure Act had led to the 
division of the country into two equal halves of 44.9 million acres, there still was 
overcrowding in the rural communities.113 This meant that there were 6 000 whites 
owning 15, 5 million acres of the best land, 8 500 small-scale black farmers on 1 400 000 
acres,114 and 700 000 communal farmers’ families on 16, 4 million acres in marginal 
areas.115 While the allocation was inadequate in 1969, it got worse as the African 
                                                 
112 See Joann Mcgregor, “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology, pp 71-72, and Tapera Knox 
Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”.  This method of agriculture still continues and people still use 
these wetlands for the growing of traditional brown rice. Wetlands are also still made use of for the early 
crops and the late maize crop, that which matures in late April and May. This method is common in places 
that do not have irrigation. I have seen it being done in both the old communal areas (previously reserves) 
and in newly resettled areas like Mavhumashava. At times wetlands are used for horticultural gardens. On 
a nationwide scale, vlei cultivation is still a problem that confronts the country, and to this end the 
Minister of Environment Francis Nhema sent out a passionate appeal for the conservation of wetlands in 
early 2011. See “Nhema calls on nation to preserve wetlands”, in www.theherald.co.zw, accessed 12 April 
2011. 
113 Utete Commission Report, p 12. 
114 Utete Commission Report, p 14. 
115 See Roger Southall, “Too soon to tell?: Land reform in Zimbabwe”, in Africa Spectrum, 3, 2011, p 84, in 
hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewPDFInterstitial/.../487, Accessed 18 June 2012. 
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population in the reserves continued to grow exponentially to 3,9 million by 1982, and 
5,1 million in 1987.116  
In post-independent Zimbabwe, the theme of emphasising “technical development” or 
scientific development together with its nerve system of maximising productivity in fact 
remained part of the selection criteria for resettlement even during the most populist 
nationalist-liberation rhetorical phase that espoused unmitigated transfer of land to all 
the landless blacks.117 The state also continued the policy of re-organising communal 
areas in terms of land use.118 As Alexander says, this was in line with the imperatives of 
the “modernising state” that was embarked upon, which was however, “top-down” in 
its approach.119 It is also imperative to point out the fact that due to cash shortages, 
inadequate technical expertise, and other social programmes that absorbed it, the 
government could not adequately assist the resettled farmers. Neither did it meet the 
targets of “modernising” the agricultural sector. 
The Riddell Commission of 1981 pointed to the acute land shortages in the country. It 
reported that: “[t]he greatest problem facing the peasantry is land. In practically every 
peasant area which the Commissioners visited, the first issue raised by the people was 
land shortage”, which was causing “a very pronounced degree of discontentment, 
frustration and often anger.”120 Reporting in a similar fashion was the Chavhunduka 
Commission of 1982, which, while pointing to land shortages, also pointed at the need 
for better land husbandry techniques.121 Despite the findings by these two successive 
post-independence Commissions, the resettlement programme remained lower than 
                                                 
116 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”. See also Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung 
and Chimurenga, p 34, who says that the total population in 1979 was 7,1 million blacks and 200 000 
whites. 
117 See Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state in Zimbabwe”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian 
Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: Rethinking land, the state and nation in 
the context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003, pp 84-5. 
118 Ibid, p 89. 
119 Ibid, p 85. 
120 See Report of the commission of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service (Riddell 
Commission), Harare, 1981, p 34. 
121 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Industry (Chavunduka Commission), Harare, 
1982, cited in Michael Drinkwater, “Technical Development and Peasant Impoverishment”, p 290. 
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the demand. As an example, the Riddell Commission reported that in 1981 a total of 219 
000 families required resettlement but the government only targeted to resettle only 
162 000 by 1984.122  
The situation remained the same up to 1990 as the government had managed to only 
resettle 52 000 families on 3,5 million hectares as opposed to the target of settling 
162 000 families on 9 million hectares.123 The key factors for this slow pace of 
resettlement was the emphasis for technical-scientific based resettlement model, 
especially between 1980 and 1986,124 the constraints imposed by the Lancaster House 
Constitution, shortages of capital as well as the government’s adoption of the policy of 
resettlement centred on growth with equity or internal reorganisation,125 the poor 
quality land that was availed by the willing sellers,126 and the drought of 1982 to 1984.  
There was not much resettlement between 1990 and 1997 the resettlement programme 
stalled considerably despite the passing of the Land Acquisition Act in 1993. Outside the 
problems highlighted above which still affected the programme, the introduction of the 
ESAP in 1990 brought with it a shift in government focus “from a primary emphasis on 
addressing landlessness” to the identification of “capable” small farmers and supporting 
large scale indigenous farmers.127 As a result of the slowdown, there was a general rise 
in “spontaneous” farm occupations across the country by the peasants up to 1999.128 
However, the government did no support these and it forcibly evicted the invaders.129 
                                                 
122 Riddell Commission, Ibid . 
123 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 
Becoming Zimbabwe, p 172. 
124 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance: Tenure reform and visions of 
progress in Zimbabwe”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s 
Unfinished business, pp 249-251. 
125 See R.M Mupawose and E.T Chengu, “Development of land policy: Determination of land policy in 
Zimbabwe”, in http://unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/80604e/80604E06.htm, Accessed 5 March 2011, and 
Michael Drinkwater, “Technical Development”. 
126 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, p 172. 
127 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance”, p 250. 
128 See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers”, pp 163-165. Outside the Svosve case, these 
were also experienced in Mashonaland Central, Matebeleland(s), Masvingo, and Mashonaland East. 
129 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance”, p 250. 
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JAMBANJA, THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME (FTLRP) AND POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which started with “spontaneous” land 
grabs by war veterans and “land hungry peasants” in March following the February 2000 
constitutional referendum130, but officially launched on 15 July 2000, witnessed the start 
of sustained orgy of violence on many commercial farms in Shurugwi district as in other 
districts of the country.  
The scale of the transformation of land ownership under the FTLRP was ominous,131 and 
because it was not properly coordinated and politicised to retain ZANU-PF in power it 
produced a lot of violence. As Rukuni and Jensen say, the FTLRP was “characterised by 
limited planning, compulsory acquisition, partisan selection, immediate occupation, and 
uncertain compensation.”132 The tables below comparing the land ownership patterns 
in Zimbabwe just before and just after the FTLRP show tremendous alterations to land 
ownership that largely brought about the violence. It can be seen from the two tables 
below that by 2000, not much change had occurred to decongest the rural areas of the 
country. However, the landscape was radically altered under the FTLRP and its fore-
runner, the jambanja. 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 Whilst there is so much contestation over the spontaneity and the role that war veterans, see Tapera 
Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and violence” describes some of the war veterans were too young to be 
born after 1980)  peasants played in setting in motion the land invasions commonly referred to as 
jambanja. There is, however, general agreement that these farm invasions started following the No vote 
in the Referendum of February 2000. See Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers”, p 175. 
131 See Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe: Mugabe in Context”, Concerned Africa Scholars, 
Bulletin No 82, Summer 2009, for an in-depth, though controversial discussion of the scale of the land 
transfers due to the FTLRP. 
132 See Mandivamba Rukuni and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance: Tenure reform and visions of 
progress in Zimbabwe”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s 
Unfinished business, p 251. 
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Table showing land ownership patterns in Zimbabwe as at 30 June 2000.  
Category Area (million hectares) As 
at June 30 2000 
% of total land area 
Large Scale Commercial  11.8 30 
Small Scale Commercial 1.4 4 
Communal Areas 16.4 41 
Resettlement Area 3.7 9 
National Parks and Urban 6.0 15 
State land 0,3 1 
Grand Total 39,6 100 
Source: Adapted from Utete Committee Report, September 2003, p25. 
Table showing land ownership patterns after the FTLRP 
Category Area (million hectares) As 
at July 30 2003 
% of total land area 
A1 4,2 11 
A2 2,2 6 
Old Resettlement 3,7 9 
Communal 16,4 41 
Large Scale Commercial 2,6 6 
Small Scale Commercial 1,4 4 
National Parks and Urban 6,0 15 
State Land 0,3 1 
Other 2,8 7 
Total Land Area 39,6 100 
Source: Utete Committee Report, September 2003, p 26. 
The figures for the number of farms that were occupied between 2000 and end July 
2003 in the Midlands Province contained in the Utete report show that there were a 
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total of 1347 farms of which 791 were gazetted for resettlement under the FTLRP.133 
Shurugwi district itself saw a lot reordering in terms of land ownership in this period. It 
was one of the districts that had a well-defined skewed landownership in the country. In 
this regard 80 percent of the district belonged to large scale commercial and small scale 
commercial agriculture sectors by 2000.134 This therefore left a paltry 20 percent of the 
district for close to 70 000 people.135 As already discussed this 20 percent was made up 
of poor soils. Contrasted to the communal areas which were congested, the large scale 
farms averaged 3 175 acres.136  
A cursory survey of the district revealed that the areas in Shurugwi district that fell 
under the categories of crown and European lands were massive and broadly covered 
the whole region between the Shurugwi- Zvishavane highway and the Gweru-Bulawayo 
highway, also from the Mvuma road to De Beers ranch, and other areas outside this 
general demarcation by 2000. Early resettlements had been done in the Chitora and 
Gwanza in the East, and Dorset and Zhaugwe in the West under the villagisation model. 
These were primarily under the villagisation model. In the latter half of the 1990s had 
been established self-contained resettlement scheme in the Mavhumashava area to the 
south-west of the district.  
According to the Utete Commission, Shurugwi had a total of 151 farms by the start of 
the jambanja.137 Out of these 151 farms, 127 were originally gazetted for compulsory 
acquisition for resettlement, however, 9 were delisted.138 In total therefore 118 farms 
were eventually gazetted by the end of July 2003. In addition to these 118 farms, 5 more 
farms were “illegally” occupied in the district.139 In the Midlands province Shurugwi 
                                                 
133 Utete Committee Report, pp 24 and 69. 
134 See http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki/en/shurugwi_Rural_Areas, Accessed 18 February 2011. 
135 Zimbabwe Population Census Results, 2002. 
136 Robin. R Palmer, “Aspects of Rhodesia land policy”, p 7. 
137 Utete Committee Report, p 69. 
138 Ibid, p 69. 
139 Ibid, p 70. This represented people who continued to occupy farms that were not supposed to be 
occupied such as those on headwaters of major dams, dairy farms or conservancies. This also represented 
farms which were parcelled out by the war veterans, councillors and government officials outside the 
government regulations. 
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together with Gweru and Mvuma were the three districts with such “illegal” 
occupants.140 Of importance is the fact that Shurugwi ranked second after Gweru which 
had 438 farms, in the number of farms that were gazetted for the FTLRP.141 Further to 
this, Shurugwi with five illegal farm occupations also ranked second after Mberengwa 
with seven on the scale of the highest “illegally” occupied farms.142  
 The number of farms gazetted for resettlement in the early years of the 2000s also 
represented sites where violence was witnessed, as more often than not the process 
was fraught with violence, firstly to remove the white farmers and to sustain the 
settlers. This was despite the provision of legal protection for the new settlers under the 
Rural Land Occupiers (Protection) Act.143 We should also consider the two background 
factors to the launch of the FTLRP, which were the harbingers of the violence. These are 
the disorderly land invasions led by the war veterans before the official launch of the 
FTLRP, and the defeat of ZANU-PF in the 2000 constitutional referendum which pushed 
it to deploy jambanja.  
Thus by the time of the official launch of the programme violence was already central to 
occupations and land transfers and it also defined who would and who would not have 
access to land.144 This violence was used as a ZANU-PF mobilising tool, as a displacement 
tool against the white farmers and their workers, as well as a means by the white 
farmers to hold on to their farms.145 The other important point to note is that the farm 
                                                 
140 Ibid, p 70. 
141 Ibid, p 70. 
142 Ibid, p 70.  
143 See the Utete Commission, p19. See also Constitution of Zimbabwe Constitutional Amendment No 16 
of 2000. 
144 See the conflicting statements on the farm invasions by senior ZANU-PF officials in early 2000. Dumiso 
Dabengwa and Edison Zvogbo, for example wanted them removed, see The Daily News, 3 March 2000, 
and 24 March 2000. This contrasted with the views of President Mugabe, The Daily News 29 March 2000, 
who wanted them to remain on the farms. Thus the programme was chaotic, experimental and left to the 
war veterans to decide the course of action on the ground, on the farms, which left it open to abuse, 
especially with no code of ethics/conduct for the invaders. See also Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, 
“Human rights and Zimbabwe’s June 2000 Election”, January 2001, p 18, which posits that violence 
started even before the 12-13 February Constitutional referendum. 
145 See Blair Rutherford, “Belonging to the farm(er)” and Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and 
occupiers”, for more discussions on the deployment of violence on the farms. 
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invasions were led by the war veterans with a known history of violent 
demonstrations,146 including “besieging” President Mugabe on several occasions.147  
Another important point to make is that the FTLRP was an integral part of the Third 
Chimurenga in ZANU-PF discourse. Under the Third Chimurenga, the state through the 
war veterans and landless peasants began to sponsor farm/land invasions as part of a 
package of responses following the defeat in the Constitutional referendum and the 
impending June 2000 general elections.148 
Although somewhat exaggerated, Chitiyo’s analysis that the Third Chimurenga “was 
essentially ZANU-PF’s version of the ‘Total Strategy’ which the South African apartheid 
state had used as a socio-political grand strategy” in the face of a “total onslaught” from 
both internal and external opponents who threatened the “sovereignty” of the 
country,149 deserves some merit. Following a similar trend as in apartheid South Africa, 
the forward looking military strategy was chosen to lead and coordinate all the other 
responses by ZANU-PF against its political opponents in Zimbabwe. This was organised 
under Operation Tsuro that was launched from March 2000.150 Over the decade of 
political turmoil, this version of Zimbabwe’s total strategy was epitomised by the pre-
emptive violence on the opposition especially before elections to intimidate them and 
                                                 
146 Besides having violently demonstrated against Robert Mugabe at the National Heroes Acre in Harare, 
the war veterans were also feared for their intimidatory tactics. AS an example, they threatened to go to 
war if ZANU-PF lost the 2000 elections, see the Daily News 16 March 2000, “Ex-combabtants threaten war 
if ZANU-PF loses (June 2000 elections)”, see also John Makumbe “”Mugabe’s desperate acts against his 
own people”, in The Daily News, 24 June 2000, in which he outlines that the war veterans were paid a 
handsome fee of twenty million Zimbabwe dollars (Z$20 million) to campaign for ZANU-PF. It also has to 
be recalled that it was as a result of violent demonstrations that the war veterans were awarded the Z$ 50 
000-00 gratuities and monthly payments of Z$ 5000-00. See also David Moore, “Zimbabwe’s triple crisis: 
Primitive accumulation, nation-state formation and democratisation in the age of neo-liberal 
globalisation”, in African Studies Quarterly, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a2.htm, Accessed 19 
May 2012.  
147 James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, p 198. 
148 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “tracking Zimbabwe’s political history”, p359. See also, Brian Raftopoulos, 
“The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 212. See also Jocelyn Alexander, “Squatters, veterans and the state”, pp 84-
114. See also Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in 
Zimbabwe”, p 157. 
149 Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history”, p 359, who says the basket of responses 
included legal, political, cultural, economic and military ways. 
150 Tapera knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political History”, p 359. 
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also to clear the ground for ZANU-PF “victory” at the ballot that it needed for legitimacy 
purposes. Among other things, under Operation Tsuro, war veterans and landless 
peasants were encouraged to occupy white owned-farms, and to vigorously campaign 
for ZANU-PF.151 Importantly, too is the fact that victims had little recourse through the 
police who refused to prosecute the perpetrators. At another level, supporting 
legislation, as already discussed, was passed to legalise the process, depicting a multi-
pronged scheme. 
In other words, the preceding process to the FTLRP was not peaceful and was organised 
along military lines under Operation Tsuro. Going forward the official launch of the 
FTLRP did not bring an end to the violence on the farms. In fact it continued to utilise 
violence. Words of senior government and ZANU-PF officials gave impetus to this 
violence. President Mugabe, for instance, on one occasion said “Strike fear into the 
heart of the whiteman, our real enemy.”152 Although fear was targeted at the “heart of 
the whiteman” it was also meant for the other “white race”, in the Foucauldian 
formulation, that is, generally MDC supporters.153 In this Foucaldian formulation, race 
transcends biological groups that ordinarily make races. It rather is a social construct 
that denotes groups of people that belong and those that do not belong. It is basically 
                                                 
151 Tapera knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political History”, p 360. On the whole Operation Tsuro was 
organised around three facets: It aimed firstly to coordinate the Third Chimurenga under the JOC, which 
comprised the Ministry of Defence, the Police (ZRP), CIO, and the war veterans. Secondly, it established   
“operations zones” , from which “ loyal”  and “opposition” communities and individuals were established, 
for rewards or punishment respectively. As Chitiyo says, Mashonaland and Manicaland provinces were to 
be made “ no-go” areas for the opposition. The third task was, as seen already, to push landless 
communities and war veterans to occupy white farms. See also, Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on 
its citizens, p 36. 
152 President Robert Mugabe speaking at the official opening of the ZANU-PF Congress on the 13th of 
December2000. This was at the height of the land invasions, and in the build-up to the 2002 Presidential 
elections, quoted in CNN.Com.world cited in 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/12/14/mugabe.zimbabwe/, Accessed 20 February 2011, see 
also Independent.ie cited in http://www.independent.ie/world-news/mugabe-bids-to-strike-fear-into-
the-heart-of-the-whiteman, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
153 In the Foucauldian formulation race is more than a biological distinction, but it is a more used to 
distinguish those people who have to live and those who must die in a population. See Michel Foucault, 
Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-6, edited by Mauro Bertani and 
Alesandro Fontana, translated by David Macey, Picador, New York, 1997, p 254, for a nuanced discussion 
of this race. 
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used to separate those have to live from those that have to die. In addition to this, 
President Mugabe is quoted as saying on Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) that: “We were 
told to arrest them (war veterans) and remove them from farms. We refused because 
the occupiers are justified. We said there would be no policemen who will go there. If 
the British want police to evict the war veterans they must send their police.”154 
The government-sponsored Utete Committee also alluded to problem of violence and 
chaos. To the Utete Committee:  
[t]he launching of the Fast Track Programme in July 2000, in rapid order in the 
same year, the voters’ rejection of the draft new constitution; Parliament’s 
amendment of the Lancaster House Constitution in respect of the land issue in 
April; the general elections in June; the appointment of a new government in 
June/July and the mounting widespread land demonstrations by veterans of the 
liberation struggle and other land hungry communities throughout this period, 
gave hardly much of an opportunity to the authorities to plan in the necessary 
detail the requisite strategic perspective on Programme Implementation155 [my 
emphasis].  
As a result structures to control the process of redistributing land were set up 
retrospectively, in most cases in an expedient manner that reacted rather than led the 
process in an administrative fire brigade fashion. Again, the Utete report is valuable 
here when it stated that “new institutions at central Government, provincial and district 
levels …. were hurriedly set up to spearhead implementation of the programme in 
collaboration with relevant ministries…”156  
                                                 
154 See President Mugabe quoted on ZTV 8 April 2000, cited in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who 
was responsible? Alleged perpetrators and their crimes during the 2000 Parliamentary Election Period, July 
2001, in http://www..dogstoc.com/docs/17003921/Harare, Accessed 8 March 2011. In addition to such 
speeches that encouraged impunity, there were other actions that were done to entrench this impunity. 
Most notable of these were: ZANU-PF’s ignoring several court rulings in favour of white farmers, police 
refusal to act farm occupiers, the involvement of security personnel in farm occupations and general 
violence, as well as the 8 October 2000 Presidential amnesty for all crimes around the June 2000 
elections. See the Human Rights Watch, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 8 March 2002, in 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c8c82df4.html, Accessed & March 2011, for more details. As for 
Shurugwi, it cites a former District Administrator who said that he had seen “a lot of violence in Shurugwi 
where farmers have been beaten. Dockets have not been opened. The law enforcement agencies have 
been helpless. You get cases where they loot the homestead dry.” 
155 Utete Committee Report, p 30. 
156 Ibid, pp 30-31. 
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The resettlement of about 136 548157 in the Midlands province was a massive 
undertaking, which no doubt produced a lot of emotions between the invading farmers 
and the farmers and/ or their workers. It also resulted in a lot of forced movements on 
to and off the farms, which all added to the possible increase in incidences of clashes. 
While I could not obtain statistics for Shurugwi, based on violence from other 
districts,158 it can be plausibly inferred that it could not have escaped the entrapments 
of the failings of the national structures. Allegations of evictions of some settlers 
(invaders), occupation of farm close to harvest times, and reports of clashes in the 
media (see following section below), all seem to confirm a chaotic and to some extent 
bloody process.  
To further underscore the absence of proper planning, the Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
pointed out that there were no structures to support the newly resettled farmers.159 
Another illustration of this inadequate planning is highlighted by the fact that no prior 
survey of the farms had been done, which resulted in people moving onto unfertile 
farms. This caused them to move to other farms, which not only created further 
confusion but caused more violence especially on unoccupied farms where they met 
resistance by the commercial farmers. Where there were other farmers already settled 
questions began to be asked about one’s political affiliation, which more often than not 
resulted in the beating and expulsion of those that could not prove their membership of 
ZANU-PF beyond doubt. This also resulted in multiple farm/plot holders, which 
heightened competition for land amongst the villagers from Shurugwi.  
Of note here again is that in most cases the occupations occurred in secluded positions, 
which meant that violence went on unrecognised and unrecorded. This then contests 
the assertion by the Utete Report which described the FTLRP in the Midlands as 
                                                 
157 Ibid, p 24. 
158 See Blair Rutherford, “Belonging to the farm(er)”. See also, Nelson Marongwe, “Farm occupations and 
occupiers”. 
159 See IRIN Africa, “Zimbabwe resettled farmers returning to communal areas” in 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=45936, Accessed 19 February 2011, for more details on 
this leading to some of the beneficiaries returning to their communal areas. 
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peaceful, as it was allegedly carried out with the consultation with previous owners.160 
Of significance, however, is that the Utete report goes on to describe situations of 
unprocedural allocations of farms by war veterans in Shurugwi, Gweru and Mvuma.161 In 
addition to the lack of planning alluded earlier, there were also some fortuitous 
occupations of some farms in Shurugwi where some were reportedly occupied very 
close to the time of harvest, which made struggles between the invaders and the 
farmers inevitable.162 The occupation of Edwards farm in 2000 by Gunpowder in 
Shurugwi is a classic example. Informants told me that the farm was “invaded” by the 
team under Gunpowder at the beginning of March 2002. This was at a time when the 
maize crop was nearing full maturity. As such Gunpowder stood to gain from having to 
simply harvest and sell a maize crop, which partly explains the numerous run-ins 
between the team of Gunpowder and the farm owner and his farm workers.163 
Again it may be pointed out that while the FTLRP might not have produced much 
violence after its adoption in July 2000, the process before it that of “spontaneous” farm 
invasions was characterised by violence.164 People in Shurugwi talk about teams that 
were put together and led by war veterans which carried knives, axes and hunting rifles 
for “protection” against the farmers. Further to this, Gunpowder, who was notorious for 
violence, was a leading figure in the District Land Distribution Committee (DLC) in 
Shurugwi.165 Alongside him were other war veterans of different capacities. It is 
important, however, to note that some of the war veterans in the District Land 
Committee were successive District Administrators: Mutikizizi and Mazai, who were 
successive Chairpersons of the DLC; as well as Assistant District Administartor, Rwafa. 
                                                 
160 Utete Committee Report, p 70. 
161 Ibid, p 70. 
162 Based on interviews and discussions with resettled farmers. 
163 Besides the interviews, see also The Daily News, 1 April 2002. 
164 See the NGO Human Rights Forum, “Human Rights and Zimbabwe’s June 2000 election”, January 2001, 
which highlights that violence of farm invasions started just after the February 2000 referendum, and 
which also describes how the road to the 2000 violence was one of the bloodiest. See also Nelson 
Marongwe, “Farm occupations and occupiers”, p 170. 
165 See The Daily News, 16 June “Farmers in trouble with Gunpowder” in 
http//:www.dailynews.co.zw/daily/2000/June/June16/1177.html, cited 20 March 2011, for more details.  
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That the District Land Committee was headed by war veterans led to its adoption of 
methods along military lines.  
Other human rights reports state that Gunpowder operated alongside another war 
veteran, “General Nduku”, in terrorising the commercial farming community of the 
district.166 It is also reported that the white farmers in Shurugwi suffered various forms 
of violence at the hands of ZANU-PF supporters led by Gunpowder.167 In addition to the 
white farmers, farm workers also bore the brunt of the violence. The Daily News 
reported for example that thirty-three land occupiers led by Gunpowder had appeared 
before the Magistrates Court in Gweru on charges of assaulting farmworkers at the 
Edwards farm close to Boterekwa in Shurugwi,  destroying property worth Zimbabwe 
$274 000,00 in the process .168  
Nationally, there were also serious allegations of violence on the farms. The Human 
Rights Watch cited in the UNHCR report for March 2002, for example stated that several 
cases of intimidation, assault, and murder on farms had been recorded nationwide. 
Citing the National Employment Council for the agricultural industry, it reported that 
some 3000 farm workers had been displaced, some twenty-six killed, 1600 assaulted, 
and eleven raped, by March 2002.169 The same report also stated that farms were also 
turned into bases for launching attacks on MDC supporters in the communal areas and 
adjacent farms. Teams that went into occupy the farms were also organised along 
“military structures”, with war veterans situated as base commanders, and their home 
                                                 
166 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “Who was responsible? Alleged perpetrators and their 
crimes during the 2000 Parliamentary Election Period”, July 2001, in 
http://www.dogstoc.com/docs/17003921/Harare, Accessed 8 March 2011. My own fieldwork has 
revealed, however, that there were other war veterans, other than these two who were also key in 
perpetrating violence on the farms. See also the Human Rights Watch, Fast Track land Reform in 
Zimbabwe, 8 March 2002, in http://.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c8c82df4.html, Accessed 7 March 2011. 
167 The Daily News, 16 June 2000, alleges, among other things, that farmers were ordered to use their 
tractors and cars to ferry ZANU-PF supporters to rallies and were ordered to repair and provide fuel for 
Gunpowder’s car. 
168 See The Daily News, 1 April 2002. 
169 See The Human Rights Watch, Fast Track land Reform in Zimbabwe, for more details. 
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on the farms referred to as “command bases”. Besides, the commonest method to take 
farms was around “tactics of terror, force and intimidation.”170 
President Mugabe himself the chief ideologue and guarantor of the FTLRP noted the 
seriousness of inadequate planning and other problems that bedevilled the programme. 
Speaking at the annual ZANU-PF conference in Gwanda in 2005, he said: 
We still have people in need of land yet at places land has not been taken up. 
We still have people whose resettlement is disputed for various reasons. Such 
people remain deeply anxious and unsettled. Then there are boundary problems 
arising from newly resettled. We have problems of inputs and extension support. 
We have problems of water and irrigation support, some of it vandalised. ……We 
have to revamp rural councils so that they are able to service our farmers on the 
land. The road network into farms is deteriorating ….We have to improve 
security on the farms and the arms of security will have to attend to that 
challenge.171 
Violence also occurred on these resettled farms as local Shurugwi residents fought 
people from other districts. They regarded these people as “foreigners”, because they 
originated from outside the district. Mostly these people came from Zvishavane, a 
district which did not have many farms to begin with, but one that also had a congested 
population. In addition Zvishavane is a neighbouring district to Shurugwi, and some 
parts of it are indeed very close to some of the farms that were occupied.172  
As a result of the violence that accompanied the farm takeovers, there were few 
females that accessed farms. This was because those that were allocated farms in most 
cases had taken part in the invasion of those farms. This process favoured mostly males, 
who could withstand the oft-violent confrontations with the farm owners and their 
workers. However, this has to be taken together with the patriarchal tendencies 
common in the patterns of ownership of land in the district, where the land belongs to 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Part of President Robert Mugabe’s speech from Gwanda, in December 2005, cited in Peter Philip 
Mondhlani, “Zimbabwe’s agricultural policies fail to ensure food security” in Dateline: Southern Africa, 
Journalists Report a People’s perspective of poverty, in 
http://www.panos.org.zm/sites/www.panos.org.zm/files/PovertyReport.pdf, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
172 Based on field interviews. 
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the men: present, working in towns or deceased. In this case women simply work the 
land for the good of the family headed by the males, who (males) also own the land by 
customary rights.  
The Utete Report summarises these statistics on land allocation by gender after the 
FTLRP well. Although the Report does not represent the statistics for Shurugwi district 
per se, those for the Midlands province and national level show that only 18 percent of 
the beneficiaries were women under the A1 model.173 Regarding the A2 scheme, a 
paltry 05 percent of the beneficiaries were women.174 Going by these national and 
provincial figures, it is reasonable to estimate that the statistics for Shurugwi could not 
have been much different.  
 
OPERATION MAGUTA AND VIOLENCE 
The government-sponsored Operation Maguta/Operation Sisuthi/Operation Eat Well, 
officially launched in November 2005 by Vice President Joyce Mujuru to boost 
agricultural production (maize/grain) and to complement the FTLRP, led to the 
sustenance of the orgy of violence in Shurugwi district, as in other districts of the 
country. Under this operation the government targeted putting 1 500 000 hectares 
under maize production and to produce 2 250 000 tonnes of maize; 90 000 tonnes of 
tobacco; 49 500 tonnes of maize seed; 210 000 tonnes of cotton; and 750 000 tonnes of 
horticultural crops, for example in the 2005/6 agricultural season.175 It was a 
programme spearheaded by the army who were tasked, among other things, to repair 
irrigation equipment and to bring to productive use of all ARDA (Agricultural Rural 
Development Authority) farms. The government’s role was to supply inputs to the 
farmers, provide extension services and monitor the scheme.  
 
                                                 
173 Utete Committee Report, p 25. 
174 Ibid.  
175 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi: Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe- Its impact on 
rural communities, April 2006.  
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However, in many districts soldiers were accused of a heavy-handed approach and were 
said, inter alia, to have destroyed market gardens in Matebeleland in order to force 
people to grow maize, the major crop targeted under the operation.176 In addition, 
farmers who resisted were beaten by the soldiers to ensure compliance.177 Weintraub 
also claims that some women and daughters were raped.178 At times the army also 
seized maize crops from farmers and sold it to the GMB with no guarantees of payment 
from the persistently cash-strapped parastatal; as well as seizing irrigation equipment 
from places such as Masvingo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi.179 The Solidarity Peace Trust goes 
on to say that the army also imposed fines on those that did not comply, and that the 
presence of the army had a general effect of closing the democratic sphere because of 
their close alliance with ZANU-PF, which meant that the opposition found it difficult to 
access the rural areas.180  
 
This has to be taken together with the fact that the structures of Operation Maguta 
clearly resembled ZANU-PF structures, and structures that have been blamed for the 
violence on the opposition. The operation which was the brainchild of the JOC was 
launched by Vice-President Joyce Mujuru, who remained its figure head, but whose day-
to-day management was left in the hands of two ministers: Joseph Made (Agriculture), 
and Sydney Sekeramayi (Defence), and was to be implemented by the army personnel 
of various ranks together with personnel from the Agricultural Research and Extension 
Services (AREX).181 At the rural levels, the operation was supervised by village heads, 
                                                 
176 See Zimbabwe Standard 7 May 2006, for more details. See also Jeff Weintraub, “Zimbabwe, the land of 
dying children” in http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.com/2007/01/zimbabwe-land-of-dying-children-rw.html, 
Accessed 2 March 2011. See also “Zimbabwe: An opposition Strategy”, in Africa Report No 117, 24 August 
2006, in 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/media/Files/africa/southernafrica/zimbabwe/ZimbabweAnOppositionStrateg
y.ashx, Accessed 1 March 2011, for more details. 
177 See also Jeff Weintraub, “Zimbabwe, the land of dying children” in 
http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.com/2007/01/zimbabwe-land-of-dying-children-rw.html, Accessed 2 March 
2011. 
178 Jeff Weintraub, Ibid. 
179 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi, pp 7 & 9.  
180 Ibid, p 6. 
181 Solidarity Peace Trust, “Operation Taguta”, p 8. 
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councillors and traditional chiefs, who selected beneficiaries whose names they 
forwarded to army officers.182 In addition the structures of the operation were conflated 
with and or confused with those of another scheme, the GMB input scheme, which was 
also controlled by army structures.183 
 
Under the operation farmers were supposed to receive subsidised agricultural inputs, 
viz, seeds, fertilisers and herbicides. The table below shows the differences in the prices 
of inputs under the operation and those that were obtaining in the open market. 
Table showing subsidised and unsubsidised agricultural inputs prices during Operation 
Maguta. 
ITEM QUANTITY SUBSIDISED PRICE 
Z$ 
PRICE ON THE 
OPEN MARKET Z$ 
Top dressing 
fertiliser 
50 kgs 750 000 6 000 000 
Paraquat herbicide 10 litres 870 000 10 000 000 
Petrol/Diesel 200 litres 90 000 10 000 000 
Source: AREX, HARARE, Cited in Mudzonga and Chigwada, p 6. 
When compared to prices on the open market, the subsidised prices were a small 
fraction, at least a tenth, of the street cost. While the rational was to help peasant and 
resettled farmers access cheaper inputs, which more often were in short supply, the 
programme ended up appropriated for political reasons. From interviews I carried out it 
became apparent that those in the opposition were not considered. In addition to 
entrenching the politics of discrimination against opposition supporters the operation 
                                                 
182 See Evangelista Mudzonga and Tendai Chigwada, “Agriculture: Scenarios for Southern Africa: A case 
study of Zimbabwe’s Food Security”, in International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
Winnipeg, Canada,2009, in http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/ag_scenarios_south_africa_zimbabwe.pdf, 
Accessed 2 March 2011. 
183 See Evangelista Mudzonga and Tendai Chigwada, “Agriculture: Scenarios”, p6, see also Solidarity Peace 
Trust, “Operation Taguta”, p 15, for more details. 
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brought, the profound disparities in the sponsored  prices of inputs opened the scheme 
to abuse by the beneficiaries, who in most cases stood to reap huge profits by selling 
these inputs on the black market than to use them to grow crops which they would reap 
at the end of the year without guarantees of payment from the GMB.  
In this regard in Shurugwi people set up fuel stations along the Beit Bridge road, which 
they euphemistically called NOCZIM,184 the acronym for the National Oil Company of 
Zimbabwe that had the sole mandate of securing fuel before the liberalisation of the 
sector under the GNU, but one that was failing to supply fuel to the country. Incidences 
where people also sold some of the 25 kilograms of maize seed, 300 kilograms of 
compound D fertiliser and 200 kilograms of ammonium nitrate abound from the 
informants from Shurugwi.185 Perhaps what explains this banalisation of corrupt 
practices by the beneficiaries besides the good black market prices was also the general 
economy of shortage of foodstuffs. In this regard the beneficiaries sold what they 
received as inputs to buy food that was immediately needed to survive. 
The operation also was set against the backdrop of shortages of key inputs, which made 
it susceptible to corrupt tendencies and political abuse. Reports of shortages of seeds, 
fertilisers and inadequate and/ or vandalised irrigation equipment abound.186 Shortages 
of seed resulted in people using retained seed and pure grain, which led to low 
germination rates. In 2008, for example, it was reported that only “7% of the targeted 
600 000 tonnes of basal fertiliser and 10% of the required 400 000 tonnes of top 
                                                 
184 This came up in most interviews, and people in the district were aware of these “NOCZIM” stations 
especially the two very close to Chachacha, close to the Chuni River to the west, and another between 
Mukandapi Shopping Centre and Chachacha to the south. These were paradoxically very close to the 
police post there. See also The Standard, 12 February 2006, “Top chefs exposed: 66 000 litres of diesel for 
former CIO Boss”, Gideon Gono, the Reserve Bank Governor of Zimbabwe, is also quoted admitting to this 
abuse of inputs, see Solidarity Peace Trust, “Operation Taguta”, p 11. 
185 For the quantities allocated to the communal and A1 farmers, see Evangelista Mudzonga and Tendai 
Chigwada, “Agriculture: Scenarios”, p 6. 
186 See excerpt of President Robert Mugabe’s speech in Gwanda in Peter Philip Mondhlani, “Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural policies fail to ensure food security” in Dateline: Southern Africa, Journalists Report a People’s 
perspective of poverty, in http://www.panos.org.zm/sites/www.panos.org.zm/files/PovertyReport.pdf, 
Accessed 1 March 2011, see also 
http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/zimbabwe/documents/2ndCropandLivestockAssessm
entRevised24April2008Final.pdf, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
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dressing fertiliser have been supplied” for the 2007-2008 agricultural season.187 The 
same report also highlighted other challenges and shortages that rocked the operation. 
Among others, these were fuel shortages, which made it difficult to use mechanised 
equipment, and poor agricultural financing.188 With the shortages also came another 
form of violence. The type of violence that informants described for me in Shurugwi was 
not so much of the physical type. Most of it related to the discrimination against 
perceived or real MDC supporters, who in most cases were named and shamed at the 
various meetings over these inputs especially at the village level. 
 
OF THE KITCHEN, THE HOME, “CULTURE” AND VIOLENCE 
In the literary work, Nervous Conditions by Tsitsi Dangarembga, Jeremiah, Tambu’s 
father, asks his daughter Tambu: “Can you cook books and feed them to your husband? 
Stay at home with your mother. Learn to cook and clean. Grow vegetables.”189 Similar 
sentiments were expressed by Supreme Court Judge Wilson Muchechetere who, in a 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe judgement in the Magaya versus Magaya case, posited 
that  
women’s status is […] basically the same as that of a junior male in the family[…] 
It must be recognised that customary law has long directed the way African 
people conducted their lives and the majority of Africans in Zimbabwe still live in 
rural areas and still conduct their lives in terms of customary law.190  
 
In the classic work, Dangarembga brings to the fore certain Zimbabwean peasant family 
expectations of the girl child. More than this Dangarembga also conveys the tribulations 
that women are confronted with under the yoke of patriarchy in a Shona societal setup. 
                                                 
187 See 
http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/zimbabwe/documents/2ndCropandLivestockAssessm
entRevised24April2008Final.pdf, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
188 Ibid. 
189 See Tsitsi Dangarembga, Nervous conditions, 1989, p 15.  
190 This is the verdict read byJustice Wilson Muchechetere in explaining why Vennia Magaya could not be 
appointed heir to the family estate in the controversial unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe in 1999, in Mail and Guardian 10 June 1999. 
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To Tambu’s father the ultimate good a girl/woman could do was to impress her husband 
by being a wife who could cook, clean, take care of the home and do gardening well.  
Women, to this extent, therefore lived to satisfy their men. Their worth is also 
determined by men. The hallmark of a woman in the traditional Shona social setting is a 
woman who is obedient and faithful to her husband, does her household duties and is a 
good mother of her children.191 In the modern era, from Nervous Conditions, education 
and the pursuit of other ulterior goals unrelated to the family and the home that is in 
the public sphere, are regarded as secondary, unimportant, and as a preserve of men.  
 
During the course of my field work I noted the differences in how girls and boys are 
initiated and socialised into the society. I found that girls are still socialised to be good 
mothers from a very early age by being made to play with dolls, which they are 
supposed to treat as their own children. Boys, on the other hand, are “masculinised” by 
being given guns, toy weapons and toy cars as they are “initiated” into the world. Teen 
girls are expected to help their mothers in the home, fetching water, cooking and 
cleaning. This extracts a lot of labour and time demands from the girls, who in most 
cases have to work in the kitchens till very late. Usually after supper, girls are supposed 
to clean the dishes and sweep the kitchen huts before they can focus on their school 
work. Usually by this time the girls will be too tired to concentrate. What is worse is that 
they are also expected to rise up earlier than the boys, to set up fires, cook and sweep 
the yards before they head for school. 
 
Against this, teen boys herd cattle and are generally freer to play, study, and explore the 
world around them as the girls become more tied to the household chores. As a result 
of such socialisation and the initiation of the girls into the domestic sphere and the boys 
into the public sphere we may discern the disadvantaged start to life for the girls. More 
generally this is explained in terms of “culture”, where the education and general 
                                                 
191 For an even detailed discussion of the societal expectations of virtuous women in Zimbabwe see the 
literary work by Rudo Gaidzanwa, Images of women in Zimbabwean literature, College Press, Harare, 
1985, pp 29-31. 
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advancement is not prioritised because the girl is expected to be married and such 
investment would not benefit her family of birth but where she will be married. Girls 
and women are supposed to play second fiddle and be subordinated to their male 
counterparts.  
 
That women and girls have to play second fiddle in Shurugwi recalls the reading of the 
judgement in the Magaya vs Magaya case highlighted above. Besides affirming the 
tradition of patriarchy in Zimbabwe, the judgement also seriously negated the gains that 
women had accrued since the golden decade of the attainment of independence.192 
 
The above has to be taken together with the late Joshua Nkomo, the Vice President of 
Zimbabwe and former Second Secretary of ZANU-PF,193 and Vice President Joyce 
Mujuru194 (also a Second Secretary) of ZANU-PF’s pronouncements on the need for 
women to be “responsible” mothers of future generations and good wives of leaders. In 
these prominent politicians’ view there was not much space in politics and the public 
sphere in general for women, but in the home. The two speeches were influenced by 
the masculine traditions of ZANU-PF. From the discussion in Chapter One, this could be 
traced back to the moment of the evolution of African nationalism, for example, the 
raping of the ladies at the Carter hostel. This repressive masculinity was extended to the 
camps and “operation zones” where women besides being converted to bed fodder, 
were expected to provide other domestic duties to male combatants. In some sense, it 
is possible to suggest that Mujuru herself had imbibed this tradition to the extent that 
she felt “masculinised” and did not consider herself on a par with the other ordinary 
women.  
 
                                                 
192 For a quick run through of some of the successes that women gained post-independence, see 
Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For better or worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe’s Liberation 
Struggle, Weaver Press, Harare, 2000, p 145 and Horace Cambell, Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The end of the 
patriarchal model of liberation, Africa World Press, Trenton, 2003, p 284. 
193 See Ona Kwanele Jirira, “Gender, Politics and Democracy”, pp 12-13. 
194 Lene Bull, “Mai Mujuru: Father of the Nation”, p 88. 
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On the whole one finds that women face ominous challenges in their endeavours and in 
their daily lives to survive and upgrade their status in Zimbabwe. These challenges from 
the two cases above that cut across the so-called “cultural” trope in Dangarembga’s 
novel and in the political view in ZANU-PF, carried in the two high ranking officials’ 
(succeeding Vice Presidents) speeches from both sexes, illuminate the hurdles that 
confront women.  Indeed as Dangarembga’s Mai Tambu says to her daughter Tambu, 
women’s problems are multifaceted:  
[t]he business of womanhood is a heavy burden….How could it not be? Aren’t 
we the ones who bear children? When it is like that you can’t just decide today I 
want to do this, tomorrow I want to do that, the next day I want to be educated. 
When there are sacrifices to be made, you are the one who has to make 
them…You have to start learning them early. The earlier the better so that it is 
easy later on.195 
 
It however, has to be remembered that there seems to be an ambiguity between the 
general condition of women in Shurugwi district and political representation. As 
established in the Introduction, there were twelve female councillors in the twenty-four 
member Tongogara Rural District Council. Again at a higher level of parliamentary 
representation, there is one female representative out of three. This gives a false sense 
of the upliftment of women in the district. However, the situation with regards 
traditional power hierarchies brings the correct situation to the fore. None of the three 
chiefs was female, while there was only one out of the twelve headmen.  
 
The “traditional” practice of paying lobola that has often been blamed for the 
oppression of women was also the norm in Shurugwi, with men expected to pay lobola 
for the women they married. It has to be stated that the payment of lobola greatly 
circumscribes the freedom of women. As in the pre-colonial Zimbabwe lobola “reduce[s] 
them (women) to legal minors throughout their lives: they ha[ve] little control over the 
wealth they produce[…] or over the children they bore. It [is] only through side earnings, 
                                                 
195 Tsitsi Dangarembga, Nervous Conditions, p 16. 
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such as income from property or work as midwives, or offspring from the gift of a cow 
by a son-in-law […] that women could acquire property.”196  
 
That the issue of lobola payment has been contentious for some time in Zimbabwe 
comes from it being on the agenda of the first ZANU-PF conference at Xai-Xai, where the 
delegates resolved to do away with dowry payment.197 However, the dowry was only 
suspended for those in camps in Mozambique and only for the duration of the war of 
liberation. Even today the family, as a result of the dowry, remains the most unequal 
institution not only in Shurugwi, but in Zimbabwe as a whole, making family in Ona 
Kwanele Jirira’s terminology the “most undemocratic” institution in Zimbabwe.198 
Marriage has thus remained a patriarchal institution of social control, oppression and 
for the transference of the females [re]productive capacities.  
 
Explaining this, Gwaunza argues that marriage is a union of unequals because women 
usually marry older men, who in most cases are better educated, better paid and of 
higher social standing than themselves; and who above all would have paid lobola.199 
The inequalities could even be reified if the system of marriage was forced on the 
woman, for example after pledging (kuzvarira) or arranged marriages during crises in 
return for grain and also in situations of kuripa ngozi (appeasing avenging spirits), which 
overall symbolise the power of men over women. The reason for the oppression of 
women is due to their exclusion from direct control of the family’s means of production 
after bride wealth payment (compensation to her family) which, for all intents and 
practical purposes, transfers her labour from her family of birth to that of her 
                                                 
196 A.K.H Weinrich, “Changes in the Political and Economic Roles of Women in Zimbabwe since 
Independence, in Cultural Dialogue between the Peoples of the World, vol 8, No 4, 1982, p 44. 
197 Ibid, p 54. 
198 Ona Kwanele Jirira, “Gender, Politics and Democracy”, p 11. 
199 Elizabeth C Gwaunza “Social Attitudes-A hindrance to Women’s Advancement”, Southern African 
Political and Educational Magazine (SAPEM), August 1990, p 16. 
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husband.200 The overall impact of the lobola and marriage, as President Mugabe argues, 
is:  
[a]ll is not well in our world, there is still the issue of dowry, a man pays cattle 
and money in order to get a wife, if he does not do so, he does not get the wife 
so really, when he does pay the dowry he expects that the woman will obey him, 
that he is the head of the family and that all children belong to him, those things 
have not changed and I doubt they will change because the men will say: What 
do we pay the dowry for? So there are certain customs that tend to make the 
woman inferior.201 
 
However, it has to be said that under the Customary Marriages Act as amended in 1996, 
the payment of lobola is not compulsory but may be expected.202 This means that one 
may choose not to pay the lobola. From my personal experience of living in Shurugwi 
and in doing this research, lobola is demanded before marriage. Paying lobola is the 
standard norm, and a community expectation of a man who marries a woman.203 
Marriage arrangements before the payment of lobola are regarded merely as 
cohabitation, and the Shona term that is used for such unions, kuchaya mapoto, is even 
derogatory. It denotes illegality, immoral if not an adulterous relationship or one which 
is rooted in fornication. This is despite the fact that it is a union of consenting adults. It 
becomes a serious issue when the wife dies and no lobola had been paid, which often 
results in conflicts at burials.204  
 
Notwithstanding the above, we should, however, also note that bride wealth payment 
has other values in Zimbabwe. As Nicola Ansell suggests, lobola serves other roles like: 
                                                 
200 See for example an argument by Angela P Cheater, “The role and position of women in Colonial and 
Pre-colonial Zimbabwe” in ZAMBEZIA, Vol 13, No 11, 1986, p66, for more insight. 
201 See Newsday, 25 May 2012, “President bemoans the suppression of women”, in 
http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-05-25-president-bemoans-suppression-of-women, Accessed 26 May 
2012. 
202 See The Constitution of Zimbabwe: Customary Marriages Act (Revised Edition), Harare, Government 
Printer, 1996. 
203 Nowadays lobola is demanded in the form of a combination of cash, cattle, goats, kitchen utensils and 
clothes for the bride’s parents. 
204 Non-payment of lobola is viewed as one sure way of inviting ngozi/avenging spirits into the home. See 
Augustine Tirivangani, “Towards a theory of Africa centred metaphysics: A critical exploration of the Ngozi 
theme in selected Zimbabwe fiction”, PhD Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, cited in The Standard 23 May 
2010, Accessed 01 July 2011. See also Chapter Six. 
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the redistribution of material wealth, the establishment of relationships within and 
between lineages, as well as the construction of social identity.205 As such it should not 
be viewed negatively throughout. It is also true that there are a number of pieces of 
legislation since independence that have been enacted to help uplift the status of 
women. These include: the Legal Age of Majority Act of 1982, the Maintenance Act of 
1984, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1985), the Labour Relations Act (1985), the Taxation 
Act (1992) and the Inheritance Act (1993).206 As such the cause of women should not 
necessarily be viewed as all doom and gloom. On the whole however, lobola is widely 
used by men to circumscribe women. 
The relevant question to be answered is: could these cultural and political practices that 
contribute to the domestication of women and the general closing of opportunities for 
women have predisposed Shurugwi women to the high levels of violence? The answer is 
not at all simple. It is rather ambiguous. I would like, however, to suggest that it might 
have some salience to imagine these cultural and political practices as having 
contributed to the violations the women suffered. Women in Shurugwi district do not 
have equal opportunities with their male counterparts in terms of specialist jobs. This 
comes out clearly from the study done by the National AIDS Council (NAC) referred to in 
the General Introduction, which shows an inverse relationship between the total 
population figures and representation by gender in professional occupations. Whereas 
there are 37 164 females and 34 409 males in the district, there are 566 female teachers 
in both primary and secondary schools out of a total of 1137 teachers. A similar trend is 
found in the health sector, where out of a total of 82 workers, only 24 were females.207 
A lack of adequate education compared to the boys, for many reasons centred on the 
tradition of not favouring to send girls to school in favour of boys, may account for the 
low proportions of women in the NAC categories of professional employment cited 
                                                 
205 See Nicola Ansell, “’Because it’s our culture!’ (Re) negotiating the meaning of lobola in Southern 
African Secondary Schools” in Journal of Southern African Studies, 27, 4, December 2001, p 698.  
206 See Kwanele Ona Jirira, “Gender, Politics and Democracy: Kuvaka Patsva [Reconstructing]- The 
Discourse” in Patricia Macfadden, editor, SAFERE, Vol 1, No2, 1985, pp 10-11. 
207 See National AIDS Council, Tongogara District AIDS Action Committee, Second Quarter Report, April-
June 2005. 
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above. My conclusion from the field research is that in some cases the sending of girls to 
school is still not favoured as it is perceived that girls will one day get married and so it is 
a disinvestment to send them to school because they will eventually transfer their 
economic, productive and reproductive rights to their husbands’ families.  
 
Again due to inferior education and consequent economic/social/political disadvantages 
the women were at the mercy of politicians in the period of severe economic meltdown 
between 2000 and 2008. In their study in Norton, Jocelyn Alexander and Kudakwashe 
Chitofiri, for example, found that poverty begot desperation. As a result of the mainly 
economic (and also political) problems people were vulnerable and found advantages in 
belonging to- and identifying with- the MDC and ZANU-PF. This was for the material gifts 
like food hampers, health care, solidarity and protection from violence.208  
 
At times both political movements, however unequally, used these material and social 
goods to create patronage systems. As agriculture failed, due to a combination of 
natural and man-made policy disasters, poverty set in deeply in Shurugwi district which 
made these women vulnerable and susceptible to the whims of the political schemes of 
politicians. A succession of droughts and floods rocked Shurugwi between 2000 and 
2008 which conspired with the negative effects of a violent and poorly conceived and 
chaotic land redistribution to create food shortages and generated high poverty levels. 
In this atmosphere people could only buy the staple maize from the GMB. The passport 
to buying the precious commodity (grain) was by being a ZANU-PF supporter. What 
made this particularly worse was that people could not approach the GMB at Tongogara 
as individuals; rather they were supposed to pool their cash together and send their 
village heads/headmen to go and buy or worker representatives, in the case of civil 
servants.209 In the period under discussion the village heads and headmen had to be of 
                                                 
208 Jocelyn Alexander and Kudakwashe Chitofiri, “The consequences of violent politics in Norton, 
Zimbabwe”, p 5. 
209 This came out in the many interviews conducted. See Chapter Four, for a pithy discussion of this 
economy of patronage in Shurugwi between 2000 and 2008. 
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unquestioned loyalty to ZANU-PF. This meant that in order to be on the list to buy from 
the GMB one had to be an active and card carrying ZANU-PF member. Thus shortage of 
food was turned into a carrot to entice support for ZANU-PF. This was an effective 
method used alongside the coercive technology of violence and intimidation in 
mobilising support in the district. 
 
 I also established that for its part the MDC created a counter-patronage system by 
giving its supporters who had been victimised medical, financial and a general support 
regime. At times the MDC patronage system got entangled with that of the relief NGOs 
that operated in Shurugwi. A trend was that the NGOs operated in the classical 
communal areas and shunned resettlement areas. Of significance is that resettlement 
areas were associated with ZANU-PF mainly because those that got the farms were 
aligned to ZANU-PF or were known war veterans and well-known ZANU-PF supporters. 
However, this needs further complication because ZANU-PF won in other wards outside 
the resettlement zones, and it also won the two House of Assembly and Senatorial 
seats.  
 
On the whole, however, belonging to either political party, as individual women or as 
part of a family, or as part of a group, enabled the women in Shurugwi to access the 
limited essential resources in the highly polarised political economy.210 This 
participation, however, also opened up these women to abuse and violence. The 
women were expected to attend the respective parties’ rallies and to vote for these 
parties. The MDC supporters had to also attend ZANU-PF rallies as well. Due also to the 
high poverty levels many women victims could not escape hence they were trapped 
inside the district.  
 
The participation of women in the patronage economy opened them to their continuous 
participation in, and their victimisation in the violence. To continue to receive the 
                                                 
210 See Chapter Four, for more insights. 
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benefits the women had to continue in a role, singing and showing ostensible support 
that acted as fuel to the violence. It might be helpful here to refer to Reeler’s 
articulation of participation through compulsion. She describes compulsion in two ways: 
firstly, by creating conditions or even forcing someone to participate in violence and 
patronage system which forces them to commit to the political movement. Related to 
this, forcing someone to commit a violation will most likely force them to repeat thus 
ensuring their recruitment.211 Secondly, witnessing the torture of others triggers “a 
strong self-protection motive, identification with the aggressor, and at least compliance 
with the aggressor.”212 We should also be able to also mention the possible impact of 
the pressure the community had on the women.213 In this regard the existence and 
impact of “lists”214 needs to be emphasised. (See Chapter Four, where I discuss the 
positive and negative uses of lists). Among the negative uses was their use for the 
identification of opposition supporters and those that did not participate in ZANU-PF 
activities. Probably because of these negative uses, some women committed violence so 
as to be seen to belong and to show ostensible support of the violence. 
 
GOLD PANNING SITES AND VIOLENCE 
Gold panning sites also became spaces of political and other forms of violence. To begin 
with, Shurugwi district is blessed with the Great Dyke, which is endowed with a lot of 
mineral riches. Stretching from the South West, around the Mberengwa regions, the 
Great Dyke extends all the way to the North East of the country into regions of 
Mashonaland Central. In Shurugwi, the Great Dyke range literally bisects the district 
through the middle. It is on the Great Dyke that Shurugwi Town was established in 
                                                 
211 See A.P Reeler, “The role of militia groups in maintaining ZANU-PF political power”, March 2003, p 18. 
212 Ibid. 
213 See also AP Reeler,  Ibid, p 18. 
214 See Chapter Four of this thesis, for a nuanced discussion. In that chapter, we discussed the positive and 
negative uses of lists. Among the negative uses were their deployment for the identification of opposition 
supporters and those that did not participate in ZANU-PF activities. 
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1899,215 after the discovery of chrome and gold. Recently, large reserves of platinum 
have been discovered in Shurugwi along this belt leading to huge mining investments by 
Unki and Todal corporations.  
With the abundance of mineral resources along Shurugwi’s Great Dyke section, it was 
therefore not surprising that when the economic meltdown worsened, residents of 
Shurugwi, and from elsewhere in Zimbabwe, and even from across the borders of the 
country,216 converged on the Boterekwa escarpment turning it into a notorious gold 
panning site, a politically contested space, and a den of social vices, especially between 
1999 and 2007. As early as 2000, there were about 15 000 gold panners around the 
Boterekwa escarpment.217 This figure grew as the economic meltdown in the country 
worsened. After 2007, however, the Boterekwa gold panning site had lost its lustre 
because of the exhaustion of the gold, and more importantly because of the discovery 
of the lucrative Chiadzwa diamond fields in Manicaland province where most of the 
panners flocked with mixed fortunes.  
In interviews, I gathered that there were two major divisions around Boterekwa 
between those that sought alluvial gold, and those that sought to establish some form 
of shaft mining away from the rivers. Those that were into alluvial gold panning were 
especially found along the Mutevekwi river.  There were many other alluvial panners 
located along the Runde river, which was some distance from Boterekwa.  The other 
group engaged in shaft mining were found closer to the Boterekwa escarpment, 
commonly referred to as kuNumber One,218 and also in Mangwende farm. It is difficult, 
                                                 
215 See Mark Matsa and Kudakwashe Muringaniza, “Rate of land-use/land cover changes in Shurugwi 
District, Zimbabwe: Drivers for change”, in Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol 12, No 3, 
2010, p 110. 
216 See Painos Moyo, “Operation chikorokoza chapera bears fruit in Shurugwi”, in 
http://www.msu.ac.zw/cm/joomla/index2.php?options=com, who says some of the panners came from 
Beit Bridge, Gokwe, Lupani, Gwanda, Mberengwa, Chivi and Bindura. In interviews I was told that there 
were some panners and buyers  from Mozambique. Some of those from Mozambique were foreigners 
from West Africa who were residing in Mozambique. 
217 See the Daily News, 13 January 2000, for more details. 
218 kuNumber One refers to the area close to the Boterekwa pass, where heavy trucks have to engage the 
first gear/heavy gears when ascending or descending the steep slope. 
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however, to say unambiguously if this division between these groups of panners was a 
permanent one or contingent and whether panners moved from one to the other 
constantly. What cannot be denied is that working on alluvial gold along the Mutevekwi 
and Runde rivers was much lighter work, less technical and less expensive compared to 
shaft mining done at Mangwende farm. As a result, the newly arrived would establish 
base first at Boterekwa, and those who had made financial gains or those that sought 
better fortunes moved to engage in shaft mining. The panning activities were so 
pervasive that the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on mines, energy, environment 
and tourism, sounded alarmed its negative impact on the environment around 
Boterekwa.219  
The site also saw a lot of militarised violence in 2006 under Operation Chikorokoza 
Chapera/Isitsheketsha Sesiphelile/Gold panning is over. The operation was carried out in 
a rather heavy-handed way in Shurugwi. Panners accused the police of shooting at them 
and setting the dogs on them. There were also allegations that the police used live 
ammunition against the panners. Indeed the minister of Home Affairs, Kembo Mohadi, 
admitted as much saying:  “[w]e regret that during this operation there were incidents 
that should not have occurred, such as the shooting incident in Shurugwi and the 
destruction of huts in Chikuti.”220  
The interview with John below shows the horrors of the operation on the panners. 
It was one early morning, at about 8 or 9, in December 2006, that we saw a low 
flying helicopter above us. The police officer in it told us to go to the road and 
surrender ourselves to the officers who had a lorry. Naturally we did not want to 
surrender ourselves for arrest. Unbeknown to us was that there were other 
police officers with dogs, guns and rubber sticks very close to us. We tried to 
escape by running towards Chironde. The police officers on the ground let their 
dogs on us. We could not run far away because there were so many pits and 
shafts that were uncovered, and by running too fast we risked falling into these 
                                                 
219 See “Report of the Portfolio Committee on mines, energy, environment and tourism on the 
developments in Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park”, 8th June 2006, in Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates: The 
Senate, Vol 15, No 23, cited in http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms\Hansards\Archives\Senate\15_2005-
2006/8June2006_15-23pdf, Accessed 10 February 2011. 
220 See Kembo Mohadi, Home Affairs minister quoted in The Standard newspaper, 21 January 2007. 
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pits, which would have meant that we would have run ourselves into graves.  In 
no time the police dogs caught up with us, some of these dogs were really 
vicious, for example, the one that came to me and two others mauled us 
severely before the police officers arrived. However, they started to assault us 
with the rubber sticks as punishment for having attempted to escape. We were 
taken to Shurugwi Central police station where we were made to pay Z$300 000 
per person. All those that were found with gold and lots of money were further 
fined and in most cases they lost these to the state or to corrupt police officers. 
What might not be clear from the interview above are the underlying political currents 
to the gold mining in Shurugwi. The mining of gold in Shurugwi was run and controlled 
by a well-connected mafia-like group which had political connections. In interviews with 
some of the ex-panners names of rival senior politicians were mentioned. Some of the 
allegations made were that one such leading politician controlled panners not only in 
Shurugwi, but those that also operated in Kwekwe and Mvuma. There were other 
groups of panners who were allied to different other senior politicians. Due to this, rival 
groups of panners often clashed over control of mining sites. In the comprehensive raid 
referred to above, there are claims that it was ordered by one of the political factions 
that wanted to wrestle control of illegal gold mining. The above makes sense if one 
looks at the general informal and illegal economy characterised by, among others, 
underworld cartels, unemployment, shortages and illegal foreign currency 
transactions.221 It also makes sense if one brings in the general atmosphere of the 
“primitive accumulation” of wealth, in the Marxian sense,222 by the top ZANU-PF brass. 
 The raid was not only limited to the Boterekwa gold panning area. Simultaneous raids 
were also done at the Mangwende, Runde, Gwenoro and other smaller sites in Shurugwi 
                                                 
221 In informal discussions with illegal foreign currency changers in Gweru and Shurugwi I was made aware 
that at times the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and some of the major industrial concerns in both Gweru and 
Shurugwi sent their own people to buy forex on the black market. This goes to show how bad the illegal 
economy was in the decade under discussion. 
222 Karl Marx cited in Adam David Morton, “Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution 
in the Global Political Economy, Pluto Press, London, 2007, p 44, defines primitive accumulation as “the 
transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, 
of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass 
of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour, this fearful and 
painful 
expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital.” 
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along the Runde river using the same combination of low-flying helicopters and ground 
police officers. At all these sites temporary huts were torched, which resulted in the 
panners losing most of their personal belongings. These personal belongings included, 
inter alia, clothes, blankets, gold, televisions, cooking utensils, and huge sums of cash. 
All those who were arrested were made to pay fines, with those that could not raise the 
admission of guilt fines spending varying periods in custody.  
What is important is that these attacks on panners followed along similar lines to 
Operation Murambatsvina that was mainly set in urban areas. It was also in the 
background of grinding poverty and astronomical unemployment levels. Operation 
Murambatsvina, resulted, among others, in large-scale urban to rural migration of most 
of the 700 000 urbanites displaced nationally,223 and also contributed to the high 
unemployment as backyard industries and market stalls were criminalised and made 
illegal. However, these had become one of the largest sectors employing an ever-rising 
number of people.224  
In a way, Operation Chikorokoza chapera was a follow up operation to finish off the 
former urbanites who had migrated to the rural areas and were engaged in panning for 
gold for survival. These were regarded as the timeless enemies by ZANU-PF for having 
contributed to the thrashing of ZANU-PF in urban constituencies. As such the operation 
was meant in a way to further disperse and browbeat them. This also has to be seen in 
the light of increasing hardships even in the rural areas leading to increasing discontent 
with the government. Under such circumstances, the ZANU-PF government flexed its 
muscle and pre-empted intimidatory tactics to induce fear, as much as however 
stamping out the illegal panning activities.  
                                                 
223 See Joost Fontein, “Anticipating a tsunami: Rumours, planning and the arbitrary state in Zimbabwe,” in 
Africa: The journal of the International Africa Institute, Vol 79, Number 3, 2009, pp 369-398, in 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/afr/summary/v079/79.3.fontein.html, Accessed 21 May 2012. 
224 See Anna Kajamulo Tibaijuka, “Report of the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and 
impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the United Nations special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in 
Zimbabwe”, cited in http://ww2.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf, Accessed 2 May 2011, 
for more details.  
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The operation should also be seen as a part of the larger military-style quick fix head-in-
the -sand solutions to the ailing economy. To this degree, the state may have been 
trying desperately to capture the gold from panners to prop up the fiscus whose sources 
of income were drying by the day and were becoming almost non-existent. To give 
credence to the above argument, we can look at another seemingly desperate move by 
the state via the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) which embarked on a stop, 
search and confiscate operation targeting cross-border traders who might not have 
declared their goods at the border or who could have lost their declaration forms on the 
way from the border.  
Gold panning also increased conflict and violence between newly resettled farmers and 
gold panners in Shurugwi. The panners at times dug through the plots of land opened up 
by the new farmers for crop production and for grazing livestock.225 According to the 
Utete report this was at Shangrilla farm and Mangwende.226 As a result of this, the 
farmers reported loss of cattle that had fallen into the open pits dug by the panners. In 
other instances the livestock died after drinking water contaminated by cyanide used by 
the panners to purify their gold, and farmers also faced water problems due to cyanide 
use.227 Confrontations also resulted from the silting-up of rivers especially Mutevekwi, 
which meant that water for irrigation, for domestic animals and for domestic use, 
became a problem.228  
In my own interviews I established that there was a paradoxical relationship between 
the panners and the newly resettled farmers. On the one hand were the farmers who 
accused the panners of crime, including theft. Some told me that the panners stole their 
livestock, especially chickens, and goats; as well as grain both in the field and stored 
grain.229 At another level, panners were also accused of spreading social immorality by 
                                                 
225 See the Utete Committee Report, p 72. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Based on personal interviews, with the new farmers. 
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taking the resettled farmers’ wives and daughters because of their financial power.230 
The panners, while refusing theft allegations, did not refute those around immoral vices. 
Instead they counter-claimed that most of the new farmers hated them for making 
money, when most of them had been struggling off the land as farmers.231 Also as a 
result of having had the money, they were in “demand” from the farmers’ wives and 
girls. On the other hand the farmers did brisk business from selling different things to 
the panners.232  
What is striking to note is also the turning of the conflict between panners and newly 
resettled farmers into a political one. The panners were said to be MDC or anti-ZANU-PF 
because their activities destroyed agricultural potential. A closer scrutiny, however, 
reveals that politics made an easy escape for people to fight their personal battles, and 
it also resulted in the quick “resolution” of disputes. This also points to the fusion of 
petty jealousies into mainstream politics with disastrous consequences for those that 
were labelled anti-ZANU-PF. Of note again is the fact that some of the prominent 
panners were key ZANU-PF figures, for example Marvellous, who we shall discuss in 
greater detail in Chapter Three. 
A trip to Mangwende farm, a major gold panning site between 2000 and 2008, during 
the 2010 field research revealed that the farm had suffered serious degradation with 
several uncovered holes symbolising the gold panning scars. These holes and open pits 
dug will require a serious programme to rehabilitate the land for future agricultural use. 
Another interesting feature from Mangwende farm was that there was a crossover 
between farmers and gold panners. This crossover also came out in other discussions 
and interviews elsewhere in the district where, for example, men went to Mutevekwi or 
Boterekwa escarpment to pan for gold while the women and children remained home 
                                                 
230 This came up in most interviews. 
231 Interviews with gold panners. 
232 Some of the common goods that farmers sold to the panners were agricultural products such as green 
maize cobs, dried maize, mealie meal, sugar salt, bread, clothes, blankets and chickens. Panners described 
of stalls and market centres that developed among the panning sites, which drew not only the newly 
resettled farmers but also traders from as far as Gweru who brought different wares that originated both 
within Zimbabwe and across the borders, especially electronics and clothing items. 
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and continued to farm using inputs from the gold mining activities. More often, I was 
told, newly resettled farmers also turned to gold panning for its immediate and higher 
returns. The above therefore makes the attempt to separate farmers from gold panners 
rather tenuous. 
 
NATIONAL POLITICS AND VIOLENCE 
Shurugwi district has also been an active district politically. In this sense it has produced 
several key politicians. Among these was Ian Douglas Smith, the leader of the rightist 
Rhodesia Front and Prime Minister of Rhodesia from 1965 to 1980. Up to the time of his 
death in 2007, he still maintained his farm in the district and he also remained a critic of 
ZANU-PF.233 Josiah Magama Tongogara, the former ZANLA Commander and a senior 
member of ZANU’s central Committee, also hailed from this district. There are other 
important politicians from this district across time, including Francis Nhema who at one 
time was minister of Environment and Tourism, now minister of the Environment; while 
former ZAPU senior members Matibenga and Clement Muchachi were also from the 
district. Thus the district has experienced a lot of political contestation since the struggle 
for independence, especially with two of the most senior commanders of opposing 
armies, the Rhodesian army and ZANLA, hailing from the same district. As such the 
district has a symbolic significance for ZANU-PF, especially due to its associations with 
the late ZANLA General Josiah Tongogara. In addition, having won against Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesia Front in 1980, it would also be indigestible for ZANU-PF to lose the district to 
the opposition in the post-colonial dispensation.  
Shurugwi, like most parts of the Midlands province has always been a contested area for 
ZANU-PF, which has not always had a clean hold of the district. Its struggle with ZAPU 
over the district was never completely won up to the time of independence.234 In the 
                                                 
233 See his autobiography, Ian Smith, Bitter harvest: The great betrayal, Blake, London, 1997. 
234 As an example, Clement Muchachi, from Shurugwi was in the first GNU in 1980 represented ZAPU. See 
Pathisa Nyathi, “Zimbabwe: Msika- anationalist par excellence”, in The Herald, cited in 
 
 
 
 
 163 
 
 
 
 
post-2000 period, this contest was against the MDC. Lucia Matibenga, for example, the 
first MDC Member of Parliament candidate for Shurugwi in 2000 is the wife of the late 
ZIPRA cadre Matibenga. She also challenged the results of the parliamentary election 
against Francis Nhema of ZANU-PF, citing violence and intimidation, despite eventually 
losing her appeal.235 The MDC continued to make inroads into the district, and this has 
been a major source of political violence post 2000-period. The Tongogara family, for 
example, was at one time reported as abandoning ZANU-PF, the party of the late ZANLA 
Commander. As an example, Joshua Tongogara, Josiah Tongogara’s brother, was 
reportedly forced to withdraw his MDC candidature in the 2002 local council elections, 
together with other two candidates: Hlomayi Makotore of ward 8 and Irene Mafukidze 
of ward 11, because Tongogara’s MDC candidature humiliated ZANU-PF.236 
Election results since 2000 also consistently point to a strong MDC showing in Shurugwi. 
This despite the strong alliance ZANU-PF has always claimed with the rural areas. In 
Shurugwi, this is despite the emotional attachment ZANU-PF has with the district where 
its late military commander Tongogara comes from. In this regard, the MDC has had 
between 2000 and 2008 a third of the cast votes notwithstanding the high levels of 
violence, threats, and intimidation on its supporters. Campaigning has been next to very 
difficult. In addition its supporters have been systematically targeted. The following set 
of election results show a close contestation between ZANU-PF and the MDC. These are 
as follows: ZANU-PF to MDC 14 891 to 6 524 in 2000;237 16 212 to 5113 in 2005;238 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://allafrica.com/stories/2009081001.html?, accessed 5 March 2011. Added to this Shurugwi like the 
rest of the Midlands has never really “belonged” to ZANU-PF from the struggle for independence and into 
the post-independence period. In 1980, as an example, ZANU-PF only managed to win eight out of twelve 
seats in the Midlands province (although it won the Shurugwi seat), unlike in other predominantly Shona 
speaking provinces like Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland Central where it won all the seats. See 
http://en.wikimedia.org/wiki/SouthernRhodesia_general_elec_1980, for more details. 
235 See “Playing with fire: Personal accounts of human rights abuses experienced by 50 opposition 
Members of Parliament in Zimbabwe, and 28 election candidates”, by the Zimbabwe Institute, 
Johannesburg, March 2004, in http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/fire.htm, Accessed 20 August 2011. 
236 See The Daily News, 12 September 2002, “Tongogara’s brother held hostage in Shurugwi”, cited in 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200209120516.html, Accessed 16 February 2011 
237 See http://.zimbabwesituation.com/results.html, Accessed 15 December 2009. 
238 See http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No2/Trends.pdf, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
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in 2008: Shurugwi North 6 452 to MDC-M  1 006 and MDC-T 2 112; and in Shurugwi 
South: 5 068 to MDC-M 754 and MDC-T 1 977.239 
 
BASES AND OTHER SITES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The concept of bases,240 which is in many ways a reincarnation of the Second 
Chimurenga secret guerrilla and civilian meeting points, was [re]introduced in 2000 at 
the national level, although it was in 2008 that it was adopted on a large scale in 
Shurugwi, especially in the lead-up to the Presidential election runoff between April and 
27 June 2008. They became the main sites for the violations against women and 
generally suspected MDC supporters. In Shurugwi there were bases created at every 
kraal head level called a village base and above these were ward bases.241 Depending on 
the conditions in the village, bases could be open spaces under trees at whatever part of 
the village, but they were mostly located at the village head’s homestead or at borehole 
sites, which are usually centrally located. Village bases were manned by village heads 
who kept a register or a roll call of attendance. Village heads were ably supported by the 
“green bombers” and ZANU-PF youths. It was from these village bases that victims were 
identified and forwarded to the ward bases for punishment.  
 
The most notorious ward base in Shurugwi was the one established at the former farm-
stead turned into Boterekwa School, which was superintended by the widely-known war 
veteran, Gunpowder. At both the village and ward bases meetings called pungwes242 
were conducted, where all villagers were to compulsorily attend and receive political 
orientation in ZANU-PF propaganda and indoctrination. From interviews, much of the 
discourse at these pungwes held at the bases focussed on the role of ZANU-PF in the 
                                                 
239 See http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/electoral20317984.html, Accessed 19 February 2011. 
240 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Land, violence and compensation”, for pungwes at bases during the Second 
Chimurenga. 
241 Based on an interview with a former ZANU-PF Youth League member, he was himself later on 
victimised after being suspected of “selling out”, at Tongogara Growth point, 21 April 2010. 
242 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history”, p 360. 
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Second Chimurenga and in the Third Chimurenga, which qualified it to continue to rule 
the country. People were also told repeatedly how the country was under the threat of 
re-colonisation, and the dangers the MDC posed in this regard.  
 
Such reinforcing of the central role that ZANU-PF played in liberating the country fits 
into the discourse of “coercive nationalism”,243 and also the discourse of hegemony 
espoused by Antonio Gramsci.244  Gramsci articulates hegemony as a strategy of power 
that operates alongside, and complements, direct domination. For him, domination 
occurs through what he terms the political society or state made up of the government 
and the “juridical”. On the other hand hegemony operates through the civil society or 
non-coercive structures (churches, schools, political parties, the family, trade unions and 
social clubs) functions to naturalise authority through non-coercive means that 
established values, systems, beliefs and morality that support the existing power 
relations.245 
 
For Shurugwi, and more generally Zimbabwe, the hegemony contained under patriotic 
history or Mugabeism provided justification for the violations that the MDC supporters 
suffered by categorising them as sell-outs. This was in line with Foucauldian racialization 
that we discussed earlier in this chapter. This also recalls the practice of ZANU-PF 
politics obtaining from the Schmittian “political”, that was violent and rooted in the 
dangerous binary of friend and enemy,246 which like in the Foucauldian “race” discourse 
determined who was to live or die. As such, by classifying the MDC supporters as the 
other “race” or as the enemy, it justified beating, rape or other forms of violence. 
 
 
                                                 
243 See Tapera Knox Chitiyo, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history”, p 360. 
244 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, Orient Longman, Chennai, 1998, pp 12-13 
245 Ibid. 
246 See Carl Schmitt and G. Schwab, The Concept of the political, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2007, p 19.  
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WOMEN’S BODIES AS TEMPLATES OF THE VIOLENCE 
Alongside hegemony, there has been a strategy of using pre-modern torture-based 
forms of punishment. These were aimed at disciplining the body of the “criminal” by 
inflicting severe pain, glorifying the punishment and simultaneously discouraging the 
spectators from performing similar “crimes”.247 Here bodies of women were 
appropriated as a site for the violence. Many of my informants recall the violence that 
was inscribed on the bodies of women, as well as other non-ZANU-PF supporters. The 
commonest example from this battery of physical violence mentioned by these 
informants was beating, that was instituted to the same degree as suggested by 
Foucault’s supplice.248  
 
As will be highlighted in Chapter Three, these beatings were meted out on those that 
were described as MDC supporters, or those whose husbands or sons who were known 
to be MDC supporters had escaped. In this way the women were beaten and exposed to 
other forms of torture to reveal the whereabouts of their husbands or sons or to entice 
the husbands and or sons to come out of hiding. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
such attacks were done as part of Operation Tsuro negwenzi,249 where those that were 
sought were attacked with those that were supposedly hiding them. In the cases where 
the husbands or sons had escaped, women were beaten to reveal their whereabouts. In 
most cases it was thought that by beating the women the “real” targets would emerge 
from their hiding. The impact of targeting one’s family has been known to not only lead 
to the intended victims coming out of hiding, but it also weakens their resolve. This is so 
because “an activist may be willing to sacrifice his own life and limbs, but is he prepared 
to risk those of his entire family and his property? It is possible for one person to live on 
                                                 
247 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp 6-34. 
248 Supplice, as defined by Jaucourt, cited in Foucault, Ibid, is “corporal punishment painful to a more or 
less horrible degree.” 
249 For more on Operation Tsuro negwenzi, see Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity: What 
prospects for a new Zimbabwe?, Durban 29 July 2008, p 29. 
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the run, but much more complicated to displace an entire family, with school-going 
children or infants.”250 
 
What I gathered from the informants is that whilst some beatings were done at the 
village bases, these were few and less severe compared to the beatings done at ward 
bases. Instead names of those that would be targeted were sent to ward bases, usually 
manned by “war veterans” and youth militias. A possible explanation could be that the 
village bases were usually made up of family members and neighbours, which made it 
difficult to directly inflict beatings. What instead happened was that from these village 
bases, as already pointed out, names were forwarded to the ward bases where people 
were less connected by the various communal relations. What is also interesting is that 
the ward bases were larger in terms of hierarchy, not least because they were manned 
by “war veterans”, but also because they were also better attended. The scale of 
attendance thus provided the right platform to execute public floggings. As Foucault 
says, in the case of the public disciplining of Damiens, for example, a large crowd was 
necessary to create a spectacle.251 This was more to send a message to the larger 
audience that witnessed as it was also aimed at disciplining the one undergoing the 
punishment.  
 
In some instances, however, the beatings were not done in public. Others were done 
outside the public eye, and usually these were more severe. Informants told me of how 
they were abducted in unmarked CAM pickup trucks, especially in 2008, and severely 
assaulted and abandoned by the roadside. Yet others reported their husbands and sons 
were abducted and kept at the different base camp sites. In part the severity of the 
beatings, which for some translated to falanga, might have been due to the long period 
of time the victims were kept in captivity, which exposed them to continuous beatings. 
The unmarked vehicles referred to point to the possible involvement of state operatives 
                                                 
250 Solidarity Peace Trust, “Desperately seeking sanity: What prospects for Zimbabwe?”, in 
http://www.zwnews.com/SPTdesperatelyseekingsanity.pdf, Accessed 29 May 2011. 
251 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp 3-6 & 34 
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ranging from those from the Central Intelligence Organisation, (CIO), Police Internal 
Security Intelligence (PISI) or even army officers who were not in uniform. As such, such 
beatings done by professionals were rather severe. The bodies of the women and other 
victims were used both figuratively and literally as sites of violence.252 As Michel 
Foucault has noted, a person’s body is a contested terrain for many things, including 
power. As he says: “The body is directly involved in a political field; power relations have 
an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, train, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to 
perform ceremonies and to emit signs”.253 Indeed the bodies were turned into sites 
where the scars of the violence were inscribed, both physically and emotionally.254 
 
The violence on the rural women of Shurugwi also recalls the literary writing of Yvonne 
Vera in Stone Virgins where she describes the essence of Sibaso’s violence against the 
weak woman he abused. She writes: “He (Sibaso) turns steadily, with the movements of 
a hunter who kills not because he is hungry but because his stomach is full, therefore he 
can hunt with grace.”255 For Shurugwi, one could say that ZANU-PF engaged in violating 
opposition supporters, especially women, to also show that they could do it with 
impunity, besides sending a powerful message that sought to cow MDC supporters who 
were supposed to vote for it out of fear. 
 
Findings from elsewhere in Zimbabwe also confirm the use of women’s bodies as an 
integral site of violence. Jane. L. Parpart puts it well and says: 
… the ruling party’s struggle to retain power has often been played out on 
women’s bodies. Indeed, policing the bodies of women who do not ascribe to 
male authority has become one of the prime goals of the Green bombers…These 
youth have become a symbol of the ruling party’s dominance, its warrior 
masculinity and its clear message that women who ‘belong’ and submit will be 
                                                 
252 See Charlotte Bunch and Niamh Reilly, Demanding Accountability: The Global Campaign and Vienna 
Tribunal for Women’s Rights, UNIFEM, New York, 1994, p 38, for a nuanced expose of these terms. 
253 Michel Foucault, cited in Kizito Muchemwa and Robert Muponde, eds, “Introduction: Manning the 
Nation”, p xvii. 
254 See Chapter Three of this thesis for an in-depth discussion of the types of violence perpetrated on the 
bodies and minds of women, and generally MDC supporters in Shurugwi in the period 2000-2008. 
255 Yvonne Vera, Stone Virgins, p 71. 
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protected- those who do not may suffer the humiliation of rape and even 
death.256 
 
Outside the public media gaze, women’s bodies in rural Shurugwi became the template 
on which the physical manifestation of violence was performed during rallies and in 
secret locations of homes, in the darkness provided by nights or during the day at rallies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter tried to give the background factors that helped to make Shurugwi such an 
important theatre of the post-2000 violence. It has drawn attention to the land issue, 
not least because it was used in ZANU-PF discourse to explain the necessity of that 
violence, but also to establish the unfortunate conflation of this genuine problem with 
the rather fortuitous demands of the Third Chimurenga, in which ZANU-PF was faced 
with the necessity to survive. The chapter also tried to explain the impact that political 
violence had on localised politics, and on other forms of violence, including the 
culturally inclined abuses in the family and in the home, and vice-versa. I also tried to 
extend the same analysis to other activities that have transformed the socio-political 
landscape of Shurugwi, most notably gold panning. Overall, I wished to argue that there 
was nothing particularly unique in the factor(s) that predisposed Shurugwi to the 2000-
2008 violence except the transformation of the issue of land into a ZANU-PF political 
agenda to stamp out opposition in this rural district. However, there were moments like 
the adoption of centralisation and the strong polar influences of the Tongogara and 
Smith legacies that made Shurugwi “special” and prone to political struggles.  
 
 
                                                 
256 Jane. L. Parpart, “Masculinities, race and violence in the making of Zimbabwe”, in Kizito Muchemwa 
and Robert Muponde, eds, Manning the Nation, p 103. Kizito Muchemwa and Robert Muponde, eds, 
“Introduction: Manning the Nation”, p xvii, have also established that women’s bodies throughout the 
world have been more often than not been appropriated as sites for political battles and have been 
mutilated, raped and killed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: VIOLENCE AND MEMORY: INTERPRETING WOMEN’S VOICES  
 
INTRODUCTION 
While acknowledging that it would be overly simplistic to portray women as pure 
victims of the violence without any agency, this chapter dwells on the experiences of 
women as victims of the militarised violence. Another chapter (Four) has been set aside 
to explore the levels of relative agency of the women of Shurugwi. The multi-layered-
ness of woman-ness in Shurugwi, based on geographic location, political affiliation, and 
economic and social status, meant that they suffered differential violations. To this 
extent some suffered the violence of not belonging, that is, as outsiders who were also 
cast as sell-outs; others suffered retaliatory attacks; and some were affected by 
dispossession or acquisition.  
 
Among other issues, this chapter grapples with the meanings of the women’s narratives; 
the context, the nature and extent of the violence in the district; the organisation and 
patterns of the violence in order to address the question in its complexities. In addition, 
the chapter grapples with the “silences” encountered during the field research. Key 
questions to be addressed include how do the women interpret the events of their 
victimisation? What factors predisposed Shurugwi to the violence?  
 
Based on the narrative accounts of the women, I argue that the violence in the district 
occurred in the context of the transformation of politics into a war1 of survival by ZANU-
PF, under the controversial Third Chimurenga. This occurred, as explained in the General 
Introduction, under conditions of the militarisation of both the state and violence. 
Broadly, because there was a conflation of strategic interests between the army and 
ZANU-PF, the era was distinguishable. The conflation of interests also demanded a 
unitary strategy. In the end, an unholy alliance emerged between the security forces’ 
                                                 
1 I wish to continue on the thread that I started with in Chapter One based on the Foucault’s analysis of 
power as war by other means.  
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top hierarchy, the war veterans and ZANU-PF. This culminated in a project of coercive 
mobilisation, armed electioneering, intimidation and aggressive masculinities aimed at 
retaining of ZANU-PF in power amid reduced electoral support.  
 
As such, violence had become the standard mode of political mobilisation and survival. 
The narrative accounts that the women gave also showed the link between their 
victimisation and their suspected or actual links with the MDC. Moreover, I would like to 
suggest that ZANU-PF had the capacity and means to stop the violence. It was the only 
party in government, and it certainly wanted it, abetted it and benefitted from it. Hence 
it had no desire to abate it. It is also crucial to add that the opposition MDC also 
engaged in acts of retaliatory violence. Because of its trivialisation as well as its use as 
political strategy of eliciting support, it became easy for more localised and informal 
politics to adopt, and be subsumed, in the narratives of the political violence. These 
vendettas, conflicts and jealousies became significant in shaping the direction and in the 
“democratisation” of the violence at the village and extended family levels. 
 
CONTEXT OF THE VIOLENCE 
The attacks on political opponents that rocked Shurugwi district between 2000 and 
2008 should not be looked at in isolation. They were a part of a countrywide campaign 
for political survival by ZANU-PF in the face of a strong opposition.2 In essence, it was a 
part of a brutal mobilisation to rescue ZANU-PF from the political doldrums to which it 
was banished from the beginning of the new millennium. Following the February 2000 
Constitutional Referendum loss that wounded its pride, the political fortunes of ZANU-
PF were threatened. As highlighted in the General Introduction, there were reasons to 
believe that this loss would be replicated in the subsequent June 2000 parliamentary 
and 2002 presidential elections.  
 
                                                 
2 See a similar compelling argument by Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, pp 17-20. 
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To pre-empt the prognosis ZANU-PF then turned to coercive methodology of retaining 
lost ground and instilling fear in the citizenry, co-ordinated as the Third Chimurenga. 
Under the Third Chimurenga, it first reverted to a language of coercive mobilisation that 
simultaneously revoked the policy of reconciliation3 and sought to legitimise its 
continued hold on power based on its role in the Second Chimurenga and the resonant 
anti-imperialist argument.4 This authorising narrative at the same time blamed white 
farmers and the British for contributing to the NO vote and the strengthening of the 
MDC because they were allegedly against land redistribution and behind attempts to 
recolonize the country.5 Second, ZANU-PF fomented violent farm invasions (jambanja) 
led by war veterans and land hungry communities to forcibly take over farms from 
whites.6 Concurrently, it initiated a violent programme of repression aimed at those 
constituencies considered pro-MDC.  
 
The state was also reorganised resulting in the clear militarisation of its structures.7  
The militarisation was marked by the central and dominant role played by the security 
arms and semi-military bodies (the war veterans and the National Youth Service 
graduates) in ZANU-PF and in the state. Officially, the perverse presence of security 
services’ was explained as an attempt to preserve national sovereignty in the face of 
revived Western imperialism. Outside the usurpation of civilian duties in the state, the 
various military and quasi-military structures also engaged in a coercive political 
mobilisation for ZANU-PF. Primarily, these groups were used as shock troops for ZANU-
PF. This in turn led to the militarisation of violence as these structures helped foment 
                                                 
3 See President Robert Mugabe’s speech at the ZANU-PF Headquarters on 25 October 2000 cited in 
Sabelo. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist, p 207. In this speech he posited that:  “the national 
reconciliation policy we adopted in 1980 is threatened, gravely threatened, by the acts of the whites in 
this country and we shall revoke that national reconciliation, we shall revoke it”. 
4 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the crisis” in David Harold-Barry, ed, 
Zimbabwe: The past is the future, Weaver Press, Harare, 2004, p 13. 
5 See the many speeches by President Mugabe in Inside the Third Chimurenga for further elaboration. 
6 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Current politics in Zimbabwe”, p 13. 
7 See the General Introduction for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon. 
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and sustain violence throughout the country. At another level, the state increasingly 
resorted to military-style operations in its civilian administration.  
 
As also discussed in the Introduction, the effects of the militarisation on the pogrom 
were first presented in the farm takeovers. Over the years, however, this was extended 
to the invasion of public sector institutions, the intimidation of disgruntled civil servants 
who suffered unwarranted dismissals, humiliations, beatings and torture. In addition, 
the actions were extended to industrial and firm invasions, the signing of the anti-
sanctions petition, and the indigenisation of other sectors like mining, industries and 
banks. 
 
In the end intimidation, threats, force and browbeating of opposition structures became 
the core mobilising strategy for ZANU-PF seeking renewal in the presence of diminished 
electoral promises amid a worsening crisis.8 Thus, once ZANU-PF felt its grip on power 
loosen it turned to the technology of violence to cow the population and more generally 
to retain its hold on the state. As Hannah Arendt explains: 
[…] every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence - if only because 
those who hold power and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the 
government or be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist the 
temptation to substitute violence for it.9 
 
However, it is also prudent to acknowledge that ZANU-PF played to its strengths to gain 
some votes and retain political power besides using violence. These included its 
powerful articulation of its inalienable role in the liberation struggle and its portrayal of 
the “role” of the British in attempts to recolonise the country especially to the people 
who bore the brunt of the liberation war in the not so distant 1970s, and the ingenious, 
though narrowed, articulation of the land question at a moment of increasing 
overcrowding in communal areas that was marked by spontaneous farm invasions.10  
                                                 
8 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”. 
9 See Hannah Arendt, On violence, Harcort, Brace and World Inc, New York, 1970, p 87. 
10 See Robert Mugabe, Inside the Third Chimurenga. 
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ZANU-PF also cleverly spread out the various forms of indigenisation and redistribution 
of wealth, carefully articulating them to sweeten its election campaign at strategic 
moments. It also enabled it to gloss over its shortcomings, and promote elements of 
primitive accumulation of a select few under conditions of unclear indigenisation policy 
and human rights violations. This staggering, while preventing the total collapse of the 
economy, enabled ZANU-PF to sustain for a long time a resonant campaign platform. 
Beyond this, however, it also meant that the threats to deploy force against the MDC 
and those refusing to “share” remained alive. In this way mining concerns, large foreign-
owned companies and banks that showed signs of resistance to the indigenisation 
strategy were labelled as agents of imperialism. They were also threatened with the 
withdrawal of their operating licences or with closure.11 
 
This violence also speaks to the instrumentalisation of power by the state. In a version 
of the Maoist doctrine, that has strong influences on ZANU-PF, “power grows out of the 
barrel of the gun.”12 Violence as the pillar of political power in this Maoist modality 
became an even more attractive option for ZANU-PF at a time when its political fortunes 
were at the lowest ebb. In this regard, it reinvented its status as a “revolutionary party” 
and it converted the national army into a “revolutionary army” that deploys violence in 
a “revolutionary struggle” to attain political objectives.13 What is crucial in this 
                                                 
11 See for example, Roman Baudzus, “Zimplats fighting Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policies” in 
http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2012/03/05/zimplats-fighting-zimbabwes-indigenization-policie, 
Accessed 14 July 2012. See also Office of the Prime Minister, “Zimbabwe: statement on the indigenisation 
of banks and private educational institutions”, in http://allafrica.com/stories/201207040159.html, 
Accessed 14 July 2012.see also Newsday 13 July 2012, “Bank takeover scares away investors”, in 
http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-07-13-bank-takeover-scares-away-capital, Accessed 15 July 2012. 
12 See Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on violence” in New York Review of Books, 27 February 1969, cited in 
http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/arendt-hannah_reflectionsw-on-violence.html. The linking of 
votes to the role that ZANU-PF played in the Second Chimurenga supports this link in Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF 
cadres were also trained in China during the liberation struggle and were well schooled in the Maoist 
literature. Also the discourse of ZANU-PF’s military prowess and accomplishments in the liberation 
struggle is emphasised in the academia and in the media. See for example Terence Ranger, 
“Historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the struggle of the past in Zimbabwe” in 
http://cas1.elis.rug.ac accessed 12 May 2009. 
13 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 8. 
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“revolutionary” construction is that military and political objectives are conflated.14 In 
the process bodies of individual people were apportioned as spaces for violence to 
obtain the political objectives. This is, however, not to say that Maoism officially 
condones such acts of abuse of the population. Rather, it implores its cadres not to “hit 
or swear at people”; or to “take liberty with men or women,” among other things.15 In 
fact during the Second Chimurenga, this code of conduct for guerrillas was even 
composed into a ZANU nationalist song, The soldier’s code of conduct.16 
 
However, this inclination towards Maoist discourse should not be very surprising 
because ZANU-PF had strong historical attachments to Maoism going back to the days 
of the liberation struggle. Most of the senior military officers underwent military and 
political orientation in China. This relationship was cemented at the time of the creation 
of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces from the three main protagonist armies involved in the 
Second Chimurenga. As Kriger ably demonstrates, the army integration process 
promoted more ex-ZANLA cadres compared to the ex-ZIPRA.17 The “Look East” policy 
launched by the Zimbabwe government from the early 2000s, in the face of hostilities 
with the West, led to strengthening of economic and political ties between ZANU-PF and 
China. In terms of the economic cooperation, trade grew significantly between the 
two.18 Again, there were significant Chinese investments in the country. China also 
advanced lines of credit to the troubled Zimbabwe government. Politically, China, 
together with Russia and South Africa vetoed the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe 
                                                 
14 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, p 94. 
15 See an adaptation of Mao’s Red Book, in Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse Tung and Chimurenga, p 110.  
16 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse Tung and Chimurenga, pp 250-251. 
17 The three armies that were merged to form the ZDF were ZIPRA, ZANLA and the Rhodesian Forces. 
Many analysts feel that in the course of the integration BMATT (British Military Advisory and Training  
Team)  tended to favour ZANLA cadres, which has helped to create an army that is sympathetic to ZANU-
PF. For a detailed account, see Norma Kriger, Guerilla veterans in Post war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and 
violent politics, 1980-1987, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 103, who says that at the end 
of the integration process ZANLA consisted 60 percent, ZIPRA 35 percent and Rhodesia forces 5 percent of 
the ZDF. In time the percentage surely improved in favour of ZANU-PF, especially with the mass 
desertions by ex-ZIPRA during the dissident era and also in the creation of the Fifth Brigade. 
18 See The Zimbabwean, 08 May 2012, “China and Zimbabwe trade doubled”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/58106/china-and-zimbabwe-trade-doubled.html, 
Accessed 13 July 2012. 
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by the United Nations.19  Importantly, the Look-East policy helped significantly to invent 
a repressive brand of Maoism which enabled ZANU-PF to trample on people’s liberties.   
 
An important aspect of the Third Chimurenga was that it was fought on a clear terrain of 
insiders and outsiders.20 In this trope whites, together with Black supporters of the 
MDC, were labelled alien. To this extent, some urbanites were castigated as totemless,21 
while farm workers, many of who originated from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, 
were labelled foreigners.22 More than this, however, the basis for this labelling was their 
association with the MDC. They were too accused of siding with their employers, the 
white farmers, in the 2000 constitutional NO vote.23 This overall meant appropriating 
another layer of foreign-ness on them. The urbanites had consistently voted for the 
MDC.  
 
Regarding the whites, who had campaigned strongly for, and partly sponsored, the NO 
vote in the February 2000 Constitutional Referendum, and who also partly financed the 
MDC,24 President Mugabe once said, “they think because they are white they have a 
divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa 
is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans.”25 In the process, many urbanites, farm 
workers and white farmers were subjected to alienation, property expropriation and 
destruction, displacement, and intimidation.  
 
                                                 
19 Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a Passive Revolution.” 
20 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The state in crisis”, p 213. 
21 See J Mujere, “‘Tsunami!’, Coping with the impact of Operation Murambatsvina in Harare: The case of 
elderly vendors and tuckshop owners in Mbare and Highfield suburbs”, Paper presented at the 
conference on Ageing in African Cities: revisiting the issues, responses and outcomes, Nordic Africa 
Institute, Zomba, Malawi, 29 November-1 December 2007, p 13. See also Deputy Minister Phineas 
chihota’s description of some Harare victims of Operation Murambatsvina as non-indigenous in See The 
Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005, for a complete statement. 
22 See Blair Rutherford, “Belonging to the farm(er): Farm workers, farmers, and the shifting politics of 
citizenship”, pp 191-213. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”, p 210. 
25 See “Mugabe’s Zimbabwe”, in http://www.mugabeandthewhiteafrican.com/mugabe-zimbabwe/, 
Accessed 12 February 2010. 
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To further underscore the foregoing discussion it might be useful to think through 
Mamdani’s discourse of the shifts and inventions of nativity in his analysis of the 
Rwanda genocide.26 In this work, Mamdani brought to the fore the dangers of 
essentialising nativity. As he says, this led to a murderous campaign in which up to 
800 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were exterminated. It also mirrors the various forms 
of non-biological racisms referred to by Foucault, which determine “what must live and 
what must die”.27 As Foucault posits, racism results in the ranking of races as either 
superior or inferior. These distinctions then form the grounds for exclusion and 
elimination of the alleged inferiors ostensibly to protect the interests of the superior 
race.28 As in Rwanda the politicisation of, and “ownership” of, nativity in Zimbabwe met 
with catastrophic consequences. Many hundreds of people were killed, thousands 
tortured and millions more intimidated.  
 
In a significant way also, the articulation of the native-alien discourse in Zimbabwe 
represented the transformation of liberatory nationalism into racialised nationalism or 
reverse racism29 that sought to exclude all those that opposed it. To this extent, ZANU-
PF portrayed the whites in and outside Zimbabwe as the root of Zimbabwe’s problems. 
As already stated, this stemmed from the role the white farmers played in the NO vote 
in the Constitutional referendum of 2000 and their political mobilisation and economic 
support for the MDC. The net effect was a sometimes racialised nationalist mobilisation. 
This step assigned collective guilt on to the whites and ascribed collective historical 
victimhood on the blacks. On the whole, by using the racial card therefore ZANU-PF 
evoked violence because “racism …. is fraught with violence by definition because it 
                                                 
26 See Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become killers, for a more detailed discussion. 
27 Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”, p 254,cited in Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenburg, 
“Michel Foucalt: Crises and Problemisations”, The Review of politics, vol 67, no2, Spring 2005, Cambridge 
University Press, in http://www.jstor,.org/stable25046414, accessed 28 October 2010, p 341. He says 
there are various racisms which are not necessarily based on skin colour. He posits that ethnic differences, 
religious differences, criminality, physical and mental differences constitute other racisms. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp 157-159. He sees nationalism in Africa metamorphosing, 
under the pitfalls of nationalism, from liberatory nationalism, to ultra-nationalism, to chauvism, and 
finally racism. 
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objects to natural organic facts- a white or black skin- which no persuasion of power 
could change; all one can do, when the chips are down, is to exterminate their 
bearers.”30  
 
Further, by playing victim of Western imperialist forces masked as the MDC provided 
some justification for resorting to violence. As Mamdani argues, “by portraying 
opponents as potential perpetrators and ourselves as potential victims, war tends to 
demonise opponents and sanctify aggression as protective and defensive.”31 In ZANU-PF 
vocabulary, the pogrom was necessary to protect national sovereignty and the gains 
made from the Second Chimurenga. It was also defensive against Western aggression 
masked as the MDC. ZANU-PF was thus mirrored as fighting an invasion by an imperialist 
enemy and not a local opposition political party.32 
 
This portrayal of victimhood by ZANU-PF also recalls a reading of Franz Fanon that 
native violence is not aggressive but is a derivative of colonialist violence and was 
retaliatory and emancipatory.33 Above all, it touched on the notion that the only 
appropriate language the settler colonialist understood was violence.34 Furthermore, in 
this “cult of victimisation”,35 to borrow Mbembe’s terminology, ZANU-PF felt justified to 
use violence in defence of national sovereignty. The evocation of war (Third 
Chimurenga) therefore proffered justification to the use of the security forces on the 
opposition. As a result the MDC was vilified and violently treated.  
 
The genealogy of violence on the opposition can, however, be traced back to intolerant 
nationalist politics dating back to the struggle for independence in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Nationalism was viewed as a unitary movement, with little room for dissent or even 
                                                 
30 Hannah Arendt, On violence, bid, p 76. 
31 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become killers, p 217. 
32 Robert Mugabe, Inside the Third Chimurenga, p 88. 
33 See Chapter One section on “Liberatory violence.” 
34 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p 78. 
35 Achille Mbembe, “African Modes of Self Writing” in Public Culture, 14, 1, 2002. 
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constructive criticism within or outside the movement. As such trade unions, women 
and students who sought to challenge colonialism from outside the nationalist politics 
of ZANU and ZAPU, were often subjected to various forms of intimidation, actualised 
and threatened.36 The contestations and bitter rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU, the 
major liberation movements, during the 1960s and 1970s, that we discussed in Chapter 
One, for majority status, donor funding and recognition, should be perceived in this 
light. For this reason the liberation movements sought to be the “sole” representatives 
of the people’s grievances against colonialism.37  
 
The genesis of this authoritarianism can also be traced to the time of the liberation 
struggle when ZANU and ZAPU set up camps, both military and civilian, outside the 
country. These camps in a way became laboratories for the development of the post-
independence governance structures and the genesis of authoritarianism in 
Zimbabwe.38 We ought to note that it was in the camps outside Rhodesia at Chimoio, 
Tembwe, Osibisa, Nyadzonia and Mboroma, among others, that the current leadership 
of ZANU-PF first tasted leadership and it was there that the current leadership hierarchy 
was also developed. This hierarchy of power was then brought to govern the nation 
1980. This leadership that developed during the struggle for independence was largely 
maintained with few cosmetic changes. Mugabe and his core group still maintained 
power in ZANU-PF and in government, and had added a few former ZAPU, and younger 
leaders to their ranks.  
 
                                                 
36 For a more nuanced explanation refer to Timothy Scarnecchia, The roots of urban and political violence 
in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfields, 1940-1964, p 2. 
37 See Chapter 1 for more details. 
38 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare life, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1998, for a detailed discussion on the importance of the camps in the nurturing of authoritarian 
leadership. His articulation of the relationship between the “sovereign” and the “bare life” of camp 
occupants remains seminal. 
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In the post-colonial set up ZANU-PF, and in keeping with ZANU-PF’s long cherished 
dream of imposing a one party state in post-independent Zimbabwe,39 the thread of 
intolerance continued. Intolerant nationalism had however metamorphosed into 
authoritarian nationalism. Ideally, ZANU-PF preferred a façade of plural politics 
characterised by weak opposition parties. These opposition parties were useful only to 
legitimate the notion of plural politics to the outside world. Once an opposition outgrew 
this use it had to be “silenced once and for all”.40 To this degree, strong political 
contenders were brutally dealt with. At one level they were criminalised, at another 
they were infiltrated and forced to crumble, at yet another level their leaders and 
supporters were arrested, tortured, publicly humiliated and physically abused.  
 
To exemplify, in the 1980s ZAPU which was a formidable opposition was dragooned to 
merge with ZANU-PF following the murderous gukurahundi military campaign between 
1982 and 1987.41 In the 1990s the emergence of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, led by 
Edgar Tekere, a former ZANU-PF stalwart, was also met with a lot of violence from the 
ZANU-PF government.42 Again in the 1990s in 1995, the Forum Party was branded a 
European settlers’ party, the United Parties as a sell-out party due to its involvement in 
the 1978 Internal Settlement, and ZANU-Ndonga was called a tribal movement.43 
Through various aggressive methods, these parties were bullied into insignificance or 
into dissipation. 
 
                                                 
39 Jonathan Moyo, Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe 
Publications, Harare, 1992, p 22, acutely gives a detailed analysis of this attempt by ZANU-PF to establish 
the one party system. 
40 John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen: The politics behind the 1995 General 
elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2000, p 303. 
41 While accepting that there are varied explanations to the dissident problem and the Gukurahundi 
response to it in Matebeleland in the 1980s, the indiscriminate targeting of ZAPU supporters and 
generally Ndebele speakers point to some kind of goal to exterminate ZAPU. There were also quite 
deliberate attempts at the life of Joshua Nkomo the leader of ZAPU. See for example, Joshua Nkomo, The 
Story of My Life, Norma Kriger, Guerilla Veterans, for the various analyses of the Gukurahundi. 
42 See Sabelo. J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist, pp 180-198. 
43 See ZANU-PF Election Manifesto, 1995, pp 4-5, for details.  
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The scale of attacks and intolerance worsened dramatically at the turn of the century 
with the creation of an even bigger threat, the MDC, which actually threatened the core 
of ZANU-PF’s traditional support base in the rural areas,44 including Shurugwi. In all the 
seven elections that were held between 2000 and 2008 the MDC made strong showings 
culminating in the two MDC formations controlling the lower house of parliament and 
the MDC-T winning the first round of the Presidential ballot in 2008. Correspondingly, 
most of these elections witnessed numerous cases of violence.45 Cases cited from the 
interviews from Shurugwi serve to buttress the correlation between elections and the 
upsurge in violence.46 Besides the numerous cases of beatings and public humiliations, 
there were temporary forced displacements which caused the disenfranchisement in 
Shurugwi. Other MDC supporters were simply too terrified to go to the polling stations 
on voting days. Alongside this strategy was the deliberate caricaturing of the MDC as a 
sell-out party, a puppet and front for Western imperial forces. 
 
Mbembe also makes sense of similar violence on the African continent. To him, this was 
part of the historical trajectory which had become an integral part of the continent’s 
politics. He posits that:  
[t]he course of African history is said to be determined by combined action of a 
diabolic couple formed by an enemy- or tormentor- and a victim. In this closed 
universe, in which ‘making history’ consists of annihilating one’s enemies, 
politics is conceived as a sacrificial process, and history, in the end, is seen as 
participating in a great economy.47  
 
                                                 
44 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe”. 
45  The elections between 2000 and 2008 were the June 2000 parliamentary, November 2000 Local 
Council, the 2002 Presidential, the 2005 parliamentary, the October 2005 senatorial elections, the 
harmonised 2008 and the infamous June 2008 Presidential runoff elections. See for example “Graveyard 
governance”, p 2, for more details. See also Brian Raftopoulos, “Nation, race and History in Zimbabwean 
politics” in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, eds, Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004, p 164 for an in-depth look at violence at 
election times. 
46 I shall come back to these examples, see the section titled, “Types of violence in Shurugwi” in this 
chapter. 
47 Achille Mbembe, “African Modes of Self Writing” in Public Culture, 14,1, 2002, p 252, he uses sacrifice in 
two categories: firstly, to denote risking oneself for others; and secondly to kill others/enemies/identified 
with the enemy. Thus on both ends, deaths are unavoidable.  
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Inadvertently, issues around gender, masculinity and femininity have surfaced around 
the violence. While the violence was not necessarily against women in the country and 
in Shurugwi district, it could not adequately escape these entrapments. Masculinities 
became heavily militarised to the detriment of women who ended up victimised. 
Participating in war and violence generally raises the social profile of masculinity of men 
who are in charge, while at the same time it apportions femininity to those on the 
sidelines.48 The other end result was the entrenchment of patriarchal oppression of the 
weak, not only women but also men who do not have political power in society. As 
Kizito Muchemwa and Robert Muponde suggest, wars and conflict situations in the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods in Zimbabwe have resulted in the dominance 
of masculinities. In their words:  
Diachronic and synchronic approaches show how pre-colonial and post-colonial 
wars and the First and Third Chimurenga are important sites for the historical 
evolution of Zimbabwean masculinity. War consistently functions as a site of 
erasure and rearticulation of other sites of masculinity. Families and 
communities are fractured, erased and dispersed, turning individuals into 
drifters without allegiance. Outside the war ethic driven by an excess of 
masculinity, individuals whose gender does not contribute to the war economy 
are under threat. There are pressures to discipline, militarise and transform the 
male body into an instrument of surveillance and violence. Macho masculinity, in 
both the public and private spheres may be understood as a phenomenon 
unique to the Third Chimurenga but its aetiology…can be traced to pre-colonial 
times.49  
 
In Zimbabwe these various versions of dominant masculinities were well encapsulated 
in the amadoda sibili narrative.50 The overall effect was to alter the gender relations in 
the country, as gender roles were violently spelt out in the face of an increased 
domination of a virulent discourse of male superiority. It was in this context that in 
Zimbabwe homosexual men, those in the opposition and those whose masculinities 
                                                 
48 Kizito Muchemwa and Robert Muponde, eds, “Introduction: Manning the Nation”, in Manning the 
Nation: Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and Society, Weaver Press and Jacana, Harare and 
Johannesburg, 2007, p xviii. 
49 Ibid, p xviii. 
50 See the General Introduction for a pithy discussion of this. 
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were not in sync with those of ZANU-PF were feminised and brutalised because they did 
not conform to the ZANU-PF definition of amadoda.  
 
In some other cases, however, women were deliberately targeted as well. This was 
particularly true under Operation Tsuronegwenzi/Operation Attack the Hunted and 
those that Shelter them.51 Under this operation, women whose husbands or sons were 
thought to belong to the MDC were attacked in addition to those that were violated for 
supporting or suspected to support the MDC. As Cockburn asserts “attacking enemy 
women both emasculates the enemy (male) and reinforces the masculinity of the 
perpetrator. The rape and murder of women and children are an act of war, often 
applauded by women as well as the perpetrators.”52 Those men whose women have 
been raped are humiliated for having failed to “protect their women” and hence are 
categorised as weak.53 
 
The spaces given to women were largely in the private sphere, in the homes and far 
away from the public or political spaces. Even women leaders like Vice President Joyce 
Mujuru, who had been masculinised through her role in the Second Chimurenga and her 
later role as Vice President,54 felt it best for women to remain domesticated. As she 
said, “women have a great role to play in uniting the nation because they are the 
household builders, mothers, of future generations and wives to the rulers. The more 
women cooperate, the more prosperous will be our nation”.55 As we discussed in the 
Introduction, while this perception was strong, it also ran counter to another ZANU-PF 
                                                 
51 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity: What prospects for a new Zimbabwe?, Durban 29 
July 2008, p 29. 
52 Cockburn cited in Jane. L. Parpart, “Masculinities, race and violence”, p 104. 
53 See “Sexual violence and armed conflict: United Nations response”, Women 2000, United Nations 
Division for the Advancement of Women, department of Economic and Social Affairs, 18 April 1998, p 3. 
54 Joyce Mujuru fought as a ZANLA guerrilla in the Second Chimurenga under the name of Teurai Ropa, 
which loosely means spill blood, and she is also famed for shooting down a Rhodesia airforce helicopter 
using an AK47 riffle in 1977 when she was pregnant. In 2003, following the death of Vice President Simon 
Muzenda, she was appointed as the first woman Vice President of Zimbabwe. 
55 Joyce Mujuru, cited in Lene Bull Christansen, “Mai Mujuru: Father of the Nation?” in Kizito Muchemwa 
and Robert Muponde, (ed), Manning the Nation, p 88. 
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programme to encourage more women to participate in politics. In Shurugwi this latter 
policy resulted in more female representatives in local politics than males. To this end, 
there was a 50 percent female representation at Council level and one female out the 
three representatives at parliamentary level. 
 
The violent episode also occurred at a time when there was an upsurge in cases of 
domestic violence in the country due to the economic meltdown. Mrs Masawi, a 
counsellor with Musasa Project in the Midlands, said that there was an increase in 
domestic abuse of women between 2000 and 2008. As she stated, domestic violence 
was multi-faceted and it encompassed economic abuse, physical abuse, psychological 
abuse, sexual abuse and ill-treatment around inheritance.56 Domestic violence, as 
Mapimhidze further clarifies includes  
… yelling, threats and acts meant to purposely humiliate the other in public. 
There also can be isolation of a partner from family or friends. Physical abuse 
includes hitting, punching, shoving, restraining, destroying property and choking. 
Abusive sexual behaviour is rape and any coercion or forcing of a partner to 
engage in sexual activity.57  
 
Astounding statistics from Musasa Project  state that more than 60% of murder cases 
that went through the High Court in the first decade of the millennium in Harare 
stemmed from domestic violence, and that at least one in three Zimbabwean women 
was in a violent and abusive marital relationship.58 Mrs Masawi further highlighted that 
as the political crisis worsened, the economic meltdown also worsened, which further 
exposed women to abuse by their spouses, family and neighbours. To this end, women 
were opened up more to sexual violations as they sought to survive through selling their 
bodies. In some instances they were not given cash by their husbands to purchase 
family provisions. Inheritance problems also compounded the plight of the women as 
                                                 
56 Interview with Mrs Masawi, Musasa Project offices, Gweru, 09 April 2010. 
57 Ropafadzo Mapimhidze, “Domestic violence most tolerated abuse”, in Newsday, 15 October 2011, 
accessed 16 October 2011. 
58 Musasa Project, quoted in Mapimhidze, Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 185 
 
 
 
 
relatives more than ever sought a claim to the deceased estates.59 The above also helps 
to account for the rise in the HIV infections in the Midlands province as the political and 
economic pinch worsened.60  
 
TYPES OF VIOLENCE IN SHURUGWI DISTRICT 
In an interview, a middle aged woman, Barbara, said: 
A group of ZANU-PF supporters led by Z, a war veteran, came to our home 
looking for my husband. They told me they had proof that he was an MDC 
member. They asked me about his whereabouts. I told them that my husband 
was attending a funeral in Lower Gweru and would only be coming back after a 
few days. They insisted that he was there and hiding in one of the houses and so 
they started a room by room search for him. When they could not find him they 
then began to assault me claiming that my screaming and cries would make him 
emerge from hiding. After a while they stopped and asked me to cook sadza and 
chicken for them. By this time my neighbours had gathered to witness my 
humiliation. Meanwhile my seventeen year old son had also returned with our 
cattle which he was herding. They stated to interrogate him on his dad’s political 
activities and his whereabouts. After failing to get anything useful from my son, 
they later took him to the base where they kept him for about two days in an 
effort to entice my husband to come out of hiding and come to the base. I 
suffered a lot in those few days: I had to tend to cattle and other household 
chores. In addition I had to check on my son who was at the base and was also 
worried what they were going to do with my husband on his return. I phoned my 
husband not to return until after the situation had improved. Unfortunately my 
husband went to Johannesburg and he has not come back.61 
 
From the interview above, Barbara and women in similar positions suffered complex 
forms of violence. In this instance there were multiple violations occurring 
simultaneously. These violations included the beatings that the woman suffered. There 
was also psychological trauma of dealing with the forced separation from her husband, 
who had not returned by the end of 2011, which potentially might trigger a permanent 
collapse of the family union and spell worse fortunes for the larger family. She also 
suffered psychologically when her son was taken hostage for two days. In addition she 
                                                 
59 Interview with Mrs Masawi, Musasa Project offices, Gweru, 09 April 2010. 
60 See for example the T5 Programme of the Ministry of Health and Child welfare, Midlands Province, 
Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2008. 
61 Interview with Barbara, a mother of four, at Chironde, 12 May 2010. 
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had to multitask so as to spread her responsibilities and duties to keep the home and 
other needs like cattle herding and caring for the other three young children running. 
There was also the added dimension of the humiliation that she had to endure with her 
neighbours whom she had to interact with in her everyday course of life. Moreover the 
violence impacted directly on three people of the same family. These were herself, her 
son and her husband. It also caused social discomfort for the family. Thus violence at 
times occurred in layers, which makes it difficult to unpack it into individual types.  
 
It was not, however, always that violence occurred in such compounded ways. In some 
instances the women suffered only one of the genres of violence. This could either have 
been a beating, dressing down in public, rape, torture, kidnapping of family members, 
torture of close family members, being forced out of jobs or denied access to social 
goods and services. The interview below illustrates this case:  
It was in May 2008 when my son was abducted by unknown people at the shops 
after he had been drinking “scuds” (opaque beer) with his friends. My son is a 
well-known MDC supporter. They blindfolded him, drove him in an unregistered 
CAM pick up, beat him thoroughly and dumped him close to Boterekwa 
Mountain. He walked back home the following day, but he really was struggling 
to walk. They had beaten him under his feet. He was in pain. We took him to the 
police station to obtain a report to enable us to take him to the clinic. The police 
refused saying they did not deal with political cases and so we could not get him 
treated at the clinic. Due to the severe beatings he lost his sense of hearing and 
his brains do not work so well anymore. He has become useless, non-productive 
and he is of very little help to the family compared to what he used to do.62 
 
In this case the central theme of the violence is the abduction and torture of the son. It 
was him alone who suffered the direct physical torture. He was the one who was 
abducted and beaten. However, the idea of a sole form of violence occurring on its own 
is tenuous. The broader family, including his mother, endured indirect tremors of the 
violence. They had to nurse him and provide for him outside the state health care 
system, because they could not access it without a police statement on what had 
transpired. They worried about his safety and their safety too, because his open support 
                                                 
62 Interview held with Molly, at Gakaka shopping centre, 23 March 2010. 
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for the opposition exposed them to scrutiny, which increased their chances of being also 
tortured.  
 
In other cases, indirect violence came through the deaths of the relatives of the women. 
In Ward 24 in the Mapumbu area, I was informed of a woman whose son was severely 
beaten by alleged ZANU-PF supporters in the lead up to the June 2008 Presidential 
election runoff. The son was allegedly picked up from his sleeping hut at night and taken 
to the nearby bush. There, he was subjected to prolonged beatings until he collapsed. It 
is alleged that the perpetrators poured cold water on his body in an attempt to revive 
him. The following day he was taken to Shurugwi hospital where he was detained for a 
few days. Unfortunately he passed away due to the effects of the beatings. A similar 
case was reported by Kubatana.net which alleges that Nigel Dube, an MDC youth, was 
murdered in Shurugwi in early May 2008.63  
 
On the other hand women also endured primary violence. Primary violence is taken to 
mean that which the women suffered personally because it had been committed on 
their persons. Mostly it was of a physical nature and it targeted corporal punishment 
and property destruction. From the interviews, these included violent abduction, 
physical assaults, beatings, tortures, and victims being forced to walk on foot for a long 
journey to return home. Other cases also involved denial of food, verbal assaults, 
labelling and rape.  
 
The commonest form of primary violence was the physical assaults on the women. 
These included strokes on the back, buttocks and under the feet using whips. At times 
these were so severe that victims developed deep wounds on the buttocks and backs. 
Some of the victims still carry the visible permanent scars of these severe beatings. An 
example of this comes from Tineyi of Ward 6 in the Zvamatenga area. She told me that a 
                                                 
63 Kubatana.net, 06 May 2008, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/080506ba.asp?sector=ELEC&year=0&range_start=1, Accessed 
01 August 2011. 
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group of six well-known ZANU-PF supporters comprising four men and two women 
wielding sticks burst into her room. She knew them because they came from two 
neighbouring villages. According to her,  
As soon as they entered, they tied my hands to the back and pushed me out of 
my bedroom. They also shoved me, beat me, threatened me and accused me of 
being MDC. They dragged me to a nearby bushy area where for a long time, say 
a full hour; they severely assaulted me all over the body, especially my back and 
buttocks. I cried and pleaded with them but they would not listen and they kept 
beating me. As a result of the beatings my clothes were torn.64 
 
As this research was done more than two years after the 2008 election violence, it was 
not easy to distinguish between the scars due to political violence and scars from other 
causes. One woman, for example, showed me burn marks on her arms and legs she said 
were due to political violence because of her support for the MDC.65 However, her 
neighbours claimed that she had always had these burns from early childhood. What I 
found out was also that she had one of her huts burned down, but neither she nor any 
members of her family were inside. This case illustrates the possible exaggerations of 
victimhood that people suffered for some as yet to be named gain. It also shows the 
elements of opportunism that may be exploited by some to claim extended victimhood. 
At another level, however, she may have used old scars to draw attention to invisible 
fears caused by burned hut. 
 
Another violation was to force the women to confess being opposition supporters at 
rallies. In most cases this was done in a humiliating manner involving admitting to being 
sell-outs. Once they had made their confessions, they were expected to surrender their 
regalia, or to throw it in fires specifically made for this purpose. Tatenda said:  
There was a ZANU-PF rally at Tongogara growth point in May 2008, and 
everybody was supposed to attend. My husband and I went to the township for 
that rally. We were made to sit on the grass in the open sun. As it got hotter my 
husband decided to remove his jersey. Unfortunately he was wearing an MDC T-
shirt underneath and he quickly wore his jersey back. This was picked by 
                                                 
64 Interview with Tineyi, Zvamatenga, 17 May 2010. 
65 Interview with Juliet, of Mukandapi area, 27 March 2010. 
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someone who reported to the chefs seating in front. My husband was invited to 
go to the front and asked why he was wearing the T-shirt. He realised 
immediately that he had to escape, and so he sprinted away with the youths in 
hot pursuit. As he was running my husband managed to remove the T-shirt but 
did not stop. After they failed to catch him they demanded that I take his place in 
the front. I was told to confess my “sin” of belonging to the sell-out party, the 
MDC. As part of the repentance I was asked to repeat ZANU-PF slogans and to 
burn the MDC T-shirt that my husband had been wearing.66 
  
Some female teachers also suffered humiliation at rallies. In most of the interviews they 
told me that they were forced to sing liberation war songs, repeat ZANU-PF slogans, 
renounce MDC membership, and were forced to join Ward committees. Others told me 
also that they had money extorted from them as “protection fees” by some village boys 
who also doubled up as ZANU-PF youths. What was worse, they said, was that some of 
the people who made them to do these things were their former students, who had 
assumed the role of ZANU-PF youths. In worst instances some of these were still in 
school, which meant that after the electioneering the two groups met at school. Now in 
an apparent reversal of roles, their former students were in control. More than 
anything, this was double humiliation for the teachers. 
 
In some parts of the district, teachers were forced to buy ZANU-PF membership cards to 
show their loyalty to ZANU-PF and most importantly as insurance against public 
humiliation or physical abuse. The Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), for 
example, reported that teachers at Nhema Primary School and Svika Secondary School 
were made to buy such cards for their security.67  
 
                                                 
66 Interview with Tatenda of Gonye village, 27April 2010. 
67 See Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), Pre-election Update No 5, 6-11 March 2008, cited in 
http://www.zesn.org.zw, accessed 1 March 2011. 
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Nationally, besides the humiliations at rallies, it was also reported that about eight (8) 
teachers were murdered in the 2008 violence.68 The Progressive Teachers’ Union of 
Zimbabwe further reported that 51 percent of rural teachers had experienced political 
violence, while a further 55 percent stated that they had been forced to vote for a 
particular political party because of intimidations or threats of violence between 2000 
and 2008.69 
 
At another level, the violence emanated from the strong interpenetration between 
ZANU-PF administrative structures and state structures in Shurugwi district. Deployment 
of what are known commonly as temporary teachers or relief teachers was controlled 
by ZANU-PF whose officials issued letters of recommendation to the District Staffing 
Officers. Those candidates with these recommendations were in most cases favourably 
considered together with the graduates from the National Youth Service (NYS) colleges. 
The same recommendations were needed for those who required enrolling at training 
colleges, for those who wanted to apply for the Presidential scholarship funds, and for 
those requiring employment with state parastatals.  
 
At times these structures ordered known MDC civil servants to transfer from Shurugwi 
rural. In this regard ZANU-PF leadership also engaged in deliberate witch-hunts of MDC 
civil servants, especially teachers. As seen above, some teachers were publicly 
humiliated or physically assaulted. At times such recommendations enabled party 
supporters to partake in some government duties activities meant for civil servants only. 
For example, I was informed that Jerry70 recruited party supporters to do voter 
                                                 
68 Newsday, 10 October 2011, “Political parties must stop violence against teachers — PTUZ”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-10-10-political-parties-must-stop-violence-against-teachers-
ptuz, Accessed 10 October 2011. 
69 See Zimonline, 13 February 2012, in http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6905, Accessed 
16 February 2012. 
70 Jerry lived in one of the villages and was a known ZANU-PF official. Later he was employed by the 
Ministry of Youth as a Ward Coordinator. Apparently he did not possess any qualifications for this job. His 
only qualification was his membership of ZANU-PF. 
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education, census counting and as polling officers.71 These were roles that were 
supposed to be performed by civil servants. 
 
Of significance was the existence of some civil servants who also engaged in or 
encouraged the abuse of their fellow workers. In one school, a male teacher is alleged to 
have caused the beating of his colleague in 2008 by accusing him of being an MDC-T 
supporter. This led the victimised teacher to go to South Africa to escape further 
victimisation. He left behind his wife who was also teaching at the same school. He 
returned in early 2009, and re-joined his old school. This meant that the two began 
working together at the same school.72 
  
There were cases where teachers were forced to make donations towards national 
holidays. These included Independence and Heroes Days. Failure to pay, I was informed, 
was taken to reveal disloyalty. Making contributions on the other hand, demonstrated 
that one supported ZANU-PF. Payment was thus some kind of insurance against future 
abuse. Because in many instances lists of those who had made contributions were 
produced, this pushed the others to make contributions. 
 
Women who were active supporters of the MDC also reported verbal harassment from 
the perpetrators and the police. Usually they were insulted as prostitutes who were out 
to look for men, or as women who neglected their families for politics. More generally 
they were seen as uncultured. Even a high-ranking civil servant at the Provincial 
Government Complex in Gweru admitted to having suffered such stigmatisation that 
was also extended to women in leadership positions. As she said:   
There are a lot of prejudices that women leaders face. We are firstly viewed as 
fulfilling a quota, and others see us as products of affirmative action. On the 
other hand we are viewed as being of questionable morals. It’s a struggle to rise 
up this far. It’s a man’s world and all the time they are trying to keep you down, 
                                                 
71 In some interviews, I was told that some senior ZANU-PF officials and war veterans also participated in 
such activities, which not only compromised the quality of delivery but also intimidated the locals. 
72 Interview with Ndaka, at Chachacha, 22 June 2010. 
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in some cases through smear campaigns. You get labelled and named. You get 
uncalled-for background checks. The more you rise the more difficult it will be 
for you to get married.73  
 
The senior woman leader brings out ambivalences in this discussion. On the one hand 
she condemns “cultural” expectations for pulling women down and on the other she 
feels women have to conform to the grand social expectation of getting married.  
 
Overall, the interview illuminates the amounts and levels of name-calling and labelling 
that aspiring women politicians and leaders faced. These women were made to feel that 
they were in the wrong, doing wrong things and did not belong in such positions. If it 
could be felt by and done to a high-ranking civil servant, it stands to reason that the 
rural women in opposition ranks fared worse. That the name- calling was even done at 
times by the police officers, who are supposed to have been protecting them, made it 
worse for the rural women in the ranks of the opposition. Importantly, this underscored 
the perception that draws on the naturalisation of patriarchal tendencies inherited from 
the Greek polis tradition that considers politics and citizenship as male preserves.74 In 
this way, leadership positions are supposed to be filled up by men, while women are 
supposed to remain in the private domestic sphere. These were transmitted through 
Christianity and through histories of colonial and political systems put in place during 
the decolonisation period. 
 
Secondary violence was also experienced.  It was when women experienced violence 
through their relations, like husbands, siblings or children. Secondary violence also 
involved trauma and spirals of violence. It was largely through secondary manifestations 
of violence that violence seems to have made the descent into the ordinary everyday 
lives of Shurugwi rural residents. Through secondary violence people lived side by side 
with trauma. Relations within the nucleus family, the extended family and neighbours 
                                                 
73 Interview with a senior provincial government employee, 14 April 2010, Gweru. 
74 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body: Western theories and African bodies”, in Oyeronke 
Oyewumi, ed, African gender studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005, p 8. 
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were physically, economically, socially and psychologically ruptured. This overall marked 
the “negative transformations of the institution of the extended family system” into one 
that was increasingly marked by “selfishness and individualism.”75 
 
From the cases of Barbara and Molly, referred to earlier, we find that the family unit in 
Barbara’s case was torn asunder. Her husband has migrated to South Africa to escape 
ZANU-PF violence, but he left behind a wife and family without a husband and father. 
Moreover the family was more susceptible to economic violence as the family had lost a 
breadwinner. Violence had thus helped to shake the very root of the community of 
Shurugwi, the family. As for Molly, her son was now suffering from a mental condition 
from the assaults to the extent that he could not fend for himself. This also left the 
family at the mercy of poverty. More often than not men were the breadwinners in the 
district, and so losing a man either to migration or due to some psychological condition 
exposed families to greater risks of poverty and generally to inadequate provisions. 
 
At times the violence was blended with gender violence. There were increases in 
recorded cases of wife beating and battering in the whole of the Midlands Province 
between the years 2000 and 2008.76 I was informed of cases where women were beaten 
at home by their husbands after these men had been politically victimised. The cases 
point to a causal-effect between political abuse and domestic repression. The women 
themselves, however, did not bring out issues of their beating at the hands of their 
husbands or boyfriends as an important aspect of their lives in the era of unprecedented 
violence in the district. They acknowledged to having been beaten by their men but they 
did not link it to the macro-political environment. This could be the result that in the 
cultural trope of the Shona it is accepted that a wife could be beaten as a sign of 
disciplining her, and as a sign of loving her.77  
                                                 
75 See Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence Zimbabwe”, p 82. 
76 Interview with Mrs Masawi, Musasa Project, Musasa Project Offices, Gweru, 9 April 2010. 
77 This tradition is taken from the pre-colonial practice that allowed men to beat their women who were 
regarded as minors and to some extent their “purchase”. For a nuanced discussion of wife beating in pre-
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However, that there was an increase in domestic violence as the period of political 
violence extended may be indicative of the causal relationship of political violence to 
that in the domestic sphere. The question that begs further research is whether violence 
as a relation of interaction had become so trivialised that it became a part of what 
Gramsci would refer to as “common sense.”78 At the same time, I am again grappling 
with whether the beatings at home then led the women to seek out political opponents 
upon whom to vent their frustrations.79  
 
Gender violence involved another dimension when the members of the extended family 
abused women. More often it was verbalised violence especially regarding socially 
acceptable dress code and behaviour. Such comments from members of the family 
included: “ihembe yemukadzi wemunhu iyoyi? Or, mafambire emukadzi wemunhu 
iwaya? (Is this how a married woman should dress? Or, Is this how a married woman 
behaves?)80 What is clear in these statements are the violations to the women’s rights 
based on assumed atemporal cultural expectations that are highly controlling of the 
woman. They set parameters that classified women’s behaviour as acceptable or 
disgraceful. These are a part of “patriarchal norms of female behaviour” among which a 
woman has to dress and conduct themselves “conservatively.”81 There are traits that 
women have to follow if they have to pass the social test, for which there is no generally 
accepted standard but still to which women must still conform. These expectations 
                                                                                                                                                 
colonial Zimbabwe, see Pauline Ada Uwakweh, “Debunking Patriarchy: The Liberational Quality of Voicing 
in Tsitsi Dangarembga’s ‘Nervous Conditions’” in Research in African Literature, Vol 26, No 1, Spring 1995, 
in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3820089 Accessed 05 October 2010. See also Eunice Njovana and 
Charlotte Watts, “Gender violence in Zimbabwe: A need for collaborative Action”, in Reproductive Health 
Matters, Vol 4, No 7, May 1996, p 47, cited in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3775350, accessed 19 March 
2011, who say that it is common for women to be socialised to absorb beatings based on the Shona 
notion that says “ndizvo zvinoita mudzimba/that is how matrimony is”). 
78 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from prison notebooks, p 419, for a more nuanced discussion of the 
common sense phenomenon. 
79 See Chapter Four in which I discuss the agency of the women in the violence. 
80 Interview with Mrs Masawi of Musasa Project Gweru office, 9 April 2010. 
81 See Marissa Moorman, “Duelling bands and good girls: gender, music and the nation in Luanda’s 
musseques, 1961-1974”, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 37, 2, 2004, p 280. 
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recall what Raftopoulos calls the “selective recourse to ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’” on the 
parameters of female “respectability” as set out by the men.82   
 
What is worse, as Njovana and Watts posit, is that once the violence is perpetrated by 
someone so close it tends not only to be reinforced because it is repeated often. 
Additionally, the women often were put in a double bind because seeking redress at law 
puts their future and their children’s at stake due to their lack of earning power.83 As a 
consequence, the impact of the violence is bound to be long term.84  
 
Another aspect of the violence in the district was the denial of access for the victims to 
rights and services that were accessed by other citizens. Firstly, the victims were denied 
basic political rights as enshrined in the constitution, especially under two repressive 
laws: Political Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA).85 These were the right to freedom of expression, association, and 
assembly. To fully appreciate the circumscription of human rights under AIPPA, Eddison 
Zvobgo, its key architect, described it as “the most repressive piece of legislation ever 
passed in this country since the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.”86  
 
An MDC official at the Midlands Provincial Headquarters stated that “several” of their 
rallies were cancelled in Shurugwi district under POSA. This was corroborated by an 
MDC official from Shurugwi who estimated the number of MDC rallies that were 
                                                 
82 See Brian Raftopoulos, “Gender, Nationalist Politics and the fight for the city: Harare 1940-1950s”, in 
Patricia Macfadden (ed), SAFERE, Vol1, No2, 1995, p 31. 
83 See Eunice Njovana and Charlotte Watts, “Gender violence in Zimbabwe”, pp 46-47. As a result of this 
they have found that it takes an average of ten years for those suffering domestic violence to report such 
cases. 
84 Ibid, p 46. 
85 See the impact of these two pieces of legislation nationally, in Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in 
Zimbabwe”, p 214. See also, Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of 
institutionalised violence in Zimbabwe, Jacana, Auckland Park, 2011, p 64 
86 The Zimbabwean, 09 July 2011, “AIPPA not necessary: Matonga”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/50762/aippa-not-necessary-
matonga.html?utm_source=thezim&utm_medium=homepage&utm_campaign=latestarticles, Accessed 
10 July 2011. 
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cancelled in the district from 2001 to 2008 at over sixty.87 He said that the major reason 
was that the police told them that they did not have enough manpower to provide 
security at their rallies. As such their rallies were not cleared to take place as required 
under POSA. He went on to allege that at no point were ZANU-PF rallies cancelled, for 
similar reasons.  
 
In addition the victims were also denied access to societal protection as the police 
refused to record or to act upon their cases. In most of the interviews, like in the case of 
Molly, people stated that they could not open dockets for their cases because the police 
refused to receive their complaints. However, there were a variety of other reasons. At 
times victims simply did not bother to report cases to the police because they had lost 
confidence in the impartiality of police services. For some it was fear of a backlash from 
their perpetrators and generally a fear of the unknown. Yet elsewhere, as the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum has reported, some victims knew that sections of the police 
force had also abused opposition supporters. In this regard, for example, the Law and 
Order section of the police services embarked on a systematic programme of torture of 
women civil society leaders. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum concluded that 
“the behaviour of the ZRP is not random violence by a few officers but they are 
apparently acting on instructions from their superiors. Instructions have sometimes 
been heard given on the spot.”88   
 
At other times some victims suffered violence of denial. They were denied access to 
subsidized groceries, agricultural inputs, health care, legal representation, and food 
hand-outs. Denial of food and access to basic amenities can best be summed up in Chief 
Fortune Charumbira’s words that: “we [ZANU-PF] cannot continue to feed the enemy 
                                                 
87 See also Solidarity Peace Trust, Disturbing the peace: An overview of civilian arrests in Zimbabwe: 
February 2003-January 2004, July 2004, for a national overview of the instrumentalisation of POSA in 
Zimbabwe against the opposition. 
88 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who guards the guards?: Violations by Law Enforcement 
Agencies in Zimbabwe, 2000-2006, Harare, December 2006, p 15.  
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because they are sell-outs.”89 In the Midlands Province, the words of a ZANU-PF 
councillor that “even if stone was to melt, MDC children will not get food because it is 
ZANU-PF food” further reinforce the basis of this discrimination.90 These denials 
contravened various international conventions that the government had ratified.91  
These practices of discrimination compounded the traumatic encounters the women 
had in the violence. In some sense they represented denial to existence because of the 
cataclysmic collapse in their socio-economic standards of living under the debilitating 
crisis. The crisis, as described in the General Introduction, was exemplified by the 
informalisation of the economy, massive unemployment, record inflation and a fall in 
the standards of living. Under these conditions food and other forms of hand-outs for 
daily necessities played an important part in sustaining the bare existence of these 
women. What perhaps made it worse was that these denials occurred at the same time 
the various operations of NGOs were severely circumscribed.  
 
ENCOUNTERING THE FIELD: SILENCE AND THE OTHER CHALLENGES  
Researching violence is never an easy project, but trying to do so in the place of its 
recent occurrence is even harder. I embarked on my main field research between 
December 2009 and July 2010. The follow up was between November and December 
2011. Although the physical wounds for many of the victims had healed, the emotional 
wounds were still fresh. Because of this some known victims refused to share their 
                                                 
89 Chief Fortune Charumbira, the President of the Chiefs Council, quoted in “Zimbabwe: Between a rock 
and a hard place: Women human Rights defenders at risk” in 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/assset/AFR46/017/2007/en/d9609e02-d38d-11dd-a329- accessed 10 
September 2010. 
90 This is a quotation from a statement allegedly made by a ZANU-PF councillor from the Midlands 
Province in 2002. See Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark, Zimbabwe: Post Presidential Election March-
May 2002, 21 May 2002, p 15. 
91 Ibid, for a pithy discussion of these conventions and their implications for the women of Zimbabwe. Just 
to state, some of these are: Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, the United Nations Convention against Torture and other cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment and Punishment. Apparently the government violated its own constitution, for 
example Section 20(1) says; “No person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, 
that is to say freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without 
interference and freedom from interference with his correspondence”. And Section 21 guarantees the 
freedom of assembly and of belonging, see the Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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encounters, preferring to keep to themselves. There were other problems such as 
selective memorialisation, an unfriendly political environment, cultural taboos, and in-
built self-policing mechanisms. The other challenge was that the period when the 
research was done offered a lot of opportunities to various people to claim victimhood. 
 
To begin this section I wish to return to the issue of silence by answering the following 
questions. Why did the women choose to be silent? And, what do the silences reveal or 
obscure? One plausible explanation could be to refer to Foucault’s suggestion that 
silence by the victims is based on the group policing and prohibition mechanisms by 
those in power.92 In the Shurugwi situation, the currency of Foucault’s argument lies in 
the fact I established that politics was a major taboo. Discussing MDC-ZANU-PF politics 
and political violence allegedly perpetrated by ZANU-PF was never easy. This was 
particularly so because the ZANU-PF intimidatory structures led by war veterans and 
youth were still visible. These potentially scared off many victims from sharing their 
encounters.  
 
Besides the war veterans and youth, the defence forces were under Minister Emmerson 
Munangagwa, General Constantine Chiwenga and Air Marshal Perence Shiri, while the 
Police were under Commissioner Augustine Chihuri. These were staunch ZANU-PF 
loyalists and members of the JOC, that had appropriated state power in the country 
since 1999 and who were blamed for coordinating violence.93 In addition, the traditional 
leadership structures involving the chiefs and headmen were still not reformed and 
their patronage to ZANU-PF and President Mugabe was not in doubt.  
 
                                                 
92 For a more detailed reading, see Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, vol 1, Panthen, New York, 1978. 
93 See Chapter Four for more details on this. Of interest is the fact that the hierarchy of authority that is 
largely blamed for the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s was at this time calling the shots in 
government in 2009 and 2010. Most notable of these were Emmerson  Munangagwa, the Defence 
Minister, who was minister responsible for the dreaded CIO; Perence Shiri, of the Airforce of Zimbabwe 
who was the commander of the Fifth Brigade. 
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The constitutional consultations from the beginning of June 2010 in the district 
highlighted this. As part of the GPA, the GNU was supposed to gather people’s views 
and produce a new people-driven constitution to replace the Lancaster House 
constitution. However, a lot of cases of coaching of the people on what they wanted in 
the constitution were witnessed.94 In most cases village heads and known war veterans 
spoke at these meetings. In addition the chiefs and headmen also had embarked on 
their own consultations before the COPAC consultations, attended by senior ZANU-PF 
politicians, not only from the district but even provincial leaders. 
 
Under these challenging conditions we had to halt some of the scheduled interviews in 
wards where the COPAC meetings were taking place for our personal safety and that of 
the respondents. In this scenario the victims decided to privatise their memories due to 
the potential threats to their security in the uneasy peace environment where ZANU-PF 
still had control of the coercive arms of the state. The continued existence of these 
structures was salient in muzzling the victims because in a country where violence and 
impunity had assumed cultural statuses, there was a threat in the air which meant that 
speaking about previous encounters could invite future violation.  
 
That the violence was committed by close relatives, co-workers, fellow villagers, former 
friends and neighbours, especially in 2008, and who were also articulating the dominant 
ZANU-PF discourse against “sell-outs”95 as the ZANU-PF youths and war veterans, did 
not help matters. They continued to share the same spaces like homes, churches and 
workplaces. The presence of the perpetrators in their everyday lives was intimidating 
and became a constant reminder of the violence they suffered and potential violence 
they could suffer in the future. In other cases, as RAU established, there were instances 
when the perpetrators threatened their previous victims that they would suffer repeat 
                                                 
94 Refer to Chapter Five for more on this. 
95 See also CCJP, Graveyard governance: A report on political violence following the March 2008 
harmonised elections, for a detailed national outlook of the same occurrence. 
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violations.96  The victims thus still lived in fear and felt powerless as the perpetrators 
continued to receive immunity from prosecution97 and roamed the district freely. As 
such, some feared to talk about their experiences in and with violence.  It was also as if 
speaking about it further exposed them.  
 
Due to fear and the continued presence of the structures that had sustained the 
previous pogrom, the use of research equipment became difficult. Ordinarily people 
would not speak in the presence of a tape recorder, camera and even a note book.98 
These tools scared away responses. I ended up employing more the informal ways of 
getting the information, where I would discuss in ordinary conversations with women 
about their memories of the violence.99 I also used the observation technique and less-
structured questions on those things that we could not comprehend. However, I still 
retained the core of the questions that I needed to ask. This happened despite strong 
assurances of anonymity. At the end of the day for most of our (me and my assistant) 
interviews the golden rule applied, no tape recorder, no camera and no notebook. We 
would write down what we got in the discussions and observations in private or after 
we had gone back to our bases to avoid unnecessarily scaring away potentially fruitful 
discussions. 
 
Where we got reluctant victims to speak there tended to be other variations of silences 
in their responses. As Veena Das says, silence is not necessarily the absence of speech. It 
has more to do with how an event is told, which might be language that is 
                                                 
96 RAU, When the going gets tough the man gets going, p 8. 
97 As with the other cycles of violence, the 2008 one ended with Clemency Order No 1 of 2008 which 
pardoned political crimes committed between March and June 2008. See Human Rights Watch, Perpetual 
fear: Impunity and cycles of violence, March 2011, p 25, in 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/.../zimbabwe0311NoPage8Full.pdf, Accessed 14 June 2012. 
98 Even senior women politicians refused me to use these preferring rather informal discussions. 
99 This method was adapted from Mats Utas, “Agency of victims: Young women in the liberation civil war” 
in Alcinda Honwana and Felip de Boeck, (eds), Makers and Breakers: Children and youth in Post-Colonial 
Africa, Africa World Press Inc, Trenton and Asmara, 2005, p 54, who used it in researching women’s 
encounters in the Liberian civil war. 
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...general and metaphoric … that evaded description of any events with 
specificity so as to capture the particularity of their experience, or by describing 
the surrounding events but leaving the actual experience […] unstated.100  
 
This, in essence creates fences around memories.101 This also includes the deliberate 
editing of what to say, even some sort of a censorship, which might be a result of the 
need to avoid negative labels in the aftermath of their encounters with violence. In this 
case women who could have suffered rape, for example, would try to keep their 
experiences a secret for fear that they would be labelled prostitutes who invited the 
men to rape them. Such situations then bring to question the reliability of the words 
that are spoken by such women victims. This is true because “words can be relied on 
only if one is sure that their function is to reveal and not to conceal.”102  
 
For Shurugwi, the question then is to what extent were the testimonies revealing or 
occluding? This is a particularly important question as some women could have felt the 
need to protect themselves and their families from the possible negative impact of 
certain disclosures. There is also a strong possibility that some of the women suffered 
gross violations, including rape, but they rather retained these memories to themselves 
than risk exposure with the danger of ostracisation especially by their husbands. In 
discussions with men in the district it became clear that almost all men were not 
prepared to take women tainted with a rape stigma.103 As Greene says, such disclosures 
might bring unwanted divisions, conflicts and disharmony.104 It might also be extended 
to mean safety from further persecution especially if the tormentors are still within 
                                                 
100 Veena Das, Life and words: Violence and the descent into the ordinary, University of California Press, 
Los Angeles, 2005. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hannah Arendt, On violence, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc, New York, 1970, p 66. 
103 This came out in most of the general discussions I had with men during the course of the fieldwork. 
Surprisingly even some women are also of the belief that women victims of rape cannot continue as wives 
because they would have become ‘dirty’, in their language. 
104 See Sandra. E. Greene, “Whispers and silences: Explorations in African oral History”, in Africa Today, 
vol 50, no2, Oral Heritage and Indigenous Knowledge, Autumn/Winter, 2003, Indiana University Press, 
cited in http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187571, Accessed 16 August 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 202 
 
 
 
 
sight, an “unfreedom” in Brecht’s lexicography.105 On the whole, as Alexander, 
Mcgregor and Ranger, said, “[m]emorialisation has thus been forced into the realms of 
silence, of private arenas of discourse, and of possession and ritual.”106 
 
Related, I am also still grappling with issues around words written down as a means of 
representation. My problem is: Can words really represent violence, and can the 
testimonies that the women gave adequately represent their experiences? True, words 
can be the only weapon the women have to confront their trauma. Words convert their 
silences into speech, and are a means of expressing their pain, means of identifying 
perpetrators, generally of bringing the hidden to light, means of retelling the events and 
a possible step towards healing. But are these words adequate to fully articulate the 
violence? To what extent can I also be able to represent these voices? In the latter I find 
one of Ranciere’s guiding questions, in relation to representing the “others”, “from what 
position do we speak and in the name of what or whom?”107 to be instructive. 
 
There are a lot of translations involved and certain statements tend to be diluted and 
mean less when translated and without the context in which they were made.108 An 
example is a statement like Ndinotya mwanangu/I am afraid my son, which one 
respondent made. It only verbalises the fear without showing the bodily expressions, 
such as, on the face, in the eyes, general body language, the social meaning, the 
emotional feelings and also the atmosphere or context in which it was said. Thus, words 
at times tend to be empty and at best half able to represent the encounters the women 
had with militarised violence. More often I find them to be orphaned outside context 
                                                 
105 Ernst Bloch, George Lukacs, Berchtolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, Aesthetics and 
Politics, Translated by Ronald Taylor, Verso, p 74. 
106 Jocelyn Alexander, Joann Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory, pp 8-9. 
107 See Gabriel Rockhill, “Translator’s introduction Jacques Derrida’s politics of perception”, p 2. 
108 See Jacques Derrida, “Force of law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfield and David Gray Carlson, eds, Deconstruction and the possibility of justice, Routledge, New York 
and London, 1992, p 5, who says that “…translation, however, excellent it necessarily remains a 
translation, that is to say an always possible but always imperfect compromise between two idioms.” 
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and outside their setting.109 The question then is what or who is she afraid of? Was it 
me? Or was it those who surrounded her or even the obtaining political environment? 
All could be relevant. As mentioned earlier, issues of who to trust with your encounters 
in the violence were really crucial so that she could have simply been afraid of me. On 
the other hand, I also think that she felt unsafe to be discussing these matters with me 
in the aftermath of a ZANU-PF rally that had recently taken place. 
 
At another level then it becomes a problem of translation.  In this regard, the statement 
“I am afraid my son” above which the woman used when she refused to be drawn into 
discussing her experiences in the 2000-2008 violence is also instructive here. More than 
the fact that it was isolated from its context(s), and at a deeper level, it intimates a 
deep-seated fear, a fear that now constitutes her everyday lived existence. Thus she 
lives a life as a perpetual victim. Her life is ever regulated by the Shirlow’s “spaces of 
fear”.110 In these spaces, she cannot discuss her encounters in and with the 2000-2008 
violence.  
 
Silences might also be related to the fact that the women might not have felt 
comfortable relating their experiences to a male researcher. Culturally, women of 
Shurugwi are supposed to share their problems with women relatives or relations such 
as their mother, aunt or a female village councillor. However, even after the recruitment 
of a female assistant silences remained, which might point to other causes for it, such as 
the security situation and an unsupporting social environment. Another possibility of 
this silence could be that the violence had taken a domestic dimension. As discussed 
earlier, and in Chapter Four, close relatives and family members contributed to the ways 
that led to the targeting of women. Some kept lists that implicated their neighbours and 
                                                 
109 See also the argument by Veena Daas, Life and Words, which alludes to the fact that words carry more 
weight in certain contexts. These contexts include their original language, time and political agency. 
110 See Pete Shirlow, cited in Nils Zurawski, “’I know where you live’- Aspects of watching, surveillance, 
and social control in a conflict zone (Northern Ireland)”, in Surveillance and society, 2 (4), p 502, in 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org, Accessed 28 May 2012. 
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fellow villagers, while others participated in the public humiliation or beating of the 
victims.  
 
At other times, as discussed earlier in this chapter, some husbands also began to take 
out their frustrations on their wives. This was either through physically beating their 
wives, or through emotional abuse or even abandoning their families which put extra 
financial strain on the women. In these circumstances the silence might be explained in 
terms of the rise of general gender-based silence. In a study in South Africa, which might 
inform us here, Morrell discusses the fact that economically weak women do not 
confront domestic violence by speaking out against it because they risk expulsion from 
the home.111  
 
The above also speaks to the findings of the Musasa Project (cited earlier) that recorded 
an increase in domestic violence in the Midlands province in the period 2000 to 2008. 
Besides this, I established also that social transactions that engender disparities 
between men and women in the home still persisted unchallenged in Shurugwi. Dowry 
was still demanded. In addition women, in the highly commercialised and 
“mercenary”112 transactions around lobola, still received a single cow when their 
daughters got married and left the men to get the bulk of the bride price. Also going by 
the NAC study,113 and my field observations, most of the women in the district lived as 
housewives while men sought wage labour. 
 
The other challenge was that the accounts that I got were more often embedded in, and 
pervaded by, the two meta-narratives on the violence.114 These were more broadly the 
                                                 
111 Robert Morell, “Silence, sexuality and HIV in South African Schools”, in The Australian Educational 
Researcher, Vol 30, No 1, April 2003, cited in http://www.aare.edu.au/aer/online/30010e.pdf, Accessed 
28 February 2011. 
112 See Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence Zimbabwe”, p 78, who, 
using Oliver Mtukudzi’s song “Nyanga yenzou”, describes the evils of the extortionist demands placed on 
sons-in-law. 
113 See General Introduction, for the statistics of employment ratios in the district. 
114 See Chapter One for a nuanced discussion of these discourses on the violence. 
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emancipatory discourse that was used by ZANU-PF, and the human rights narrative that 
was associated with the human rights NGOs and the MDC. This was tricky for me 
because these narratives impacted on the informants’ memorialisation. There was, I 
suspect, an incitement towards these domineering discourses, so to speak. In this way 
they invited respondents to a certain perceptive recalling of their experiences and to a 
certain way to speak about them.  
 
Related to the above, the research aimed to look at violence and its memory from 2000 
to 2008. In most cases women, however, tended to remember with ease the later 
violence, especially that of 2008.  Earlier encounters were only referred to after a lot of 
probing. Violence of earlier periods seemed to have been cast to distant memory. While 
shortness of memory could be important, it seems though that the intensity of the 
violence in 2008 which overshadowed other periods of violence made it a common 
reference point. As discussed in Chapter one, the latter episode was organised under 
the twin operations Mavhoterapapi and Tsuro negwenzi. Maybe its recent occurrence 
also made people easily recall the events. It could also potentially point to the selective 
recalling, which privilleged “psychological truths” over “forensic truths”. 115 In this 
regard, women victims might have deliberately left out episodes and encounters that 
did not support their claim for victimhood. In the highly politically polarised society of 
Shurugwi, it was thus difficult to take given statements without cross-checking with 
neighbours, for example, which was not always easy.  
 
VICTIMHOOD, OPPORTUNITY AND VIOLENCE 
Violence also presented itself as a time of opportunity to claim victimhood. A lot of hope 
for compensation was high in the district. With the GNU in place there were widespread 
rumours that some form of restorative justice mechanisms would be implemented. 
                                                 
115 See Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates” in the Journal of Southern African Studies, 35, 4, for 
more elaboration. Forensic truths are “essential facts of what happened such as might be used in a court 
of law” or for lobbying purposes, pp 5-7. 
 
 
 
 
 206 
 
 
 
 
There were as well some NGOs116 collecting information about the violence. These 
included the CCJP, Centre for Violence and Conflict Resolution (CVCR), ZZZICOMP, and 
the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 
transitional also held a transitional justice consultative meeting at Makusha Community 
Hall on the 3rd of February 2010.117 These were in addition to the other relief NGOs 
operating in the district. 
 
The flurry of activities by these NGOs sent mixed messages. First, it sent shivers through 
the perpetrators because they could be held to account. Second, it also sent hopes that 
victims could be compensated. Both sets of messages led many to lay claim to 
victimhood. Even some well-known perpetrators claimed to be victims of their political 
party affiliation and of their superiors’ instructions. A well-known war veteran in the 
district claimed to have committed violence in the name of his party and indicated that 
he should therefore not be called to account.118 Instead he clamoured for victimhood. 
To him, his association with the ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF is to blame. He also claimed that 
he was suffering from ostracisation by fellow community members.119 This case while 
showing elements of in-house coercion in ZANU-PF, importantly, however, highlights 
the instrumentalisation and fluidity of victimhood. The shifting meanings and contexts 
around who was a victim again reinforce the perceived profits of victimhood.  
 
For some, they saw an opportunity to settle old scores or to fight petty jealousies, and 
to assert political power. It was also a period to accumulate wealth and try to escape 
poverty, while for some it was an opportunity to find work in ZANU-PF through engaging 
in political violence. Work for some was created and they worked in the newly 
                                                 
116 Among some of the NGOs that have worked on violence in the district are CCJP, Centre for violence 
and conflict resolution (CVCR). Musasa Project has also been working on domestic violence, while the 
National Aids Council has worked on the trends in HIV and AIDS. 
117 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth? Vol 
2, 2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 
2011, p 119.   
118 I explore his and other cases in Chapter Five. 
119 Interview with a senior war veteran in Shurugwi, 30 June 2010, Ward 22. 
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established posts of Ward Coordinators, and also in various government departments as 
a reward for engaging in the Third Chimurenga. 
 
PATTERNS AND STRUCTURES OF THE VIOLENCE 
The narratives point to episodic violence especially around election time, which had 
turned into some sort of a culture. Even more than a culture, these election bouts of 
organising violence constituted a kind of economy.120 At these moments the violence 
was generalised and deliberate against the opposition. However, there was no evidence 
of systematically targeting women in Shurugwi.  In many ways violence was systematic 
and used as a technology to retain political power in the seven elections held between 
2000 and 2008.  
 
The way that politics of coercion, intimidation, physical assault and displacement in 
Shurugwi was crystallised around election times between 2000 and 2008 is captured in 
the words of an informant, Tendai. She said: 
We have not known peace in Shurugwi since the MDC was formed [in 1999]. At 
every election time we experience violence. For me 2000 parliamentary elections 
and the 2008 Presidential runoff elections were the worst, there was too much 
violence. ZANU-PF was losing ground here. It was fashionable to want change. I 
also wanted change. We were open in 2000 about our support for the MDC. 
Mugabe has been too long in power, and so we needed change. We could not do 
anything against ZANU-PF violence. Many violations occurred, we were forced to 
sing ZANU songs, shout their slogans, we were humiliated and threatened and 
some were beaten at rallies. Yet others were abducted, while others ran away to 
escape punishment. It was terrible. Every time I think about an election my heart 
is filled with fear. I do not look forward to another election soon.121  
 
The above interview also fits the analysis by Makumbe and Compagnon following the 
1995 elections, in their book Behind the smokescreen. To them, the violence before, 
during and after the elections was related to the need by ZANU-PF to crush the 
                                                 
120 Many NGO reports, for example, CCJP, Graveyard Governance, and the Solidarity Peace Trust, 
Desperately seeking Sanity: What prospects for a new Zimbabwe?, Durban, 29 July 2008, p 15, also point 
to a similar trend in other parts of the country. 
121 Interview with Tendai of Mukandapi area, 26 May 2010. 
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opposition. They posit that “everybody knows in Zimbabwe that any other outcome is 
unthinkable in the current political system and that the ruling party would never 
concede a nationwide defeat at the ballot box”.122 Despite falling out of the period 
under discussion, their analysis is spot on. In the 2000s with the emergence of a strong 
opposition in the form of the MDC, which actually threatened to unseat ZANU-PF, 
ZANU-PF “lost its façade of tolerance and unleashed its repressive party and state 
machinery”.123  
 
Importantly, the analysis by Makumbe and Compagnon illustrates how the  genealogy of 
the ZANU-PF intolerance against strong opposition predates the year 2000. It goes even 
to the days of the liberation struggle when the liberation movements sought to be the 
“sole” and “authentic” movements,124 through the 1980s and 1990s elections.125 
Violence at election times was used to try to keep the project of a one party state 
alive.126 Moreover it was in keeping with Mugabe’s views on elections. In 1976 he 
argued that “our votes must go together with our guns; after all any vote……shall have 
been the product of the gun. The gun which provides the votes should remain its 
security officer, its guarantor.”127 He repeated similar sentiments in 2008 when he said 
“we shed a lot of blood for this country; we are not going to give up the country for a 
                                                 
122 See John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the smokescreen, p 20.  The sham re-election of 
President Robert Mugabe in a one man election rerun in 2008 fits perfectly the analysis. President George 
W Bush of the USA castigated the manner in which President Mugabe won following the last minute 
withdrawal of Morgan Tsvangirai citing unprecedented levels of violence on his supporters. The 
diplomatic standoff between President Mugabe on the one hand and Presidents Ian Khama and The late 
Levy Mwanawasa of Botswana and Zambia, respectively, also centered on this election of June 2008. 
123 Brian Raftopoulos, “The state in crisis” in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, 
Zimbabwe’s Unfinished business, p 234. This was in the context of the first defeat for ZANU-PF at the 
ballot in the constitutional referendum of February 2000 and other impending elections. 
124 See Ibbo Mandaza “The one party state and democracy in Southern Africa: Towards a conceptual 
framework, in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, eds, The one party state and democracy: The 
Zimbabwe debate, SAPES Books, 1991, Harare, p 27. 
125 See for example, Norma Kriger, Guerilla veterans, M.J Matshezi, Zimbabwe: With Robert Mugabe to 
the brink of the abyss, University of Fort Hare Press, Alice, 2007, Ian .D. Smith, Bitter Harvest: The great 
betrayal and the dreadful aftermath, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1997, See also Lloyd Sachikonye, When 
a state turns on its citizens, pp 17-20, for detailed accounts of this intolerance.  
126 See for example the discussion by Jonathan Moyo,  
127 See Robert Mugabe, “Fight Harder, Fight Harder”, in Our War Of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, and 
Interviews, Mambo, Gweru, 1980, p 12. 
 
 
 
 
 209 
 
 
 
 
mere X on a ballot. How can a ball point pen fight with a gun?”128 At another level, the 
deployment of violence speaks to the ideals of a revolutionary party that we discussed 
earlier in which the use of the army and violence is pivotal to advance political 
objectives. 
 
It thus becomes strongly evident that elections were apportioned as a space where the 
ruling party waged a war against its enemies. In these “battles”, as Muzondidya 
suggests, “political opponents” were viewed as “enemies to be annihilated rather than 
as political competitors.”129 Traditionally in the post-independence era, this “war” was 
waged by the women and youth leagues to seek subordination of opponents.130 
However, in the post-millennium, as we highlighted earlier it was militarised and 
increasingly performed by the war veterans, and state security forces. This furthered the 
importance of the Foucauldian perception of Zimbabwean politics as an extension of 
war by other means. 
 
 That election time was also a period of high levels of violence can be seen from the high 
number of election petitions presented to the courts by the MDC. Most of these 
petitions cited intimidation as the basis for seeking the nullification of election 
results.131 In 2000, for example, the MDC petitioned the High Court to nullify results in 
thirty-eight constituencies because of the violence perpetrated in these 
constituencies.132 In addition, between 2000 and 2004, about 90 percent of MDC 
parliamentarians suffered violence on their persons, while 60 percent reported attacks 
on their families and staff. Another 50 percent reported property vandalism, while other 
                                                 
128 See the Report of the Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Runoff and House 
of Assembly By-elections, Republic of Zimbabwe, 27 June 2008, pp 13.  
129 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 
eds, Becoming Zimbabwe, p 177. 
130 Ibid, pp 177 & 179. 
131 See for example Norma Kriger, Guerilla Veterans in Post war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent Politics, 
1980-1987, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 196, See also Tony Reeler, “Subliminal 
terror?: Human rights violence and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008”, Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation, Cape Town, pp 6-7. 
132 Norma Kriger, Guerilla Veterans in Post war Zimbabwe, p 195. 
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senior MDC officials had spent varying periods in prison on various cooked-up 
charges.133 Most of these arrests, acts of property destruction and attacks on MDC 
members’ families meant to demoralise and intimidate them were mostly done in the 
lead-up to elections. The violence around election times qualifies ZANU-PF as an 
“electoral-authoritarian regime,” in which “competitive elections in Zimbabwe serve the 
useful purpose of demonstrating the incumbent’s dominance, but only as far as the 
opposition can never win.”134 
 
The irony of it is that elections are supposed to epitomise “mass participatory 
democracy”, where people exhibit their freedom of choice and also to lead to 
representative government.135 In other words, it is hoped that elections will “broaden 
and deepen political participation”, and serve “not just as a foundation stone but a key 
generator of further democratic reforms.”136  Above this, elections are supposed to be 
the tonic for democracy, where citizens by participating in elections help create a 
government of the people by the people and for the people.  
 
The questions that need to be asked are on the relationship between election time and 
violence. What is the relationship between violence and elections in Zimbabwe? Why 
too has there been a sustained call for elections, and, also, why has the opposition 
consistently participated in these elections despite the expected brutalisation of their 
supporters, especially in the [hidden] rural areas? These questions stem in part from the 
increasingly evident correlationship between elections and an increase in violence. The 
                                                 
133 See a discussion by Brian Raftopoulos, “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics”, in Brian 
Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, eds, Zimbabwe: Injustice and political Reconciliation, Institute for Justice, 
and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004, p 164, for a more nuanced discussion. 
134 Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony”, Journal of Democracy, 19, 4, 
October 2008, p 43. 
135 For a more nuanced discussion of this, see John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Law and disorder in 
the postcolony”, in Jean Comaroff and john L Comaroff, eds, Law and disorder in the postcolony, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2006, p 3. 
136 See Carothers, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The global Political agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution”: 
Notes on Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe,” The Round table, in 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-agreement-as-a-passive-revolution/, 
Accessed 02 June 2011. 
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statement made by the MDC-T women’s representative at a rally in Chegutu in 2011, 
who pointed out that MDC-T women did not want elections because “[a]s women we 
are tired of being beaten and we don't want elections because we will always be on the 
receiving end of violence,"137 encapsulates such concerns. This also stems from the 
analysis by the Comaroffs in which they have argued that the advent of liberal 
democracy post-1990 has ushered increased disorder in the whole world.138  
 
The above also prompts a recalling of the Derridaen formulation that violence and law 
are flip sides. To him, law originates in violence and also exists in and through 
violence.139 In this formulation therefore the elections were useful in providing a façade 
of the rule of law and legitimacy to rule, and simultaneously through it was availed the 
avenue to persecute those that were known or thought to belong to the opposition. In 
Zimbabwe, this Derridean formulation holds water in the two senses that it has been 
deployed. Firstly, it was been deployed prior to elections. It was also been deployed 
post elections. In both cases, it was used as intimidatory violence to cow the electorate 
to vote for ZANU-PF, and also in a witch-hunt fashion to victimise those suspected of 
having voted for the opposition.140 
 
In the end one also has to note the crucial role that elections play in terms of conferring 
legitimacy. As the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition aptly sums it up, besides ensuring the 
popular participation of the ordinary people to determine who governs them, elections 
also confer legitimacy to politicians, that is, in terms of “the right to govern and the 
                                                 
137 See The Herald, 25 July 2011, “Violent protests an option: Tsvangirai”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16281:violent-protests-an-
option-tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 25 July 2011. 
138 See the chapter by John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Law and disorder.” 
139 See this chapter by Jaques Derrida, “Force of law: The mythical foundation of authority”, in Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Grey Carlson, Deconstruction and the possibility of justice, Routledge, 
New York and London, 1992, for a nuanced discussion. 
140 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 19. 
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political right to make decisions that may be applied.”141 Thus for ZANU-PF the faithful 
calling for inclusive participation in elections, but ones where it was guaranteed victory 
should be seen in that light. Thus in addition to its legitimacy to rule eternally based on 
its participation in the liberation struggle,142 it also sought to renew its legitimacy 
through periodic election “victories” in a period dominated by Western liberalism that 
placed electoral democracy at the heart of human rights. 
 
The trend also shows a pattern of the violence, with some organisation and 
coordination from a centre. This centre became the authorising centre and it again 
provided the authorising narrative for the violence.143 To exemplify, the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum reported a well-developed structure of violence involving 
ZANU-PF leaders and the war veterans, where they seemingly sanctioned the use of 
violence and intimidation on political opponents during the June 2000 parliamentary 
elections.144 This pattern was discernible in the other subsequent elections where war 
veterans spearheaded armed electioneering on behalf of ZANU-PF while drawing 
authorisation and strategic direction from the JOC.145 That not any of the war veterans, 
or other perpetrators, who spearheaded violence in the district have been arrested 
lends credence to the collusion and cooperation between them and the JOC, which is 
also some evidence of centralised coordination of the violence. 
 
In Shurugwi district there were well known and feared war veterans who terrorised the 
district. These include “General Nduku” and “Gunpowder”. The pattern was that these 
war veterans operated as individuals leading groups of non-war veterans who by 
association with these war veterans also became identified as such. In fact, there are 
                                                 
141 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs” in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The Military factor in Zimbabe.pdf, Accessed 02 July 2011, p 
9. 
142 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The GPA as a passive revolution”. 
143 See Chapter Four, especially section “Who were the perpetrators?”, and sections on the JOC and, war 
veterans and Youth militias. 
144 See The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Report, July 2001, p 2 for details. 
145 Refer also to Chapter Four for a detailed discussion.  
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several cases reported about fake war veterans and war veterans by association in the 
district. In the early years, Gunpowder terrorised the district, moving from one part to 
the other, beating, humiliating and torturing MDC supporters.146 There were other war 
veterans operating at more localised settings. Interestingly there were also female war 
veterans involved, for example in and around wards 19, 16, 12 and 13. Another 
prominent war veteran operated in the newly resettled wards including 20, 21 and 18.  
 
Alongside them were prominent ZANU-PF councillors and workers like “Jerry” and 
“Marvellous” around wards 10, 11, 12, and 13. As mentioned earlier, by the start of the 
2000s, Jerry was a simple villager who was later employed by the Ministry of Youth as a 
Ward Coordinator. His only qualification was his membership of ZANU-PF. Marvellous 
was a driver at the Shurugwi ZANU-PF offices, and he was known to be of a violent 
disposition. He was described as somebody who liked to be involved in fist fights at 
Chachacha township which was close to where he grew up. Chachacha became the hub 
of the illegal gold panners who established lodgings there. It was also where most pubs 
were located outside of Shurugwi town. In fact there are accounts that suggest that 
Chachacha at times overshadowed Tongogara Growth Point in terms of its growth and 
attraction. This was in part based on the nodal location that it occupies, and its 
closeness to the Boterekwa gold panning site in comparison to Tongogara. At the start 
of the millennium Chachacha also became a hotbed of politics and violence around 
political mobilisation.  
 
                                                 
146 See The Daily News, “Farmers in trouble with Gunpowder” in 
http//:www.dailynews.co.zw/daily/2000/June/June16/1177.html, for more details. 
See also Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “Who was responsible? Alleged 
perpetrators and their crimes during the 2000 Parliamentary Election Period”, July 2001, 
in http://www.dogstoc.com/docs/17003921/Harare, Accessed 8 March 2011. My own 
fieldwork has revealed that there were other war veterans, other than these two who 
were also fundamental in perpetrating violence on the farms. See also The Human 
Rights Watch, Fast Track land Reform in Zimbabwe, 8 March 2002, in 
http://.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c8c82df4.html, Accessed 7 March 2011.  See The 
Daily News, 1 April 2002. 
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My informants told me that Marvellous was part of mabhuru (bulls)147, who terrorised 
panners demanding some “tax” for their protection. They also told me that he got his 
job as a driver around 2000 partly on the basis of his mastery of violence and he 
continued to harass gold panners in combined portfolios, as a “bull” and as a ZANU-PF 
employee. Perhaps because of their backgrounds these two men, especially Jerry, felt 
compelled by their lack of academic qualifications for the jobs they held to employ 
coercive mobilisation tactics on behalf of their party as a way to retain their jobs.   
 
From the information I gathered there were not many uniformed national youth service 
graduates fomenting violence in the district, but there were untrained ZANU-PF youths 
from the wards. These operated on the guidelines from the war veterans. Mostly it was 
the ZANU-PF youths and other local ZANU-PF structures and the supporters who were 
leading in violating their MDC or alleged MDC supporters. This might have been so 
because they were the “foot soldiers” in this district where the structures of violence 
permeated the lowest levels, especially towards June 2008.  
 
Though some names of senior ZNA (army) personnel were given, it would be safe to 
suggest that the security forces in the district were even more guilty of complicity, 
through coordinating war veterans or youth militias and also through their failure to 
provide the security to civilians from the marauding perpetrators. It would seem that 
they had a behind-the-scenes role possibly to avoid international indictment for crimes 
against humanity as the country is a signatory to a number of these conventions. They 
could also have been responsible for imparting torturing skills to the war veterans. Their 
direct participation in the violence does not easily come out in the interviews held. 
However, more research is required to establish the exact role the security forces 
played at imparting torture skills and at the coordination level of the violence. However 
                                                 
147 Mabhuru was a colloquial term given to gold panners who used or threatened violence on other 
panners to get gold and or cash. In most cases these “bulls” did not want to pan for the gold themselves, 
rather they used violence to create a system of control over other panners. 
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this is a very difficult task, one that might never be accomplished considering the 
influence the army and other security organs have in the state. 
 
The behind-the-scenes role of the security forces, however, buttressed the “battle-
front” role taken by the quasi-military institutions like the youth militias and the war 
veterans. As the Zimbabwe Human Rights stated in 2001, the ZANU-PF government 
allocated a whopping twenty million Zimbabwe dollars to the war veterans in early 2000 
for their campaign efforts, which enabled them to form “militias composed of party 
supporters, mostly unemployed youths, and paid the recruits […] The party also 
provided transport and other logistical support, and the veterans enjoyed the support of 
CIO, army, and police personnel.”148  
 
An important point is that the top army leadership are themselves war veterans and 
want ZANU-PF to remain in power. They, according to Kriger, “receive[d] excellent pay 
and benefits, augmented by patronage, including farms and lucrative opportunities in 
the DRC.”149 They continued to reap the same benefits, and they grew into top business 
people, with interests in mining and agriculture. Because of this it was not surprising 
that the army leadership authorised the use of their personnel, cars, planes, and arms to 
aid the land invasions an election tool for the June 2000 elections.150  
 
In Shurugwi there was extensive use of unmarked or unregistered cars, which were used 
to coordinate the activities of the war veterans and other ZANU-PF structures of 
violence. These vehicles are widely thought to have belonged to the state’s dreaded 
                                                 
148 See Zimbabwe Human Rights Report, July 2001. See also, Patrick Bond an Masimba Manyanya, 
Zimbabwe’s Plunge,: Exhausted Nationalism, Neo-liberalism and the search for social Justice, Weaver 
Press, Harare, 2003, p 74, trace the resuscitation of the ZANU-PF-war veterans relationship from 1997 
when Mugabe allocated war veterans fifty thousand dollars payout each, which dynamic relationship was 
exploited from 2000 when ZANU-PF used them as “shock troops”. 
149 Norma Kriger, Guerilla veterans,  p 198. 
150 See Zimbabwe Human Rights Report, August 2001, cited in Norma Kriger, Guerilla veterans, p198. It 
should also be realised that violence was not only witnessed before the elections. There was also violence 
after elections especially in 2000 directed at the judiciary. See for example Minister Patrick Chinamasa’s 
attack of the Supreme Court in The Herald, 19 January 2001. 
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secret agents, the CIO. In the district many victims recall a “Major” in the hierarchy of 
their torture and intimidation in the district. Further investigations revealed that this 
“Major” indeed existed and was still with the ZNA in 2010 and he had a farm in the 
district. 
 
The narratives also point to a pattern that was followed, that is, identification, 
abduction, torture, and forced confessions. Identification took two methods. Firstly, 
villagers would secretly inform PISI (Police Internal Security Intelligence), ZANU-PF 
leadership and the Central Intelligence Organisation operatives of the names of MDC 
supporters. At other times PISI officials attended MDC rallies and took note of all the key 
officials. These also included locals who attended these meetings. At yet other times, 
the names were from the lists that the village-based structures of ZANU-PF kept and 
which they passed to the higher party echelons. Usually the identifiers were people who 
were close to the victims, including members of the extended family, fellow workers or 
fellow villagers. In the interviews and informal discussions with women who had been 
victimised it was clear that they knew who had reported them and possibly why they 
had done so.  
 
The reasons the victims gave bordered around petty conflicts or disagreements or even 
jealousies, which were married to the larger party political struggles and which were 
eventually fought on the political terrain. I met Naomi who, for example, told me that 
she had been labelled MDC by her late husband’s brother because she had refused to be 
inherited under the Shona system of kugara nhaka (wife inheritance). She also claimed 
that her late husband’s brother was jealous of her proficiency as an independent 
woman entrepreneur. I gathered that she was a cross-border trader, who by the village 
standards was doing well. Through cross-border trading, she ensured that her family 
was well looked after and well-nourished even during the worst famine of 2008.  
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From this discussion, personal issues between individuals were transformed into 
political issues and fought on the landscape of ZANU-PF and MDC terrain. What also 
comes out is the use of ZANU-PF as a franchise in which to package violence against 
those against whom one had a vendetta to settle. In this way private disputes were 
transformed into political confrontations. Even criminal attacks were at times fought in 
ZANU-PF-MDC battles. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Four, these localised 
confrontations and disputes while they did not trigger off the political violence, 
nonetheless helped to extend its reach and seriously sustained it at the village levels. To 
this list of private personal issues that extended and sustained politically authorised and 
directed violence I found issues like neighbours who had their cattle straying into the 
other’s crops, families quarrelling over lobola, others feeling their neighbours were 
jealous of their children’s success and disagreements at work places.151 Once these 
“small” issues, which were primarily meant to score back at neighbours, pervaded the 
political discourse they became magnified and the consequences for the victims were 
dire. 
 
 This ran concurrently with the second method where village heads kept lists of the MDC 
supporters. These lists while having some positive functions were largely used for the 
negative role152 of identifying “enemies” of ZANU-PF.153 Those on the lists were targeted 
for abuse. They also showed the power of those that compiled them. These lists 
contained names of MDC supporters, who had to be excluded from ZANU-PF and 
government-sponsored programmes such as food hand-outs, agricultural inputs, land 
allocation under the fast-track scheme, government employment and police protection, 
among others.154  
 
                                                 
151 Interviews in Shurugwi, December 2009- July 2010. 
152 I use the term positive list to denote those lists that were used to benefit the locals and negative lists 
for those lists that were used to identify political opponents. 
153 See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of lists from the Second Chimurenga, the gukurahundi and 
into the Third Millennium. 
154 Ibid. 
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Broadly, many of the interviewees claimed that they were in a vulnerable state on so 
many fronts given their status as MDC supporters. They pointed to a host of 
discriminations, for example in the fast-track land scheme, and instances where the 
police were reluctant to receive their harassment charges for a number of reasons. 
Others claimed they were forced out of government employment, while others even  
mentioned that their children were discriminated against by ZANU-PF aligned teachers 
and school heads.  
 
The abuse of the practice of drawing up lists accords with what Foucault describes as 
the practice of the devolvement of the sovereign’s “power of life and death” to almost 
everyone in the state. As he says for NAZI Germany, “ultimately, everyone in the […] 
state had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the 
practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or 
having them done away with.”155 
 
The above also speaks to the devolving of violence to the lowest structures of the 
district, that is, the family. This showed that the levels of participation were quite 
complex, ranging from the conception, planning and coordinating of violence as a 
technology to remain in power at the national, provincial and district levels, cascading 
down through the ward, and cell levels to the family unit.156 My argument in Chapter 
Four is that while there was coordination and sanitisation of the violence at higher 
levels, the main participants in its actual commission, however, were villagers. They 
identified MDC supporters, they played an auxiliary role of singing and praising 
perpetrators at meetings, were parents of perpetrators, were wives of war veterans. At 
other times they also sometimes participated in the torturing of the victims.  
 
                                                 
155 Michel Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976, Translated by 
David Macey, Picador, New York, 2003, p 259. 
156 See Chapter Four for a detailed discussion of this. See a similar argument by Mahmood Mamdani, 
When Victims Become Killers, pp 5-6. 
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In Shurugwi, once identified, victims would be taken from their homes, townships, 
places of work, from social gatherings or from anywhere they were to the homesteads 
of village heads, bases or the outskirts of villages where they would be subjected to 
different kinds of torture. These varied from beatings and assaults using logs, sticks, 
belts, and booted feet. At times the violations were undertaken at rallies in the 
presence of family and fellow villagers. However, if it was carried out by unknown 
assailants, generally suspected to be state secret agents, this was done in secret and at 
secluded locations. It was these victims who received the felanga type of torture. At 
times victims were locked up inside old farm houses, classrooms, shop backrooms and 
at times village head’s houses for periods ranging from a few hours to several days.  
During the torture, the victims were made to confess and recant from the political “sin” 
of being MDC supporters.  
 
We ought to realise that the humiliating “confessions” that led to “repentance” were 
not new. As discussed by Kanengoni, they were used by ZANU during the struggle for 
independence on suspected collaborators.157 The same was also used in the immediate 
post-independence period in the 1980s and 1990s. Eddison Zvobgo, the late former 
ZANU-PF secretary for Legal Affairs, once said, speaking about members of his party 
who had decided to run for election as independents, that “the onus is on the person 
who had decided to go astray, to publicly recant his wrong doing and publicly proclaim 
contrition so that the party may be afforded a basis for considering their application to 
re-join the family.”158 The forced confessions at the rallies also draws parallels with what 
Foucault posits that:  “…at the moment of execution, it seems that he [victim] was given 
another opportunity to speak, not to proclaim his innocence but to acknowledge his 
crime and the justice of his conviction.”159 The crime in Shurugwi was being MDC or 
                                                 
157 See Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing silences, Baobab, Harare, 1997, who discusses its use in both the 
outside camps and in ZANLA operational areas. 
158 See The Chronicle, 12 April 1995. 
159 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish, p 65. 
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perceived MDC supporter. The punishment ranged, as already discussed, from primary 
to secondary violent methods. 
 
There were no “short sleeve” or “long sleeve” amputations of the Second Chimurenga 
type. During the Second Chimurenga ZANLA used various methods to punish 
collaborators and those that did not support it. Outside the severe beatings, forced 
confessions, killings of so-called sell-outs and other methods of torture such as jato du 
povo,160 ZANLA cadres chopped off these people’s limbs: hands, legs, lips and 
tongues.161 However, for Shurugwi district between 2000 and 2008, I did not come 
across anyone or a claim that they had any or alleged limbs that had been cut off.  
 
The chopping off of limbs was, however, reported in other parts of the country. The 
gruesome murder of the wife of an MDC district chairperson of Mhondoro, who had her 
hands and legs chopped off before she was burnt in her hut, points to this practice. 
Patrick Chitaka, the MDC Manicaland Chairman, also hinted at the existence of such a 
practice in Manicaland province. Commenting on the alleged presence of foreign 
soldiers in Manicaland in 2008 aiding ZANU-PF terror campaign, he said:  
We have observed that some people leading the violence are foreigners because 
they speak a different language and they do not understand our languages. Also 
the tactics they are using are not perculiar to Zimbabwe, because they are 
cutting out the tongue, removing eyes, and genital parts.162 
 
There was the use of hate speech and strongly worded sloganeering in the district in line 
with the national trend. The hate speech was channelled through songs, poems and 
dances. In them the opposition MDC party leadership was vilified as stooges of the 
West, commonly articulated as Blair’s “tea boys” or Blair’s running dogs.163 Between 
                                                 
160 See Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing silences, p 81.   
161 See for example, Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 5, for a detailed discussion. 
162 See “Mugabe now using mercenaries”, Cape Times, 16 July 2008, in Solidarity Peace Trust, 
“Desperately seeking sanity”, p 25. 
163 In one of his many speeches, which have formed the core of Inside the Third Chimurenga, President 
Robert Mugabe said the MDC was not a local formation, but a front for the former colonisers and was also 
regressive and counter revolutionary. He said “the MDC should never be judged by its black trade union 
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April and June 27, 2010, these were done at the bases where pungwes were held.164 
Hate language stirs enmity and also tends to dehumanise those that are targeted. In the 
past such language was used with disastrous consequences in Hitler’s anti-Semitic 
vocabulary, in the National Party language against blacks in South Africa, and in Rwanda 
leading to and during the infamous genocide of 1994.165  
 
In Zimbabwe such language led to the deliberate victimisation of opposition supporters 
in several ways. The most condemning of it all was Pasi na..!/Down with… !, slogan. As 
already discussed those condemned to go “down” were physically attacked, emotionally 
blackmailed, discriminated upon in social services, inputs and food supplementary 
schemes run by the government. At pungwes, the major goal was to mobilise support 
for ZANU-PF. This was done through singing ZANU-PF party songs, dancing and the 
chanting of party slogans. However, they were also apportioned as a space to mete out 
severe floggings of “sell-outs”, which helped to create “fear and trauma in affected 
communities.”166 
 
As will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter Four, there were other reasons that led 
women to be targeted. These included the fact that there was in 2002 a 52 percent 
female population in Shurugwi. This was worsened by the increasing depopulation of 
men as the crisis deepened. Again, the fact that with the depopulation of men, women 
assumed more political duties of keeping lists, further exposed women to negative 
                                                                                                                                                 
face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough 
and violent high density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficies; for it is 
immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the 
repulsive ideology of a return to white settler colonial rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that 
control it; that converge on it and control it; that drive and direct; indeed sponsor and spot it. It is a 
counter revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and 
oppressed our people yesterday.”, p 88. 
164 Bases are places where meetings are held, while pungwes are all night meetings where political 
orientation and correction are held. 
165 See Geoff Hill, What happens after Mugabe, Zebra press, Cape Town, 2005, pp 64-65. 
166 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 16. 
 
 
 
 
 222 
 
 
 
 
scrutiny. Under these circumstances there was thus a greater probability that more 
women could be attacked.  
 
Also as highlighted under the types of violence many women were not always the 
primary target of the violence. It was their family: their husbands and sons who were 
sought for their role in the MDC politics. In this scenario women were beaten, abducted 
or threatened so that their brothers, sons or husbands could emerge from hiding. What 
this also points to is that women were not actively engaged in opposition politics in the 
district. In most cases therefore women were only attacked once their relatives had 
escaped in an effort to force them to reveal the whereabouts of their husbands. In 
addition, there are cases that point to women being the extended victims in the 
domestic sphere from husbands who had been victimised publicly for supporting the 
opposition. Thus women suffered more from spirals and to some extent offshoots of 
political violence.  
 
Related to this, rape that is generally used as a weapon on women and the opposition in 
conflict situations was not widely used in Shurugwi. Turshen, for example, says that men 
often use rape to “assert their power over women and groups of men assert their power 
over other groups by overpowering their women.”167 Carolyn Nordstrom, cited in Beth 
Goldblatt and Sheila Meintjes, corroborates this and says sexual assaults are used to 
attack “the core constructions of identity and security in their most profound sense” 
and this is aimed to “breakdown the fabric of society, and thus to breakdown political 
resistance.”168 More generally, sexual penetration, and by extension rape of women, is 
                                                 
167 Meredith Turshen, “Women’s war stories” in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya (eds) What 
do women do in Wartime: Gender and conflict in Africa, ZED Books, London and New York, 1998, p 10. 
168 See Carolyn Nordstrom cited in Beth Goldblatt and Sheila Meintjes, “South African women demand the 
truth” in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya, (eds), What women do in wartime: Gender and 
conflict in Africa, p 39. 
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widely viewed as a way men use to assert their masculinity and patriarchal power over 
women and the men whose women they rape.169  
 
In the recent past rape and sexual assaults were systematically deployed as strategies of 
war in such countries as Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe during the 
gukurahundi crisis.170 In the ground-breaking report on the disturbances in 
Matebeleland and the Midlands, CCJP/LRF concluded that rape was a systematic 
strategy used by the state agents against the people of Matebeleland. As they aver, this 
deployment of rape, was to try to “create a generation of Shona babies” in 
Matebeleland.171 This also speaks to the deployment of rape in the 100 days of the 
Rwanda genocide by the Hutus in which up to 250 000 Tutsi women were raped,172 out 
of whom an astounding 66 percent later tested positive for HIV.173 The use of rape as a 
tool of war also led the United Nations Security Council to pass the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1820 (UNSCR1820) to specifically address the deployment of 
sexual violations in conflict situations across the world.174 
 
It was not pervasive in Shurugwi between 2000 and 2008. Only isolated cases were 
recorded, which points to its random, if not sporadic, use. It was thus not a major 
                                                 
169 See Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988, for a nuanced discussion of this 
feminist discourse. See also “Sexual violence and armed conflict: United Nations Response”, in Women 
2000, United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, April 1998, p3, which also describes the various reasons for the commission of sexual violence 
against women in conflict situations. In addition to those sited already, it says these are meant for troop 
mollification; also to punish women involved/supporting men in opposition; to inflict terror on the 
population; and for ethnic cleansing. 
170 Meredith Turshen “Women’s war stories”, see also the CCJP and LRF report on the Gukurahundi era in 
Matebeleland. 
171 See CCJP/LRF (Abridged version) Breaking the silence, p 15. See also pp 22, 23 & 34. 
172 Adin Thayer, “Women in post-genocide Rwanda: Facing the past to build a future” in 
http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1413:women-in-post-
genocide-rwandafacing-the-past-to-build-a-future-&catid=169:multiple-intolerance-mounting-resistance,  
Accessed 24 March 2012. 
173 See Jeanne Izabiliza, “The role of women in reconstruction: Experience of Rwanda”, p 2, in 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Role-Women-Rwanda.pdf, Accessed 
24 March 2012. 
174 See United Nations security Council Resolution 1820, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 224 
 
 
 
 
strategy of this violence, but just one of those methods at the bottom of the basket. The 
findings of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum from a country-wide study over eight 
years also suggest that rape was not systematically employed against women. That 
there were only 27 reported cases of rape out of a total of 40 559 incidences of violence 
goes a long way to show this.175 On the whole, this shows clearly that rape ranked lowly 
compared to other violations perpetrated on the women and the opposition supporters 
in general. There could be other possible explanations like the fear of contracting 
HIV/AIDS as the rates in the Midlands province were rising.176 However, it could also be 
that some cases went unreported or unrecorded.  
 
In direct contrast to the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, other NGO national reports, 
however, point to the deliberate and systematic deployment of rape as a tool of the 
political violence. The AIDS Free World posits, for example, that rape was used on a 
massive scale. They, for example, put the figure of rape cases at 2000 for the period 
from March to June 2008 countrywide.177  The same portrayal was made by Everjoice 
Win in an open letter to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2004 claiming that there was 
indiscriminate rape of women by ZANU-PF agents, and that young girls between nine 
and ten had fallen victim to the rape crisis.178 Similarly, others claimed that up to two 
percent of women victims were raped, while 3 percent felt that a family member had 
been raped and a further 16 percent stated that they knew of a woman in their 
community who had been raped.179  
 
                                                 
175 See Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, adapted from “Sublimal terror?” p 12. See the full statistical 
compilation in Apendix 1. 
176 See T5 Programme of the Ministry of Health and Child welfare, Midlands Province, Zimbabwe, 2000 to 
2008.  
177 See www.aids-freeworld.org, cited in Tony Reeler, “Sublimal Terror”, for this and other estimates from 
other NGOs, p 31. See also Voice of America (VOA) “Zimbabwean women face HIV risk following rape as 
political violence” 14 July 2008. 
178 See Everjoice Win, “Open letter to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and other women in South African 
cabinet”, in Feminist Africa: National Politricks, Issue number 3, October/November, 2004, pp 74-75. 
179 See IDASA, ICTJ and RAU, Women, politics and the Zimbabwe crisis, May 2010, p 3. 
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However, the fact that I did not find rape as a general tool of the violence in Shurugwi 
could be based on the stigma attached to it, where the women affected feared rejection 
by their families. In addition to the fear of stigmatisation, as Njovana and Watts say, 
women often hush their rape encounters because rape in Zimbabwe is also associated 
with “bad” women such as drunkards and prostitutes. These two groups of women are 
often accused of “inviting” men to rape them, which often transfers the blame from the 
perpetrators to the victims.180 The stigmatisation of rape victims has been reported in 
the DRC in 2011.181 In this case, rape victims recounted narrations of rebuke by their 
husbands and relatives, as well as being openly ridiculed by fellow villagers who labelled 
them HIV positive after the attacks.182 Some reasons that have also been proffered for 
rape victims to remain silent in Zimbabwe include: the fear of revictimisation, the 
feeling that opening up makes the victim to relive the encounter, fear of being arrested 
by the partisan and unsupportive police force, fear of being laughed at and the fear of 
rejection.183  
 
Another dimension the violence took was what we may term the repetitive dimension. 
This happened where the victims and perpetrators continued to share the common 
spaces. As we referred earlier, they intermingled in the everyday as neighbours and as 
work mates. They again met at church, and at other social events like funerals, nhimbe 
(collective village farm labour), ancestral appeasing ceremonies, and at local village 
courts. Because of this the victims were constantly reminded of their violations and also 
of their perpetrators. This kept reopening old wounds. This is suggestive of violence that 
had descended into the ordinary rather than one that has ascended into 
transcendence,184 and one that had become a part of trivia. At another level, this helped 
to rupture the traditional communal support systems that helped to protect women 
                                                 
180 See Eunice Njovana and Charlotte Watts, “Gender violence in Zimbabwe”, p 48. 
181 See Mail and Guardian online, 10 July 2011, “DRC villagers spurn raped wives”, in 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-06-drc-villagers-spurn-raped-wives, Accessed 10 July 2011. 
182 Ibid. 
183 See RAU, When the going gets tough the man gets going, p 10. 
184 On this I borrow from Veena Das, Life and Words. 
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against abuse. As such these women victims endured it in their everyday lives, which 
placed a heavy strain on their lives especially psychologically. Suffice to say that there 
were no ostensible mechanisms to deal with trauma in the district, and the country.185 
 
It was thus not surprising that anger, suspicion and fear were still rife at the time of the 
field work. By 2010, justice for the victims of the violence seemed elusive. This was 
notwithstanding the existence of the GNU and the ONHRI. The ONHRI was supposed, 
among other things, to coordinate efforts to finding a transitional justice mechanism for 
the country. However, the problems and contestations within the GNU watered down 
this prospect. Thus the recourse for the victims remained limiting and limited. The 
channels were limiting because it was expensive to take cases of violations to court. The 
police, as we saw earlier, were not forthcoming in investigating alleged political 
violence. However, the victims argued that they wanted to see justice done and possibly 
some form of restorative justice implemented.186 Potentially, this pointed to the 
possibility of another cycle of retaliatory violence. 
 
People also lived in suspicion. As demonstrated already in the section on silence, many 
were still not keen to share their experiences. They could not trust anyone with their 
memories for fear of victimisation again. This speaks to self-policing that people 
adopted in order to protect themselves. One woman victim jokingly but melancholically 
told me that she could not even trust her husband.187 By extension she meant that she 
could neither trust me nor my assistant as she could not guarantee who we were and 
why we wanted to hear her experiences.  
 
To further underscore the fact that violence had become a part of the trivia there was 
evidence in terms of the everyday language and norms that governed people in which 
                                                 
185 See Chapter Five for the discussion on the impact of the lack of post-violence support mechanisms, 
especially in terms of bottling up anger, suspicion and the need for revenge. 
186 See Chapter Six for a pithy discussion of this. 
187 Interview with Sinikiwe, Jobolinko, 07 February 2010. 
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there was overt and covert reference to violence. The term jambanja, for instance, 
which was used initially to specifically to define the violent farm takeovers in 2000, had 
by 2008 been appropriated in the everyday grammar to refer to misunderstandings, 
small conflicts even between two people or even contests at soccer matches.  
 
CONCLUSION  
On the whole the chapter tried to centralise the narratives of the women in constructing 
the types, patterns and “silences” that animated the violence. Broadly, I contended that 
the violations suffered can be tentatively divided into two that is primary and 
secondary. In terms of the patterns, I elaborated that there were, firstly, discernible 
steps that followed from identification, to abduction and punishment. Most of these 
stages made use of locals who at times utilised personalised vendettas for political 
profit. The chapter also tried to make sense of the silence that was encountered in the 
field. As a shorthand, these silences were mediated by the conditions of incomplete 
political transition which, while offering hope were simultaneously pregnant with 
threats as the structures that were blamed for instigating the 2000-2008 violence 
remained visible and at times active in 2010 when the interviews were undertaken.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AGENCY AND OR VICTIMHOOD: CONTRASTING THE LEVELS OF 
PARTICIPATION IN, AND VICTIMHOOD FROM, THE VIOLENCE IN SHURUGWI. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“What man does”, and “what woman is”, because “after all, men do the soldiering, most 
women are civilians”1, and “men fight as avatars of a nation’s sanctioned violence” 
while “women work and weep”2, are expressions that give the impression that women 
are perpetual victims in wartime or situations of conflict or violence. At another level it 
also points to the notion that victimhood in conflicts is gendered. Broadly, this emanates 
from the dominant Western feminist discourse that has set a priori and universalised 
relations between sexes. In this regard, “whatever female[s] do is ‘femininity’ and 
whatever male[s] do is ‘masculinity’”.3 As a consequence, the “universal social and 
cultural inferiority of women was a foregone conclusion.”4  
 
The same discourse has also impacted on the discussion of the relationship between 
women and violence, as exemplified by the opening lines of this chapter. The 
assumption is even worse for rural women who because of their invisibility, and limited 
economic, social, academic and political standing, are lowly regarded and are thought of 
as weak, powerless, and as perpetual victims.5 This is the same sort of inclination one 
gets when reading through the bulk of the human rights literature produced on the 
“crisis” period in Zimbabwe. Women are presented as vulnerable, weak, economically 
dependent and thus as victims. 
                                                 
1 See Meredith Turshen, “Women’s War Stories” in Meredith Turshen and Clottilde Twagiramaraya, eds, 
What women do in Wartime, ZED Books, London and New York, 1998, p 1. According to her more often 
than women erroneously are portrayed as silent victims in violent conflicts while men are the ones that 
are regarded as the perpetrators. 
2 See Mats Utas, “Agency of victims: Young women in the liberation civil war” in Alcinda Honwana and 
Filip de Boeck, eds, Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Post-Colonial Africa, Africa World Press, 
Trenton and Asmara, 2005, p 55. 
3 See Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, in Alexandra Shepard and Garthine, 
eds, Gender and History, Vol 20, Issue 3, November 2008, p 559. 
4 See Ifi Amadiume, cited in Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, p 565. 
5 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body: Western theories and African subjects”, in Oyeronke 
Oyewumi, ed, African Gender Studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005, p 11. 
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While it holds water to some extent, this generalised perception is problematic, and can 
be challenged on the basis of the events of the violence in Shurugwi between 2000 and 
2008. In this chapter I would like to argue that it is true that women have several 
disadvantages: physiological, economic, social, and cultural in Shurugwi (and Zimbabwe 
in general), compared to men. However, the local conditions ensured that political 
agency transcended the sexed body of women. To this extent some of the women from 
Shurugwi actively encouraged the farm occupations, the perpetuation of threats and the 
actual terror against their counterparts. Outside their usually prescribed roles as wives 
and mothers, women in Shurugwi also became important political participants. However 
small a role they played, it significantly spurred the violence.  
 
Also, as the violence wore on and as these acts cascaded to the lower levels of the 
extended family, the gap between victims and perpetrators became nebulous. This 
served to muddy the fixation of femininity or masculinity to a particular biological sex. 
Again in the context of the increased depopulation of men, who had moved to towns 
and the diaspora, women assumed some of the “manly” political duties that contributed 
to, and extended, the violence. Also through what one may refer to as “traditional” 
African women’s political activities such as ululations, songs, dances, praise poetry and 
by wearing different party regalia, they helped to push the levels of hatred, emotions, 
and related attacks or their threats, to new levels.  
 
True, women have sung songs, performed dances and praised their leaders in rural 
settings throughout the past, but this time these had a different role and impact, that of 
encouraging and extending violence. As Michael Karlstrom would probably say, songs 
were performed for “political hospitality”.6 In this chapter I try to discuss the different 
contributions of the various perpetrators of the violence. Crucially, besides articulating 
                                                 
6 I borrow this phrase from Michael Karlstrom, “On the aesthetics and dialogics of power in the 
postcolony”, in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol 73, no1, 2003, p 66, who uses it to 
differentiate it from domestic hospitality in the home. Under political hospitality the songs and various 
performances are done in the service of praising postcolonial party leaders and spurring party political 
ideologies and activities. 
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the political roles performed by women, which set their agency,7 I also seek to analyse 
the effect on party political objectives of their various performances. Another important 
discussion point is why women participated in the violence. Taking the latter thread 
further, why did women discard their gendered (women) identity for party political 
identity in the violations of other women and other opponents? Having said this 
however, these women were not a homogenous group and need to be discussed in their 
plurality. Different women had differential experiences of and in the violence.  
 
A related question is whether their participation was only due to coercion. In other 
words, how far is it possible to argue that without Mugabe there could not have been 
violence in Shurugwi? Is it possible to write on the history of violence in Shurugwi solely 
on Mugabe’s terms? This question derives from the strong MDC, human rights, and 
generally Western discourse on the violence in Zimbabwe that portrays Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF as the authors and executors of the violence between 2000 and 2008. Violence 
is construed only in ZANU-PF leadership terms and in terms akin to Robert Mugabe’s 
biography, which is partially incorrect because the structures of that violence extended 
beyond these two institutions.8 Secondly, how much agency did the rural women of 
Shurugwi have between 2000 and 2008? If they did, as I would like to posit, where was 
that agency located? To what extent was it based on their party political membership, 
coerced agency or self-propelled?  
 
                                                 
7 In trying to locate this agency, I am cognisant of the warning given by Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak, 
“Subaltern studies: Deconstructing Historiography”, in R Guha and G Spivak, eds, Selected Subaltern 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 3-32, of not falling into the same trap as other practioners of 
subaltern studies, who in an attempt to recoup agency from the past have ended up objectifying them as 
they had been in the archives they are trying to dismantle. 
8 I use the term institution to denote Robert Mugabe as a person, and those structures and powerful 
people that have over the years surrounded him and that have sustained him in power. See also Sabelo 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “The meanings of Mugabeism in the postcolonial African present: Beyond the polemics” 
Unpublished paper presented at the Re-Imagining Postcolonial Futures: Knowledge Transactions and 
Contests of Culture in the African Present Colloquium, organised by the Centre for Humanities for 
Research of the Western Cape, and The Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies of the Open 
University, UK, 8-11 July 2009, UWC, Cape Town, especially p 14. 
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While an attempt is made to disrupt the overestimated power of men over women in 
the violence, the bottom line of the argument is to try to show the ambiguous nature of 
the relations of power between the women at the bottom and those in the political 
leadership positions. While these women from “below” are prone to victimisation, they 
sometimes used their same positions and conditions to their advantage, to influence 
their leaders, and to contribute to the violations of their peers.  
 
To unpack the seemingly contrary position, I seek to draw on Michel Foucault’s thesis on 
power relations. By debunking a centralised source where power is generated and from 
which it is distributed, Foucault regards power as an immanent and relational quality 
that is not obtainable from an outside source. Rather, it is internally produced at 
different locations by the “divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums” that occur in the 
multivalent situations.9 As he says, “power is everywhere, not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere.”10 As such, power relations in any 
society are more than just hierarchical top-down, but that they are rather complex, 
multi-dimensional, and multi-directional.11 Thus at times power “comes from below,” 
with local struggles and differences constituting the base for larger ones or instructing 
the larger hegemonic explanations.12   
 
On the whole, Foucault’s notion widens our scope on relations that are not usually 
“captured by the Manichaean […] dominant analyses” of power.13 The above helps in 
understanding further the web of relationships between the “extrinsic site of 
legitimation” which produces the authorising narrative and the site of doing.14 Crucially, 
                                                 
9 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, Volume 1, Translated by Robert Hurley, 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, p 94. 
10 Ibid, p 93. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, p 94. 
13 See Blair Rutherford, “Belonging to the farm(er): Farm workers, farmers, and the shifting politics of 
citizenship”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s Unfinished business, 
p 196. 
14 See Allen Feldman, Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern 
Ireland, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991, p 3. 
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it situates agency at the site of doing because “agency was not the author but the 
product of doing.”15 The “doing” is measured in acts and effects. As a result, agency is 
temporal and spatial.16 In this way, the political violence that rocked Shurugwi district 
can thus be perceived as not “anchored in ideological codes and conditions external to 
the situation of enactment and transaction.”17 Instead it can be imagined as “being 
sedimented with its own local histories that are mapped out on the template of the 
body”18 and not necessarily as the sole product of the external ideological constructions 
in Harare. The effect of this is that the justification for its occurrence, or what Feldman 
calls the “legitimation”, then “becomes performative and contingent.”19  
 
Following in this modality in relation to the commission of violence in Shurugwi, it can 
then be argued that while there was the overall ZANU-PF narrative for the force-driven 
farm, factory and firm takeovers, the threatening and the physical lynching of MDC 
supporters, its success depended on local conditions. The acute land shortages, local 
politics, petty jealousies, as well as the presence of identifiable MDC supporters 
concretised the imperative in the “space[] of dispute”20, in Ranciere’s words, and 
provided the fuel that drove the violence in Shurugwi district.  
 
It is in the Foucauldian complex web of interactions and relations of power between the 
local and the national that I seek to locate the various levels of agency the women of 
Shurugwi had in the violence. This take also enables a vocabulary of the violence that 
looks at women not only as objects but also as subjects (however unequal) whose 
actions generated effects which impacted on their neighbours and the overall direction 
of the ZANU-PF political strategy. I take a cue from Africanist feminist theory that is 
increasingly challenging the universalising Western feminist theory. In the latter, 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, p 3. 
17 Ibid, p 4. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, p 3. 
20 Jacques Ranciere, The politics of aesthetics, p 51. 
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“differences and hierarchy […] are enshrined on bodies; and bodies enshrine differences 
and hierarchy.” And, “male/female bodies [are] hierarchically ordered, differentially 
placed in relation to power, and spatially distanced from one another.”21  Challenging 
the Western feminist explanation invokes the argument for the importance of spartial-
temporalities in generating agency. It also invokes the articulations by James Scott in 
Weapons of the weak which established power and agency among the peasants in the 
everyday forms of benign resistance against oppression.22 Scott challenges us to look at 
agency in its variegated forms, especially by those ordinarily considered weak. 
 
Useful as this distribution of power and action is, it has to be read, however, alongside 
Immanuel Kant’s thesis on radical evil. It also has to be considered on the backdrop of a 
strong state presence in the people’s lives. Arguing in the realm of morality and 
rationality, Kant avers that evil is an immanent human quality that drives human beings 
to take certain courses of action, albeit without a positive being of its own.23 Rejecting 
the theodical perception of evil as merely a negation, a subversion or a perversion of 
God’s will, he suggests that the immanence of evil means humans have the power to 
perform evil, and its (non)commission basically depends on the choice individuals take. 
The outcome of the commission had also to be gauged in terms of good or bad vis a vis 
moral law. For Kant, however, humans have a propensity for evil over good.24  
 
However, Kant says that where there is no freedom of choice and where human beings 
are compelled by situations, both in time and space, to physically do evil there is no 
                                                 
21 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body”, p 8. 
22 See James. C. Scott, Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of Peasant resistance, Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 1985, who states that some of these include recalcitrance, chicanery, pilferage, 
foot dragging and minor forms of sabotage. On the whole he posits that the weak have some “weapons” 
with which to fight those in dominant positions. 
23 Steven R Grimm, “Kant’s argument for radical evil” in European Journal of Philosophy, 10, 2, in 
http://faculty.fordham.edu/sgrimm/Site/Papers_and_Presentations_files/ejp-kant-radicalevil.pdf, 
Accessed 20 September 2011. 
24 Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, “Introduction” to FWJ Schelling, Philosophical investigations into the 
essence of human freedom, Dennis J Schmidt, ed, State University of New York Press, New York, 2006, p 
xvi. 
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agency involved.25 This is productive in assigning the agency that can be ascribed to 
women and other actors outside compulsion. The question then is: to what extent was 
the physical commission of “evil” by many constitutive of agency? In this regard what 
therefore seizes this discussion is whether the rural women of Shurugwi who 
participated in the violation of others, singing, or keeping of lists, which literally 
constituted “singing for their supper”, had any moral evil (agency), in the Kantian sense, 
since they did not have positive choices. This tension between Foucault and Kant 
animates the anxieties, and the causal-effect relationship between the “centre” that 
provide both institutional and narrative legitimation and, the site of the commission of 
violence. The same fault line also informs the shifting categories of actors between 
perpetrators and victims of violence that I grapple with throughout this chapter. 
 
WHO WERE THE PERPETRATORS OF THE VIOLENCE? 
There are many groups of people that can fit the description of perpetrators in the 
violence in Shurugwi (and Zimbabwe) in the years between 2000 and 2008. Events in 
Shurugwi help to debunk the oft-conveyed narrative that equates the history of the 
post-1990s violence in Zimbabwe to the biographies of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. By 2008 
the politics around raising fear, coercion, intimidation, threats and physical harm was so 
pervasive, structured, and “democratised” that it had reached deep into the extended 
family circles. To this extent therefore it meant that large sections of society 
participated and sustained the violence.  
 
The pervasiveness of, and to some extent the “democratisation” of, the structures of 
violence therefore makes it imperative that we think beyond the two binary categories, 
first, the centre-periphery used in hierarchized power relations, and the  perpetrator-
victim binary. Rather, it would be productive to “fracture the appearance of lawful 
continuity between centres of legitimation and local acts of domination.”26  
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Allen Feldman, Formations of violence, p 2. 
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The move towards transcending these divisions enables us to look at the relations 
between the state and the women as complex and not as given. This also allows us to 
have a glimpse into the contrariness of the nature of the interactions, on the one hand 
between the women and the state, and on the other between women and the other 
perpetrators of the violence. By merely participating, either willingly, grudgingly, or 
coerced, whether to either gain from the fruits of participation and belonging to the key 
political parties in whose names the acts were committed, or to simply survive, this 
involved the agency of the women. As Foucault and Feldman argue, power and agency 
lie in the doing subject and not at some central place.27 These various actions from the 
multiple situations that the women found themselves in pushed larger national politics 
further. It also opens us to the more intimate and hidden sources that sustained the 
hatred, intolerance, name-calling, the political bifurcation, the keeping of lists, denial of 
access to food and other social services at the lower levels of society. 
 
Following in the Foucauldian line, the localised activities then fed into the national 
ideological grid where the commission of the “evil” at the village levels was used to 
showcase the necessity of the Third Chimurenga.  It also gave more credence to the 
ideology. As already discussed in Chapter One, the violence experienced in Shurugwi, 
and elsewhere in Zimbabwe, was a product of planning and participation. Planning was 
done in Harare while the execution was led by the war veterans, villagers and local 
communities. The start of the nationwide violence was the period following the defeat 
of ZANU-PF in the constitutional referendum in February 2000. Besides marking the first 
defeat of ZANU-PF at the ballot, the constitutional referendum served as a sort of a 
“plebiscite on ZANU-PF rule since 1980.”28 At another level, this defeat actualised the 
dwindling electoral fortunes of the ruling party and it inauspiciously pointed to 
subsequent election defeats for ZANU-PF.29  
                                                 
27 See Michel Foucault, A history of sexuality, p 94. See also Allen Feldman, Formations of violence, p 3. 
28 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, Becoming Zimbabwe, p 212. 
29 Lovemore  Madhuku, “Law, Politics and the land reform process in Zimbabwe” in M Masiiwa, ed, Post-
Independence Land Reform in Zimbabwe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare,  2004, pp 137-141,for a 
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Following this, ZANU-PF leadership planned and started farm invasions, which became 
the harbinger of the post millennium violence in the country.30 The same strategy of 
fomenting insecurity, steering emotions and the targeting of opposition was also 
repeated at intermittent times, especially around election times.31 ZANU-PF party also 
organised the violence through its authorising narrative rooted in anti-imperialism that 
typecast and caricatured the MDC as a foreign face of Western colonialists. What gives 
credence to this thought is that besides having had the means to stop the violence, the 
party leadership condoned or openly supported it. Also, the duration, intensity, and 
recurrence of the violence point to some form of its encouragement and coordination.  
 
It also has to be said that in time the mastermind of this strategy, that is, ZANU-PF’s top 
echelons and the Joint Operations Command (JOC) seemed to have devolved control of 
the violence, which gave rise to local centres of control. As the violence deepened and 
was further extended there was little way they could manage it all, which gave rise to 
local initiatives and opportunities by the lower level structures. Thus, while the general 
strategy and authorising ideology were controlled from Harare, the tactics on the 
ground were not as firmly controlled.32 For the violence to be sustainable at these levels 
it was suffused with localised struggles and localised histories.33  
 
Importantly for Shurugwi, the national ideology was buttressed by the severe historical 
land shortages, and the conflicting legacies of the late ZANLA commander Josiah 
                                                                                                                                                 
nuanced discussion of this. Among other issues he says that the MDC had “visible and widespread 
support”, p 137, which necessitated ZANU-PF to devise a survival strategy for the forthcoming June 2000 
general elections. This strategy, as Madhuku points out, was violent political mobilisation. 
30 A lot of work has been done, and a key and instructive research has been done in Amanda Hammar, 
Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and 
Nation in the context of Crisis, Harare, Weaver Press, 2003. 
31 See Pamela Machakanja, “National healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and 
opportunities”, Institute for justice and Reconciliation, Wynberg, 2010, p 1. 
32 See also an interesting discussion of this on a nationwide scale by Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately 
seeking Sanity: What prospects for a new Zimbabwe? Durban, 29 July2008, p 25, which posits that: “In 
May and June (2008) there was a clear falling off of the direct role played by JOC in the actual day to day 
implementation of violence. The violence appeared to become self-perpetuating without the daily 
oversight of JOC”. See also similar arguments summarised in Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbours, p 9. 
33 See a similar argument by Allen Feldman, Formations of violence, pp 2-3. 
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Tongogara and the late far-right Prime Minister of Rhodesia Ian Smith. The Tongogara 
legacy especially made for a strong case for emotive electioneering for ZANU-PF. He 
embodied the ZANLA struggle and triumph against the Rhodesia settler state. Ironically, 
Tongogara had worked on Ian Smith’s mother’s farm in his youth,34 which in some sense 
symbolised the history of racialised economic inequalities and black suffering in 
Rhodesia. 
 
Furthermore, there were various groups of people who contributed to the perpetration 
and sustenance of the orgy of political violence either in groups or as individuals. There 
were also instances when localised jealousies, competitions, examples, and conditions 
were used to justify the violation of the opposition MDC supporters. Locals again 
identified farms to invade and enemies to target, plus strategies to deal with them. 
However, this was largely in the brand name of, and in the service of, ZANU- PF’s 
scheme to retain power.35  
 
Addressing the violence in Shurugwi in terms of Foucault’s discourse on the multivalent 
sources of power that takes into account the different relationships is also helpful in 
unpacking the various categories of perpetrators in Shurugwi. There were perpetrators 
at different levels depending on the political, social and economic power at their 
disposal. Others showed more active roles while others had more at stake. Yet for 
others their lowly positions meant that they had a smaller stake in the political violence, 
hence their minimal contributions. The latter’s participation seemed to have been 
spurred by the need to benefit materially in an economy of severe shortages.  
Among those who had some seemingly benign agency were rural women. This of course 
did not diminish their cumulative impact on the overall violence. However, I would like 
                                                 
34 See Luise White, The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p 103. 
35 See for example Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates: forensic, narrative and psychological truths 
and the challenges facing human rights researchers in Zimbabwe” in  www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/.../..., 
pp 1-9., for a detailed discussion on the levels of the commission of political violence. The central point is 
that ZANU-PF structures were responsible for the highest percent of the violence. She also discusses the 
retaliatory violence from MDC structures. 
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to argue that the exhibition of one’s agency depended on the amount of profit to be 
gained. The profits were either material gains or simply the need to survive. For the 
majority of the women in Shurugwi the profit was safety from being cast as the 
opposition. This meant that they were not beaten, threatened or had their property 
destroyed. They also needed the benefits that membership of ZANU-PF brought: access 
to food hand-outs, access to the GMB, access to agricultural inputs and access to social 
services or social grants, among others. 
 
The above, other than merely highlighting the imperative of analysing the moral 
blameworthiness of the perpetrators, also calls for the troubling of the categories of 
perpetrators and victims. In this regard, following the vantage point provided by Fujii for 
the Rwanda genocide that posits for complexities, that is, tensions, blurred lines and 
ever-changing relations between and amongst perpetrators, victims and bystanders,36 is 
productive. This is crucial in unpacking the complex forms of interactions between these 
different categories, as well as in sifting through the different shifts between these 
categories. It invites us to see the participants in these categories as transient between 
rigid categories.37 Thus, this link again draws us to consider the 2000-2008 violence as 
“… a temporal and spatial unfolding of ambiguous actions, shifting contexts, and actors 
with multiple and contradictory motives.”38 What emerges on the whole therefore is 
that agency from such power relations is complex: at times covert, even suppressed, at 
others dominant, while at other times, benign.  
 
But, where did that agency come from? In this regard we now turn to addressing the 
importance of coerced agency. For Shurugwi, in the face of the spread of the violence to 
the lowest social levels of the extended family, the distinction between willing and 
coerced participation is nebulous and difficult to articulate. Again the participation of 
                                                 
36 Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbours: Webs of violence in Rwanda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, 2009, p 8. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p 11. 
 
 
 
 
 239 
 
 
 
 
women (and other categories) in the violence, either as victims or perpetrators, in the 
name of political parties further complicates it.39 It then becomes tenuous to say 
whether the women got involved simply as members of their political parties which 
compelled them to participate, or whether they joined out of their own choice or to 
fight their own conflicts on the political stage.  
 
The task of demarcating voluntary participation from coerced participation became 
further complicated by the circumstances around the period of the research. Besides 
the fact that this was the moment immediately after the violence, fraught with 
emotions and unsettled scores, there were more gains in claiming victimhood.40 
Informants told of rumours that promised compensation for the victims during 2010. 
There was also trepidation concerning reprisal attacks among those who had caused or 
threatened harm on their neighbours. These anxieties were exacerbated by the calls by 
human rights and the MDC for justice with regard to perpetrators.41 Thus in this 
atmosphere it also became difficult to get to elicit complex narratives of what really 
happened.  “Truths” became instrumentalised by those who gave their testimonies.42 In 
this sense, there were various truths regarding the commission and organisation of the 
2000 to 2008 violence.  
 
Furthermore, the obtaining political polarity encouraged the polarisation of the “truth”. 
“Truth” was then only possible through the subjective political-party inclined 
perspectives. In the end it came to the questions: Whose truth, and, for what purpose? 
It might suffice to say that there was a ZANU-PF version of the events, which stood in 
sharp contrast to the MDC, human rights NGOs’ one. In brief, ZANU-PF’s version of 
events was aimed at the diplomatic community and for political indoctrination carried 
out in state-controlled media. On the other side was the human rights one that was 
                                                 
39 See a similar argument by Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbours, p 8. 
40 See Chapter Three for a pithy discussion of the reasons for claiming victimhood. 
41 See Chapter six here, for the various contestations around a possible TJ in the aftermath of the crisis. 
42 See Shari Eppel, “A Tale of three dinner plates” pp 6-7, for the core discussion of the various kinds of 
truths and how truths are important in claiming victimhood.  
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primarily aimed at keeping the “Zimbabwean problem” before the eyes of the 
international community. It also targeted the gaining of donor funding.  
 
Although there may be collusions in some of the versions, for example, individuals at 
the centre of the violence, dates, and venues, for example, there are also fundamental 
contrasts between them. This polarity was even decipherable in the testimonies by the 
women at the lowest structures of the political movements, which mirrored that 
disseminated by their top structures. In the end I established that the versions of the 
“truths” were purposeful, and some of the versions of events by individuals even 
changed on repeat visits.  
 
Arguing for the need to locate agency outside of the so-called “authorising centre” is not 
to demean the role of the state in the actual commission of the violations. The state had 
a strong hold in the rural areas especially as ZANU-PF has always regarded them as its 
powerbase. As for Shurugwi, the political symbolism regarding the legacy of Tongogara, 
the ZANLA commander, who hailed from the district, was strong.  His legacy sat 
alongside that of Smith, who also came from Shurugwi, the hallmark of Rhodesian far 
right conservatism and settler colonialism that featured prominently in ZANU-PF’s 
authorising narrative. Boasting of degrees in violence43 President Mugabe, the chief 
ideologue of the “Third Chimurenga”, and other senior party as well as government 
officials, constantly hammered on the importance of violence to ZANU-PF.44 They 
explained this alongside Tongogara’s Second Chimurenga biography, in the simplified 
and overkill narrative of fighting against Western imperialism and its supposed local 
face, the MDC.  
 
The pronouncements served to clear the path for ordinary members of the party and at 
times criminals to evoke their agency, taking advantage of the situation, to violate the 
                                                 
43 See David Blair, Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the struggle for Power in Zimbabwe, for more 
of these pronouncements by Mugabe. 
44 See Chapter One for a pithy discussion of this. 
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emotional well-being, as well as the social, political and economic rights of the members 
of the “ethnic” MDC group with guaranteed impunity. As we will briefly demonstrate 
below, and as we also intimated in Chapters One, Two and Three there were different 
state organs that committed violence, including the army, the police, the CIO, as well as 
quasi-government organs like the war veterans and the NYS graduates.  
 
Crucially, however, once the process of inciting differences, “fears and hatred”,45 as well 
as the targeting of opponents and enemies had been set in motion the government 
withdrew from the day to day overt supervision. With this, it was then left to local 
communities to extend the fears, hatred and differences, through marrying their 
struggles on to the larger party political discourse. In an atmosphere where the 
targeting of the opposition MDC supporters was acceptable, it was easy to convert 
personal battles into political battles between ZANU-PF and the MDC.46 Once the 
framing of the “enemy” or “ethnicisation”, in Fujii’s language, was achieved and the 
emotions were drummed up,47 it became easy to sustain the political violations through 
the family and village level confrontations and structures. 
 
In Shurugwi there is “evidence” of people taking advantage of the violence to loot and 
grab property from their neighbours. As an NGO worker claimed: 
 Generally the violence provided an opportunity for some to move up the ladder 
largely through looting property from their victims. Look at what Gunpowder did 
in 2000, he chased away the owner of the farm and he harvested all the crops 
and retained the profits. After that he was not able to send anything to the Grain 
Marketing Board. I also know of criminals who looted their fellow villagers’ goats 
and chickens and hid in the name of their political party. Also state property was 
distributed along partisan lines. Scotch carts, ploughs and agricultural inputs 
                                                 
45 See Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbours, p 5.  
46 See Chapter Three, for a nuanced discussion on how petty jealousies were mapped on to the larger 
national political struggle.  
47 Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbours, p 5 posits an interesting brand on the reasons why neighbours turn 
against each other in what she terms an ethnicity-based (or race based in Foucault’s language). I find this 
useful in bringing together an ensemble of personal struggles that were put under the common 
denominator of politics. Thus political belonging became a form of ethnic formation. 
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were distributed through chiefs and headmen. It is all there to see. ZANU-PF 
supporters benefitted and MDC supporters were left out.48 
 
From the interview above we have a glimpse of how people took advantage of their 
association with ZANU-PF to loot property from the white farmers and also from the 
generality of the MDC supporters. Criminals are also said to have benefitted from the 
confusion created by the statements that condoned violence against the opposition to 
deprive the defenceless peasants of their valuable property. There were numerous 
reports of theft of property from white farms. These included cattle, fence equipment, 
irrigation equipment, poaching, and theft of water pumping engines. Such actions were 
also witnessed in other sectors, such as gold panning. In this regard, criminal elements 
took advantage of their association with ZANU-PF to accumulate wealth.49 
 
 A useful analogy for the commission of violence that happened in the Zimbabwe comes 
from the Rwanda genocide. Contrasting the Rwanda genocide and the German 
holocaust, Mamdani writes that:  
Unlike the NAZI holocaust, the Rwandan genocide was not carried out from a 
distance, in remote concentration camps beyond national borders, in the 
industrial killing camps operated by agents who often did no more than drop 
Zyklon B crystals into gas chambers from above. The Rwandan genocide was 
executed with the slash machetes rather than the drop of crystals, with all the 
gruesome detail of a street murder rather than the bureaucratic efficiency of a 
mass extermination. The difference of the technology is indicative of a more 
significant social difference. The technology of the holocaust allowed a few to kill 
many, but the machete had to be wielded by a single pair of hands. It required 
not one but many hacks of a machete to kill even one person. With a machete, 
killing was hard work; that is why there were several killers for a single victim.50 
 
As a result of that the Rwandan genocide saw nearly whole populations affected and 
possibly millions participating in the killing. Mahmood Mamdani continues to say that in 
                                                 
48 A project officer with an NGO that worked in the district in an Interview held on 25 May in Gweru. 
49 See Chapter Two, especially the discussion of Marvellous who demanded that panners pay him 
“protection fees.” 
50 See Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda, Fountain Press, David Philip, and James Currey, Kampala, Cape Town, and Oxford, respectively, 
2001, p 5. 
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the Rwanda case “the government did not kill. It prepared a population, enraged it and 
enticed it.”51 While this analysis by Mamdani has courted controversy, in part because 
of his over reliance on Rwandans based in Uganda, recent studies on the genocide have 
affirmed his conclusion. However, they point to the initial direct role of the state in the 
killings.52  
 
The Mamdani discursive framework is very instructive in unpacking the organisation, 
distribution, and execution of violence in Zimbabwe, and in Shurugwi in particular. In 
the Zimbabwe situation, and Shurugwi specifically, I would argue that the ZANU-PF 
government planned the attacks. In a series of hate speeches against the whites and 
opposition MDC supporters in general,53 it prepared its supporters to launch onslaughts 
on them. It also enticed them with threats and rewards of various kinds.54  
What I have established for Shurugwi is that patronage drew people to participate 
rather than the oft-claimed spontaneity by the land hungry citizens. As Alexander and 
Chitofiri said for Norton, ZANU-PF also used state resources for its patronage system. 
They say:  
ZANU-PF relied on the state’s assets and the state’s ability to control assets, and 
it deployed its resources to encourage and coerce performances of loyalty and-
crucially- to mobilise violence… Our point here is to emphasise the way in which 
                                                 
51 Ibid, p 6. 
52 See for example, Charles Kabwete Mulinda “A space for genocide:  local authorities, local population 
and local histories”, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape, September 2010, p 14, who 
contends that firstly the Rwandan government openly participated in the killings while simultaneously 
preparing and encouraging the population to kill. This is the same view I share and which I would like to 
also take on the role of the Zimbabwean government in the post February 2000 period. See my discussion 
on the distribution of the violence especially my discussion on the JOC in the following pages. 
53 See the rather inflammatory speeches of Mugabe in Inside the Third Chimurenga, for example. 
54 A serious culture emerged from the violence in Zimbabwe, that of patronage, where participants in the 
violence against MDC supporters were rewarded with farms or land, jobs in the government, food hand-
outs, protection from violence or harm and agricultural inputs, among others. Due to this people were 
lured to partake in the violence against family members, neighbours and workmates, in the district. Shari 
Eppel, “A Tale of Three Dinner Plates: Truth and challenges of Human Rights Reports in Zimbabwe”, p 3, 
gives a detailed discussion of this in his study of Gomoza village of Lupane. For a pithy insight into the 
levels of hate speech see Robert Mugabe Inside the Third Chimurenga: Our land is our prosperity, Ministry 
of Information and Publicity, Harare, 2001, which contains some of Mugabe’s speeches 
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such practices were woven into the organisation of violence, creating particular 
kinds of incentives, expectations and relationships.55  
 
They go on to say the MDC also created its own version of patronage as a counter by 
giving food and a support network to its supporters to counter the ZANU-PF model.56  
What this translated to in a situation of severe shortages basically was that everyone 
had to belong to either party to gain provisions and to survive. This also meant the 
entrenchment of the binary of belonging. The two political parties controlled the scarce 
resources; in the case of ZANU-PF it was state resources through its control of 
government, and for the MDC because of its internal and external donor resources. 
However, for the MDC, this was rather a counter and at times subterraneous patronage 
system because its supporters were being discriminated against and it feared for its 
supporters.  
 
Once this binary of belonging was established people had to prove the worth of their 
belonging in order to continue to access the benefits or they could be labelled “sell-
outs.” Importantly, this helped to complicate the already tenuous zone between 
perpetrators and victims. By belonging to a side, one became guilty by association in 
cases of violence committed by or in the name of the party. This character of the 
execution of the violence added a group dimension to the individualised commission for 
most of the women in Shurugwi.  
 
From Shurugwi the case of Chipo, a middle aged woman, illustrates the importance of 
patronage.  
I was a secretary of an MDC ward set up from 1999 to 2005. Thereafter the ward 
committee became non-functional because the national executive of the MDC 
abandoned us at the height of the inter-party struggles. I became an ordinary 
card carrying MDC supporter. My membership was known by all in my area and I 
did not want to renounce it. I was MDC at heart and I believed in its policies. As a 
                                                 
55 Jocelyn Alexander and Kudakwashe Chitofiri, “The consequences of violent politics in Norton, 
Zimbabwe”, p 5.  
56 Ibid. 
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result of my known associational membership of the MDC I was ignored for 
government welfare programmes. At school my children were not considered for 
BEAM (Basic Education Assistance Model). Other people received free farming 
inputs, food hand-outs, and had access to cheap groceries. My children were 
also discriminated at for National Youth Training, which was important for one to 
enrol at teacher’s training and nurse training, because the councillor could not 
give them a recommendation due to my MDC membership. Things got worse 
from 2006 to 2008. There was high inflation, my farming activities failed. My 
shop closed as well because I could not stock it. It became tough to survive. I 
eventually renounced my MDC membership in 2007 and publicly declared my 
support for ZANU-PF. I began to be considered for the benefits (outlined above). 
I had to show that I was ZANU-PF now. I had to dress up in its regalia. I had to 
sing at rallies. I had to do the slogans with passion. I had to attend all rallies and 
had to also accept a position in the ward.57 
 
The interview confirms the impact of the economic catastrophe that hit the country 
between 2000 and 2008 in Shurugwi. This was due to industrial closures, economic 
sanctions, and the collapse of the agricultural sector under the twin pressures of 
unplanned farm takeovers and a combination of natural disasters in the form of floods 
and droughts. As a consequence there were unprecedented job losses, which led to 
rampant unemployment; astronomical and historical inflation, high poverty levels and a 
desperate need for citizens to survive.58  It was in this environment that desperate 
women participated in politics as performers at rallies.  
 
Under such dire conditions, rural women of Shurugwi renounced their support for the 
opposition for ZANU-PF with its access to and power over state resources, which it 
selectively distributed on patronage lines to its supporters. Chipo transformed herself 
over night from supporting the MDC to supporting ZANU-PF and has even risen over 
such a short space of time to the ward executive. While the public renouncements were 
humiliating, they at the same time provided the women with spaces and opportunities 
to reap some rewards, especially financial, material and security. In the environment 
where daily commodities were scarce, performing at rallies in Shurugwi enabled women 
                                                 
57 Interview with Chipo, 22 July 2010. 
58 See for example, Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, for more. 
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to access them. At times such goods as mealie- meal, the staple in the district, were sold 
or were given for free at rallies. Having participated actively in the political aesthetics,59 
such women, as Chipo did, were placed in a good stead to receive the hand-outs or to 
be placed in front of the queue to purchase the goods in short supply but which were 
available at the rallies.  
 
Besides the basic goods such as mealie-meal, maize and cooking oil that were either 
given or sold at rallies or the GMB, active membership of ZANU-PF, and to a limited 
degree of the MDC, again entitled one to other goods and services.  These included the 
agricultural inputs, scotch carts, ploughs and other agricultural implements handed out. 
Jobs in the civil service were also accessed on the basis of one’s strong participation in 
ZANU-PF politics. The desire to live and escape poverty was therefore quite crucial in 
enticing women to participate in political performances.60 This ought to be put in the 
perspective of a clear patronage system from the national ZANU-PF hierarchy. The 
President, for example, gave out computers, food, buses, farm equipment and cows at 
rural rallies,61 and in other cases he announced pay rise for civil servants; and 
distributed vehicles and agricultural equipment to ZANU-PF supporters.62  
 
Elsewhere, giving alcohol, selling goods that were in short supply such as soap, mealie-
meal and cooking oil, offering free uniforms, making promises to pay kids’ school fees, 
and handing out cellphone lines (sim packs), were used to attract performances and 
                                                 
59 I am here guided by the thoughts of Jacques Ranciere on the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics in his discussion of “the distribution of the sensible.” Broadly, one of the issues he raises is the 
close relationship between politics and aesthetics. See Jacques Ranciere, The politics of aesthetics, 
Translated by Gabriel Rockhill, with an afterword by Slavoj Zizek, Continuum, London, 2006, pp 7-34.  
60 See a similar contention by John Lwanda, Promises, Power Politics, and Poverty: Democratic Transition 
in Malawi, (1961-1999), Dudu Nsomba Publications, Glasgow, p 19. 
61 See Mail and Guardian online, 18 February 2008, titled “Economic chaos may deny Mugabe rural vote”, 
Accessed 18 February 2011. 
62 See Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and the implications for US 
Policy”, 22 May 2008, cited in fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/106142.pdf, accessed 12 January 
2010. 
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attendances at rallies.63 High Court Judge Rita Makarau also made reference to this 
practice of patronage. In passing judgement in the Elton Mangoma vs Didymus Mutasa 
election petition she said:  
I am satisfied that throughout the constituency, villagers were threatened with 
the withholding of food and other hand-outs and were denied these if they 
supported the MDC… the perpetrators of this practice were the leadership of 
ZANU-PF at the village levels and the war veterans residing in the constituency.  
 
She also stated that “It has been my finding that corrupt practices were committed in 
respect of the election of the [ZANU-PF] respondent. Villagers were denied food and 
other hand-outs and resettled farmers were intimidated with loss of their land if they 
voted for the [MDC] petitioner.”64  
 
Professor Heneri Dzinotyiwei also established that many people attended ZANU-PF 
rallies in rural areas to benefit from these goods that were given at these rallies, and not 
necessarily out of genuine support for ZANU-PF.65 Further, the Physicians for Human 
Rights established these cases of “politically motivated discrimination” were also 
extended to children of MDC supporters who were excluded from accessing social 
services such as schooling and donor feeding schemes for those of school-going ages 
and the under-fives.66 
 
In addition, I established also that party attire, such as wrap-around materials 
commonly referred to as mazambia, and t-shirts, scarfs, whistles and flags were not 
                                                 
63 See Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), “Pre-election Update No3, 22 January-6 February 
2008” cited in http://www.zesn.org, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
64 Part of Justice Rita Makarau’s judgement delivered in the Elton Steers Mangoma vs Didymus Mutasa: 
Judgement on Electoral Petition for Makoni North: Justice Rita Makarau, cited in Solidarity Peace Trust, 
Operation Taguta/Sisuthi: Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe: Its impact on rural Communities, April 
2006. 
65 Mail and Guardian, 18 February 2008, Ibid. 
66 See Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark, Zimbabwe: Post Presidential Election March-May 2002, 21 
May 2002, pp 11-22 for more insights into this. This however, can be succinctly encapsulated in the words 
of one ZANU-PF councillor they quoted as bragging that: “Even if stone was to melt, MDC children will not 
get food, because it is ZANU-PF food.” In addition they also say that known or suspected MDC supporters 
were excluded from a range of services such as purchasing maize from the GMB, “food for work” 
programmes.  
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randomly given. They were allocated according to the levels of participation by 
individuals in party political activities. The most active, besides providing entertainment, 
also advertised the political parties on national media. Except for flags and whistles, 
most of these became important fashion apparel in an era in which it had become 
luxurious to buy clothes. This meant that the apparel came in to fill the gap, and they 
became important everyday fashion items both inside and outside of the political 
contexts and spaces. This was in addition to the symbolic role the attire played in 
identifying those who supported or belonged to whichever political party. The role of 
political paraphernalia became especially crucial around election times, which also came 
to signify moments of intense onslaught against non-supporters.  
 
In the above scenario one cannot help but notice the contrariness between women 
being forced to participate, in order to benefit, on the one hand, and the symbolic 
empowerment that they experienced from the material benefits they acquired, on the 
other. They might have been “forced”, literally and figuratively, to perform, but they 
ended up surviving the scathing poverty of that infamous decade. One might be 
tempted to posit that this ended up as somewhat skewed, though contemporaneously 
mutually beneficial, relationship.  
 
However, we ought to note that as the economic conditions became dire and overall 
made survival a mammoth task, state repression and coercion also worsened. This was, 
as we discussed in the General Introduction, the result of the transformation of politics 
into an extension of war by the ruling party. Faced with a strong opposition, which 
perhaps was the strongest in the post-independence period, ZANU-PF increasingly 
called upon its coercive apparatus in the form of the security forces to mobilise support 
for its survival. Alongside this was also the deployment of a “war” language, reminiscent 
of the Second Chimurenga, which clearly categorised opponents as outsiders and 
enemies who had to be annihilated.  
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In this background, as Mbembe has established for Cameroon and Togo, there was 
always the possibility of a resort to violence to enforce compliance whose aim was “not 
just to bring a specific political consciousness into being but make it effective.”67 This 
placed the women in an untenable position. To navigate their survival in such an 
economy women had to, among others, engage in active politicking. For example, 
dancing at rallies became somewhat dancing for survival. This further complicates the 
symbiosis we attempted to posit above because what the women got was nowhere near 
what they were forced to give out. 
 
Confronted with state excesses that demanded unquestioned loyalty to ZANU-PF, 
women had to participate as a form of public gesture. Threats to violence, and examples 
of what could befall “sell-outs,” sustained the belief in the strength of the tactics of 
intimidation. Aware of their shortcomings women felt obliged to take part in the 
economy of these performances in the public rallies. They saw more reward in being 
seen as belonging and being co-opted as insiders than to seek resistance and 
disengagement that amounted to being labelled as sell outs, or public violation. The 
women had to know the slogans by heart, and were expected to keep abreast with 
changes within these slogans as part of this scheme of ZANU-PF’s version of biopolitics. 
By repeating these slogans and songs the women were put through a regime of 
indoctrination. Through this, the images and words were engraved as epitaphs on their 
minds. The above speaks to Ruddick’s assessment of fear in generating for the 
underclasses moments of empowerment. In this way, faced with little freedom, the 
women passively participated in order to avoid painful encounters, such as threats and 
actualised physical violence.68 
 
                                                 
67 Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 4. 
68 See, Susan Ruddick, “The politics of affect: Spinoza in the work of Negri and Deleuze”, in Theory, Culture 
and Society, cited in http://tcs.sagepub.co/, accessed 23 July 2012. 
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At another level the annual military drills that were undertaken in the Mufiri area69 of 
the district served to intimidate the women residents. As much as they are supposed to 
be regular and “normal” military exercises to help in the Zimbabwe National Army 
(ZNA)’s readiness for emergencies, they had another meaning to the locals, that of a 
state which conspicuously displayed its machinery of violence. Once the military drills 
were viewed in this light of the fetish state power, it meant that the rural women in the 
district saw more need to take part in the sloganeering, singing, dancing and other ritual 
performances at rallies.  
 
The above has to be taken together with the dissemination of a powerful state 
propaganda, that of a nation at war against the British, the European Union, the United 
States of America and their agents in the form of the MDC. In the propaganda 
campaigns, graphic images of the suffering during the Second Chimurenga, the 
aggressive speeches and calls for sacrifice to retain national sovereignty compelled the 
submission of women. We ought to note, however, that in the ZANU-PF narrative there 
were a range of very emotive issues that were raised, which had a powerful resonance 
among the poor citizens of the district. These included, inter alia, land redistribution and 
the fight against Western imperialism that targeted the re-colonisation of the country.  
 
The combination of political repression and harrowing economic climate leading to 
forced participation as a negotiating mechanism is amplified by the performances of 
music stars at what were termed national music galas.70 These were music festivals 
organised at or around important national days including Heroes’, Independence, and 
Unity days or anniversaries marking the birth of Mugabe on 21 February or the death of 
Joshua Nkomo on 1 July.  
                                                 
69 The army has a training field in this area, which it regularly uses for its drills. 
70 Watching such galas between 2001 and 2005, for example, I remember all the big names in the 
Zimbabwe music industry such as Alick Macheso, Tongai Moyo, Charles Charamba, Nicholas Zacharia and 
Sandra Ndebele participated in these galas. These big guns performed alongside the young and upcoming 
musicians, who were eager to be known because the galas were all beamed live on the sole television 
station in Zimbabwe, the ZTV. 
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Besides the dollars they made, musicians indirectly showed their allegiance to ZANU-PF, 
which was the “official custodian” of these important national days on the calendar of 
Zimbabwe. This is notwithstanding the fact that some songs and performances could 
have contained anti-ZANU-PF or subversive subtexts. The galas also advanced the image 
of ZANU-PF the sponsoring political party. The background stage was covered in ZANU-
PF colours and campaign messages. These differed at various moments from “Land is 
the economy and the economy is land”, to “100 percent indigenisation.” In the end, 
these popular musicians, as Mbembe suggests,  
by dancing publicly for the benefit of power, the ‘post-colonised subject’ is 
providing his or her loyalty and by compromising with the corrupting control that 
state power tends to exercise at all levels of everyday life (over benefits, 
services, pleasures…) the subject is reaffirming that it is incontestable …71  
 
Again, performances by the different groups were often interspersed with excerpts of 
speeches made by President Mugabe and other leaders associated with ZANU-PF 
including Tongogara, Chitepo and Joshua Nkomo. At times there would be images from 
the Second Chimurenga shown. All these buttressed ZANU-PF’s emancipatory narrative 
and its claims to power.  In this fashion, galas were an important component of the 
“cultural nationalism”72 that ZANU-PF deployed to further legitimate itself.73 Thus the 
performances helped to buttress the reimagining of the history of the nation, and the 
history of the struggle for Zimbabwe, especially the Second Chimurenga, along ZANU-PF 
terms.74 Crucially, also, was the fact that because some of the most popular musicians 
performed their songs and dance routines meant that ZANU-PF got maximum marketing 
                                                 
71 See Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 25. 
72 See Hutchinson cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making sense of cultural nationalism and the politics 
of commemoration under the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe”, in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 
35, No 4, December 2009, URL, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070903314226, Accessed 22 August 
2012, p 946.  
73 I am here drawing on the mode of the deployment of cultural nationalism to aid a certain kind of 
politics that Askew has argued for Tanzania. See Askew cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making sense of 
cultural nationalism”, p 952. 
74 Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making sense of cultural nationalism”. It is also vital to note that galas ran 
alongside a battery of other cultural projects that were sponsored by the government, including the 
introduction of the 75 percent local content on radio and TV, virginity tests in Manicaland as well as 
attacks on homosexuals. 
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to both the rural and urban constituencies. Advertising to the young people and to 
urban constituencies was especially crucial for ZANU-PF that was suffering constant 
defeats in urban-based constituencies to the MDC and whose policies did not carry 
much support from the younger voters.  
 
At another level the galas were organised to offer a monologic function. In this way, 
“rally organisers attempt[ed] to control the messages that emerge to ensure that they 
conform[ed] to the party’s goals.”75 In this fashion, galas were to be the “reincarnation 
of the night vigils (pungwes) that whipped people into common liberation thinking and 
kept them informed, educated and informed.”76 It was thus in this context that some 
musicians went out of their way to compose such praise songs for ZANU PF as 
Tambaoga’s “Blair is a toilet”, and Hosiah Chipanga’s VaMugabe vanopa asi njere 
ndodzatisina/Cde Mugabe gives but we lack wisdom. I recall watching on television, 
Minister Saviour Kasukuwere giving Tambaoga Zimbabwe $50 000-00 after a 
performance. While it showed his appreciation of the performance, it also emphasises 
the economic and political hierarchies between those who were performing and ZANU-
PF leadership.77 More than this, some of these big stars wore the gala regalia, especially 
T-shirts and caps which produced a huge impact. As Rappaport says, these performers 
“are not only transmitting messages they find encoded in a canon. They are 
participating in this-that is, becoming part of- the order to which their own bodies and 
breadth give life.”78 Thus, they link “their presentation of identity at the event to the 
party.”79  
 
At another level, performing at these galas went beyond aggrandizing ZANU-PF. It was 
simultaneously a space for pursuing personal benefits for the musicians. Strategically 
                                                 
75 Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 339. 
76 See The Herald, 26 July 2005, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making sense of cultural nationalism”, p 
953.  
77 See also Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 353. 
78 See Rappaport, cited in Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 349. 
79 Lisa Gilman, Ibid, p 349. 
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utilising the “alliances as well as lines of cleavages,”80 the galas meant that the 
participating artists benefited from the publicity at such events, as their music got more 
air play or remained playing on the sole state-controlled media. Performing at galas was 
especially important for young and up-coming musicians who were involved in a 
fledgling “Urban grooves” genre.81 These artists sought all the publicity they could get in 
order for them to compete with established musicians and music genres. There were 
instances when certain musicians were barred from national radio and television for 
being seen as anti-ZANU-PF. More air play too meant more royalties. It also stands to 
reason that the ZANU-PF tried in the same process to calm if not win over the restive 
urban population through providing entertainment at subsidized prices amid a 
worsening economic decline. Below I will now turn to look at the different categories of 
“participation”, which is linked to the murky issue of “perpetrators”. 
 
JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND (JOC) 
In this section I return to the highest authority so that I can explain fully the structures 
of the violence. This is also intended to demonstrate the importance of the central 
body, whose control however loose, in allowing for the commission of the violence.  The 
JOC was created in 1999, and was “based on a Rhodesian military structure and staffed 
by heads of security services, all of whom are former guerrillas.”82 We must hasten to 
add that there were civilians in JOC as well. Notable among these were Emmerson 
Munangagwa and Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono. This conflation of the security-
political oligarchies should not be seen as novel in ZANU-PF history because during the 
prosecution of the armed guerrilla war in the 1970s there was a strong overlap between 
the commanders of both ZIPRA and ZANLA and their respective political parties.83 To 
this end, guerrilla commanders, especially ZANLA ones, were also active political 
                                                 
80 See Stuart Hall cited in Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence 
Zimbabwe”, in African Studies Review, vol 43, No 2, 2000, p 76.  
81 See also Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making sense of cultural nationalism”, p 954.  
82 See Paul Sorenson, “Zimbabwe’s Security Services: Views from the Inside” in RUSI Journal, 
August/September 2010, vol 55, no4, p 60. 
83 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, pp 147-148. 
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commissars for their respective parties. In this role, they were responsible for mobilising 
and raising party support. However, in the end the JOC became a powerful ZANU-PF -
security forces junta.84 There was a strong interpenetration between these two parts, 
with the result that security forces became heavily politicised and the ZANU-PF polity 
became heavily militarised long after the struggle for independence was achieved.85  
 
One major feature of the JOC was its reliance on coercive tactics in dealing with matters 
of the state. It is little wonder therefore that between 2000 and 2008 the country 
witnessed an increased resort to military-style operations. These military-style 
operations were performed on purely civilian governmental issues. The most notable of 
these include Operation Murambatsvina/Drive out Filth of 2005, Operation 
Maguta/Drive out hunger and Operation Mavhoterapapi/How did you vote in 2008. The 
pre-eminence of the military and military-style leadership led Morgan Tsvangirai, the 
leader of the MDC, to complain that “the country [had] witnessed a de facto coup d’e 
tat and [was] effectively run by a military junta.”86 Newspaper headlines in the 
independent media depicted the scenes graphically illustrating a country at war 
between April and July 2008 during Operation Mavhoterapapi. As an example The 
Zimbabwe Independent of 23 to 29 May 2008, and 13 to 19 June 2008, were headlined 
“Mugabe orders warlike campaign”, and “Army boosts Mugabe campaign,”87 to capture 
the insane levels of armed electioneering and accompanying fires of retributive violence 
spearheaded by the JOC in the Presidential election runoff of June 28, 2008.   
 
                                                 
84 See James Muzondidya, “Our guns our votes’: The Political-Military Allience in Zimbabwe and Prospects 
for Democracy”, Paper presented at the European Conference on African Studies 2009, Institute of African 
Studies, University of Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009, p 3, for  a more detailed discussion. 
85 See Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s Long Journey” in Journal of Democracy, 19, 
4, October 2008, p 42, for a more extended analysis of the JOC. See also the Report of the Pan African 
Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Runoff and House of Assembly By-elections, Republic of 
Zimbabwe, 27 June 2008, pp 14-15.  
86 See “Zimbabwe opposition leader says country run by military” in Voice of America, 10 April 2008, cited 
in Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s long agony”, p 50. 
87 See The Zimbabwe Independent newspapers, 23 to 29 May 2008, and 13 to 19 June 2008. 
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The major role of the JOC in the violence in Shurugwi (and in other parts of Zimbabwe) 
was to act as the headquarters of the violence. It planned, directed and financed the 
violence. As Sorenson posits, the JOC provided “tactical direction, human resources and 
logistical support” to the war veterans and militia groups, as well as general 
coordination.88 Added to this organisation, Eppel says, the JOC gave “very systematised 
instructions [while] structures of command were set up in every district across 
Zimbabwe.”89  Indeed as Bratton and Masunungure have found, in the 27 June 2008 
Presidential election runoff the JOC was in charge of the election campaign for ZANU-PF, 
and it 
divided the country into ten provincial command centres staffed by two hundred 
serving army officers who were dispatched to rural areas to supervise operations 
by war veterans and party youths militias…..The JOC ordered the Reserve Bank 
to print money to fund pay hikes for war veterans, allowances for party youth, 
and payoffs for chiefs and headmen. These combined forces were instructed to 
invade farms, burn down houses, and incite violence.90 
 
At times also, members of the JOC participated directly in the execution of violence. An 
example is that of Perence Shiri who is said to have mobilised about 1 500 war veterans 
to spearhead farm invasions in 2000 and who is also said to have masterminded the 
bloody “Operation Mavhoterapapi” of 2008 on the national level.91  
 
The JOC had operational structures of violence in Shurugwi. Under Operation 
Mavhoterapapi, for example, there was a Major in the ZNA who led the war veterans 
and ZANU-PF aligned structures. The Major hails from the district and he owns a 
commercial farm in the district which he got during jambanja. Together with known war 
veterans, he is said to have led a campaign that terrorised known MDC supporters and 
that campaigned for the re-election of President Mugabe. This structure was joined to 
                                                 
88 Paul Sorenson, “Zimbabwe’s Security Services”, p 60. 
89 See Shari Eppel, A Tale of three dinner plates”, p 3. See also Solidarity Peace Trust, Punishing Dissent, 
Silencing Citizens, 21 May 2008. See also Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in 
Zimbabwe’s”, for a detailed view of the role of JOC in setting up structures of violence in the districts. 
90 See Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony” in Journal of Democracy, 19, 
4, October 2008, p 51. 
91 See Paul Sorenson, “Zimbabwe’s Security Services”, p 60. 
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the national one via the provincial one that was headed by a leading Airforce of 
Zimbabwe commander.92 
 
Over time the JOC metamorphosed into a wealth-accumulating structure that used its 
power and influence to amass resources for its members as well as to retain ZANU-PF in 
power. In a complex cause-effect matrix, ZANU-PF needed these men in the JOC for its 
political survival and in turn the JOC capitalised on its close alliance with the ruling 
ZANU-PF to gain economic power. The JOC members also realised that they wanted the 
continuation of ZANU-PF hegemony so that they could continue to have privileged 
access to the country’s resources. A rather symbiotic but kleptocratic relationship thus 
developed between the JOC and ZANU-PF, which however negatively bled the country 
on so many fronts. Using the systems of patronage and privileged access to state 
resources, mainly through cheap finances via the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, as well as 
economic opportunities that were availed by the DRC war, and taking advantage of their 
privileged position to grab fertile farms and mining, the JOC members engaged in some 
kind of “primitive accumulation.”93  
 
As a result, many became super rich and had a diverse hold on key government 
economic sectors as well as in lucrative private enterprises.94 These ranged from mining, 
                                                 
92 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s” 
93 See Newsday, 22 June 2011, “ZANU-PF engages in primitive accumulation of wealth”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-zanu-pf-engages-in-primitive-accumulation-of-wealth, 
Accessed 27 June 2011. It is also rumoured that some members of JOC have serious investments in the 
Gecca diamond mines in the DRC and also in the two mining concerns responsible for mining of diamonds 
in the controversial Marange mines. For Zimbabwe security forces investments in the DRC, see the United 
Security Council “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” 16 October 2002 which lists the 
company COSLEG as the vehicle through which the security chiefs are mining diamonds. The report also 
says key officials were Emmerson Munangagwa, Vitalis Zvinavashe, Sydney Sekeramayi, Brigadier Sibusiso 
Moyo. Other companies linked to the senior security officials include Thorntree, Oryx Natural Resources, 
OSLEG Company, and Tremalt. Other members had multiple farms, for example Gideon Gono, who has 
proclaimed himself to be the largest individual chicken and egg farmer in Africa. See also Crisis in 
Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s”, pp 18-25. 
94 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, pp 
18-25, for a pithy discussion of the economic interests and gains to befall members of the JOC. 
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industrial, transport and included agriculture. Richard Saunders has aptly captured the 
central economic relations between the members of the JOC and ZANU-PF. He says:  
In the 2000s, elite accumulation went off rig: out of reach of transparent 
regulation by government, primarily benefitting a small cadre without systematic 
empowerment redistributive concerns; the frequently overlapping with regional 
‘parallel markets’ and crucial networks. If accumulation and new class formation 
were driven in the first two decades of independence by state based policy 
making, in the third it was often hidden behind a veil of secrecy, operating on 
the edges of the state and fuelled and protected by business-security networks 
patronised by competing ZANU-PF factional blocs with links to the military and 
political wings of the party.95 
 
Because the JOC had become a bizarre mixture of political, business and security 
interests, with powerful tentacles in the state through patronage benefits, it sought, 
through the commandement96, to retain President Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power 
seemingly in the face of loss of popular mandate based on elections. As already 
discussed in earlier chapters, this retention scheme started from about 2000 in the form 
of state-orchestrated but war-veterans led farm takeovers, through the 2002 security 
forces’ pronouncement that they would suspend the constitution in the event that 
ZANU-PF and President Mugabe lost elections. Similar pronouncements continued to be 
made, for example in the lead to the 2008 elections and even in the era of the GNU by 
senior army personnel. Most notable of these were made by General Chiwenga, 
Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba, Major-general Chedondo and Brigadier General 
Mugoba between 2008 and 2012.  
 
The threats were visibilised, so to speak, in the June 2008 runoff when the JOC crafted 
violence under “Operation Mavhoterapapi?  and Operation Tsuro negwenzi. President 
Mugabe has unconditionally stood by members of JOC. For example, he unilaterally 
                                                 
95 See Richard Saunders, “Zimbabwe: Liberation Nationalism, Old and Born Again” in Links International 
Journal of Socialist Renewal, in http://links.org.au/node/1831, Accessed 12 January 2010.  
96 The commandement is described as “images and structures of power and coercion, the instruments and 
agents of their enactment.” In other words it relates to structures of authoritarianism. See Achille 
Mbembe, “Provisional Notes on the postcolony”, in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 
vol 62, no 1, 1992, p30, cited in http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-
9720%281992%2962%3A1%3C3%3APNOTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N  Accessed 20 October 2010. 
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extended the terms for Police Commissioner and Army Commander Constantine 
Chiwenga despite provisions of the GPA that he needed to consult other principals who 
wanted them replaced. Their reappointments together with that of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, Gideon Gono, and those of provincial governors and 
ambassadors perennially threatened the survival of the GNU.97  
 
WAR VETERANS AND YOUTH MILITIAS 
These became the main storm troopers for the ZANU-PF government and are largely 
blamed for fanning the flames of the violence that engulfed Zimbabwe. Many human 
rights reports cite war veterans as being behind the largest percentages of violence 
committed. This may have resulted because unlike the proper security organs, this 
quasi-state organisation often operated on the margins of the law. It also lacked the 
discipline associated with regular security forces. It also benefitted from their closeness 
with the President, who ensured their impunity through a number of amnesties.98  
 
With the 2000 constitutional referendum defeat, ZANU-PF organised the war veterans 
to lead farm occupations in an attempt to punish the whites who had spearheaded the 
NO vote campaign in the rural areas, their workers who had allegedly voted with their 
employer farmers, and more generally to eviscerate MDC’s encroachments into the 
rural areas.99 It has, however, to be stated that war veterans operated on the guidelines 
and orders from the state. As Raftopoulos puts it, “while the leadership role of the war 
veterans was prominent, the organisational, logistical and coercive support provided by 
                                                 
97 See Newsday, 05 June 2012, “Tsvangirai address to Sadc in full”, http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-06-
05-tsvangirai-adress-to-sadc-in-full/, Accessed 11 June 2012. 
98 See for example the Clemency Order of 2000, in Pamela Machakanja, “National healing and 
reconciliation in Zimbabwe”, p 10. See Human Rights Watch, Perpetual fear: Impunity and cycles of 
violence, March 2011, p 25, in www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/.../zimbabwe0311NoPage8Full.pdf, 
Accessed 14 June 2012, for Clemency Order No 1 of 2008, which pardoned political violence between 
March and June 2008. 
99 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, p 212, and Norma Kriger, Guerrilla 
Veterans in Zimbabwe, for nuanced discussions on the dynamics of the relations between the war 
veterans and ZANU-PF and their leading role in the farm invasions. 
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the state were crucial distinguishing features of the post 2000 occupations.”100 These 
however, strengthened the local war veterans’ operations at the local levels. 
 
As illustrated above, the state power rested with the JOC. In turn the war veterans were 
guided by the terms set out by the JOC. While operating under the general JOC 
guidelines, the war veterans in Shurugwi were also small centres for the coordination of 
farm invasions in the district with independent powers of decision making. To this 
extent they identified farms for occupation. They also mobilised groups of people for 
the invasion of the identified farms. They again coordinated the security for the 
occupiers. After this the war veterans were at the head of parcelling out these farms to 
those who would have participated. Usually the war veterans allocated themselves the 
homesteads and fields that were previously utilised by the former owners. They also 
decided the fate of the farm workers on occupied farms.  
 
At times, personal gains informed war veterans’ invasions. In an interview with Mrs 
Ndlovu of Ward 24, she highlighted among other issues that war veterans led in the 
invasion of more than one farm for personal gain. She stated that: 
It was the war veterans who led the occupation of many farms. They wanted to 
make a name for themselves, and they also wanted to get land for their sons. For 
some they took to these invasions because they wanted to genuinely reduce 
overcrowding in the district. For some however, they went to enrich themselves, 
they took things from the farms like doors, locks, fences, asbestos sheets and 
cattle. They also became leaders of those farms they invaded with powers to 
evict and bring in people on to the farms.101  
 
At another level, they were responsible for the setting up of base camps and the re-
enactment of the pungwes. They also determined how the sell-outs were punished. At 
times they determined if civil servants and local government remained or not in their 
positions. In like manner they had a strong role in the selection of new recruits 
especially relief teachers in the district. They were responsible, through 
                                                 
100 Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, p 213. 
101 Interview held with Mrs Ndlovu of Ward 24, Mazivisa area, on the 6th of July 2010.  
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recommendations, in choosing NYS recruits. They also had a say in who accessed inputs 
or maize from the GMB. Together with the local traditional leaders and party leadership, 
war veterans also discussed the agenda for the political rallies held by ZANU-PF.  
 
Youth militia, who were also known as the green bombers, were another category of 
perpetrators. These received a dose of “patriotic history” in their three-months’ stay in 
the training camps, which “extolled the pre-eminence of ZANU-PF in the liberation 
struggle and government” and which also glossed over the opposition as “sell-outs and 
Western puppets.”102 Because they had received this essentialised brand of history, they 
were already indoctrinated hence they also formed a readily available hegemonic arm 
that articulated ZANU-PF propagandist renditions. They too played an important role in 
the farm invasions and the violation of opposition supporters at the national level. 
There were some cases where these youth militias were joined by ZANU-PF youths in 
these farm invasions.103  
 
In Shurugwi, the NYS graduates seem not to have had a big impact in causing the ill-
treatment and the public humiliation of opposition supporters. Potentially, this points to 
the pre-eminence of other structures especially the war veterans in the humiliations and 
public floggings of the MDC supporters. It too points to the laid-back position they took 
and their absorption in other sectors of the economy. This notwithstanding, however, 
there was one Tonderai who was one of the first NYS graduates in the district. He had 
trained at Dadaya NYS centre. He was easily identifiable because he favoured wearing 
the green fatigues. He was also said to have worked very close with Jerry whom we 
discussed in Chapter Three in the violent threats against MDC supporters. His major 
role, I was informed, was in reciting the history of the land in the country. He was again 
famed for introducing new songs at rallies.  
 
                                                 
102 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 21. 
103 Brian Raftopoulos, “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, p 213. 
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As intimated above, many of these youths however worked under the ZANU-PF 
structures. In this role they were not conspicuous. At times they were confused with the 
other “ordinary” ZANU-PF youths who had not undergone NYS training. For their roles in 
fomenting violence they received government employment in the civil service. More 
often than not they have had first preference in this employment. At some stage by 
2009, there were about 29 000 youth militias in government employment costing the 
state in excess of three million United States dollars per month.104 In an atmosphere 
where there was widespread unemployment in the country, and in an economy that 
was not able to create jobs, these statistics represent an enormous figure.  
 
While I could not get the employment statistics for Shurugwi district, I observed quite a 
significant number of the NYS graduates working as temporary school teachers and at 
the Grain Marketing Board at Tongogara Growth Point. Lots more were employed as 
Ward Coordinators, which was a relatively new job title having been introduced around 
2009. Because many staffers were NYS graduates and others were known ZANU-PF 
members, many people in Shurugwi associated it with ZANU-PF grassroots mobilisation 
structures. Officially, these Ward Coordinators were supposed to supervise and 
encourage self-help projects in their wards. However, we heard from civil servants in 
the district that more often than not these coordinators did nothing more than to 
mobilise support for ZANU-PF. However, more research needs to be done on it. From 
the above we can discern the fact that these NYS graduates were “easy to mobilise … as 
they were unemployed”, and that they were also drawn from local ranks hence they 
easily knew who to target.105 
 
WOMEN AS PERPETRATORS 
The starting point here is to reject the notion that women are always mute victims in 
violent situations. They had power of different sorts that influenced the nature and 
                                                 
104 See Paul Sorenson, “Zimbabwe’s Security Services”, p 61. 
105 See RAU, When the going gets tough, p 12. 
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direction of the violence in the disparate categories which hugely impacted on the 
violence in Shurugwi. From field research, it emerged that there was a very small group 
of women who took an active role in the physical commission of violations. Many, 
however, had a rather indirect role in perpetuating and sustaining the violence. This 
speaks to Meredith Turshen’s assertion that women in conflict situations “are also 
combatants, women resist and fight back; they take sides, spy, and fight among 
themselves; and even when they don’t see active service, they often support war efforts 
in multiple ways, willingly or unwillingly.”106  
 
For women in Shurugwi their agency in the violence largely depended on the need for 
survival and gains to be made. In the politics of patronage that evolved, as the political 
and economic situations deteriorated, one had to be seen to belong. It was difficult to 
survive without political membership. Under such conditions women were left with little 
choice but to associate with or join either of the two parties, especially ZANU-PF, and 
reap the food hand-outs, protection and survival as well as obtain land. For these 
rewards therefore women had to perform and be active members of their political 
party.  
 
From the foregoing, one gets a sense of tactical and strategic agency by the women. 
Strategic agency refers to long-term goals that have to be achieved, while tactical 
agency is about immediate goals, gains and circumstances to be achieved.107 As Utas 
avers,  
The agency of any human being is set within certain societal confines. This is not 
unique to womanhood. Rather the amount of individual agency or the amount of 
victimcy changes from situation to situation, from one social relation to another, 
whether you are a man or woman. In war men and women are situated on the 
same sliding scale between abundant agency and victimcy. Even the so-called 
perpetrators are severely limited in their agency: to survive, civilians are forced 
to participate in war trade, while fighters are forced by their commanders to 
                                                 
106 Meredith Turshen, “Women war stories”, in Meredith Turshen and Clottilde Twagiramariya, eds, What 
women do in war time, ZED Books, London and New York, p 1. 
107 Mats Utas, “Agency of victims”, p 56. 
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participate in atrocities. Likewise the commanders are forced to command so as 
to keep their men in place and the enemy terrified.108 
 
The women in Shurugwi by engaging in patronage relations with either of the parties 
appear to have done so out of necessity in the face of widespread shortages. As such 
patronage was one of the major means that the women employed for their own and 
families’ survival. Also, in an economy of shortages, crime, especially plunder, had 
become a way of survival. Hence some participated in the violence to find Stuart Hall’s 
“cleavages”109 to loot or to be fed from the proceeds of the violence. In this regard, the 
fact that there was food, cool drinks and even alcohol at bases meant that those 
considered first were the ones engaged directly in the perpetration of violence. In a way 
therefore people took advantage of the opportunity presented to survive, through the 
looting, presented by the politics underlined by plunder and threats. 
 
When looking at the role of women in the violence in Shurugwi it is, however, useful to 
ask the questions that Shari Eppel asked relating to moral justification, in the Kantian 
sense, of the participation in the violence by those at the bottom. As she put it:  
If you genuinely believe that you are defending the nation against re-
colonisation and defending the land, if you are following orders from powerful 
people outside your village who have given you impunity, do you have 
diminished responsibility or not? How does this influence your own and others 
perceptions of your guilt? […] If somebody who has been provoked by ZANU-PF 
then attacks a ZANU-PF supporter who was not among his own persecutors, will 
the MDC community perceive this as acceptable street justice, or as an 
offence?110  
 
These are crucial questions that open up the discussion of the levels of agency on the 
one hand and of victimhood on the other. Put for Shurugwi women, the key question 
could be whether the women who participated in the victimisation of political 
opposition have a reduced responsibility and guilt? The answer is not simple, but to me 
                                                 
108 Ibid , p 57. 
109 See Stuart Hall cited in Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence 
Zimbabwe”, p 76. 
110 Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates”, p 2. 
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the women, and men for that matter, who participated at the local levels in the violence 
share in the blame with senior ZANU-PF officers who planned and sanctified the 
violence. Those at the village-level were responsible by doing.  They executed the 
violence by assaulting their neighbours, by destroying their neighbours’ crops, by 
drawing up lists that implicated their neighbours, which extended the scale of 
participants, and by participating in dancing that spurred the morale at the bases; and 
should therefore share in the actual responsibility. 
 
In Shurugwi district there were some women ex-combatants (war veterans) from the 
Second Chimurenga who went around terrorising civilians. To this group we can also add 
some women councillors. At the forefront of the violence were one woman war veteran 
from one of the old resettlement wards, and another long-serving woman councillor 
from the same ward. Some highly active ZANU-PF women councillors included the 
councillor for Ward 14 and councillor for Ward 18, who was also the wife of the late 
notorious war veteran, Gunpowder. There was also a woman war veteran and councillor 
for Ward 16. Together with the male war veterans, they actively participated in serious 
campaigning for their positions, and in the controversial Presidential election rerun of 
2008. Some like the councillor for Ward 16 who was also the wife of a war veteran who 
terrorised the district, usually accompanied her husband when he went around the 
district, campaigning and performing political “exorcising” duties. The councillor for 
Ward 19 was alleged to have been responsible for dressing down women in the 
opposition and for threatening opposition supporters.  
 
Overall war veterans, councillors, together with traditional authorities, were responsible 
for farm invasions, organising political meetings and political education on behalf of 
ZANU-PF. As one female councillor said “I am a servant of the party (ZANU-PF) and I 
participated in the farm invasions. I wanted to give land back to the landless. I went to 
war for the land and I also respect my President (Mugabe). I have campaigned for him 
since 1980 and I will continue to do so.” She however, refused to admit her role in the 
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violence, saying “There was no violence in the district, never. I certainly do not know of 
anyone who was beaten in the name of ZANU-PF. People take advantage and in the 
process tarnish the name of the party (ZANU-PF).”111 What is clear from the interview is 
that she campaigned for ZANU-PF and for herself. Information gathered from the other 
interviewees, however, point to the fact that it was at these campaign rallies or 
meetings that ordinary people were subjected to torture, threats and name-calling. Also 
the women war veterans, councillors and the Members of Parliament were a part of a 
ZANU-PF institution that thrived on violence and coercive technologies of mobilisation.  
 
It was here also that the differences between male and female perpetrators were 
blurred. As well, the binary between perpetrators and victims became too grey and 
tenuous to distinguish. In this case for example, whilst one might have exhibited great 
agency, they could have been at the same time unseen victims of their belonging with 
ZANU-PF (or the MDC) in whose names the violence was committed. Many people, 
however, participated at these rallies either as cheer-leaders, politicians, ordinary 
women and men, youth militias or also as war veterans.112 At times these roles were 
confused and conflated, making the distinction more difficult. 
 
Besides these office-bearing women in political organisations the majority of the 
ordinary women also helped to foment political violence. These women sang, danced, 
ululated, wore party regalia and made various performances. I shall, however, return to 
political performances in the next section.  
 
Outside these performances ordinary women played a key role in identifying opposition 
supporters. This was made possible by a number of factors. First, was the deliberate 
                                                 
111 Interview with a woman Councillor 14 June 2010.  
112 See Meredith Turshen “Women War Stories” in Meredith Turshen and Clottilde Twagiramariya, eds, 
What Do Women Do In Wartime, ZED Books, London and New York, 1988, p 1, for a discussion on how the 
gender boundaries are blurred and disappear in conflict/violent situations. For example she says that “in 
modern forms of war especially civil wars and wars of  liberation, women are also combatants, women 
resist and fight back; they take sides, spy, and fight among themselves; and even when they don’t see 
active service, they often support war efforts in multiple ways, willingly or unwillingly”. 
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ZANU-PF policy of increasing female political participation on a country-wide scale. For 
Shurugwi, as discussed in the General Introduction, this policy led to the rise to twelve 
of the number of female councillors in a twenty-four member TRDC in the post 2008 
period. There was also a female MP. By comparison there were twelve male councillors, 
and two male MPs, one for each of the two houses of parliament. These positions were 
buttressed by some monetary rewards they received. For example, councillors were 
paid one hundred United States dollars a month in 2010, and were also entitled to a 
sitting allowance.113 As such women were encouraged by the opening up of the political 
space and eventually held more political clout in the district. On balance Shurugwi fared 
way ahead of other constituencies. It had a 50 percent female representation at the 
Council level and a 33 percent female representation at the parliamentary level. This 
was way above the lowly 18 percent114 female parliamentarians. However, this was a 
strong motivator for Shurugwi women to participate in violence. 
 
Secondly, there was a significant depopulation of men in Shurugwi between 2000 and 
2008. While the 2002 census results show a female-male ratio of fifty-two to forty eight, 
the situation was exacerbated as the economic crunch deteriorated. While we do not 
have the statistics, the field survey undertaken between December 2009 and July 2010 
revealed that most homes were female-headed. Men had left for Shurugwi town, Unki 
Mine, other towns or had escaped the country to South Africa, Botswana or elsewhere. 
While the phenomena of labour migration might not be new to the district,115 it reached 
extreme proportions in the first decade of the 21st century as the “crisis” deepened.  By 
randomly asking if the fathers were around at various homes, I concluded that between 
40 and 60 percent of the households had male heads working away from home. 
 
                                                 
113 At face value one hundred dollars might seem a little amount, but most government professional 
workers were earning about one hundred and fifty dollars. 
114 See RAU, When the going gets tough the man gets going, p 6. 
115 Shurugwi like other districts has a long genealogy of male migrant workers, either in or outside the 
country. See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders and wives: Shona women in the history of Zimbabwe, 
Heinemann, baobab, James Currey, Portsmouth, Harare, London, 1992, p 3. 
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The other reason that enabled the women to assume this political agency was because 
the identification was more localised, which meant that it was easy for the women to 
identify those who did not belong from among their peers. This presented the women 
with a political vacuum to fill. Thus women became active at the grassroots, especially 
among their neighbours at “branch” and “cell” mobilisation for their political parties. In 
these roles, among other duties, they kept registers of membership and of attendance 
at rallies. It is from these registers that non-members were identified and put on the 
infamous lists.  
 
Names from these lists, drawn by the women, were passed on to the war veterans and 
ZANU-PF leadership who then called out the names thereon at rallies or would secretly 
abduct the victims from shopping centres or from their homes. In some cases the 
registers and or lists played a positive role of locating those members who needed help. 
However, they were more often used for the negative reasons. They were used for 
identification of torture victims and for exclusion purposes, and on their basis non-
members were left out of government schemes aimed at alleviating poverty and 
mitigating the effects of the widespread shortages. In other words, these lists became 
the right hand tools in the patronage economy that defined the terrain of survival.  
 
This recalls the use of lists during the Second Chimurenga, and the most (in)famous one 
was the Cletus Chigowe’s list which contained names of those who had to be punished 
for allegedly supporting the Nhari rebellion.116 Shari Eppel also discusses the negative 
use of lists in the post-independence Matebeleland. As she says, “lists” decided who 
would receive food support, who would qualify for social grants or who needed to be 
incorporated in food for work programmes. They have also been used to identify 
political enemies for ZANU-PF: during the Gukurahundi massacres, where the Fifth 
                                                 
116 See Luise White, The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p 42. Chigowe was ZANU’s chief of security at 
the time and his list has been imagined by some as a death list, p 43. 
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Brigade used them to identify ex-ZIPRA cadres, and also later to identify MDC 
supporters countrywide in the new millennium.117 
 
As also argued in Chapters Two and Three, petty jealousies were fought out on the 
political stage, which meant also that those with access to the registers and lists at times 
abused their positions to score back at those against whom they had personal 
vendettas. On the whole, lists had a paradoxical role that of maintaining group 
solidarity, and simultaneously for the identification of the enemy, that is, those who had 
to be “disciplined”, punished or excluded from patronage benefits. 
 
POLITICAL PERFORMANCES AND WOMEN IN VIOLENCE 
At a typical rally in Shurugwi: 
Everybody is expected to be at the venue at least two hours before the arrival of 
the guest of honour, be it the Member of Parliament, the Senator, the Governor, 
or any senior ZANU-PF official. This is to ensure that all are settled and that the 
stage is warmed for the guest. We sing our party songs; these are usually derived 
from the Second Chimurenga. They also depict the current struggle for land in 
the Third Chimurenga. We also dance and do dramas as part of the 
entertainment. These keep the morale high and we also teach our people the 
history of our struggle against imperialism. School children, women and men do 
these. Everyone is free to do it. This is the time to rehearse the slogans, and to 
gather people’s grievances that need to be conveyed to the leaders of the party. 
When the guest arrives we also sing and dance to welcome them and to settle 
them. Some of the dignitaries also love to participate and this creates an 
atmosphere of joy and camaraderie. There are also entertainment breaks in 
between the speeches.118 
 
The above describes the general atmosphere at a political rally in Shurugwi. Political 
education and the articulation of party policies take place at the same time and are 
interposed by singing, dancing, dramas, poetry and other forms of entertainment. 
Throughout these performances people make use of drums (ngoma), whistles, 
magagada, hosho and horns, among other equipment, to add flavour to the forms of 
                                                 
117 Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates”, p 8. 
118 Interview with a War veteran, on 16 June 2010. 
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entertainment. The value of these various arts, as already intimated, is multi-faceted: 
ranging from educating the people about their political party’s policies, praising party 
leadership, political entertainment, providing interludes in the programmes at rallies, 
welcoming guests and new-comers, introducing speakers, and occupying the people 
before the guests arrive, is crucial for the sustenance of these rallies.119  
 
Beyond the above, this section is informed by the need to understand what happens 
when political performances become ritualised. This question encapsulates other issues 
around why women performed at rallies, as well as the result of the adulteration of 
various genres of dances to suit political goals. In their book, Power and the Praise 
Poem: Southern African Voices in History, Leroy Vail and Landeg White trace the history, 
and, illuminate the positive functions of praise poetry done by the lower classes in pre-
colonial and colonial Southern Africa. Drawing from case-studies from pre-colonial and 
colonial Southern Africa, they point out that besides informing the chiefs and work 
foremen of their followers’ grievances, the poetry also served to critique these leaders’ 
decisions.120  
 
In the latter way it acted as commentary from below, as licensed criticism, which was a 
system that checked the abuses of rulers.  This genre of poetry was in some sense 
similar to the performances under the oriki of the pre-colonial Yoruba of Nigeria121 and 
the bards and folk culture of Europe. As Bakhtin has tried to portray, folk culture, that 
includes bawdy humour and carnival tradition performed by commoners, offered a 
benign subversion of the official discourse of the church and the state.122   
                                                 
119 See for example, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7583128.stm  Accessed 26 August 2008, 
which in an article titled “Fuming Mugabe rattled by hecklers” describes how President Mugabe was 
welcomed by songs to the occasion of the opening of parliament in 2009. 
120 See Leroy Vail and Landeg White, Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History, 
University of Virginia Press, 1991, for a pithy discussion of the value of bards in pre-colonial and colonial 
Southern Africa in traditional rule and in the emerging capitalist urban environments. 
121 See Karin Barber, “Obscuring the exegesis in African oral praise poetry”in Duncan Brown, ed, Oral 
literature and performance in Southern Africa, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1999, pp27-49.  
122 See Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. However, Bakhtin’s work 
was severely denounced by Achille Mbembe “Provisional notes on the postcolony”, for its lack of 
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In a nutshell therefore we are able to see that even in some seemingly autocratic 
governments of the pre-colonial past, the subjects utilised poetry to contest their 
difficult positions. An interesting case is that of Mzilikazi of the Ndebele state, who at 
one time had to suspend meetings with Robert Moffat and Andrew Smith because of 
the recitation of poetry that did not approve of their meetings in the face of the British 
massacres of the Xhosa in the 1835 Sixth Xhosa war in which Xhosa fields were burnt, 
their land and cattle seized.123 From the above we can deduce that power relations are 
not rigidly top to bottom, but that they are also, as Foucault argues, from below. This 
also gives a good starting point in the understanding of the importance of performance 
in the politics of Africa. This was often to check the abuse of political authority by the 
kings and chiefs. 
 
In a similar way women could also perform dances to register complaints against 
abusive husbands or relatives from the husband’s side. In this regard, performances 
were useful for claims to better their positions and to contest repression. Among the 
Shona these performances were done during collective labour times called nhimbe or 
close to the dare (meeting place for men)124, which meant they received attention and 
reprieve. What needs to be emphasised is that due to the patriarchal nature of pre-
colonial Zimbabwean polities, songs were the most common and effective informal 
ways that women used to draw community attention to their plight.  
 
However, the resort to songs was just but one of the informal methods that women 
utilised to confront abuse. As discussed in Chapter One, women also resorted to child 
and dog naming to register their unpleasant situations. To this extent, there were names 
                                                                                                                                                 
relevance in postcolonial Africa. Instead Mbembe argues in the opposite and avers instead that it is the 
postcolonial state that has arrogated to itself the grotesque to affirm its power. 
123 See Leroy Vail and Landeg White, Power and the Praise Poem, p 91 for a more nuanced discussion. 
124 See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders, and wives, pp 20-21, for a nuanced discussion of these 
techniques. Lisa Gilman has also established that across the African continent songs were more widely 
recognised channels through which women conveyed their displeasure in society. Lisa Gilman, The dance 
of politics, p 17. 
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among the Shona that registered tribulations in polygamous marriages, those that told 
of husband abuse, unfair family or societal treatment, times of plagues, and that 
highlighted displeasure with rulers.125 In addition to this, however, there were 
acknowledged dynasty-based kinship channels that safeguarded women from 
victimisation.126 Moreover, the Shona governing code “Ishe vanhu”, that is, a king is not 
one without subjects or a ruler’s worth is measured by the number of subjects under his 
rule, ensured that most of the people’s rights were respected. Failure to respond to the 
demands of the subjects resulted in the subjects switching allegiance, emigrating, rulers 
being forced to drink poison (muteyo) or other forms of censure.127 
 
Elders from Shurugwi corroborated the importance of using songs by the pre-colonial 
women in Shurugwi in tackling abusive marital, family-based or societal injustices. An 
interview below with Gogo Madhuve exemplifies this. To her:   
Women who were in abusive marriages sang songs to make their situations 
public knowledge. It was a report to the clan elders to highlight their plight. 
Remember women were married by the community elders for their sons, and it 
remained the duty of the elders to ensure that these women were protected. 
Usually, such women would wait for an occasion that drew the most 
attendances and sing their complaint. Other women would join in the singing to 
shame the abusive man. Once the ceremony for which people had gathered 
passed the elders would sit the abuser down, and implore him to respect the 
wife and them, which in most cases brought an end to the abuse.128  
 
The interview, besides highlighting the importance of songs in redressing abuse, also 
shows the importance of the community mediation in resolving family disputes and in 
helping to protect women. Also arising from the interview with Gogo Madhuve, women 
                                                 
125 Ibid, pp 19-21. 
126 See David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 93. See also Gerald Chikozho Mazarire’s 
interesting study of pre-colonial Chivi dynasties, in “The politics of the womb”. 
127 See David Norman Beach, The Shona and Zimbabwe, p 94, for the Shona. See also similar methods 
across Africa: TW Bennett, “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, p 32, and, Edward Kofi 
Quashigah, “Legitimate governance: The pre-colonial African perspective” in EK Quashingah and C Okafor, 
eds, Legitimate governance in Africa: International and domestic legal perspective, Kluwer, The Hague, 
London, Boston, 1999, p 43. 
128 Interview with Gogo Madhuve Gakata Village 26 April 2010. Gogo is a Shona term for an elderly 
woman (granny). 
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used the songs to draw on the support of other women which in some sense resembled 
women’s solidarity against abuse. From the above, songs were therefore important 
tools used by those in weak positions in mediating violent relationships of power, in the 
home and the larger communities. They were used as a form of language outside the 
everyday language to convey grievances. It enabled them to dialogue with those who 
exercised various forms of power over them. They were also used generally to speed up, 
and correct, social processes such as marriage issues.129 
 
Besides women, men in Shurugwi also used poetry to complain to their in-laws in cases 
where there was a delay in the handing over of newly-married wives or where the 
lobola was deemed too high. Such men would wake up very early in the morning, go out 
of their sleeping hut, and sing complaint songs while playing a traditional form of guitar, 
chipendani, till dawn. After such an early morning “free show” the in-laws would gather 
together and usually initiate the process of handing over the wife to her husband. Songs 
and poetry were also used by other weaker groups generally for the betterment of their 
living conditions or against autocratic leadership.130 
 
During the Second Chimurenga songs and poetry were crucial in aiding African 
nationalism. These were performed both inside and outside Rhodesia. Outside the 
country, this was usually in the camps. This was where most of the songs were 
composed. Most of the songs were adapted from traditional songs.131 Crucially, the 
songs “musicalized and transformed the woes of everyday life”132 to help create political 
awareness among the Africans through hammering on the ills of the settler regime, the 
                                                 
129 See also Ruth Finnegan, Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1992, pp 214-24, for a more nuanced discussion of the functions of 
the pre-colonial poetry. 
130 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, pp 133-143. 
131 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga: An investigation into ZANU’s strategy, Skotaville 
Publishers, Braamfontein, 1988, p 132. See also, Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, p 
97. 
132 See Marissa Moorman, “Duelling bands and good girls: gender, music and the nation in Luanda’s 
musseques, 1961-1974”, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 37, 2, 2004, p 264. 
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evils of colonialism in general, and the need for the armed struggle to supplant the 
systems.133 They also sought to drum up ancestral spirits’ protection and support for the 
war, appeal for help, and to thank foreign countries.134 In some instances however these 
songs were adapted from Christian songs.135 This is notwithstanding the rather 
ambiguous and at times strained relations between the nationalists and the church.136 
These songs, as well as providing entertainment to the refugees and combatants, were 
aimed at educating and reinforcing the nationalist grievances. They were also meant to 
venerate nationalist leaders and condemn the rival nationalist movements.  
 
A crucial aspect that Gilman highlights is that while in the pre-colonial past songs were 
used as spaces to criticise leaders in the pre-colonial past, they lost this function once 
they were appropriated in the service of nationalism. As she says, they were used 
increasingly to “aggrandise political leaders […] through such means as metaphors, the 
listing of achievements and strengths, and the expression of gratitude.”137 This speaks to 
formalism. Under formalism, “people (in power) are represented in a superstitious 
fashion or better, in a fashion that encourages superstition.”138 This genre of aesthetics, 
more than others, abstracts and simplifies reality and when used in politics it tends to 
create super-politicians.   
 
For Zimbabwe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ranger have established a similar adulteration. 
Nationalist leaders were portrayed in the aesthetics as saintly and above criticism, and 
                                                 
133 Ngwabi Bhebe, Ibid, p 97. 
134 Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, pp 134-139. 
135 See Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980”, p 58. 
136 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrilla warfare, pp 78, & 81-87. 
137 Lisa Gilman,“Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 345. See also Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU 
guerrilla warfare, p 97. See a somewhat similar contention by Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 26, 
who avers that at times some songs and performances may belie their true meaning and end up 
contesting authority. However, for Shurugwi, I did not come across evidence to this effect. 
138 See Bertolt Brecht, in Ernst Brecht, George Lukacs, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor 
Adorno, Aesthetics and Politics, Translated by Ronald Taylor, Verso, p 80. 
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to condemn opponents within and outside these movements.139 For ZANU-PF, this 
stemmed from the fact that the leadership commissioned artists at Mgagao, Tembwe 
and Chimoio to sing about the central role leaders played and how leaders were able to 
articulate the problems facing the “masses.”140 It was therefore not uncommon for 
leaders to be referred to in laudatory terms. Joshua Nkomo was nicknamed 
Chibwechitedza or a slippery stone. Other leaders such as the spirit medium Nehanda 
had their importance extolled as well.141  
 
Inside the country, most of the songs were sung at all night rallies called the pungwes.142 
These songs while carrying similar messages with those sung in the camps were rather 
allusive and more coded “to mislead and fool the [Rhodesian] authorities.”143 In the 
process this obscurity, while allowing for the audience to map their grievances to the 
lyrics, ensured security for the performers and the audiences who could be attacked by 
the Rhodesian state agents. The pungwes were, at the same time, also meant to create 
a bond between the communities and the guerrillas as well as to motivate the 
guerrillas.144  A crucial aspect of the pungwes was that whilst primarily meant for ZANU 
political mobilisation through the addresses by ZANLA political commissars,145 they were 
also characterised by violence against witches and sell-outs.146 The slogans shouted also 
praised ZANU and its leader Robert Mugabe, while consecutively condemning the 
                                                 
139 See for example the levels of the valorisation of the nationalist leaders during the second Chimurenga 
in Terence Ranger, Introduction, Historical Dimensions to Human Rights and Democracy, 
140 See Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence Zimbabwe”, in African 
Studies Review, vol 43, No 2, 2000, p 75. 
141 See the poem Nehanda Nyakasikana, that the late vice  President Simon Muzenda recited during and 
after the Second Chimurenga, in Solomon Mutsvairo, Feso, 1956.The “guardian” of the spirit was also 
transported to Mozambique. See Josiah Tungamirai, “Recruitment to ZANLA: Building a war machine”, in 
Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, eds, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s liberation war, James Currey, Heinemann, 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, London, Portsmouth and Harare, 1995, p 42. 
142 See Josiah Tungamirai, “Recruitment to ZANLA: Building a war machine”, in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence 
ranger, eds, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s liberation war, James Currey, Heinemann, and University of Zimbabwe 
Publications, London, Portsmouth and Harare, 1995, p 42. 
143 Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 134. 
144 Ibid, p 134. 
145 Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, pp 92 & 97. 
146 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 145. 
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Rhodesian state and rival nationalist movements.147 This aspect was carried over into 
the post-1999 era. However, there were other groups who were organised as popular 
musical bands that composed protest songs. Some of these were Thomas Mapfumo148 
and the Blacks Unlimited, and the Harare Mambos.149 
 
In the post-colonial set-up and most specifically in the post-1999 era the ritualization of 
performances continued.150 Cultural practices of singing and dance routines were 
employed to enhance party leadership and party ideology. These performances 
resulted, as in the Second Chimurenga, in the extolling of the political movements. For 
ZANU-PF, the songs and poetry performed [re]framed and reinforced the mythical 
powers and the invincibility of ZANU-PF, firstly, and secondly, the indispensability of its 
leadership. The leadership was extolled for “organising, executing, and winning the war, 
and for ‘freeing’ the masses from colonial bondage.”151 This further supports the view 
on the adulteration of the performative role of music as a means used by the lower 
classes to contest arbitrary power. Rather, “it is now a conduit for supporting a party, 
not social commentary.”152 Even popular artists like Thomas Mapfumo and Oliver 
Mtukudzi too joined the bandwagon of hero-worshipping and creating cult-personality 
the new ZANU-PF government and its leaders in their songs in the early 1980s.153  
 
However, Vambe has warned against the narrowing of the relationship between popular 
artists and the state to the genre of “containment and resistance” because there could 
be other factors at play. For example, certain artists may have had a genuinely similar 
view to state policies, or their support might have been due to the euphoria of 
                                                 
147 Ibid, pp 146-147, for an example of the typical sloganeering. 
148 See Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence Zimbabwe”, p 77. 
149 See Paresh Pandya, Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga, p 139, for an in-depth discussion of Thomas 
Mapfumo’s songs.  
150 See Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning in the analysis of complex performances: The case of a 
Malawian political rally”, in Journal of American Folklore, Vol 122, No 485, Summer 2009, p 340, for a 
similar view on independent Malawi. 
151 Maurice T Vambe, “ Popular songs and social realities”, p 75. 
152 See Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning, p 346. 
153 See Maurice T Vambe, “ Popular songs and social realities”, pp 76-78. 
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independence, marketing reasons, the need to get radio airplay and the record 
companies’ policies.154 But what is unfortunate about the 2000-2008 period is that 
frequently, songs by prominent musicians were performed alongside the condemning, 
naming and shaming, threatening, and the violating of the rights and dignities, of the 
opposition. 
 
The dramatisation of this relationship at rallies was meant to create a profound impact 
on the ordinary people. That is, the public displays of the humiliations and terror 
methods were deployed in a similar strategy they were used by the Rhodesia Front in 
the late 1970s. The strategy involved “the use of terror and psychological terror in trying 
to ‘convince the minds and win the hearts’ of the people.”155 The strategy also invoked 
the guerrilla methods of coercive mobilisation and for the indoctrination of the masses 
during the Second Chimurenga. They were thus intended to shore up the support for 
ZANU-PF. Crucially, by bringing up Second Chimurenga methods and narrative, it also 
sought to raise the status of ZANU-PF as an eternal heir and guardian of Zimbabwe’s 
sovereignty against revitalised Western imperialism for which it had participated in both 
the subsequent zvimurenga, that is struggle for independence, and in the Third 
Chimurenga. In this way, the songs cemented the myth that Robert Mugabe and his 
government were the “natural and indisputable political heir[s] … of the past.” 
Concurrently, they also reinforced “anti-pluralistic tendencies in political thinking in 
Zimbabwe.”156 
 
 In my own research, I established that there were no special groups of people that sang 
and performed at rallies in Shurugwi. Anyone could start the songs. However, everyone 
was supposed to join in. Non-singing was equated with disloyalty and non-belonging 
which invited severe punishment. Singing, especially new songs, on the other hand, was 
taken as demonstration of positive support for ZANU-PF. The point that I intend to 
                                                 
154 Ibid, pp 76-77. 
155 See Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla warfare, p 111. 
156 See Maurice T Vambe, “Popular songs and social realities”, pp 76-77. 
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stress here is that of the generalised participation of women and men, in the singing at 
rallies that served to spur violence and mythologise the power of ZANU-PF. The fear of 
being negatively labelled which contributed to “everyone” singing fractured the 
distinction between performers and spectators. Besides the noticeable difference 
between those who led in the singing, there were no other clear modes of separation 
because all who were in attendance were supposed to know the songs and to 
participate in the singing. Thus if the songs valorised blood or the party leaders (as shall 
be discussed later on in this chapter)  in the making and sustenance of the nation of 
Zimbabwe, then the women by joining in the singing, coerced or not, also pushed that 
theme forward.  
 
At another level, by singing such songs the women also helped to spread political party 
policies, which as Finnegan says, “reinforce[d] their own beliefs and ensure[d] that all 
members of the movement ha[d] mastery of their political aims and the means needed 
to achieve them.”157  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that all were supposed to participate, from the interviews I 
conducted it became clear that women were placed at the centre stage of the rituals at 
political rallies: in dances, songs and poetry. This was because the women were the 
largest group that wore party attire: the wrap-around cloths with leaders’ faces and 
emblems, party t-shirts and head gear. It was usually in these paraphenalia that women 
welcomed party dignitaries and provided entertainment at the rallies. By attending the 
rallies in 2010, which I describe in detail in Chapter Five, I also established that the 
above was true. More than this, the attire that the women were draped in 
simultaneously displayed party colours and the leaders’ faces. This applied to both 
ZANU-PF and the MDC-T. For me this helped to reinforce the “irreplaceable” notion of 
the respective party leaders Mugabe and Tsvangirai.  
 
                                                 
157 Ruth Finnegan, Oral poetry, p 220. 
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As I have already discussed in Chapter Three, most of the dignitaries were men. Women 
performed the central performing role at such occasions, and literally kept rallies going. 
Added to this, women generally constituted the majority of the audience at the rallies. 
This in part was a result of the depopulation of men that we discussed earlier. Thus as 
Lisa Gilman contends, women “make substantial contributions to political parties in 
their capacities as symbols, advertisers, voters, morale boosters, and mobilizers of 
support.”158  
 
Put in the Shurugwi context, women were the faces of politics: they were the most 
visible and most vocal participants at political gatherings. They led in singing, in the 
slogans, in welcoming guests and in providing entertainment to all those that gathered. 
From attending some rallies in 2010 it also became clear that for those who had been 
coerced to attend, the entertainment the women generated provided a refreshing site 
to the overkill and ritualised attacks on the MDC, and the threats to its supporters. 
However, the speeches also contained compelling promises of development for the 
district. In addition, these various political-aesthetic roles by women at rallies helped to 
mythologise the standing of the party officials and the contribution of ZANU-PF in the 
Second and Third Chimurenga. The women in these roles contrasted to most ordinary 
men who were usually mute participants and who took a back stage. The most active 
men were usually those in leadership roles. In some sense one gets the feeling that if 
there was anyone who exhibited qualities of forced attendance it was the men in their 
back-seat role. 
 
Importantly, these various performances by the women also reified the hierarchy of 
inequalities between sexes. We must admit these songs and dances provided a potential 
platform where women could air their grievances and problems and to thank their 
political leaders. Women also felt in control of the proceedings by their ubiquitous roles. 
Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that these dances, songs and poetry 
                                                 
158 Lisa Gilman, The dance of politics, p 4. 
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had lost their social commentary function for the political glorification of the parties and 
especially the leaders. They were mostly performed by women at the lowest economic 
and political hierarchies159  who showered praise on the male political leadership. 
Suffice it to say that in Shurugwi they were drawn largely from traditional160communal 
peasant farming wards. These were the most vulnerable to hunger and poverty that 
characterised the district and the country between 2000 and 2008. 
 
 In turn these male dignitaries would usually offer prepared speeches mostly in the 
English language, which no doubt was above the comprehension of most of the ordinary 
women who were more conversant in local languages. Besides offering speeches, which 
constituted the core business of the rallies, the dignitaries also led in the recitation of 
party slogans. Occasionally the dignitaries offered gifts to some outstanding performers. 
The latter symbolically underscored the inequality of the patron-clientship not only 
between the political-economic hierarchy between political leaders and the women, but 
also gendered differences between men and women.161 
 
In such situations therefore women sweated from the performances, while men sat as 
spectators who occasionally clapped their hands to the speeches and to the dances 
performed, and the senior party dignitaries were officials at the high table. After the 
dances women would then go to sit on the ground, and if there was no shade they sat in 
the sun. They were usually separated from the men who sat in a different area. In most 
cases the two groups were separated by the dignitaries who sat in the centre. Unlike the 
women, the ordinary men sat on whatever raised seats, chairs or platforms they could 
find.  
 
                                                 
159 Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 345. 
160 Here I use traditional to emphasise the difference between these areas occupied by these peasants 
before colonisation from the newly created resettlement wards that were started from 1980. These are 
also the wards that contain the bulk of the population of the district. For more details on this see the 
General Introduction. 
161 See also Lisa Giman, “Genre, agency and meaning”, p 353. 
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An even bigger difference existed between the women and the chosen delegates and or 
the leadership who were placed on the high table littered with fruits, water and cool 
drinks. Gilman162 and Leong posit that this dramatises the distinctions of power. As 
Leong says, “officials and authorities are not the participants [ in the singing]. They are 
reviewers, and their position of dominance is marked off from subordinates by an 
elevated platform from which they can look down upon people and comfortably 
observe the event.”163  
 
Thus on the whole, the differences in the stages occupied by the three categories at 
rallies symbolically and literally reinforced the gendered power hierarchies in the 
district, and the country. The hierarchy of difference is also further highlighted by the 
apparel worn between the women and the distinguished guests. As already pointed out, 
the women would be wearing party regalia including head scaffs, T-shirts, and wrap-
arounds on their waists. In contrast the guests wore suits, and on a few occasions, caps 
that identified them with the party.164 At other times some leaders wore shirts made in 
the party colours, which represented more affluence compared to the T-shirts worn by 
women.  
 
The description of the performances by women at political rallies in Cameroon by  
Mbembe is illuminating when considering those done by women in Zimbabwe. He 
writes:  
They stamped the ground with their feet, blanketing the air with dust. Wearing 
the party uniform with the picture of the head of the state printed on it, women 
followed the rhythm of the music and swung their torsos first forward, then 
back; elsewhere they pulled in, then thrust out their bellies, their undulating 
movements evoking as usual the slow, prolonged penetration of the penis and 
its staccato retreat.165  
 
                                                 
162 Ibid, p 338.  
163 See Laurence Wai-Teng Leong, “Consuming the Nation: National Day Parades in Singapore” in New 
Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 13, 2, December 2001, p 9. 
164 See also Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency and meaning”, p 349. 
165 Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 17. 
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In their dancing, the women from Shurugwi usually performed the kongonya dance. It is 
a dance that thrives on throbbing singing and emphasises a lot of energetic body 
movement coupled with hip twisting and body vibrations.  
 
SONGS AND THE PROMOTION OF VIOLENCE 
In Shurugwi performances were also used as spectacles showcasing ZANU-PF power in 
violence and also as spaces to denounce, if not condemn, the opposition. A look at one 
of the commonest songs provides an insight into this. 
Zimbabwe ndeyeropa, 
Zimbabwe ndeyeropa baba, 
Zimbabwe ndeyeropa remadzibababa, 
Ndati ndiudzei baba, 
Takaiwana neropa remadzibaba. 
 
Another song that became a theme song at ZANU-PF rallies was Nyatsoteerera (Listen 
carefully). This song became popular towards the presidential runoff, and was 
eventually recomposed and put out as a part of an album by Mbare Chimurenga Choir. 
Another was Handimbochema kana vaMugabe varipo (I will not cry if Cde Mugabe is 
there) which exalted the standing of party president, Mugabe. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
points out, the song which was adapted from a Christian hymn in some way drew 
parallels between a party President and Jesus Christ.166 Such songs were performed 
alongside those that denigrated the MDC and its leadership. The other popular song was 
Nora that was also repackaged into a commercial video by the late minister Elliot 
Manyika and Taurai Brian Mteki. In essence therefore these songs created a particular 
kind of the “distribution of the sensible … that divide[d] the [Zimbabwe] community into 
groups, social positions, and functions.”167 
 
                                                 
166 See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans exist, p 275. 
167 See Gabriel Rockhill, “Translator’s introduction Jacques Derrida’s politics of perception”, in Jacques 
Derrida, Politics and aesthetics, p 3. 
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These songs that were sung at rallies were buttressed by songs and videos that also 
glorified ZANU-PF played on the sole national television and radio stations. To this end, 
musicians like Simon Chimbetu released Hoko (Peg) and Kustate House kure (it’s a long 
and winding route to the state house). Others like Amos Mahendere, Delani Makhalima, 
and The Born Frees did similar videos. In these videos, “Mugabe is the main character”, 
and/ or his old speeches are superimposed on music tunes.168 On its side the MDC-T also 
had praise-singing musicians, who also glorified the party and the leadership. Notable 
examples were Member of Parliament Paul Madzore and Francia Chikunguru.169 Its 
Department of Information also launched a five track album by the end of 2011.170 
 
Alongside these songs were equally powerful slogans. In Shurugwi they went like: 
Pamberi na comrade Robert Mugabe, Forward with cde Robert Mugabe 
Pamberi!                                                     Forward 
Pamberi ne ZANU-PF,                               Forward with ZANU-PF 
Pamberi!                                                     Forward   
Pamberi nekuzvitonga,                             Forward with self-determination 
Pamberi!                                                      Forward 
Pamberi nevhu!                                          Forward with the land 
Ivhu kuvanhu,!                                            Land to the People 
MAZDA woye,!                                            MAZDA woye 
Woye!                                                           Woye 
Pasi naTsvangirai,!                                     Down with Tsvangirai 
Pasi!                                                              Down  
Pasi neMDC,!                                               Down with the MDC 
Pasi!                                                              Down  
Pasi na Mativenga/Banda/Fundira         Down with Mativenga/ Banda/Fundira  
Pasi nezvimbwasungata.                           Down with sellouts 
Pasi!                                                               Down 
 
The words in the songs and slogans emphasised spilling blood and or the importance of 
letting blood in the struggles that ZANU-PF had engaged in. Violence was also valorised, 
because it is in and through it that blood is let. For ZANU-PF as discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
168 See Maxwell Sibanda, “Explosive cocktail when music is mixed with politics”, in Music freedom Report 
No.5, p 6, 3 March 2012, in musicfreedomday.org, Accessed 25 June 2012.  
169 Ibid, p 7. 
170 Ibid. 
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One, this violence was, as in the official state discourse, emancipatory and in defence of 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. Blood was also conceived as sacrificial in the songs. The song 
Zimbabwe ndeyeropa encapsulates this. It is a song made up of one stanza, and four out 
of these five lines (80%) refer to the spilling of blood. Blood was at the heart of ZANU-PF 
rhetoric. Besides extolling the history in spilling blood, the song shows how “violence 
was ingrained into the political culture of ZANU.”171 
 
These songs also openly invited people to engage in violence in the name of defending 
the country against sell-outs. Those that supported the opposition became enemies 
rather than citizens with a democratic right to belong to a political party of their 
choosing. They stressed that the formulation of Zimbabwe before independence and its 
sustenance after independence depended on sacrificing blood. Blood was shed for its 
birth, and blood was necessary for its continued survival. Those that had died in the 
struggle for independence had sacrificed their lives for the land and the country’s 
independence, and those fighting in the Third Chimurenga were also sacrificing for the 
defence of that independence.  
 
Speeches by senior government officials buttressed the need for continued sacrifice. 
President Mugabe for example, taking from his numerous rabble rousing speeches, once 
said: “We shed a lot of blood for this country; we are not going to give up the country 
for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ball point pen fight with a gun?”172 Sacrifice, in this 
amadoda sibili fashion, was therefore conceived in blood of the guerrilla and civilian 
victims during the Second Chimurenga, and that shed during the Third Chimurenga. 
Thus sacrifice is a relation to the ability to “gift” one’s own life, a sort of immeasurable 
gift.173  
 
                                                 
171 Lloyd Sachikonye, When a state turns on its citizens, p 11. 
172 See the Report of the Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Runoff and House 
of Assembly By-elections, Republic of Zimbabwe, 27 June 2008, pp 13.  
173 I borrow the Gandhian concept of immesurable gift, that is, the ultimate sacrifice of one’s life, from 
Professor Ajay Skaria’s discussions at CHR Winter School, 2-13 July 2012, Cape Town.  
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It is true that it was largely through the waging of the armed struggle that forced the 
minority Rhodesia Front government to negotiate the transition to majority rule.  
However, its articulation in the post-1999 era was essentialised to privilege ZANU-PF’s 
heroism, at a time when it was facing dwindling support even in the rural areas that had 
been its stronghold since the 1960s and 1970s struggle for independence.174 This 
rendition by the state also conspicuously ignored the importance of negotiations in 
contributing towards independence.175 The articulation again misses to point out the 
role that the regional and international countries played in coercing the armed 
belligerents to the negotiating table.176 It also ignored the contributions of other 
liberation movements like ZAPU and the importance of the international community in 
the struggle for independence. As such the refreshing of the people’s memories about 
that role of ZANU-PF in violence should be seen in this context of an essentialised 
recalling of the Second Chimurenga. Also the liberation era songs that were adapted and 
repeated in the 2000s re-inscribed that violence on the minds of the rural Shurugwi 
subjects. Indeed, as Kahiya has posited, slogans have been “used as a war cry to crush 
opponents; physically that is. We all recall the violence that was unleashed on mabhunu 
(whites), ‘Ngomo’ (Nkomo) and the MDC.”177 
 
Insidious violence against those in the opposition was also encoded in the songs. The 
education or reorientation mentioned in the song Nora for example was a soft 
packaging for violence because that education was done via beatings at rallies.178 This 
was a subtle reference to violence against those in the opposition. The condemnatory 
slogans that said: “down with Tsvangirai, MDC, sell outs or running dogs” also intimated 
                                                 
174 ZANU-PF lost the constitutional referendum in February 2000, and won narrowly (63 to 57 seats) in the 
June 2000 parliamentary elections, lost the parliamentary majority and the first round of the Presidential 
poll in 2008 despite many constituencies falling in rural areas. 
175 Among other things, it was on the basis of the Lancaster House Agreement that the constitution for the 
independent state of Zimbabwe was produced.  
176 See Luise White, The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p 18. 
177 See Zimbabwe Independent, 25 February 2010, “Editor's Memo: Hate-slogans cannot win the day 
anymore”, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/comment/25491-hate-slogans-cannot-win-the-day-
anymore.html, Accessed 02 August 2011. 
178 For a more pronounced discussion of this see for example Tsitsi Dangarembga, Nervous Conditions. 
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this genre of violence. “Down” had a loaded meaning. It could be down to the grave, 
simply being ridiculed, or literally being forced to lie down to receive a thorough political 
life changing beating, which was the commonest form of punishing dissent in the 
district. By also referring to the issue of land at a juncture of increased joblessness and 
pressure on the communal lands of the district, it played on the emotions of the 
peasants who needed a redress to their plight.  
 
Crucially this also helped to forge a very close and dangerous link between land and 
violence, and also between land and national sovereignty. Whilst land was an important 
rallying point of the struggle for the independence of Zimbabwe, other issues were 
equally important. For example democracy, workers’ rights, women and students’ rights 
also made different people to join the liberation struggle.179 It would therefore be 
simplistic to reduce the independence struggle to an agrarian reform. Some of the worst 
scenes of brutalities in Shurugwi happened on the farms as the land hungry wrestled 
with the farm owners and their workers for land. It was therefore not surprising that 
people in the district to refer to the land seizures as jambanja and those that had been 
resettled or resettled themselves as majambaja.180    
 
In addition to this, the person of President Mugabe was valorised and glorified. He is 
equated with the bravery of heroes and is equated with the struggles running from the 
Second to the Third Chimurenga. Above all the person of Mugabe was portrayed as 
indispensible. A look at the slogan MAZDA reinforces this personality cult notion about 
Mugabe. MAZDA181 was an acronym for Mugabe Achatonga Zimbabwe Dakara Afa 
which means Mugabe will rule Zimbabwe till he dies. In other words Mugabe was to rule 
forever, as a form of a life president. Its continued repetition, in the backdrop of the 
                                                 
179 A lot has been written on the causes of the Second Chimurenga, but for a dense discussion see Terence 
Ranger, ed, “Introduction”, Historical Dimensions to Human Rights, vol 2. 
180 Jambanja is a Shona colloquial for violence, which in the course of the 2000s became synonymous with 
the Third Chimurenga and the land (farms) where that violence had occurred, and majambanja was to be 
used to refer to those that had obtained land in this period.  
181 Incidentally MAZDA is the most popular car and the only locally assembled car, in Zimbabwe. 
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incessant campaign of intimidation characterised by widespread displacement, torture, 
and an increase in murder of the opposition supporters in the run-up to the Presidential 
election runoff of 2008 and the military commanders’ threats of a coup in the event of 
President Mugabe’s loss, meant that it was internalised, fixed in the people’s minds and 
naturalised to the extent that his succession as leader of his party or President of the 
country had become a political taboo.  
 
As David Kertzer says, the repeating of rituals is an “important means of channelling 
emotion, guiding cognition, and organising social groups.”182 It also “works to inculcate 
messages and values and also to create an enhanced ritual space.”183 Life without the 
“great leader” was in some sense difficult to imagine. He was to be revered, 
unquestioned or unchallenged. This also comes out strongly as well in the song Nora, 
where his bravery is exalted. At one level Mugabe was personified as ZANU-PF. At yet 
another level he was personified with the struggle of Zimbabwe. In songs and slogans 
there was a scramble to shower praises on President Robert Mugabe, who many began 
to refer to as Mudhara (father or elder), or by his family praise name Gushungo. On the 
whole the President’s personality was reified and his long presidency and his grip on 
both his party and country were venerated as both God-given and uncontestable.  
 
However, as his one-time right hand man, and one who claims to have thrust Mugabe to 
the helm of ZANU-PF, Edgar Tekere tried to demonstrate, it may be a travesty of justice 
to the Second Chimurenga history.184 As such, in songs and in slogans that were 
hallmarks of the campaigns, and rallies people that sang reinforced Mugabe’s continued 
reign, and above all, they helped to naturalise violence as an integral part of ZANU-PF 
culture. People would be violated, beaten, threatened and shamed amongst such songs 
                                                 
182 David Kertzer, cited in Lisa Gilman, “Genre, agency, and meaning”, p 352. 
183 See Lisa Gilman, Ibid, p 352. 
184 See Edgar “2boy” Zivanai Tekere, A lifetime of struggle, SAPES, Harare, 2007, who argues, among other 
things, that Mugabe reluctantly joined the struggle and also reluctantly assumed presidency of ZANU-PF 
and that he had problems of getting accepted by the ZANLA guerrillas. 
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and chants, which made women accomplices in the violence even when they did not 
always willingly participate in them.  
 
In this way the performances were thus staged for and meant to be consumed by large 
numbers. The target was for more people to witness them and be intimidated. Rallies 
where these different genres were performed attracted a lot of people, some were 
forced to attend, while for others they willingly attended. In addition, threats to 
violence were issued on national television and through mass circulating print media 
owned by the state were sent out to an even larger audience. The clearest case of this 
was the statement by Elliot Manyika that vouched for the “death of the tea boy”185 in 
apparent reference to the need to assassinate Morgan Tsvangirai.  
 
The rallies thus became places for publicly punishing the opposition members. They 
were at times convened with the aim of victimising those perceived to be in the 
opposition. Here the public is required to witness the power of that violence, and the 
various performances acted as fuel for that violation. Victims would be beaten, violated 
and shamed amongst these dances. Politicians’ speeches that intimated violence were 
punctuated by songs and dances. As Michel Foucault posits in such situations of the 
punishing of the criminals there was a sort of theatrical representation which required 
an audience to witness its execution. He writes:  
An execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, 
would scarcely have any meaning. The aim was to make an example, not only by 
making people aware that the slightest offence was likely to be punished, but by 
arousing feelings of terror by the spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon 
the guilty person.186  
 
                                                 
185 Elliot Manyika was at this time the governor for Mashonaland West Province and he would rise to the 
powerful Political Commissar role in ZANU-PF. He was here quoted at a rally in Bindura on 17 December 
2001 by the Zimbabwe television (ZTV), cited in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/elliot-manyika-
dies-in-mysterious-accident  Accessed 07 November 2010. 
186 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Routledge, New York, 1979, pp 58-59. 
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From adopting the pre-modern punishment there was thus a lot of mileage gained by 
ZANU-PF by conducting public punishments to those that did not toe its line. It was 
above all a show of power meant not only for those that were victimised but also for all 
those in attendance, as well as those who would hear of these beatings and other forms 
of torture. It was meant to show ZANU-PF’s power over people’s lives. This mirrors the 
sovereign power that Michel Foucault discusses as a pre-modern form of 
governmentality based on the sovereign’s “right to decide life and death”, which in 
essence was exercised through taking away people’s lives to show the sovereign’s 
power over his subjects. This was largely to re-enact power rather than as a means to 
justice.187  
 
To the extent that the violence in the district could be done in the public glare and the 
perpetrators got away with impunity, it mythologized the power of the perpetrators in 
the eyes of the spectators. It also served to stress the fact that ZANU-PF’s rhetoric of 
“degrees in violence” was indeed underwritten by an actual apparatus of violence in real 
terms.  
 
Besides providing a catalyst for the perpetrators, these songs provided entertainment to 
the audience, some of whom also found entertainment and amusement in the tortures 
committed at these rallies.  In Shurugwi it is in this latter category of political 
performances that the agency of women in the violence was higher, and it is in this 
category that the central role of women as participants in the dances and in the violence 
is located. This genre necessitates reference to Bakhtin’s “grotesque and obscene.”188 
For Bakhtin, this refers to the adoption of a language that subverts authority.  
 
Mbembe, however, has established that in post-colonial Africa the “grotesque and 
obscene” had been embraced by most post-colonial governments. This was, first, “in the 
                                                 
187 For more details on this notion, see Michel Foucault, A history of sexuality, pp 135-136. 
188 See, Bakhtin, cited in Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 4 
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timing and location of those occasions which state power organises for dramatising its 
own magnificence” and secondly, “in the actual materials used in the ceremonial 
displays through which it makes manifest its majesty”, and “the specific manner in 
which it offers these, as spectacles, for its subjects (cibles) to watch.”189 Following up on 
this, the performances at rallies, and portrayed in radio and television, exhibit the 
grotesqueness and obsceneness of state’s “principal locus of both the self-narration of 
power and the places in which it imagines itself.”190 And at rallies women took a central 
role in the execution of those performances that valorised the power of violence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter, utilising Foucault’s theory on the distribution of power, highlighted the 
ambiguous nature of power relations of the state in the district of Shurugwi. Power 
relations were complex and exhibited a matrix of relations. It is in this web of 
interactions that I have tried to show the powerful role of the agency of rural women in 
sustaining and spurring the political violence. Through the often neglected 
performances, coerced or not, at rallies, such as dances, women played an important 
role in the violence. Women also sometimes played important roles as perpetrators, 
which has attempted to challenge the notion of their mute victimhood in conflict 
situations. Women war veterans, politicians, and those that kept lists, actively engaged 
in the violation of the rights of other women, among a range of victims in the period. 
This role as perpetrators has, however, to be taken in the context of a generalised 
violence mediated by the state, especially by the JOC. At another level, perhaps we are 
challenged by this discussion on violence to reconsider our perception on victimhood 
and gender. 
 
 
 
                                                 
189 Achille Mbembe, “Provisional Notes”, p 4. 
190 Ibid, p 19. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  FROM HOPE TO FEAR: ANALYZING THE “POST-VIOLENCE” PERIOD, 
2009-2011.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
The political violence that engulfed Zimbabwe in the post-millennium era officially 
ended with the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed on 15 September 2008 and the 
formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. The GNU was 
supposed to mark a transition from an era that was dominated by state-militarised 
violence against those who supported the MDC and those regarded as sell-outs, to an 
era, in Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s words, “where knives, machetes, knobkerries, guns 
and booted feet as instruments of violence and repression are no longer fashionable.”191 
Regarding the GPA and GNU, Sekai Holland, the co-minister in the Organ for National 
Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI), also sounded positive: “we have 
managed to get ourselves together as Zimbabweans at last working as one people at the 
political level after nearly ten years of conflict.”192 The question however, remains: was 
there the kind of transition Tsvangirai hoped for? Also, to what extent has the “working 
together as Zimbabweans at last” translated into tangible benefits for the grassroots?  
I would like to posit that to a very large extent that the GNU marked a change in the 
composition of the government without necessarily transforming the state 
administration. In serious ways it was a difficult marriage of convenience, “a co-
habitation of ‘totally uneasy souls’ who d[id] not like each other at all, who in fact 
                                                 
191 See “Security chiefs a security threat-PM”, in Newsday, 27 May 2011, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-27-service-chiefs-a-security-threat-pm, Accessed 29 May 
2011. 
192 See Sekai Holland, “Realigning input markets to former needs as a strategy on national healing, 
reconciliation and integration at grassroots based communities in agricultural production in Zimbabwe”, 
in 
http://www.farnpan.org/documents/d00738/presentation/Review_of_the_Organ_On_National_Healing_
Final.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011, p 2. 
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resent[ed] each other,”193 born out of sustained pressure by the former President of 
South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the African Union (AU).194  
The situation on the ground remained tense with pockets of violence reported 
countrywide, especially from the middle of 2010. Effective power also remained in the 
hands of ZANU-PF at the national level that had ruled the country since 1980. In 
essence, the GNU was de facto a “ZANU-PF government by another name.”195 This was 
concretised by the fact that almost always ZANU-PF wishes prevailed over those of the 
MDC be it on the appointments of Provincial Governors, diplomats, and service chiefs; 
or in terms of policy interactions with the international community; the control of key 
government levers, both hegemonic and coercive; or even the flow of diamond revenue. 
On the whole, as Chamisa stated, Mugabe was the pilot of the “aeroplane”, and “[his] 
wisdom makes sure the plane does not crash”196. Because of the skewed power balance 
the Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai quit the government on two occasions between 
2009 and 2011 to protest arbitrary appointments, arbitrary rule by Mugabe, and the 
continued violence and harassment of members and supporters of his party, and more 
generally the unworkability of the GNU.197  
President Mugabe was also to be officially addressed (rather conspicuously) by the titles 
of Head of State and Government, and Commander In Chief of the Defence Forces. This 
                                                 
193 See Brian Kagoro, in Hot Seat interview with Violet Gonda, “Let’s hope this marriage of convenience 
will work” cited in Zimonline, 03 February 2009, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=4197, accessed 1 June 2011. 
194 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution’: Notes on 
Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe”, in The Round Table, in 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-agreement-as-a-passive-revolution/, 
Accessed 02 June 2011, for a more nuanced discussion of this. Even Prime Minister Tsvangirai alluded to 
this coercion. See The Herald, 31 May 2012, “Tsvangirai meets NATO commander”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43079:tsvangirai-meets-
nato-commander&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 31 May 2012. 
195 See Stewart Chabwinja, “GNU: ZANU-PF govt by another name”, in Zimbabwe Independent, 24 May 
2012, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/comment/35631-gnu-zanu-pf-govt-by-another-name.html, 
Accessed 26 May, 2012. 
196 Nelson Chamisa, cited in Stewart Chabwinja, Ibid. 
197 See for example http://www.zimdiaspora.com, Accessed 31 January 2011, which describes how 
Tsvangirai disengaged from the GNU in October 2009. 
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was meant to symbolically and effectively fetishise and mythologise Mugabe’s power in 
comparison with the other Principals in the GNU, Morgan Tsvangirai, and even more so 
for Mutambara. Tsvangirai and Mutambara were effectively junior partners in the GNU. 
Tsvangirai, for example, headed the useless Council of Ministers, and more often than 
not, could not even chair the cabinet in the absence of Mugabe. This was a de facto 
expression about who was really in control.198 To further exemplify this, The Herald, 
reporting on why President Mugabe, and not Tsvangirai or Mutambara, had been 
invited to attend the SADC meeting in Namibia in May 2011 leading to the deferment of 
the discussion on Zimbabwe, wrote “leaders of the MDC formations - Mr Morgan 
Tsvangirai and Professor Arthur Mutambara - had not been invited to the summit since 
it was high-level, that is at the level of Heads of State and Government.”199 This 
perception in ZANU-PF was well encapsulated in the words of Jonathan Moyo who 
asked “Who is Tsvangirai?” His own answer was “He is just a senior minister……..”200 The 
situation on the ground also underscored that indeed Tsvangirai was “just a senior 
minister” as some ministers refused to report to him, while some District Administrators 
and senior civil servants refused to meet with him on his national tours.201 
The statements should be taken alongside the fact that Morgan Tsvangirai was not a 
member of the powerful JOC that continued to meet and formulate state policy despite 
it having been formally dissolved in 2009 and replaced by the National Security Council 
where Tsvangirai sat as an equal to Mugabe.202 This was open contempt of the figure 
                                                 
198 See Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s agonising but irreversible political transition”, a paper 
presented at the European conference on African Studies 2009, Institute of African Studies, University of 
Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009, and Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political Crisis, 
mediation”, pp 5-6. 
199 See “President, Zuma thrash out issues”, in The Herald, 11 June 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12385:president-zuma-
thrash-out-issues&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 11 June 2011. 
200 Newsday, 23 June 2011, “Plot to arrest Tsvangirai” in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-
plot-to-arrest-tsvangirai, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
201 See Newsday, 8 November 2011, “Lets go for polls”, in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-11-08-
lets-go-for-polls, Accessed 08 November 2011. 
202 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The military Factor in zimbabwe.pdf, Accessed 02 July 2011, p 
27. 
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who in the GPA was supposed to be head of government. More importantly it flew in 
the face of the GPA and the GNU agreements that were supposedly signed, formed and 
guaranteed, by equal partners. The terms of this dismissive discourse also represent 
President Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s refusal to share executive power as demanded in the 
GPA.203 Largely because of the bickering and open contempt for each other, some 
fundamental goals such as “media and electoral reforms, the adoption of a new 
constitution, the issue of violence and targeted sanctions as well as the entrenchment of 
freedoms of association and assembly”204 set out in the GPA remained unfulfilled by July 
2011. 
Practically, at the local level also little changed regarding the socio-political relations in 
Shurugwi. People remained polarised as during the 2000 to 2008 era. The GPA and the 
GNU remained largely tenuous elite agreements, which did very little to solve the 
problems that people had at the village and lower echelons of society. It is worth noting 
that it was at the village level and to some considerable degree the family level that 
most of the violence was fought, albeit with the blessings of the JOC, government 
security apparatus and ZANU-PF national structures.205 On their part the MDC 
supporters had the support of the national MDC structures and some internationally 
funded NGOs.206  
Because the GNU was an elitist and superficial unity of three protagonists, it left the 
structures and ills of the 2000 to 2008 violence intact. Altogether this made the 
attainment of the goals set out in the GPA, such as the establishment of peace, 
                                                 
203 See also, Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, “The anatomy of political predation: leaders, elites 
and coalitions in Zimbabwe”, Development Leadership Programme, in 
http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/Executive%20Summary%20-
%20An%20Anatomy%20of%20Political%20Predation%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf, p 2, Accessed 03 July 2010. 
204 See Financial Gazette, 01 July 2011, “GPA negotiators in crucial poll meeting”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/8887-gpa-negotiators-in-crucial-poll-meeting.html, 
Accessed 02 July 2011.  
205 See Chapter Four of this thesis, “Agency and or victimhood”, See also Shari Eppel, “A tale of three 
dinner plates”, Jocyelyn Alexander and Kudakwashe Chitofiri, “The consequences of violent politics in 
Norton, Zimbabwe”, for more. 
206 In Shurugwi there were suggestions that some certain NGOs refused to offer assistance in old and new 
resettlement areas allegedly because these areas were associated with ZANU-PF. 
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reconciliation and healing without foundation at the local levels, hence 
transcendental.207 Suspicion, hatred, fractured socio-political relations, bitterness, and 
structures blamed for the 2000 to 2008 violence remained entrenched in Shurugwi.  
It was therefore largely unsurprising that since the “moment of madness”208 of the 
2000-2008 period had not been completely stamped out, and continued low key, that I 
came across victims who were living in fear. Others were calling for a degree of justice. 
On the other hand, some perpetrators were trying to reach out to their victims. Yet in 
other cases, there were alleged supernatural attacks on the perpetrators who were 
supposedly afflicted by witchcraft or ngozi orchestrated by their victims.  
It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the implication of these ills on the post-2008 
dispensation in Shurugwi. The overall thesis of this chapter is that the GPA and the GNU 
did little to transform the socio-political conditions that served and promoted political 
violence, which conditions may prove detrimental if they remain unresolved. To do this, 
I intend to visit some of the problems faced in the time of the GNU by looking at the 
unfounded hopes raised by, and the dangers that emanated from, the imperfections of 
the GNU and the ONHRI, that were supposed to herald a new day for Zimbabweans as 
they looked towards the democratic “promised land”. 
 I also intend to use the conceptual framework of the Gramscian “passive revolution” to 
delineate the contours of the unworkability under the GNU. As Morton says, passive 
revolution is “marked by violent social upheaval, but it involve[s] a relatively small elite 
leading to the creation of state power and institutional framework consonant with 
capitalist property relations.”209 Neil Davidson, cited in Morton, also posits that passive 
revolution largely describes a “revolution from above.”210 In this regard the agency 
                                                 
207 See Section VII of the Global Political Agreement, 15 September 2008, Ministry of Parliamentary and 
Legal Affairs, Harare. 
208 “Moment of madness” was a phrase coined by Mugabe in a veiled admission of the horrors of 
gukurahundi. I use it here to denote the continuing violence post-2008. 
209 See Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution 
in the Global Political Economy, Pluto Press, London, 2007, p 66. 
210 Neil Davidson, cited in Adam David Morton, Ibid, p 65. 
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driving the change is provided by a few leading individuals and organisations, largely in a 
process characterised by “dictatorship without hegemony”.211 In the French revolution, 
for example, it was provided by the Jacobins, the enlightened bourgeoisie and 
rationalists who were backed by the army,212 while in the Risorgimento it was from the 
so-called moderates led by Cavour, the big southern landowners and northern 
bourgeoisie.213 The majority of the people’s interests and “active participation” were 
largely ignored.214 While Gramsci primarily developed “passive revolution” to describe 
the changes that were ushered by the Italian Risorgimento, he extended it to other 
moments related to the French Revolution, the post-1815 European state 
reorganisations and to the 1848 revolutions.215  
For Zimbabwe, as will be highlighted later, the idea of a passive revolution helps 
significantly to understand the GPA and its “baby,” the “distorted unitary state”, the 
“bastard”216 GNU, in place of a proper transitional government for Zimbabwe state. This 
is due to the competing demands of the reformist and the reactionary elements, which 
resulted in a “revolution-restoration”, a moment of “reformation” that enables the 
preservation of the political and economic position of the old powerful classes, thus 
avoiding complete overhauls and side-lining interests of the “popular masses”.217 On the 
whole, the GPA and the GNU were imperfect solutions that Zimbabweans were forced 
to embrace with their warped agendas.  
GNU EUPHORIA AND THE COSTLY EXPOSURE OF MDC SUPPORTERS  
The formation of the GNU on 13 February 2009 brought a great deal of excitement to 
the people of Shurugwi district, as indeed most Zimbabweans, who had witnessed and 
experienced unprecedented levels of violence from 2000 to 2008. There was also hope 
                                                 
211 Antonio Gramsci, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a ‘passive revolution’.” 
212 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, edited and translated by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p 59. 
213 Adam David Morton, Ibid, pp 63-4. 
214 Ibid, p 65. 
215 See Adam David Morton, Ibid, p 65. 
216 Adam David Morton, Ibid, p 68. 
217 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from prison notebooks, p 119. 
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that the attendant economic problems of shortages, hunger, poverty, joblessness and 
economic free-fall would end. Indeed, the economic collapse was halted. In this regard 
inflation, once described by Gideon Gono as the number one enemy of the economy,218 
was arrested. As Morgan Tsvangirai, the Prime Minister under the GNU, stated in his 
first 100 days in office, inflation came down from the astronomical levels of 500 billion 
percent per year in 2008219 to single digit figures like 3.2 percent in December 2010.220 
Inflation continued to fall into 2011 with the Zimstats department reporting that it had 
further receded to 2.5 percent in May 2011.221  
Shortages were also ended with the adoption of the multiple currency regimes rooted in 
dollarization, which not only stabilised prices but saw many goods that had disappeared 
from the shelves return almost overnight.222 Also on the national scale, the struggling 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange stabilised. Industries that had closed reopened. It was 
regarded as certain that an economic revival miracle was in the offing. True to this, for 
                                                 
218 See “Zimbabwe’s comatose economy: Enemy number one is Gono”, in 
http://www.gonogonow.com/?p=388, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
219 Different statistics have been provided, for example, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, in an interview 
with the South African Sunday Times gave the figure as having reached 500 billion percent per year in 
2008, see “Tsvangirai reviews his 100 days in office” in  http://www.zimgreats.com/index.php?, accessed 
on 09 June 2009 , while http://www.zimonline.co.za,  say it had reached 231million percent per year –
accessed 09 June 2009. 
220 See “Zimbabwe December inflation slows to 3.2 percent” in Byo24News, 18 January 2011, in 
http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-business-sc-economy-byo-751-article-
Zimbabwe+December+inflation+slows+to+3.2+percent+.html, Accessed 11 June 2011.  
221 See The Herald, 17 June 2011, 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12831:annual-inflation-
declines&catid=41:business&Itemid=133, Accessed 17 June 2011. 
222 For the impact of dollarization, see “Has Zimbabwe's Runaway Inflation Been Tamed?” in 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887809,00.html, Accessed 13 June 2011. See also Tapiwa 
Chagonda,”Dollarization of the Zimbabwean Economy: Cure or Curse? The Case of the Teaching and Banking 
Sectors.”, Paper presented at the The Renaissance of African Economies, Dar Es Salam, Tanzania, 20-21 December 
2010, organised by CODESRIA, in http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/papers14.pdf, Accessed 13 June 2011, for a 
pithy analysis of dollarization of Zimbabwean’s economy up to late 2010. See also African Economic Output, in 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/zimbabwe/, Accessed 28 July 2011.  
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the first time since 1999 the economy recorded positive growth in 2009 and 2010 of 
5,7% and 9,3% respectively.223 
On the political front, the GNU also promised a new dawn. In that regard, 
notwithstanding its flaws, the GNU, through the provisions of the GPA, tried to enforce 
a regime of accountability which was unfamiliar when ZANU-PF was the only party in 
government. As Raftopoulos says: it “[…] forced ZANU-PF into closer accountability for 
its behaviour at different levels including cabinet, parliament, JOMIC, the constitutional 
reform process, SADC, the AU and its relations with the West.”224 At the national level 
the President, Prime Minister and Service chiefs met briefly in the National Security 
Council, and there were also weekly cabinet meetings involving ministers from across 
the political divides. Ministers were also supposed to account to the Prime Minister, 
who headed the Council of Ministers and to President Mugabe who headed the cabinet. 
At other levels, such as SADC, ZANU-PF and the MDCs were constantly monitored by the 
SADC mediator and his facilitation team. However, the level of such accountability and 
its effectiveness remained open to debate. 
In addition, numbers of people who had gone into hiding or into exile returned to take 
up their places in the village or their positions in their places of work. The latter group 
mostly included civil servants, most notably teachers, who were lured back by the 
introduction of pay cheques in United States Dollars (US $) and promises of ending 
political violence under the GNU. Noteworthy is the fact that civil servants were among 
the most affected by the violence, and were also among the most affected by the 
economic down-turn. Once the government had announced that all civil servants who 
had abandoned their posts would be allowed back into their old posts without charge, 
many heeded the call and returned. Many of these had tried and failed to make it in the 
“greener pastures” of South Africa.  
                                                 
223 See Zimonline, 08 July 2011, “Gov’t lunges towards dysfunction: PM”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6748, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
224 See Zimonline, 28 June 2011, Brian Raftopoulos, “Opinion: Beyond Livingstone”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6740, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 298 
 
 
 
 
In discussions with some of the teachers who had crossed the border into South Africa 
and elsewhere in the region I established that many had ended up in menial jobs that 
were not only poorly paying but which were also demeaning given their qualifications. 
Many had ended up as gardeners, security guards, house maids, bar-tenders, waiters or 
waitresses, agricultural labourers, car washers, while some ended up working as call 
ladies.225 Yet others had also tried the “greener pastures” of the United Kingdom again 
with limited success.226 As such, once their dream of an Eldorado was rudely shattered, 
and they were called upon to return to their old jobs, they trekked back to reassume 
their teaching positions. To this end the majority of the massive 70 000 teachers 
countrywide who had left their jobs between 2000 and March 2009 returned.227 David 
Coltart, the Minister of Education under the GNU, affirmed this large-scale return of 
teachers stating that “our offices are inundated with people seeking readmission. We 
have made it easier to be readmitted than before, hence the influx.”228  
However, the promises of a violence-free environment for teachers and for other 
ordinary Zimbabweans, especially in rural areas, proved unfounded. By September 
2009, a few months into the GNU, youth militia bases were reportedly re-established at 
some schools despite Minister Coltart’s declaration to ban “partisan political” groups 
and activities from schools.229 What made the plight of teachers worse was the 
                                                 
225 See also Mavis Marongwe, who also posits similarly and states that “For Zimbabwe, the majority of its 
emigrants are working in menial jobs or jobs which although not menial do not pay a lot of money. In fact 
a good number of those in Britain for example work in care jobs in hospitals and old age homes, in nursing 
and in teaching. A good number of those in South Africa are gardeners, maids, security guards etc.” in The 
Standard, 06 October 2006. 
226 See Beacon Mbiba, “Zimbabwe’s global citizens in ‘Harare North’: Some preliminary observations”, 
Paper presented at the Skinning the skunk-Zimbabwe Futures, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005, 
cited in kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/...ef7a.../30+-+3+chapters.pdf,  Accessed 07 June 2011, 
pp 29-30, who discusses the nature of jobs for Zimbabwean diasporans living in the UK, where most 
work(ed) in what is called BBC, that is, British Bottom Cleaning- pp 30-31. These jobs fall in the Castles 
‘3D’ classification for dirty, difficult and dangerous, p 33. 
227 See “Zimbabwe: Exiles start to return”, in ReliefWeb, 19 March 2009, cited in 
http://reliefweb.int/node/302127, Accessed 21 May 2011. See also The Zimbabwean, 19 February 2009, 
“Govt is broke, says Coltart as he asks teachers to end strike”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?=option=com, Accessed 22 May 2011. 
228 See “Zimbabwe: Exiles start to return” 
229 See “Undoing two decades of neglect”, in Prime Minister’s Newsletter, 2 September 2009, in 
http://davidcoltart.com/?p=829#respond, Accessed 22 May 2011. 
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introduction of the Human Rights course in the History Subject.230 The course was 
meant to educate the students to respect other people’s human rights, and brought 
teachers into conflict with ZANU-PF structures who accused teachers of preaching MDC 
politics in the classrooms.231  
That “former” bitter rivals, Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe had started working 
together gave very strong indications that things were getting better. Or were they? 
Problems about the full implementation of the GPA continued unresolved into the 
second half of 2011, with no solution in sight.232 A chief reason was the security sector 
reform, in which both sets of the MDC negotiators called for the transformation of the 
army, police and the CIO into impartial arms of the state.233 The security arms were 
widely fingered in the fomenting of violence.234 Other problems that were unresolved 
and hampered the implementation of the GPA included election-related reforms, 
appointments to key government positions, including provincial governors, 
ambassadors, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor and the Attorney General (AG). 
The result of these political tensions was to negate the economic gains made especially 
in the first one and half years of the GNU.235  
Looking at the signing of the GPA and the consummation of the GNU through the lense 
of “passive revolution” sheds important light on the problems and tensions that were 
                                                 
230 See “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed 
under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the observance 
by the Government of Zimbabwe of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No.87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98), 
December 2009, cited in 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inquiry_report.pdf,   
Accessed 22 May 2011. 
231 Interviews with History teachers from the district. 
232 See Fingaz, 08 July 2011, Bornwell Chakaodza, “GPA talks: One step forward, two backwards”, in  
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/comment/8955-gpa-talks-one-step-forward-two-backwards.html, 
Accessed 08 July 2011. 
233 See Zimbabwe Independent, 08 July 2011, “Army, police, CIO talks divide negotiators”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31646-army-police-cio-talks-divide-negotiators.html, Accessed 
08 July 2011. 
234 See Zimonline 06 July 2011, “Volatile situation in five Zim provinces”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6747, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
235 See Zimonline, 08 July 2011, “Gov’t lunges towards dysfunction: PM”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6748, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
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met. As Raftopoulos avers, both the GPA and the GNU represented passive revolutions 
as they were forced on unwilling adversaries, ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. 
According to Raftopoulos, ZANU-PF it was largely pushed into accepting the GPA and the 
GNU due to the serious political-economic meltdown in the country and the pressure 
from SADC and the AU. For the MDCs their acceptance was the result of a combination 
of state repression and violence, their failure to assume state power after an election 
victory, the limits of Western diplomacy in Africa against ZANU-PF’s role in the SADC and 
the resonance of its Pan-African anti-colonial message in the AU, as well as the 
continued erosion of their urban workers’ powerbase due to retrenchments.236  
At another level, ZANU-PF’s intransigence, which was based on its control of the 
coercive arms of the state, set against the MDCs’ wish for the full implementation of the 
GPA,237 represented another facet of ZANU-PF domination. The above also demands a 
recall of Raftopoulos’ writing that:  “since entering the Inclusive government… the MDCs 
have on the other hand pushed for full implementation of the GPA, while on the other 
hand they have struggled to position themselves in a state whose structure is still largely 
shaped by the imperatives of ZANU-PF’s military-economic elite.”238 This resulted in the 
creation of a “bastard” Zimbabwe state in place of a reformed one that promised a new 
beginning. The struggles between ZANU-PF and the MDCs, and at times between the 
MDCs, also represented the “class struggles” that characterise passive revolutions, 
which result in the Gramscian “revolution-restoration”, a “revolution without 
revolution.”239 
The other reason that underscores the importance of the passive revolution concept 
comes from the perceptions of Shurugwi rural residents. In most of the responses to the 
question soliciting their views on the GNU, many were of the opinion that the GNU did 
                                                 
236 Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution’” .  
237 See The Sunday Mail, 5-11 February 2012, “PM Tsvangirai’s letter to President Mugabe” for a nuanced 
discussion of the impediments and frustrations that ZANU-PF-aligned structures have offered in stalling 
the vision of the full implementation of the GPA. 
238 Brian Raftopoulos, “The GPA as passive revolution.” 
239 Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p 66. 
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not represent their interests. Many felt that the MDC had “sold-out” the struggle for 
democracy in Zimbabwe. They felt that the MDC formations, especially, the MDC-T 
needed to have “hung on there” a little longer and ZANU-PF would have abdicated. The 
fear was that the MDC would be “swallowed’’ by ZANU-PF the same way that PF-ZAPU 
was. The feeling was not helped by the “high level” tensions between the MDCs and 
ZANU-PF in parliament, government or at the SADC level over policy, positions or the 
implementation of the GPA, which did not include the ordinary people.240 Related, the 
alleged cases of corruption involving senior MDC officials in central or local government 
led many to also conclude that the MDC had become a “part of them” (a part of ZANU-
PF) and interested in lining their pockets to the neglect of their pulverised supporters’ 
interests.241 Research by NGOs also corroborates this with 71 percent of the sampled 
women saying that they felt that they needed to be consulted before the GPA was 
instituted.242 A further 43 percent of the women felt that the GNU did not represent 
their interests.243 
With the façade of a promising political-economic environment MDC supporters threw 
caution to the wind and brought out from the vault their party (MDC) regalia, including 
T-shirts, caps, veils, wrap around cloths which were worn once again and other party 
regalia and insignia. They began to openly express their support for their party. In the 
excitement they inadvertently and dangerously exposed themselves. In Shurugwi, some 
of the insignia included bandanas, red cards, and red whistles. From interviews I was 
told that it had become common for some people to be identified as Machinja, street 
lingo for those who supported the MDC.  
A number of MDC meetings were also allowed to take place in Shurugwi which further 
exposed the MDC supporters and their local leadership. The MDC-T and MDC-M for 
                                                 
240 See RAU, When the going gets tough, p 19. 
241 See Zimbabwe Standard, 28 September 2012, “Politics a stepping stone to gravy train”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2012/09/28/politics-a-stepping-stone-to-gravy-train/, Accessed 04 
October 2012.  
242 See IDASA, ICTJ and RAU, Women, politics and the Zimbabwe crisis, May 2010, p 12. 
243 Ibid.  
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example, held meetings at the following venues, dates and under the following party 
leaders:  
Date Venue Political Party Meeting 
head/leader 
19 March 2010 Tongogara MDC-T Juliet Chauke 
03 April 2010 Tongogara MDC-M Paul Themba Nyathi 
17 May 2010 Kushinga Secondary 
School 
MDC-T Samuel Sipepa 
Nkomo 
10 June 2010 Mupambadzire 
Shopping Centre 
MDC-T Gift Mudhara 
15 June 2010 Mukandapi 
Shopping Centre 
MDC-T Gift Mudhara 
Source: Based on the field findings by the author. 
These meetings by the two MDC formations were to prove costly. They portrayed the 
dawn of “liberation” on the political front. To many this raised the hope that days of 
violence had ended and that unfettered democracy was ushered where all could express 
their political will freely. In this regard, besides attending the meetings, some of which 
are listed in the table above, many MDC supporters (also as stated above) began to 
wear their party (MDC) regalia, to symbolically showcase their support for their party.  
From interviews conducted and highlighted below, numerous accounts are given about 
how MDC supporters exposed themselves and the dangers that it invited. 
In the first case I met a woman in December 2009 wearing MDC party regalia in 
Mugwira village. She was just coming from the shop via the borehole. On asking her why 
she was wearing an MDC T-shirt and a veil, she replied: “Nekuti  kune hurumende 
yemubatanidzwa, tave kutongawo, tangofanana neZANU (Because there is  a 
government of National Unity, we are also in power like ZANU-PF)”. When I further 
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asked her if she was not afraid of being targeted in the future, she said that time was 
past, and that no one would want to go back to those days of “Armageddon”.  
But that was to prove a fallacious, if not a short lived political honeymoon lasting only a 
few months before the terror of ZANU-PF was again unleashed on those that had 
exposed themselves. Indeed the COPAC meetings checked her euphoria, and showed 
how wrong she was of the power relations in the GNU.244 In December 2010, I went 
back and met the her. This time she told me how wrong she indeed had been by coming 
out in the open about her support for the MDC-T. Although she was not physically 
abused, she told me that she had been verbally threatened in July 2010 by a well-known 
ZANU-PF activist, whose name she supplied. Further to this she was also asked to 
“repent”, that is, to renounce her MDC-T support before the next round of elections. 
She was also told to keep her MDC-T regalia, which she was supposed to surrender at a 
yet-to-be announced ZANU-PF rally. 
A bottle store owner at Chinho shopping centre recounted how some of his frequent 
customers used to come to his shop in MDC T-shirts. He told me that up to about 
January 2010 there were no problems. However, as the constitution view-gathering 
process gained momentum he was visited by a local “chef” who accused him of 
organising MDC meetings at his shop, an accusation he refuted. He was threatened that 
if he did not prevent anyone wearing any MDC regalia access into his shop his business 
would be shut down. He told me he was left with no choice but to ask his patrons to 
heed the call or his shop would be closed.  
 
 
 
                                                 
244 See Eldred Masunungure “Zimbabwe’s agonising but irreversible political transition”, a paper 
presented at the European conference on African Studies 2009, Institute of African Studies, University of 
Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009, for a more nuanced discussion of the unequal power relations in 
the GNU. 
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ORGAN FOR NATIONAL HEALING RECONCILIATION AND INTEGRATION: FALSE HOPES. 
Pursuant to Article VII.1.C, of the GPA, the ONHRI was formed in March 2009. ONHRI’s 
official objective “[was] to facilitate the creation of a society imbued with values of 
mutual respect, tolerance and development; a society where individuals enjoy freedoms 
enshrined in the Constitution.”245 Overall the formation of ONHRI offered the promise 
and raised high hopes for victims of the violence that they would see justice being 
served for themselves and meted out to their perpetrators seen roaming the villages 
almost on a daily basis. The formation of the ONHRI, with three co-Ministers, all of 
whom were considered very senior and who held very high positions in their respective 
political movements, also added to the euphoria.246 Prima facie, the appointment of 
three co-Ministers also seemed to point to the seriousness with which the three parties 
in the GNU attached to the process of healing the nation.  
In addition, the grand launch of the ONHRI by the three GPA Principals, which was done 
simultaneously with the launch of the “three days of dedication” to reconciliation from 
24 to 26 July 2009,247 also hugely added to the euphoria. In some serious sense this 
pointed to the potential to deal a decisive blow to the recurrent problem of violence 
and impunity. Many hoped, as senior government officials such as Prime Minister 
Tsvangirai hoped, that the ONHRI would open the space for truth telling, open and frank 
dialogue between victims and perpetrators, come up with strategies that promoted 
healing, and ensure that violence “never again” happened.248 However, the rather 
                                                 
245 See Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, “Concept Paper”, p 3.  
246 John Nkomo was ZANU-PF National Chairman and was the fourth most powerful man in ZANU-PF after 
the three in the Presidium. Gibson Sibanda was the Vice President of MDC-M. Sekai Holland was a senior 
member of the MDC-T National Executive. See Tirivavi Mukundi, “National healing and reconciliation”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk, 29 October 2010, Accessed 15 May 2011. See also The Standard, 06 
May 2010, “National healing has no clear mandate- Holland”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 
21 June 2011.   
247 See Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009. 
248 See “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed 
under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the observance 
by the Government of Zimbabwe of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No.87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98), 
December 2009, cited in 
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ambivalent tone in the speeches by Tsvangirai and Mugabe at the launch of ONHRI, 
offered a dissonance that would characterise the life of the ONHRI. The main difference 
lay in what would constitute the ethos of healing. For Tsvangirai, no doubt because he 
had suffered innumerable violations together with various structures of his party at the 
hands of ZANU-PF, called for justice while Mugabe, on the other hand called for peace 
as the basis for healing.249 
Following the promulgation of the 3 days of national reconciliation or days of 
dedication, the ONHRI embarked on a country-wide exercise to gather people’s views 
on the healing, reconciliation and integration process.250 The delegates for the district of 
Shurugwi received the ONHRI representatives at Senga Training Centre in Gweru in 
September 2009. The delegates included chiefs and headmen representing the 
traditional authorities. There were also senior government authorities including the 
Provincial Governor, the Provincial Administrator, District Administrators for all the 
districts in the Midlands, representatives of NGOs, as well as representatives of the 
three major political parties (ZANU-PF, MDC-T AND MDC-M). Amid fanfare, pomp and 
ceremony, ONHRI co-ministers encouraged people to participate in fashioning healing 
processes at their local levels. Delegates who attended the Senga workshop received T-
shirts, mugs and other regalia, which were meant to spread and to advertise the 
activities and aims of ONHRI. According to delegates, there were to be follow-up 
meetings at district and even lower levels later. However, no such meetings were ever 
held in Shurugwi district. 
The other cause for the excitement with the ONHRI was that it was supposed to work in 
a consultative and non-prescriptive role, because “the exact character, scope and 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inquiry_report.pdf,   
Accessed 22 May 2011.  
249 See “Mugabe urges end to violence, Tsvangirai seeks justice”, in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com, 
Accessed 18 April 2011. 
250 See Sekai Holland, “Realigning input markets to former needs as a strategy on national healing, 
reconciliation and integration at grassroots based communities in agricultural production in Zimbabwe”, 
in 
http://www.farnpan.org/documents/d00738/presentation/Review_of_the_Organ_On_National_Healing_
Final.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 306 
 
 
 
 
parameters of a process of national healing being in question” there was need to 
“consult widely and seek best practices to make the process credible and legitimate and 
above all …. Zimbabwean.”251 This was also to be in a more “African” way of widespread 
participation and inclusion.252 In terms of consultations, the ONHRI held meetings with 
traditional leaders, churches and civil society to chart the way forward on how best to 
bring healing to Zimbabwe.253 It was also supposed to liaise with regional and 
international partners such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
bilateral partners and donors.254 Over and above this, the Organ was supposed to offer 
“oversight, monitoring, facilitation and evaluation of the national healing 
programme.”255  
However, the Mass Public Opinion Institute reported at the beginning of 2010 that sixty-
five (65) percent of rural residents in ten provinces were not aware of the healing 
initiative and process led by ONHRI.256 A further look at the ONHRI reveals that in 2010 
it suffered irreparably from the death of co-minister Gibson Sibanda of the MDC-T, who 
was eventually replaced by Moses Mzila Ndlovu. The same year also saw the elevation 
of co-minister John Nkomo of ZANU-PF to become Vice-President. Although Nkomo 
retained his position in the ONHRI, his attention became more concentrated with the 
powerful presidium than with the Organ. This is despite the conspicuous launch of the 
three days of dedication by the GPA principals. This could have been hardly surprising 
because ONHRI, up to June 2011 when this chapter was written, remained without a 
                                                 
251 See Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, “Concept Paper”, p 3. 
252 See 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inquiry_report.pdf, 
Accessed 15 May 2011, p 142. 
253 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth, Vol 
2, 2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 
2011, p 12. 
254 See Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, “Concept Paper”, p 3. 
255 Ibid, p 3. 
256 See “Zimbabwe’s national healing elusive”, in radiovopZimbabwe 
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clearly spelt out programme257 other than to be “consultative” and not “prescriptive,”258 
and whose other stated targets or plans remained far behind.259  
Regarding the absence of a clear mandate and plan of action Holland also stated that 
“our terms of reference are to establish an organ of national healing, reconciliation and 
integration of Zimbabwe society”. Its role would be to “coordinate, which is really to see 
what progress is being made and it is to guide, it is not to do”. It would invite 
Zimbabweans to participate in its activities and determine the programme.260 The 
question to be asked is to what extent was the organ going to be dictated by the 
people? And, under such a scenario, would its operations be far away from hit and miss? 
The argument here is that people looked up to the organ for direction and they looked 
up to it for pragmatic guidance based on the actions that it took. Indeed, as the ILO 
Commission of Inquiry put it, “people were waiting to hear what the ONHRI could do for 
them,”261 rather than to take the lead as ONHRI expected. Indeed it was expecting too 
much from a pulverised population, who still lived in fear for their lives to take a lead in 
formulating their healing.   
                                                 
257 See The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-.html, Accessed 10 
July 2011. 
258 See Sekai Holland, Sekai Holland, “Realigning input markets to former needs as a strategy on national 
healing, reconciliation and integration at grassroots based communities in agricultural production in 
Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.farnpan.org/documents/d00738/presentation/Review_of_the_Organ_On_National_Healing_
Final.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011, p3. See also The Standard, 06 May 2010, “National healing has no clear 
mandate- Holland”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 21 June 2011.   
259 See Financial Gazette, 16 June 2011, “Cabinet Polarised”, in http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-
stories/8711-cabinet-polarised.html, Accessed 19 June 2011. 
260 See “Hot seat interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland, Glen Mpani and Mary Ndlovu: 
Reconciliation, justice and national healing”, cited in SW Radio Africa, 10 April 2009, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg090410swradio.asp?sector=DEMGG&year2009&range_start=75
1, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
261 See “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed 
under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the observance 
by the Government of Zimbabwe of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No.87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98), 
December 2009, cited in 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inquiry_report.pdf,   
Accessed 22 May 2011.  
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In addition, Holland also admitted that ONHRI did not have legal force, except that it 
was rooted in the ambivalent Article VII of the GPA. In her admission she said, “the 
organ has no legal framework to work within, making it powerless to implement 
concrete policies.”262 This lack of legal force led to its characterisation as a “paper tiger” 
by the Civil Society Organisations,263 one that offered so much hope, yet was able to 
deliver little if anything. Indeed the organ was powerless to act on reported cases of 
violence reported across the country.264 It ended up issuing statements without force, 
for example that political parties desist from violence, pronounced guidelines for 
demonstrations, “instructed” the police to engage the communities on the role of the 
security forces, as well as announcing the setting up of the National Security Council to 
deal with the conduct of the security forces.265  
At another level the weakness of the organ was its top-heavy structure of three co-
ministers drawn from the three parties in the GNU, each representing their party 
interests. In this regard questions began to be asked about how the three would work 
outside the imperatives of their parties’ invested interests in the healing process. Yet for 
others, this helped to give credence to such assumptions that the Organ was set up by 
politicians to hoodwink people and to buy time.266 Because of its ineffectiveness, 
                                                 
262 See “National healing organ a paper tiger”, in Newsday, 06 March 2011, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-03-06-national-healing-organ-a-paper-tiger, Accessed 21 May 
2011, for more details. See also “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry Appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation”. See 
also, Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, ACCORD, Issue 1, 
2011, cited in http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_1.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011, p 5. 
263 See “National healing organ a paper tiger”. 
264 See “Hot Seat interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland and Mary Ndlovu”, where some panellists to 
the interview session questioned the commitment of ZANU-PF to the healing process where once again 
there were reports implicating it in cases of renewed violence. 
265 See “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry”. 
266 See The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-.html, Accessed 10 
July 2011. 
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parliamentarians showed no confidence in ONHRI by forming a parliament committee 
on healing, further denting the credibility of ONHRI.267  
Budgetary problems also dogged ONHRI, especially in the first year of its launch. Having 
been launched well into the GNU, it was not catered for in the government budget in its 
first year. This made its broad plans after its launch difficult to implement. It had two 
broad plans of action namely to visit the provincial capitals and engage with the civil 
society organisations; and secondly to launch research on the history of violence which 
would culminate in a conference where the findings would be presented.268 Following a 
seminar in January 2010 at the Midlands State University in Gweru I was chosen 
together with other history and social science students, scholars and practitioners 
mostly from the University of Zimbabwe and the Midlands State University to carry out 
this research. More prominent academics at this meeting were Professor Ngwabi Bhebe, 
Dr Kenneth Manungo, and emerging historians like Gerald Mazarire and Percyslarge 
Chigora. We were given a programme of action to follow, and were also promised 
grants to enable us to do the research. However, nothing much has come up from that 
meeting except a follow-up meeting in Kariba in mid-2011. Furthermore by the end of 
2011 researchers were still stuck mostly at the theoretical stage of their researches 
awaiting the grants to go into the field to engage with the people and establish what has 
really been behind the cycles of violence. 
The healing process itself helped to reinvigorate tensions between MDC and ZANU-PF 
supporters who were the major participants and victims of the 2000-2008 violence. In 
this regard, for example, tensions were about how the healing process would be done. 
Was it to be via an amnesty as in the other episodes of the past,269 or retributive as 
                                                 
267 Financial Gazette, 18 August 2011, “Lawmakers to form national healing organ”, in 
http://eu.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/9507-lawmakers-to-form-national-healing-organ.html, 
Accessed 26 August 2011. 
268 See “Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry”. 
269 See Pamela Machakanja “National healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and 
opportunities”, Zimbabwe Monograph Series, No 1, 2010, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Africa 
Programme, p 10, who lists the recurrent patterns of violence and impunity in the post-independence 
period. These are the 1980 amnesty, the 1988 Clemency Order, the 1995 Presidential Amnesty and the 
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wanted by most MDC supporters?270 This polarisation also points to the role the two 
sets of supporters and their respective political parties played in the recent violence. 
The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism reported that NGOs trying to gather 
information in Shurugwi in 2010 on transitional justice were accused by ZANU-PF 
structures of promoting the MDC agenda and told to leave the district.271 There were 
similar reports of the police stopping healing meetings by other organisations such as 
the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance.272 The end result was that the search for transitional 
justice (TJ) ended up as a contest between the two main political parties, ZANU-PF and 
the MDC-T. In the process furthering the passive revolution set in motion from 2008 
with the signing of the GPA. Like the GPA, the ONHRI was a top-down organ which paid 
little regard to the aspirations of the common citizens. 
Notwithstanding its various incapacities, it is also prudent to accept that the formation 
of ONHRI marked a serious departure in government policy as regards transitional 
justice. To this extent, it should be highlighted that it was for the first time that some 
space was officially opened at government level for ordinary people and civil society 
stakeholders to participate and engage in dialogue in the search for a healing process 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000 Clemency Order. See also Shari Eppel, cited in Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, 
mediation and the Prospects for transitional justice in Zimbabwe”, IDASA, November 2008. Tony Reeler, 
Sublimal terror?: Human rights violence and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008, Centre for the study of 
violence and Reconciliation, Cape Town, p 3, who discusses this at great length, and who also adds a 
fourth period of serious human rights violations as the 1998 period of the food riots. See also Sabelo J 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do Zimbabweans Exist?, p 190, who posits that the history of Zimbabwe is one of 
violence coded under different names, such as wars between the Ndebele and the Shona in the pre-
colonial period, the First Chimurenga, colonialism, The Second Chimurenga, Gukurahundi, and Third 
Chimurenga. See also Terence M Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and reconciliation 
processes”, p 21. 
270 See Mass Public Opinion Institute’s survey results cited in “Zimbabwe’s National Healing Elusive”, in 
radiovopzimbabwe, which point to a dichotomy of opinion along ZANU-PF vs MDC political faultlines. In 
the statistics, 62 percent of ZANU-PF supporters wanted perpetrators of the violence pardoned by an 
amnesty, while 59 percent of MDC supporters wanted the arrest and trial of the perpetrators. 
271 See Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), “Periodic Report, March to April 2010”, in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com, p18, Accessed 12 may 2011. 
272 See The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-.html, Accessed 10 
July 2011. 
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for Zimbabwe.273 Theoretically, this policy of inclusion was a marked departure from the 
trend followed in the post-independence period where the government in a top-down 
way imposed blanket amnesties, which tried to force amnesia of the past horrors on the 
population. In this regard, the government had pronounced the General Amnesty Order 
of 1980 at the end of the Second Chimurenga; then there was the 1988 Clemency Order 
ending the gukurahundi; the Presidential Pardon of 1995 for the violence of the 1995 
elections; as well as the October 2000 Clemency Order for the violence under jambanja 
and the FTLRP.274  
Secondly, the formation of ONHRI signified an “admission of wrong doing” by ZANU-
PF275, which had never admitted to institutionalised violence, except when President 
Mugabe thinly admitted that the gukurahundi was “a moment of madness.”276 Thus 
while theoretically the GPA sought to undercut the previous passiveness of the 
population in the search for a TJ, in practice, however, the contests between the MDCs 
and ZANU-PF over which TJ model to follow, as well as the stifling of the space for 
debate led by NGOs point sadly towards a re-inscription of another forced amnesia that 
will conceal violations. 
 
CONSTITUTION SELECT COMMITTEE (COPAC) MEETINGS: ANOTHER “BLOODY” 
POLITICAL BATTLEFIELD 
COPAC meetings were premised on the GPA Article VI, which stated, among other 
things, that “…it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a 
constitution by themselves and for themselves”; and also that, “…the process of making 
this constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and 
                                                 
273 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth”, 
pp 12-13. 
274 See “National healing organ a paper tiger”.  
275 See Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition”, p 7. 
276 See Terence Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and reconciliation processes”, p 23. 
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democratic.”277 The ethos of this democratic process of participation and inclusion was 
also neatly captured in the COPAC logo:  “ensuring a people driven constitution.”278 In 
Shurugwi, COPAC meetings started with consultations by traditional chiefs and 
headmen soliciting views of the people on the role to be ascribed to traditional 
authorities in the new constitution. This was in line with Talking Point number twenty-
four (24).279 These consultative meetings were held from early January to the end of 
April 2010 and were held in all the 24 wards.  
 At times, however, they combined several wards and held joint meetings with the 
villagers from adjacent wards. This was especially where the wards were close to one 
central site like a township. Although these consultations were meant to solicit the 
people’s views on the future role of traditional authorities under the emerging 
constitution, ZANU-PF district and provincial personnel also attended and played crucial 
roles in the discussions at these meetings. At some of these meetings, the District 
Administrator (DA) for Shurugwi; ZANU-PF District and Central Committee members, 
and Members of Parliament for the district were in attendance. People who attended 
some of the meetings say they were turned more or less into ZANU-PF campaign 
platforms for the Kariba draft constitution, and that the meetings were punctuated by 
ZANU-PF sloganeering. At another level this teaming up led to the campaigning for the 
Kariba draft constitution that ZANU-PF favoured because it left many of the Presidential 
powers in the Lancaster House Constitution intact.  
The impact of these meetings was to revive hate language against the MDC, and against 
the West mostly Britain and the United States of America, who, not surprisingly, were 
cast as enemies of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. Fear was reintroduced, and a return to the 
days of intense violence of 2008 was in the air. This anxiety rose as claims concerning 
the role of the ZANU-PF in the Second and Third Chimurenga were reinstated especially 
                                                 
277 See Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Global Political Agreement, Article VI, 15 September 
2008, for more details. 
278 See the COPAC logo. 
279 See COPAC, “Talking Points”.  
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during discussions on the preamble to the new constitution, as well as the future 
position and role of the war veterans and the traditional authorities themselves in the 
envisaged constitution. This brought back the discourse of “sell-outs” and “enemies of 
the state.” 
The “actual” COPAC process of gathering views on the constitution was marked by more 
threats and intimidation in Shurugwi. This was in the period between July and early 
August 2010. Consultative meetings took more political party campaign language mostly 
featuring two of the biggest parties, ZANU-PF and MDC-T. In many cases it took a 
narrow, short term goal and was fought more on a ZANU-PF versus MDC terrain and 
ignored the imperatives of building a constitution for the future. In some cases, 
however, the constitution-making process reflected the intra-ZANU-PF succession 
struggles.280 Between March and July 2010, I managed to attend a total of ten meetings 
in the district that featured the two main political parties, ZANU-PF and the MDC-T, as 
well as the smaller MDC-M. In this regard, some of the ZANU-PF meetings we recorded 
were as follows: 19 March 2010 chaired by Member of Parliament for Shurugwi North 
Francis Nhema at Tongogara Growth Point; 04 April chaired by Maybe Chinyongo at 
Tongogara Growth Point; 24 June chaired by Simon Tibugare at Tongogara Growth 
Point; 28 June chaired by Levison Mahlahla at Gamwa; and on 02 July chaired by Simon 
Tibugare at Gundura. For the MDCs’ schedule see the table referred to earlier. 
It is necessary to underscore that this was the crucial period, literally the home stretch, 
towards the COPAC consultative meetings. These meetings by the major political parties 
were significant for the coaching of supporters regarding party positions on the 
Constitution Talking points. Coaching involved telling people in prior meetings how to 
respond to questions on the Talking Points. This underscored the importance of the 
domination from above that had been the hallmark of the GNU politics because it 
defeated the whole purpose of engaging in the consultations to make the constitution 
                                                 
280 See Ibbo Mandaza “Draft constitution: Are we now almost home and dry?” in The Standard, 10 August 
2012, Accessed 12 August 2012. 
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which was meant to set a democratic foundation for the future and more urgently the 
holding of democratic elections that were free of violence.  
In the end the process of gathering views re-enacted the violence of coercive 
mobilisation for support by the two major political parties, as well as the parroting of 
party official positions. This set in motion waves of violence and intimidation between 
MDC and ZANU-PF supporters. The violence of the constitutional outreach programme 
was coordinated under Operation Vhara Muromo (Operation Shut Your Mouth) by 
ZANU-PF country-wide which was meant to silence those with opinions that were at 
variance with the ZANU-PF ones.281 Countrywide Operation Shut Your Mouth was 
coordinated through the appointment of community mouthpieces. In Mudzi and 
Murehwa North, for example, chiefs and headmen were chosen to respond to questions 
by the COPAC teams.282 This should not be surprising because chiefs and headmen had 
received intensive coaching in the Kariba draft, preferred by ZANU-PF, prior to the 
COPAC outreach meetings. These views were again contained in a booklet that was 
disseminated across the country.283 In other instances, state security agents, most 
notably soldiers, were also reportedly chosen to speak on behalf of the local 
communities.284 
In Shurugwi, ZZZICOMP (the Zimbabwe Peace Project, Zimbabwe Election Support 
network and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights Independent Constitution Monitoring 
Project) reported that at one such meeting to gather views for the constitution on 21 
July 2010, at Musasa Ward 18 where some 800 people were in attendance, a Zimbabwe 
National Army officer dominated the discussion on the highly emotive and contentious 
                                                 
281 See http://swradioafrica.com/News290710.htm, Accessed 15 May 2011 for a nuanced discussion on 
the operation. 
282 See Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM) “Periodic Report, March to April 2010” in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com-, Accessed 12 May 2011, p 19. 
283 See Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) “Positions for inclusion in the new constitution.” 
284 See Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM) “Periodic Report, March to April 2010” in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com-, Accessed 12 May 2011, p 19. 
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issues on Talking Points 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 and 10.285 My own investigations have established 
that more often than not war veterans and senior local ZANU-PF leadership dominated 
these meetings. Village heads were also roped in to lead in the discussions. What this 
eventually meant was that many attended, pushed the numbers of attendees up, 
without adding value to the process. It was only on less-sensitive “Talking Points”, such 
as, women and gender issues; the disabled; labour; public finance; religion; and 
languages, art and culture that the “ordinary” villagers were allowed to air their views 
“freely”.  
In addition to the above, the main political protagonists, MDC-T and ZANU-PF, 
distributed fliers and pamphlets outlining the respective party positions. As reported by 
ZZZICOMP, some of the fliers were distributed just before the COPAC meetings.286 More 
generally, however, fliers and political parties’ standpoints were disseminated in 
advance. These fliers clearly articulated responses that participants at the COPAC 
meetings were supposed to recite for particular Talking Points.287 For the MDC-T this 
was through fliers as well as through their weekly newspaper Changing Times.288 For 
ZANU-PF its position was outlined in its 95-page document on the constitution.289 It was 
                                                 
285 See ZZZICOMP, “Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach process”, 19-25 July 2010, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/WeeklyReport19-25July2010.pdf, Accessed 12 May 2011, p 9. 
These highly charged Talking Points were on issues that had recently affected people’s lives and socio-
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Media; 9-War veterans; 10-Land, Natural resources and Empowerment; 12-Elections, Transitional 
Mechanisms and Independent Commissions; 13-Exective Organs of the State; 24-Traditional leaders. 
286 See ZZZICOMP, Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach process, 19-25 July, p 11. See also Civil Society 
Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), “Periodic Report, March to April 2010”, in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com, p 19, Accessed 12 may 2011.  
287 See also See http://swradioafrica.com/News290710.htm, Accessed 15 May 2011 for the details. See 
Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), “Periodic Report, March to April 2010”, in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com, p 19, Accessed 12 May 2011, for a national outlook with 
regards coaching of attendees to the COPAC meetings. 
288 See Changing Times, for the months of January 2010 to July 2010, for the details on the MDC talking 
points. 
289 See for example Newsday 24 June 2010, “ZANU-PF roots for longer presidential term for Mugabe” in 
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also in fliers as well as in the consultative meetings the traditional leaders held in the 
wards between January and April 2010 way before the coming of the COPAC teams.  
There were other cases related to these meetings where, on the actual days and just 
before the start of the scheduled consultations, people were reminded of the party 
positions. In this regard both the MDC-T and ZANU-PF, which were the main political 
contenders were almost equal culprits. Because of the pervasiveness of the fliers and 
coaching I was also told in many interviews of people referring to “scripts” such as 
written notes or official party fliers or newspapers during the outreach programmes.290  
In some cases I was informed that the mere presence of war veterans, ZANU-PF youths 
and known state security agents like police officers and PISI operatives was enough to 
shut the locals’ mouths. This was not very surprising because, as seen in Chapter Four, 
these were the structures that were responsible for fomenting and spreading violence in 
the district, as in the whole of the country. In an atmosphere that was dominated by 
fear and misinformation about the presence of the COPAC teams’ recording equipment 
including voice and video recorders, people were generally intimidated. Word, I was 
told, went round in some wards to the effect that the recorded sessions would be used 
to identify all who would have attended and who would have contributed. As such the 
presence of the recording equipment and state security functionaries helped Operation 
Shut Your Mouth because they reinforced the apprehension of surveillance amongst the 
ordinary people. 
In some cases rather unconventional methods were employed. Among the ones that 
stand out include the reiteration of party preferred responses in opening prayers. In this 
regard ZZZICOMP reported, for example, that a local ZANU-PF leader reportedly 
summarised the responses for all the Talking Points that might touch a raw nerve, and 
                                                 
290 See also ZZZICOMP, Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach process, 19-25 July 2010, p 9. 
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during the opening prayer threatened those who might make ultra vires 
contributions.291 
This, however, does not mean there were no individuals who spoke on their own 
accord. There were some meetings where people with divergent views debated the 
touchy “Talking Points” such as the status of war veterans, bill of rights, elections and 
system of government. A few cases recorded by ZZZICOMP included meetings meetings 
that were held at Selukwe Primary School, Nhema Primary school, Zhaugwe Primary 
School and Marishongwe Business Centre.292  
Barring these few “free” consultative meetings recorded, what this however meant was 
that many gathered for these COPAC meetings without their consent and without the 
privilege of airing their concerns and wants in the proposed constitution. For this study, 
the importance of the COPAC meetings in Shurugwi was to revive the political tensions 
and structures that promoted violence, like the war veterans who again threatened the 
villagers with violence if they pushed for the promotion of their ideas outside those they 
were supposed to air from the coaching that they were subjected to prior to the COPAC 
team’s arrival.  
More than anything, the process was crucial in highlighting that the lingering problem of 
political contest and attendant violence still existed. Importantly, it demonstrated that 
the GNU still had “unfinished business” to deal with and it further demonstrates how 
the constitution-making process had been turned into a theatre to fight the long-
standing MDC-ZANU-PF battles. In addition, it also sacrificed the opportunity to engage 
with people’s perceptions and real concerns with respect to the new constitution. As 
highlighted above, ZANU-PF campaigned for the Kariba draft. In this contest, as the ten 
meetings I attended demonstrated, the three main political parties utilised these 
moments not only to de-campaign their rivals but to portray their own party agendas 
                                                 
291 See ZZZICOMP, “Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach Process: 26 July-1 August 2010”, in 
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/100825zicomp.asp?sector=LEGSL&year=2010&range_sta
rt=61 Accessed 15 May 2011. 
292 Ibid, p11. 
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and positions regarding the “touchy” talking points as well. In this regard, ZANU-PF 
deployed the historic-nationalist-redistributive-anti-colonial discourse especially on 
land, national emblems and war veterans’ issues. On the other hand, the two MDCs 
tried to exploit the general disillusionment among the electorate with the past decade 
of political and economic meltdown by blaming it on ZANU-PF and the figure of 
Mugabe. The MDC-T went even further to highlight the significant improvements in the 
people’s lives under the GNU as its own successes. Across these polar opposites, the 
three sides fought the “COPAC battle”. 
However, the violence should be seen in the context of the importance of the 
constitution in the future survival of either political party. Control of the constitution-
making process, the ultimate constitution, and possibly a victory in the scheduled 
elections would usher in some guarantees of long terms in office especially under a 
winner-take-all (first-past-post) scenario that both political parties seemed to want.293 
Its control was effectively a barometer to gauge the power and influence of the parties 
in the GNU. The constant bickering between ZANU-PF and MDC-T throughout the 
tenure of the GNU testifies to this difficult co-existence. In this regard Morgan 
Tsvangirai “quit” the GNU on two occasions between 2009 and 2010.  
At another level, the violence should also be set against the backdrop of the humiliation 
of ZANU-PF, barely ten years after its defeat in the 2000 referendum. In that 
referendum, ZANU-PF had campaigned for the adoption of the Constitution, but was 
defeated by the NO vote that the coalition led by the National Constituent Assembly 
and the then opposition MDC campaigned for.294  As such, one could try to explain the 
employment of violence by ZANU-PF as an attempt to avoid another humiliation at 
another constitutional referendum.  
                                                 
293 See Pamela Machakanja, “National healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and 
opportunities”, in Zimbabwe Monograph Series, No 1, 2010, Institute for Justice and and Reconciliation 
Africa Programme, p 4. 
294 See The Daily News, 17 February 2000, “Referendum results rock ZANU-PF foundations”.  
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At the national level, some districts witnessed more overt violence. In certain cases 
people were beaten for airing views that were contrary to those held by ZANUPF. To this 
extent The Zimbabwean reported for example that three MDC supporters were 
abducted and beaten at Watsomba Business Centre in Manicaland province by CIO 
operatives for being “too talkative” at an outreach meeting.295 In some cases this 
censorship was through the reincarnation of the infamous bases, which had been used 
for the violent mobilisation of ZANU-PF support in previous years, and most importantly 
for the violent reorientation, through beatings and torture, of MDC supporters. Bases 
were reportedly been set up in Nyanga North, Makoni, Chegutu and Gokwe-Gumunyu 
districts where people were reportedly threatened that they must support the Kariba 
draft constitution.296 The reincarnation of bases at the time of the COPAC hearings 
brought back home the harsh reality of the return to the dark days witnessed between 
2000 and 2008. The open violence during the COPAC meetings as well as the 
reincarnation of bases spelled recidivist tendencies to violence by ZANU-PF as a tool to 
get its way on important matters by cowing the populace. 
The reasoning behind coaching and threats came from the thinking that COPAC 
responses would be assessed on the basis of their quantity, rather than their quality or 
the atmosphere in which the responses were given.297 In this way it was hoped that the 
more particular responses were repeated, the more chances for their inclusion in the 
draft constitution, rather like in a ballot where people who get more votes get office. 
Overall, this resulted in the altering of people’s views so that they would align with their 
respective party affiliation, which the ZZZICOMP described as the promotion of “party” 
rather than “personal” views.298 One could also be forgiven for extending this to say that 
the contest was at times even reduced to the struggle between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, 
                                                 
295 See The Zimbabwean, “MDC supporters harassed”, in http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/human-
rights/32543/mdc-supporters-harassed.html, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
296 See “Zimbabwe’s healing elusive” in radiovopzimbabwe, for a pithy discussion of the re-emergence of 
bases. 
297 See Newsday 18 May 2011 “New template delays Copac process”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.za/article/2011-05-17-new-template-delays-copac-process, Accessed 18 may 
2011. 
298 See ZZZICOMP, 19-25 July, p 11. 
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who personified their parties.299 The impact of this was felt at the thematic stage where 
the views gathered during the outreach programme were to be summarised. In this 
regard ZANU-PF pushed for a quantitative analysis of the views gathered, whereas the 
two MDC formations in COPAC wanted a qualitative analysis of the views.300  
It is also vital to say that this bickering happened slightly over a month after the three 
COPAC chairmen, Douglas Mwonzora, Paul Mangwana and Edward Mkhosi had issued a 
press statement to say that they had agreed, firstly, to merge the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in the collation of the views; and secondly, to collapse three 
meeting points in rural areas into one in order to reduce the differences between urban 
and rural wards.301 This caused the stalling of the important process of writing the 
constitution, which many hoped would usher in more democratic reforms leading 
ultimately to a democratically elected government. 
That the constitution-making consultations were political also comes from the fact that 
the 210 COPAC rapporteurs were drawn equally from the three political parties in the 
GNU. This indicated “that the constitution making process remain[ed] highly politicised 
and demonstrates how each and every step is a matter of political compromise. This 
contestation continues to make it difficult to fulfil the notion of a people-driven 
constitution making.”302 The danger was also with the partisan rapporteurs, chosen on 
the basis of their political affiliation rather than for their professionalism, would try to 
map their own political party positions over the views gathered from the people. This 
                                                 
299 See for example, Newsday 24 June 2010, “ZANU-PF roots for longer presidential term for Mugabe” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-06-24-as-zanu-pf-roots-for-longer-presidential-term-mugabe, 
accessed 14 June 2011. 
300 See Zimonline, 21 June 2011, “Fresh row stalls Zim reforms”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6731, Accessed 21 June 2011. 
301 See COPAC Press Statement, 13 May 2011, in http://www.copac.org.zw/news/179-13-may-2011.html, 
Accessed 26 June 2011. 
302 See Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), “Periodic Report, March to April 2010”, in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com, p 18, Accessed 12 may 2011, which highlights that the space 
for Civil Society Organisations trying to educate people before that start of COPAC meetings were stifled, 
harassed and stopped either through the invocation of POSA, or through the machinations of state 
machinery or functionaries, who in most cases were aligned to ZANU-PF. See also the Global Political 
Agreement, 15 August 2008, Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary affairs, Article VI, for a detailed 
discussion on the need for including people to make a “people-driven constitution.” 
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overall pointed to the likelihood of a three-party negotiated constitution rather than a 
people-driven one as demanded by the GPA because the immediate political survival 
imperatives prevailed over the need for a democratic and inclusive process meant to 
draw up, in the COPAC brief, a “people-driven constitution”.303  
The other factor is that rules, for example on the collation of data from the consultative 
meetings, were changed and/ or introduced at the agreement of the three political 
parties as and when a problem or a stalemate arose. This “tripartism”304 not only side-
lined the other stakeholders like other opposition parties, academics, the NGOs and 
mostly the ordinary people for whom the constitution is supposed to serve, but also 
flew against the ethos of “a people driven constitution.” When one adds to this 
allegations that some data from the consultative process had disappeared or been 
tampered with, the gloom deepens.305 
On the whole, the constitution view-gathering battles further buttressed the importance 
of the “passive revolution” lens in the era of the GNU. Firstly, the ordinary citizens by 
being frog-marched to the venues and being coached on what to say participated 
passively showing the importance, as Gramsci, cited earlier, would probably say, of 
“domination without hegemony”. Crucially important is the fact that the party positions 
reflected favoured international constitutional trends. The above led to the 
development of a constitution that reflected internationally accepted best practices, but 
one where citizens participated, in Gramsci’s terms, in a project beyond their control.306 
As highlighted earlier, fear of going against party positions cowed many into silence or 
                                                 
303 See Shari Eppel, “Initial Thoughts on the Matebeleland Constitutional Outreach Experience”, who 
posits that the intensely polarised political environment was conducive for the political parties involved in 
the COPAC consultations to push forward their versions of what they wanted in the new constitution. See 
The Herald, 18 July 2011, “New constitution to be negotiated: Ncube”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15605:new-constitution-to-
be-negotiated-ncube&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 14 August 2011. 
304 See Ibbo Mandaza “Draft constitution: Are we now almost home and dry?”, The Standard, 10 August 
2012, Accessed 12 August 2012. 
305 See The Herald, 27 January 2011, “COPAC data disappears”, see also COPAC, 10 February 2011,“COPAC 
response to The Herald article:  COPAC data disappears”, in http://www.copac.org.zw/news/176-27-
january-2011.html, Accessed 26 June 2011.  
306 See Adam David Morton, Ibid, p 116. 
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into religiously reciting party positions. Secondly, political party actors and to some 
extent state actors monopolised the agency of the processes, which made the 
constitution-making process elitist, and part of a “passive revolution.” At another level 
the resurgent violence was a reminder of the days of Operation Mavhoterapapi, which 
resulted in the establishment of bases at the village, ward and district levels. Whilst 
there were no bases established during the constitution-view gathering process in 
Shurugwi, there was established coaching sessions running from the village levels 
through the Ward levels superintended by party officials and traditional leaders’ 
structures.307 Thus between coaching and Operation Vhara Muromo, the overall effect 
was to foster intolerance and the production of a ZANU-PF MDC negotiated constitution 
that largely ignores the citizens’ views.  
 
FRACTURED SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE POST-2008 PERIOD  
Under the veil of normalcy ushered in by the consummation of the GPA through the 
formation of the GNU that characterised most of the life in the district, there in fact 
existed broken social relations. As discussed in Chapter Four, towards 2008 political 
violence entered the intimate spaces of the extended family, work place and the 
communal space between villagers, leading to some social paralysis.308 Largely as a 
result of the fact that the formation of the GNU was more due to pressure from SADC 
and the international community, and not arising out of the interests of the parties 
involved in the violence, ZANU-PF and the MDC, scant regard was paid towards 
normalising relations at the local level structures. This is not withstanding the symbolic 
gestures of the ONRHI and the superficial work it did regarding the gathering of 
stakeholders in the provinces in preparation for the process of compilation of people’s 
perceptions of the transitional justice process.  
                                                 
307 Interviews, January-July 2010. 
308 See Chapter Four, for a detailed discussion of this. 
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Again, elements of the passive revolution of the GPA/GNU were seen here as the 
citizens were “forced” to co-exist in the aftermath of the violence without serious 
attempts at mending the broken relations. No due regard was given to the inputs and 
interests of the residents in terms of transitional justice following the 2000-2008 
violence. The programme of reconciliation was statist, led and controlled by ONHRI, 
although practically the ZANU-PF favoured policy of letting by-gones be by-gones 
seemed to prevail. There was also some dissonance between those that sought justice 
and those that favoured unfettered reconciliation, both at the state and village levels, 
which gave more credence to passive revolution in terms of the tensions in the 
emergent state structures. 
During the field research period I was reminded of the conclusions made by the 
CCJP/LRF. Although written primarily for Matebeleland and the Midlands following 
gukurahundi, the words encapsulate what I established: “there are many problems that 
remain in communities as a result of what happened, in particular from the murders and 
beatings…” In addition,  
Some tell of how members of their families were taken at night and have never 
been seen again. Many individuals have to live with physical injuries, which 
means that they cannot work well in their fields, or travel easily on buses…And 
still others lost homesteads or possessions and have been poor ever since. There 
is still much pain in the communities as a result of what happened. This affects 
not only the bodies, but the hearts and minds of those who suffered. Some 
people are bitter….309 
During the interviews period, I was informed of the simmering hatred of the victims 
towards those who had allegedly perpetrated violence against them. These victims 
needed to see some justice done to bring to book those who had allegedly caused them 
suffering. Due to the above, tensions remained at an all-time high even between close 
relations. Cases emerged where relatives and neighbours did not speak to each other as 
a result of the recent violence.  
                                                 
309 CCJP/LRF, p 8. 
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To exemplify this, W of ward 12 told me that he would not speak to the people who 
caused him to flee his home in 2008. To prove this, in December 2010, one of the men 
with whom I had previously worked with at Tongogara High School came to greet me as 
an old workmate. We also used to drink socially when I was still teaching there. When 
he was approaching and smiling in my direction, W stood up, dusted himself, swore and 
left. I was put in a rather difficult position, these were both old comrades from the past. 
What I was to do became an issue for me. Was I to leave with W, or to remain where I 
was, receive and chat with the other comrade? I chose the latter option. In the interest 
of hearing his side of the story, X told me that W had become a “greedy” and 
“unreliable” ZANU-PF cadre. This was because he had benefitted from ZANU-PF 
significantly in the period. For example, he had been recommended on numerous 
occasions for temporary (relief) teaching posts. However, he had turned his back on 
ZANU-PF towards 2008 and had joined the MDC-T, hence he had to be taught a lesson. X 
went ahead, however, to say that he missed socialising with W because he was his long 
time “friend”.  
In addition, they had many common friends. As a result their tension was affecting their 
other friendships. More importantly, they were related in the extended family system as 
distant cousins, sekuru nemuzukuru in the Shona custom, because W’s mother came 
from X’s family. Their families had also been brought into the conflict. Although they 
came together at social functions, there was a general air of suspicion and hatred. In the 
end he (X) told me that he wanted to talk to W as well as ask for forgiveness from him. 
In another case I was told of serious tensions between teachers at the same schools also 
emanating from the past period of political strife. In one school, there were two families 
who are neighbours living in the school compound houses and are also workmates. One 
of the teachers is alleged to have caused the beating of his colleague in 2008 by 
accusing him of being an MDC-T supporter, leading to the victimised teacher going to 
South Africa to escape further victimisation. He left behind his wife who was also 
teaching at the same school. He returned in early 2009, and re-joined his old school, 
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which meant he would be working together with the other teacher. Colleagues of the 
two told me that the levels of animosity were so high that the two avoided each other’s 
paths as far as possible. However, there were situations that brought them together 
such as school assemblies or bereavements of colleagues or families. Even these 
occasions, I was told, did not bring the two to shake hands as is required when offering 
condolences in the usual Shona manner.310 
Related cases involved teachers and the local community members. These mostly 
involved teachers who were violated by certain members of the community. In some of 
these, teachers refused to pay close attention to kids from the families of their violators. 
There were also minor cases where teachers deliberately targeted kids from the families 
of the perpetrators. This may be taken as a deliberate ploy to get back at their 
perpetrators. This then affected teaching and learning in some schools. Again as people 
living in a district where communal relations are central, this offered problems in 
situations where the schools required community help, and also at such times when 
there were problems between teachers and the kids or when there were consultation 
days, which require that the teachers and parents or guardians closely interact. In a way, 
cycles of violations continued at different tangents in the district. 
On the other hand the alleged perpetrators of the violence lived in fear of counter-
violence as some of the people they violated were returning to the village. I heard of 
cases where previous victims engaged in or planned retaliatory violence. In most cases, 
however, the police were quick to bring such perpetrators to book. The first example 
involved an alleged perpetrator of violence, a ZANU-PF local official, who himself was 
threatened with an attack by two brothers whose mother he had victimised. The official 
is said to have temporarily escaped in March 2009 and returned in April of the same 
year. Upon his return the brothers had gone back to their work places. The brothers are 
said to have threatened revenge at the “appropriate time.” The problem, however, is 
when is this appropriate time? As in the other cases highlighted above, the two families 
                                                 
310 Interview with Ndaka, at Chachacha, 22 June 2010. 
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were said not to be as cooperative as they would have previously. This fed into the fears 
that the calling of another round of elections would witness the resurgence of this 
hostility, resentment and intolerance. Indeed, amongst the ordinary citizens, there was 
by 2011 a fear that elections would usher in another round of violence.311 
There have also been similar cases reported country-wide. Among these were the cases 
of war veteran Misheck Gora of Masvingo who claimed that after 2008 he had been 
abandoned by ZANU-PF to face the neighbours he had violated.312 Another case comes 
from notorious war veteran from Mberengwa district, Biggie Chitoro, who also claimed 
being used and dumped by ZANU-PF to live alongside his former political victims.313   
In other cases, perpetrators were afflicted or threatened with witchcraft. Others were 
“diagnosed” as having fallen victim to the witchcraft of their former victims. Below are 
some cases of witchcraft fears in Shurugwi that we recorded. 
According to one interlocutor her family suffered the misfortune of having three of its 
assets, a cooking hut, a cattle pen and a sentinel shed, struck by “a single bolt” of 
lightning allegedly sent by a man whose children had been victimised by her husband in 
the run-up to the June 2008 Presidential election re-run. This case allegedly occurred in 
November 2008, almost five months after the election. According to her, her husband, a 
local ZANU-PF official, was at the fore-front of the beatings which resulted in the young 
men sustaining severe injuries. She further alleged that the father of the two victims 
promised to avenge the beatings. As she said:  
One bright Sunday afternoon we got the shock of our lives and we were 
awakened to the threat that X had made. At almost the same time, in fact it was 
                                                 
311 See Newsday, 08 December 2011, “Zimbabweans too afraid of elections”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-12-09-zimbabweans-too-afraid-of-elections--research/, 
Accessed 08 December 2011. 
312 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity, See also, cases cited in The Daily Nation, also 
cited in the Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking Sanity, in an article headlined “Mugabe’s party 
deserts supporters”, p 24. 
313 See “I need forgiveness-Chitoro”, in The Zimbabwean, 6 May 2009, 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/20976/ai-need-forgivenessa-a-biggie-chitoro.html, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
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in one strike, our cooking hut, our sentinel shed and kraal were struck by a bolt 
of lightning. We were lucky that no one was killed. I was sleeping in our bedroom 
because I was not feeling well, our children had gone to herd cattle and my 
husband was on his way from the shops. We certainly believe that it was him (X) 
because he knew that by striking at the hut, shed and at our cattle we would lose 
economically. The targets were well aimed. Also on that day he had passed by 
the road close to our homestead, I think to check if my husband was there. We 
have even heard from his friends that it was him. We also went to n’angas 
(traditional healers) who also told us that he would strike again. My husband was 
advised to leave because it was him that X wanted dead. We are planning to 
meet with X’s family, ask for forgiveness and to also to pay him compensation 
(kuripa), so that my husband can come back and we can live in peace again as a 
family.314 
There are also cases of insanity, death and misfortune attributed to the use of 
witchcraft by the former victims against those who led the way in their victimisations. In 
one case a senior ZANU-PF official who was allegedly “visited by ghosts” at his home. I 
was told that he played a leading role in the death of a man who was beaten severely 
for supporting the MDC and who later died at Shurugwi General Hospital.315 In 2010 he 
was observed moving from one place to another talking to himself. He had certainly 
changed his character from a revered and feared one during the eight years between 
2000 and 2008, to an object of scorn and ridicule. Speaking to his neighbours also 
revealed that strange fires and ghosts had become a daily “feature” at his homestead, 
which possibly contributed to his mental state.  
Related cases involving occult attacks from other parts of the country include the Moses 
Chokuda’s ngozi from Gokwe that allegedly ravaged the families of the Midlands 
Provincial Governor’s and that of Isaac Gana, a ZANU-PF District Coordinating 
Committee Chairman seeking compensation.316 From Buhera is a case of a war veteran 
who was terrorised by ngozi of the people he had allegedly killed in this period and who 
                                                 
314 Interview with Monalisa, Hanke, 12 May 2010. 
315 See Chapter Three for this case. 
316 See The Herald, 19 October 2011, “Governor pays US$15 000, 35 cattle compensation to deceased 
family” in http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24181:governor-
pays-us15-000-35-cattle-compensation-to-deceaseds-family&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 
19 October 2011. 
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tried to appease it by offering sandals to the families of his victims.317 Again from 
Buhera, African Crisis also mentioned the ngozi of Headmaster Tedius Chokuda that 
afflicted Walter Marwizi, Caiphas Chimhete, and Patrick Basopo.318  
 
BROKEN HOMES AND FEMALE-HEADED FAMILIES 
Due to the violence, men who were in most cases active in the opposition politics fled 
from the rural areas of Shurugwi. Many of these men went into the diaspora, mostly to 
South Africa and considerable numbers to Botswana. These two countries were 
favoured because of their proximity by road transport from the district, as well as their 
potential to provide security to those that fled. The two are also arguably the most 
prosperous in the whole SADC region, which pointed to other economic attractions. The 
withdrawal of visa requirements by South Africa in 2009 also led to mass migrations into 
that country. During the field work, on an estimate there were between 40 and 60 
percent households that were headed by women after the men went into the diaspora.  
It was not, however, possible to conclusively determine if all the cases were due to 
political violence or for economic reasons. It should be borne in mind that economic 
problems were just as important, if not more important for some in causing their 
emigration to the diaspora. For some it was a combination of the two. At another level it 
also becomes a chicken and egg debate between political and economic reasons in 
causing people to migrate outside the borders. What is worse perhaps is the fact that 
more than 90 percent of these households are young households. This is not surprising 
because the MDC was largely supported by young people.  
Some women told of how their husbands who were victimised for supporting the 
opposition left the country and their families and have never returned. Some have even 
                                                 
317 See article titled “Ngozi: Primitive superstition or reality?”, in The Standard, 23 May 2010, cited in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 21 June 2011. 
318 Walter Marwizi and Caiphas Chimhete, “Zimbabwe: Avenging spirits torment ZANU-PF terror militia” 
cited in http:www.africancrisis.co.za/Article.php?,ID=76100&, accessed 30 January 2011. 
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“forgotten” about their families. Worse still others are rumoured to have established 
new marriage associations and seem to have cut ties with their old families in the 
district. This has hit their families hard as the women concerned are mere housewives. 
In Chapter Three, I carried out an interview with Barbara, whose husband fled the 
violence and sought refuge in South Africa. I visited this mother of four again towards 
the end of 2010 to find out if her husband had returned. She told me that he had 
phoned but had intimated to her that he was still afraid to return especially with the 
looming elections. His fears were based on that the war veteran Z was still around and 
had played a leading role in the COPAC meetings in mid-2010.  
In a related case, I met another woman aged 35 whose husband also fled the violence in 
2008 to South Africa. Her husband has not returned. It was rumoured that he had 
married another wife in Rustenburg. He left her and their three kids behind. She also 
told me that because of the desperate situation in 2008, she fell in love with a local 
cattle dealer. She hoped to use this relationship to get material support in the midst of 
the grinding poverty and shortages. Unfortunately, she said, she fell pregnant. Her 
husband heard about it and has since refused either to return or to support his other 
three children. She also told me that her family has also disowned her for her 
“shameful” act. The other man with whom she had the love child went back to his wife. 
Although he sends groceries for his child he did not want responsibility for the other 
kids. At the end of the day she literally had to struggle alone with raising four kids with 
little or no moral, social and very little economic support. 
In terms of broken homes, I met James and his wife from Ward 1 in April 2010 repairing 
their cooking hut that was destroyed by alleged ZANU-PF supporters in June 2008. They 
were busy replacing the hut’s thatch that was razed by a fire. In discussions with them 
they were still afraid that their hut or their other huts might still be targeted for political 
arson as they still had not “repented” supporting the MDC. Their hope was that the 
district would not experience a similar orgy of destructive violence in the future, and 
that none of their assets would be targeted. 
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In ward 3 I came across two homesteads whose owners were said to be living in town. 
Both sets of families were said to have elected to remain in towns after having been 
targeted for supporting the opposition. Both left at almost the same time in the period 
leading to the Presidential election runoff in 2008. One of the families is said to have 
relocated to Harare where the husband is said to have found work. The other left for 
Bulawayo. It is alleged that the husband and wife have joined the trek to South Africa 
where they are seeking employment. A look at both homesteads reveals that the houses 
are collapsing and windows and doors have been vandalised making it difficult for the 
two families to rebuild their lives here again, should they return. 
 
FREEDOM FOR FORMER PERPETRATORS AND MORE THREATS OF VIOLENCE 
War veterans, ZANU-PF officials and the youth who were responsible for the 
commission of violence against the women of Shurugwi could be seen roaming the 
villages scot free. This caused anger and fear in the victims of their violence. That they 
were free increased the need for the victims to want to seek extra-judicial methods to 
get a measure of redress.  
At the national level, threats of violence if ZANU-PF lost the elections scheduled for 
2012/13 continued to filter through during this period. To this effect, Brigadier-General 
Douglas Nyikayaramba made astounding remarks that President Mugabe should rule 
until he dies.319 Nyikayaramba went even further, openly castigating Morgan Tsvangirai 
whom he described as a security threat more than a political threat. He went further to 
say that Tsvangirai and the MDC were "daydreamers who want to reverse the gains of 
our liberation struggle [who] will continue daydreaming. They can go to hell . . . they will 
                                                 
319 See The Standard, 29 May 2011 “Brigadier throws ZANU PF into crisis”, in  
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/29820-brigadier-throws-zanu-pf-into-crisis.html, Accessed 1 June 
2011, see also Newsday, 29 May 2011, “Army must not dabble in politics”, 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-29-army-should-not-dabble-in-politics, Accessed 29 May 
2011, see also Newsday 27 May 2011, “Service Chiefs a security threat-PM”, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-27-service-chiefs-a-security-threat-pm, Accessed 27 May 
2011.   
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never rule this country. We cannot keep quiet. We will continue speaking and as the 
security forces, we will not sit back and watch things going wrong."320   
Even more chilling was the statement by Retired Brigadier-General Tapfumaneyi who 
said that an MDC poll victory “mean[s] from the extreme either the military could stage 
a coup or Zimbabwe could go to war,” because “the MDC represents a threat to 
everything we (soldiers both retired and serving) represent.”321 He went on to claim that 
their preferred candidate President Mugabe was going to win the elections, and also 
that Mugabe was as irreplaceable as a father in a family.322 The further irony is that 
ZANU-PF was at this time gearing for elections after the constitution-making process. 
Whether Nyikayaramba and Tapfumaneyi were preparing for a transition as future 
ZANU-PF politicians as other senior retired military officers like Solomon Mujuru, 
Tungamirai, Zvinavashe and Mike Nyambuya did, remains open to debate.323 There 
were also reports that the army was demanding 25 percent of seats in both houses of 
parliament for retired soldiers.324  
On the whole one could be forgiven for positing that such utterances by senior military 
officials go beyond a mere king-making role. They should be taken as part of the 
maturation of the “deep state” by the military dating back to the 1975 Mgagao 
Declaration, and hence the 2011 utterances could be termed the Fourth Mgagao 
                                                 
320 See The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba responds to Tsvangirai”, cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13369:generals-respond-to-
tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
321 See Zimbabwe Independent, 21 July 2011, “All eyes on the military ahead of Zim elections”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31762-all-eyes-on-military-ahead-of-zim-elections.html, 
Accessed 25 July 2011. 
322 See Zimbabwe Independent, 27 May 2011, “Army demands elections in 2011, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31062-army-demands-elections-in-2011.html, accessed 03 July 
2011. 
323 See Fingaz, 01 July 2011, “PM Tsvangirai versus the army”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/8867-pm-tsvangirai-versus-the-army.html, Accessed 
02 July 2011. 
324 See Zimbabwe Independent, 30 June 2011, “Military wants parly seats for retired soldiers”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31581-military-wants-parly-seats-for-retired-soldiers.html, 
Accessed 03 July 2011. 
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Declaration, following the 2002 and 2008 similar pronouncements.325 A deep state "is a 
parallel secret government, organized by the intelligence and security apparatus, 
financed by drugs, and engaging in illicit violence, to protect the status and interests of 
the military against threats from intellectuals, religious groups, and occasionally the 
constitutional government."326 In essence, it is an anti-democratic cabal, a parallel state 
within a state primarily interested in safeguarding its interests. Of note is the fact that 
the utterances while primarily targeting the MDC were also aimed at those in ZANU-PF 
who harboured Presidential ambitions.327 Suffice to mention here that under Mugabe’s 
rule the military has attained a privileged status in Zimbabwe that it wants to 
preserve.328 In the end senior army officers have become members of the post-colonial 
bourgeoisie, through prebendalism, with wide economic interests ranging from mining 
to farming.329 
It should also be highlighted that the utterances, especially by Nyikayaramba who was a 
serving general, not only undermined the GNU. They also went against international 
trends and democratic tenets where serving military personnel were expected not to 
dabble in politics. A parallel to these statements comes from the United States of 
America’s army commander in Afghanistan who was dismissed for issuing a “political 
statement” that criticised the US policy in Afghanistan. In dismissing him, President 
Obama recounted that the general’s “conduct ... [did] not meet the standard that 
should be set by a commanding general. It undermines the civilian control of the 
                                                 
325 See Zimbabwe Independent, 29 July 2011, Nyamutatanga Nyangombe, “Security reforms: The need to 
uproot the ‘deep state’”, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31810-security-reforms-the-need-
to-uproot-the-deep-state.html, Accessed 31 July 2011. It is important to note that the Mgagao declaration 
of 1975 significantly contributed to the deposition of Sithole for Mugabe.  
326 See AANGIRFAN Blogspot, 08 April 2011, in http://aangirfan.blogspot.com/2011/04/deep-state.html, 
Accessed 01 August 2011. 
327 See Zimbabwe Independent, 29 July 2011, Nyamutatanga Nyangombe, “Security reforms: The need to 
uproot the ‘deep state’”, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31810-security-reforms-the-need-
to-uproot-the-deep-state.html, Accessed 31 July 2011. 
328 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, pp 
23-25. 
329 Ibid, p 20. 
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military that is at the core of our democratic system."330 In contrast, ZANU-PF has 
defended Nyikayaramba by arguing that he had constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech.331 
In addition, state security organs continued to harass and threaten human rights 
activists and ordinary Zimbabweans.332 In some of these reports, for example, it was 
said “[t]he power-sharing deal in Zimbabwe has failed to stop extra-judicial killings, 
kidnappings and torture.”333 Brigadier Nyikayaramba himself, who headed all military 
brigades in Manicaland, was also accused of ordering the army units and chiefs not to 
allow any MDC meetings in Manicaland, as well as fomenting a violent campaign against 
MDC supporters.334 The SADC Troika meeting in Livingstone at the end of March 2011 
also demanded that ZANU-PF end the violence and intimidation recorded throughout 
the country ahead of proposed elections.335 A follow up SADC Extra-ordinary Summit on 
Zimbabwe and Madagascar held from the 11th to the 12th of June 2011, reiterated the 
need to implement the GPA fully, and also the need to end the violence and 
intimidation to help “create a conducive environment to the holding of elections that 
will be free and fair, under conditions of a level political field.”336 SADC went ahead to 
recommend that members of the South African mediation team work together with the 
                                                 
330 See Fingaz, 04 August 2011, “Defence forces under spotlight”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/9317-defence-forces-under-spotlight.html, Accessed 
06 August 2011. 
331 See The Herald, 20 July 2011, “Brig-gen entitled to own opinions”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15867:brig-gen-entitled-to-
air-own-opinions&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 08 August 2011. 
332 See Newsday, 04 July 2010, “Coalition government fails to stem out killlings”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-07-04-coalition-government-fails-to-stem-killings, Accessed 27 
June 2011.  
333 Ibid. 
334 See The Zimbabwean, “Nyikayaramba causes havoc”, in http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/human-
rights/35729/nyikayaramba-causes-havoc-.html, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
335 See Zimonline, 06 April 2011, “Rallying region against Mugabe: Zuma’s test”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6656, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
336 See “Full text of Communique from the SADC summit held on 11 – 12 June 2011”, cited in 
  http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/8333-full-text-of-communique-from-the-sadc-summit-held-
on-11-%E2%80%93-12-jun.html, Accessed 03 June 2011. 
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Joint Monitoring Committee (JOMIC) as the country worked towards the full 
implementation of the GPA.337  
The importance of the threats posed by the security agents and officers was to add to 
the atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty. Firstly, to be using threatening language 
almost three years after the GPA such as used by Nyikayaramba against a principal in 
the GNU in a large circulating media showed that no love had been lost between 
Tsvangirai and the security sector, for whose reform Tsvangirai had for long been calling. 
It also added to the uncertainty over the authenticity of the intended elections. More 
importantly, it added to the threat of recidivism towards another Operation 
Mavhoterapapi? of 2008.  
This threat of a recurrence seemed real for the rural constituencies as the leader of the 
war veterans, Jabulani Sibanda had launched Operation Kubudirana Pachena or 
Operation Come out clean in Masvingo province, which he was allegedly supposed to 
export to other provinces of the country.338 From Masvingo, Sibanda went to 
Gwanda.339 The programme, according to The Herald, was “meant to educate people 
about the history of the liberation struggle and the continued threats from neo-imperial 
aggression.”340 However, under the operation Sibanda was accused of “rounding up and 
terrorizing civil servants, traditional leaders and villagers.” Additionally, “his endless 
rallies and meetings disguised as history lessons, had one clear message, vote for ZANU 
PF or face violent retribution.”341 Other reports also pointed out that some schools were 
temporarily closed with teachers and students forced to attend Sibanda’s rallies.342  
                                                 
337 See Zimonline, 28 June 2011, Brian Raftopoulos, “Opinion: Beyond Livingstone”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6740, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
338 See The Herald, 27 June 2011, “Sibanda to stay in Masvingo” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13699:sibanda-to-stay-in-
masvingo&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
339 See Newsday, 16 September 2011, “Comment: Sibanda must be tamed” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-09-16-comment-sibanda-must-be-tamed, Accessed 17 
September 2011. 
340 Ibid. 
341 See Lance Guma, “Sibanda intimidation campaign backfires” in SW Radio News, 24 June 2011, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/news240611/sibanda240611.htm, Accessed 27 June 2011. See also 
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The above acts of intimidation should also be seen in terms of the strong 
interpenetration between the senior security personnel’s political and business interests 
in ZANU-PF.343 Again Gramsci’s passive revolution is useful in understanding the 
reconfiguration of Zimbabwe state power leading to the creation of a “military-
economic class”344 for ZANU-PF that has been at constant loggerheads with the MDCs 
structures in government. In other words, the senior security officers fear losing their 
economic interests should their guarantor lose power to the MDC-T, which does not 
seem to offer them such guarantees. Outside the land accumulation, the DRC 
investments, heading key government-controlled corporations, and being placed in all 
key sectors of the state, the military was also involved in the lucrative diamond mining 
and marketing from the controversial Marange area.345 
Taken together, the bellicose utterances by senior security chiefs, the redeployment of 
violence under Operation Kubudirana Pachena, the resurgence of the National Youth 
Service training, and the resurrection of the infamous bases across the country, sent 
very dangerous signals to an already petrified population. These acts and statements 
were recidivistic and pointed to the dark days of “Armageddon” last witnessed in 2008. 
Firstly, the hawkish utterances smacked of those made by the security chiefs in 2002 
and 2008 that were followed by violent military-led acts of aggression against the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“MDC’s Dumbu preaches peace”, in http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/34794/mdcs-dumbu-
preaches-peace.html, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
342 See Fingaz, 01 July 2011, “Why has Sibanda found a new home in Masvingo?” in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/8871-why-has-sibanda-found-a-new-home-in-
masvingo.html, Accessed 02 July 2011. 
343 See Chapter Four of this thesis for a pithy discussion on the connection between the JOC and ZANU-PF, 
as well as how their economic interests were also tied to what Minister of Finance Tendai Biti has 
characterised as “primitive accumulation.” For Biti’s argument see Newsday, 22 June 2011, “ZANU-PF 
engages in primitive accumulation of wealth”, in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-zanu-pf-
engages-in-primitive-accumulation-of-wealth, Accessed 27 June 2011. See also Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, pp 20-22. 
344 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The GPA as passive revolution”. 
345 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, p 
22, which says the military structures have been fingured in the illegal exports of gems via Mozambique, 
also two of the companies that are mining the diamonds were led by military officials and their main 
shareholders were also serving or ex-military. 
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opposition MDC. They also reinforced the fears the MDC had been raising of a military 
junta that had taken over the reins of power.346  
More importantly, they also unmasked the army as the source of power for Mugabe, 
and to some extent ZANU-PF. At another level, they also strengthened the rumours of 
power struggles within ZANU-PF, where the army was allegedly working with certain 
faction in ZANU-PF’s power struggle,347 in the battle to succeed Mugabe whose health 
had become an Achilles heel for the party.348 Such statements also helped to define 
ZANU-PF’s engagement with the other parties in the GNU, as well as international 
relations, most crucially with South Africa whose President was the SADC facilitator of 
the Zimbabwean dialogue. Not least of this is that these statements came immediately 
after the Livingstone and the Pretoria summits on Zimbabwe. 
At a very frightening level is that these statements potentially signified the strategy of 
violence in store for the citizens towards the elections envisaged for 2012 or 2013. 
According to Rupiya, there were unconfirmed sources from within the army that alleged 
that the senior military personnel were planning a bloody campaign to retain Mugabe in 
power. The plan allegedly involved the deployment of a massive 80 000 youth militia, 
war veterans and soldiers throughout the country ahead of the elections, who would be 
given the task to “unleash enough violence and terror, worse than that seen in the 
bloody 2008 presidential runoff poll….”, in order to ensure that a petrified electorate 
                                                 
346 See Tsvangirai’s comments in Thornycroft. P, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/06/mil-080610-voa08.htm, Accessed 01 July 
2011. See also Zimonline, “Interview: We are still under arrest”, 24 April 2009, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=4538, Accessed 29 June 2011, in which Gandhi 
Mudzingwa, a former personal aide to Tsvangirai calls it a “Civil-military junta”. See also comments by 
Welshman Ncube of the MDC-N, in Newsday, 27 June 2011, “Ncube blasts army generals”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-27-ncube-blasts-army-generals, Accessed 27 June 2011. See 
also see Zimbabwean Mail, 27 March 2011, in “Mugabe no longer in charge, Tsvangirai confirms 
Zimbabwe coup”in http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/7657-mugabe-nolonger-in-charge-
tsvangirai-confirms-zimbabwe-coup.html, accessed 03 July 2011. 
347 See metrozimbabwe, 03 June 2011,“Commander Chiwenga to take over from Mugabe”, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/commander-chiwenga-to-take-over-from-mugabe/, Accessed 03 
July 2011. 
348 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, see 
also  Zimonline, 28 June 2011, Brian Raftopoulos, “Opinion: Beyond Livingstone”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6740, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
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votes for Mugabe.349 The above resembled the deployment of the military under 
Operation Mavhoterapapi in 2008 aimed at both ensuring President Mugabe got re-
elected, and simultaneously punishing those who were found to have voted for the 
MDC.350 This seemed plausible considering also reports of the deployments of the 
military in several parts of the country in 2011, including in Gutu, Chitungwiza, Mbare 
and Budiriro,351 the restructuring of ZANU-PF structures under Air Vice Marshal 
Muchena, Operation Kubudirana Pachena by Sibanda in Masvingo, as well as the 
resuscitation of the NYS training camps across the country.352  
On the whole, this was pre-emptive talk, however not without substance, potentially 
pointing to another round where the Zimbabweans would vote without choosing, but 
merely rubberstamping and legitimating a farcical election, because the citizens’ 
(voters) pens cannot “fight the AK rifle”,353 in Mugabe’s language. The above again 
typified a potential “passive revolution” where the voters would participate in the 
voting process without being able to express their true interests but to rubber-stamp a 
ZANU-PF power retention project. 
Further to this there were arrests and intimidation of senior MDC-T officials. Most 
notable of these were the arrests in 2011 of Douglas Mwonzora in March, Minister Elton 
Mangoma in April, and Minister Jonathan Timba in June. In addition, Professor Jonathan 
Moyo also called for the arrest of Prime Minister Tsvangirai in June. Minister of Finance 
Tendai Biti’s house was bombed in May, and his office besieged by some war veterans 
over the issue of civil servants salaries.354 
                                                 
349 See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, “The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs”, pp 
26-27. 
350 Ibid, pp 14-17, for the military deployments in 2008 across the provinces and districts. 
351 See Zimonline, 18 January 2011; “MDC says military Deployed in rural Areas”, Accessed 19 January 
2011. 
352 See The Standard, 17 July 2011, “From the Editor's Desk: Obsession with polls stifles development”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30620-from-the-editors-desk-obsession-with-polls-stifles-
development.html, Accessed 25 July 2011. 
353 See The Herald, 23 June 2008. 
354 See Newsday, 29 June 2011, “Tsvangirai alarmed over attack on Biti”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-29-tsvangirai-alarmed, Accessed 29 June 2011. 
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Symbolic acts of intimidation by the army were also recorded in various parts of the 
country. In this regard drills were held in villages where peasants witnessed the power 
of the army.355  In Shurugwi military drills were held in the Mufiri area, for example, 
which sent shivers down the spine of the residents as these brought back memories of 
Operation how did you vote? Chilling accounts also emerged regarding how the JOC 
planned to revitalise structures of the 2008 violence by deploying military and CIO 
officials in the ten provinces and 59 districts in an effort to thwart the MDC and retain 
Mugabe in power.356 A more daring account is for Air Vice Marshal Henry Muchena who 
was quoted as telling the ZANU-PF Mashonaland Province that he and other army 
officers were “taking over” the party’s campaign in January 2011.357 
Related to this, the infamous bases that had been used to house perpetrators of 
violence between 2000 and 2008 were resurrected in many rural districts of the 
country.358 Much has been written about bases that were spread across the country, 
especially in 2008 in the run up to the Presidential re-run. They were also established in 
urban areas and were a little better than torture chambers. As such the rearing of the 
bases’ ugly heads as the country headed towards a very crucial election, aimed at not 
only ending the uneasy GNU marriage, but the very survival of ZANU-PF, demonstrated 
how far the party could go into people’s traumatised memories in order to try to keep 
afloat.   
                                                 
355 See Zimonline, 30 November 2010, “Soldiers hold drills in villages”, in http://www.zimonline.co.za/, 
Accessed 1 June 2011. See also The Herald, 01 August 2011, “Army presence in countryside normal — ZNA 
chief “, in http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17017:army-
presence-in-countryside-normal-zna-chief&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 02 August 2011. 
See also The Deccan Herald, 29 January 2011, Bangalore, India,  “Mugabe’s iron grip not about to loosen”, 
356 See Zimonline, 19 January 2011, “Military plot to keep Mugabe in power”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6529, Accessed 20 January 2011, for a frightening 
account of the plot. 
357 See http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?, Accessed 28 January 2011. See also the role of Henry 
Muchena in the ZANU-PF election directorate in “Military plot to keep Mugabe in power” in Zimonline, 19 
January 2011, cited in http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6529, Accessed 20 January 
2011. 
358 See “Zimbabwe Monitors: Destroy Bases”, in News24, 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/Zimbabwe-monitors-Destroy-militia-bases-20110601, 
Accessed 02 June 2011. See also “ZANU shifts into election mode”, in Zimonline, 02 June 2011, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6714, Accessed 03 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 339 
 
 
 
 
The utterances by the Brigadier-Generals could also be understood in terms of 
Foucault’s “modern” schema for analysing power, that is, in terms of “struggle and 
submission.”359 Basically under this theorisation, power is defined by the inversion of 
Clausewitz’s aphorism of war as a continuation of politics by other means to politics as a 
continuation of war, that is, as series of “struggles, conflict and war.”360 This means that 
power relations obtaining in any society “rest upon a definite relation of forces that is 
established at a determinate, historically specifiable moment, in a war and by war” (my 
emphasis). Again, with the end of physical war comes peace, and here also the role of 
political power is to continuously re-inscribe the relation of war “through a form of 
unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in social institutions, in economic inequalities, in 
language, in the bodies themselves of each and everyone of us.”361 At another level, this 
definition also implies that all political struggles will be ultimately decided by, and in, 
war.362 
 
ANTI-SANCTIONS DRIVE AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF VIOLENCE 
The signing of the anti-sanctions petitions also reinvigorated a strong “enemy” 
discourse, in Carl Schmitt’s language,363 against the MDC-T, which was generally cast as 
having invited the “illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the West.”364 Due to this 
                                                 
359 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings: 1972-1977, edited by Colin 
Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, Pantheon Books, New 
York, 1980, p 92. 
360 Ibid, p 90. 
361 Ibid, p 90. 
362 Ibid, p 91. 
363 See Carl Schmitt and G. Schwab, The concept of the political, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2007, p 19. According to Smitt, the ‘political’, which should not be confused with politics, but from which 
politics in the state emerge, is characterised by the friend/enemy binary. When taken to the extreme this 
binary becomes life or death binary, with friend meant to receive life and enemy set for death.  
364 See The Herald, 18 June 2011, “Indigenisation not punishing foreigners: PM”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12947:indigenisation-not-
punishing-foreigners-pm&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 18 June 2011. Also this comes out 
in  the official discourse propagated by the state controlled media, both ZBC TV and radio stations, and 
the print media houses, Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC-T are cast as having invited sanctions to the 
country and are also cast as working to retain them. See “Zimbabwe opposition group working with West 
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portrayal, the imprecations against the MDC, especially Morgan Tsvangirai, continued as 
did hate speech more generally against “sell-outs” and the West that was blamed for 
the illegal sanctions.365 These demonstrated the tensions that were at the heart of the 
GNU party members. The above view was reified by the absence of the MDC-T 
leadership at the official launch of the signing of the anti-sanctions petitions on the 3rd 
of March 2011.366 It was also underscored by the refusal by the MDC-T leadership to 
sign the anti-sanctions petition.367 The official reason for the signing of the sanctions 
petitions was to gather a total of two million signatures which would, in Webster 
Shamu’s words, “alert the world to the fact that Zimbabweans have spoken against the 
sanctions, that they are diabolic, unjustified and are affecting their economy.”368 After 
being signed in the various places the petitions were to be forwarded to President 
Mugabe for onward transmission to SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN).369   
However, the anti-sanctions campaign epitomised a ZANU-PF strategy for the envisaged 
2012 elections, in the same mode as the land reform was used at the turn of new 
millennium. Sanctions created an easy scapegoat for ZANU-PF, and they blamed it as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
on sanctions” says Wikilikeaks”, in 
http://redantliberationarmy.wordpress.com/category/zimbabwe/, Accessed 11 June 2011.See 
also The Herald, 13 February 2011, “Zimbabwe opposition working with the West on Sanctions–
Wikileaks”, in http://herald.co.zw, Accessed 11 June 2011.   
365 See The Standard, 12 June 2011, “Sunday View: Blaming Tsvangirai for sanctions baseless politics”, in 
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politics.html, Accessed 13 June 2011. 
366 See “Zimbabwe: Anti-sanctions campaign kicks off” in 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92090, Accessed 09 June 2011. See also The Herald, 28 
April 2011 “Zim now fed up with sanctions”, in, cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8707:zim-now-fed-up-with-
sanctions&catid=48:blogs&Itemid=155, Accessed 09 June 2011. See also “US rubbishes Mugabe sanctions 
petition” in http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6595, Accessed 04 March 2011. 
367 The reason given by the MDC-T for not attending the official launch of the anti-sanctions drive in 
March 2011, and for not signing the anti-sanctions petition is that the project was formulated as a ZANU-
PF programme. See The Herald, 16 June 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12777:biti-refuses-to-sign-
anti-sanctions-petition&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 17 June 2011.  
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monster on which all failure was rooted: be it economic, political or social, leading to 
the fetish of the anti-sanctions petition signing, a euphemism for another round of 
violent campaigning. The anti-sanctions petition signing also showed the ZANU-PF 
“Piedmont-type function” in the ensuing “passive revolution.”370 As Piedmont took a 
leading role during the Risorgimento, so did ZANU-PF in a matter of national 
significance. In the process it forced its political-economic worldview on the civil society 
and the general populace, especially on the role of the MDC in “inviting” the sanctions 
and the role the West played on the sanctions. This was also in terms of the role ZANU-
PF would play, as it had done in the Second and Third Chimurenga in fighting the 
machinations of Western imperialism, in fighting the sanctions. Suffice it to say that this 
stance ran counter to the spirit of the GPA that proposed a joint MDC-ZANU-PF effort in 
fighting off the sanctions. The cases of violence perpetrated by ZANU-PF during the 
petition-signing time also underscored the nature of the “revolution from above”, 
where the party tried to coerce people into toeing its line of social transformation.  
Shurugwi rural was not spared and anti-sanctions signing centres were established at 
most of the business centres, council offices and schools. From interviews, there were 
allegations that people were coerced to sign the petitions. Those who did not sign were 
painted as sell-outs. Most oral testimonies collected point to the fact that ZANU-PF 
officials of various ranks, the newly employed Ward Coordinators in the Ministry of 
Youth, and traditional leaders encouraged people in their respective areas of jurisdiction 
to sign the petition. Cases abound where residents were threatened with unspecified 
actions if they did not heed the calls. With the memories of Operation Mavhoterapapi of 
2008 still fresh in people’s minds, residents of Shurugwi rural rushed en masse to sign 
the petitions. I recorded two cases where ZANU-PF supporters beat up MDC supporters 
who had resisted signing the petition in Shurugwi. Both these cases were in Ward 19 
and by the same group of ZANU-PF supporters led by a District official. Zimbabwe Peace 
                                                 
370 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, p 83. By Piedmont-type role, I mean a 
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Project (ZPP), for example reported that “a ZANU-PF chairperson” beat up an MDC-T 
supporter who refused to sign the anti-sanctions petition.371  
Another case that I was informed of in Shurugwi was of “suspicious” strangers that 
visited Mukandapi shopping centre that was used for the signing of the anti-sanctions 
petitions. From the descriptions that they were “suspicious” and “interested” in the 
activities of the signing of the petition, it can be concluded that they could either be 
ZANU-PF officials or state security agents. More generally however, many cases involved 
verbal threats. 
Elsewhere, in Harare, IRIN News reported for example, that on the day of the launch of 
the anti-sanctions petition by President Mugabe, “Truckloads of militias escorted by 
army and police trucks descended on market stalls in the city and forced vendors to stop 
doing business. Some alleged they were beaten and ordered onto buses that 
transported them to the rally.”372 More generally, the anti-sanctions petition-signing 
campaign occurred in the  background of the rise in politically motivated violence. It can 
also be looked at as another campaign gimmick by ZANU-PF that offered it an excuse to 
violate people’s rights. Indeed, reports by the ZPP indicate that people across the 
country were coerced to attend rallies organised by ZANU-PF ostensibly to educate 
them on the importance of signing the petition.373 Reports also alluded to the extensive 
violations of people’s rights by the army, youth militia and war veterans across the 
country. The most notable of these was Jabulani Sibanda who terrorised Masvingo 
province, especially Gutu district, compelling people to sign the petition.374 
 
                                                 
371 See “Summary of politically-motivated Human rights and Food-related violations, February 2011” by 
the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), 18 March 2011, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZPP_FEBRUARY__2011__REPORT_SUMMARY.pdf, Accessed 
09 June 2011, p 5. 
372 See http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92090, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
373 See “Summary of politically-motivated Human rights and Food-related violations, February 2011” by 
the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), 18 March 2011, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZPP_FEBRUARY__2011__REPORT_SUMMARY.pdf, Accessed 
09 June 2011, p 18. 
374 Ibid, p 8. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that there was unfinished business from 2008 in the 
“post-violence” period, between 2009 and 2011 in Shurugwi. The era showed clearly 
that there was enforced artificial unity in the GNU, and that there was incomplete 
political transition. Rather the acrimonious relations between ZANU-PF and the former 
opposition parties, MDC-T and MDC-N continued. This not only threatened the shaky 
economic recovery and political stability, but it dampened the hopes raised with the 
signing of the GPA, and the formation of the GNU. This also threatened to return the 
country to the dark days of open violence. The GNU programmes of finding a 
transitional justice under ONHRI and formulating a new constitution under COPAC did 
not help matters either. At the village level, the structures that were accused of 
fomenting and sustaining violence remained largely untransformed and a potential 
threat. Thus fear remained widespread. Many victims remained bitter, and were 
demanding justice and that justice had to be seen to be done. At another level, some of 
the alleged perpetrators were trying to reach out to their victims in an effort to 
normalise relations. Yet other perpetrators were allegedly being afflicted by ngozi or 
avenging spirits that demanded they compensate their victims.  
On the whole, the period showed that there was a problem that was carried forward 
from 2000 to 2008 that needed to be stamped out. On the other hand, however, the 
fact that people were talking about compensating each other for the violations suffered 
in the 2000 to 2008 period provides a window of opportunity that the district and 
possibly the whole country need to adopt to help put to rest the demon of political 
violence, especially between neighbours. This will be articulated further in the next 
chapter devoted to transitional justice for the district, and more broadly for the other 
rural districts of Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  KURIPA NGOZI AND THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
SHURUGWI RURAL DISTRICT THROUGH “TRADITIONAL”1 MEANS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
During the course of my field work I came across several cases scattered across the 
district of alleged ngozi (avenging spirits) related to the 2000-2008 political violence. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, some of these included mysterious deaths in war veterans’ 
families, unexplained illnesses, as well as cases of some alleged perpetrators who had 
gone mad. There was also a case in which a family’s three assets were attacked by a 
“single stroke of lightning.” In this case the family’s cooking hut, the family’s sentinel 
shed and cattle pen were all struck at almost the same time allegedly in one stroke of 
lightning. The shed in the field is more than two kilometres away from the family 
homestead, while the cattle pen is at least two hundred metres from the cooking hut.  
For the locals in Shurugwi, these cases and others to be looked at in the course of this 
chapter defy ordinary conceptualisations. For the locals these cases were the products 
of supernatural forces of witchcraft and ngozi, instigated by the victims of the just-
ended violent episode, who sought revenge. Whilst one may discern some elements of 
lack of rationality in the allegations, what comes out, however, is the notion of kuripa 
ngozi. Of significance in this call for kuripa ngozi is the conceptualisation of justice in the 
locals’ worldview. Kuripa ngozi enables an opening into “conditions of possibility” and 
“conditions immanent in a particular system of thought”2 of the locals. This incorporates 
Shurugwi people’s perceptions of the truth, the way the violence of the 2000-2008 era 
has to be concluded and how the locals project their view for how the healing is to be 
                                                 
1 Cognisant of the abuses and inventions of traditions, I am using the term traditional in the mode of 
“those cultural elements and practices that are directly connected to the past: super organic, bounded, 
static, transgenerational, ‘things’ or practices that can be inherited or passed from generation to 
generation.” See Lisa Gilman, “Traditionalisation of women’s dancing, hegemony, and politics in Malawi”, 
in Journal of Folklore Research, Vol 41, No 1, January-April 2004, p 33, cited in 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jfr/summary/v041/41.1gilman.html, Accessed 12 June 2012. 
2 See Jacques Ranciere, The politics of aesthetics, p 50. 
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carried out. In this case this will be through the perpetrators acknowledging culpability, 
seeking forgiveness and compensating their victims (kuripa ngozi). This is in tandem 
with ONHRI’s vision as enunciated in its Concept paper, its Green Paper. In it, ONHRI, 
inter-alia, alluded to the need for the “recognition and reinforcement” of “traditional 
means and cultural mechanisms of settling disputes/conflicts” in the quest for a 
transitional justice mechanism.3  
In the main, this chapter would like to posit that kuripa ngozi together with the other 
occult practices and beliefs to be discussed are a part of Shurugwi people’s “common 
sense”, in Gramsci’s terms (herein-after without quotes). Thus besides articulating the 
cases related to these occult practices from Shurugwi (and from Zimbabwe), as well as 
attempting to discuss the potential of kuripa ngozi as a transitional justice (TJ) 
mechanism for Shurugwi following the violence of the 2000-2008 period, this chapter 
would also like to deploy Gramsci’s concept of “common sense” as a useful tool in 
unravelling these people’s belief systems that in a huge way fashion their worldview.  
The common sense notion was developed by Gramsci as a double critique of the 
Enlightenment tradition that looked down upon the common people as bereft of any 
sense and of the pre-enlightenment notion that uncritically celebrated their worldview 
as philosophy.4 According to Gramsci, common sense, “spontaneous philosophy” or 
“everyday philosophy” refers to the “conception of the world which is uncritically 
absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral 
individuality of the average man is developed.”5 Because it is philosophy by the “man on 
the street”, common sense is dynamic (in time and space), deeply penetrative, 
“fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural 
position of those masses whose philosophy it is.”6 This makes it “an ambiguous, 
                                                 
3 Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI), “Concept Paper”, p 22. 
4 See MSS Pandian, The Image trap:  MG Ramachandran in film and politics, Sage Publications, New Dehli, 
1992. p 5. 
5 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, p 419. 
6 Ibid, p 419. 
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contradictory and multiform concept”7 that is “embedded, incoherent and (composed 
of) spontaneous beliefs and assumptions characterizing the conformist thinking of the 
mass of people in a given social order.” 8 It is a product of fragments of “superstition, 
folklore, simple religious beliefs and the deposits of previous philosophy.”9 It is also 
established by the ruling class hegemony, and is naturalised and universalised, which 
results in their being taken for granted as “the way things are”10 in a society. 
Clifford Geertz however contends that common sense is a “relatively organised body of 
considered thought rather than just what anyone clothed and in his right mind knows,” 
whose major function  is the “immediate deliverance of experience, and not deliberated 
reflections upon it.”11 He further argues that common sense is equal to a cultural system 
that has a genealogy, hence, it can be put through epistemological discursive framing, 
that is, “can be questioned, disputed, affirmed, developed, formalised, contemplated, 
even taught…”12 Regarding hegemonic orders, Gramsci identified “theistic, Ptolematic, 
anthropomorphic, and anthropocentric beliefs.”13 An important aspect about common 
sense is that it contains “good sense",14 out of which, and in an important genealogy, 
emerges “philosophy and science.”15 On the whole, common sense is an important 
framework that enables an understanding “of the part played by culture, [together with] 
consciousness and ideology, rather than political and economic structures alone, in 
shaping and transforming society.”16 It is also crucial to highlight the fact that because it 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p 423. 
8 http://faculty.washington.edu/cbehler/glossary/commonsense.html, Accessed 4 March 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
10 http://faculty.washington.edu/cbehler/glossary/commonsense.html, Accessed 4 March 2012 
11 See Clifford Geertz, “Common sense as a cultural system”, in The Antioch Review, Vol 33, No 1, 1975, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4637616, Accessed 6 March 2012. 
12 Ibid, p 8. 
13 See Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “Gramsci, Good Sense, and Critical Folklore Studies”, in Journal of 
Folklore Studies, Indiana University Press, Vol 47, No 3, 2010, p 230. 
14 Good sense is defined as “practical empirical common sense”, that is less fragmented and is more 
coherent , see Antonio Gramsci, Selections of the prison notebooks, p 323. 
15 Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “Gramsci, Good Sense, and Critical Folklore Studies”, p 231. 
16 http://faculty.washington.edu/cbehler/glossary/commonsense.html, Accessed 4 March 2012. 
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contains “good sense” it is not necessarily retrogressive hence it is an important site for 
the subaltern classes to contest hegemonic discourses or dominant ideologies.17 
Drawing once again from Gramsci’s “passive revolution” is instructive in the discussion 
of the common sense-based kuripa ngozi. As discussed in Chapter Five, the GPA and the 
GNU were products of the “revolution from above” initiated by SADC, the African Union, 
as well as the weight of the domestic violence on the part of the MDCs, and a 
debilitating economic crisis for ZANU-PF.18 As such they neither represented the true 
wishes of these belligerent political formations that made up the GNU nor the ordinary 
Zimbabweans. Going forward, I would also like to contend that the GNU also tried to 
institute a passive revolution of its own regarding the search for a TJ through the ONHRI. 
The ONHRI, which itself was born out of Article V11 of the GPA, was supposed to 
coordinate the efforts in the search for a TJ. It represented “state intervention [that] 
undermine[d] the capacity of popular forces to develop their own autonomous politics 
and to organise alternative hegemonic alliances”19 in the search for a TJ. Because it was 
a product of the elitist “bastard” government that was characterised by reformations, 
accommodation and tenuous coexistence, it also ignored the needs of the people at the 
local levels.  
It is with the above contention that I seek to posit for kuripa ngozi-based TJ, because 
ultimately “a people are the ideas they believe and practice- the worldviews they 
embody and around which they construct identities.”20 Be that as it may, I am not 
completely discounting the role the state can play in the TJ. To begin with, ideally, the 
concept of the state, in the Hobbesian sense, emanates from the desire for justice and 
common good of its citizens who share a common history, culture and a common 
destiny.21 This is also not an attempt to reduce the potential contribution of the modern 
                                                 
17 MSS Pandian, MG Ramachandran in film and politics, p 6. 
18 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a passive revolution”. 
19 Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement  as a ‘passive revolution’”. 
20 See Stephen Olbrys Gencarella, “Gramsci, good sense and critical folklore studies”, p 223. 
21 I thank Ajay Skaria for alerting me to the need to highlight this aspect. See also Ajay Skaria, “Gandhi’s 
politics: Liberalism and the question of the Ashram”, in South Atlantic Quarterly, 101:4, Fall 2002, p 956. 
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prosecutorial transitional justice mechanisms that may deal a blow to the state and 
party agents’ impunity. In fact, as illustrated in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the traditional 
methods were used in combination with the modern ones. 
 
WHAT IS NGOZI? 
Ngozi, according to John Mbiti, are spirits that come from relatives or strangers, who 
were murdered, were wronged or those with a vendetta to make. These avenging 
spirits, as Mbiti continues, come from the people who were improperly buried or were 
offended before they died which causes serious misfortunes that require the living to 
make sacrifices to appease them.22  Ngozi should, however, not be seen as retributive. 
Rather, it performs a positive function of seeking redress for wrongs or murder through 
revealing a concealed crime, its perpetrator, the victim and his bloodline, as well as the 
form of restoration required.23 It also seeks restoration through pushing the wrongdoer 
to restore the value of the loss for the victim and his family.24  
At another level, and the mode in which I want to use ngozi in this chapter, is that 
besides referring to murder, ngozi also refers to any crime that requires settlement and 
possibly restitution. To Chivaura, the loss of land and the violence that accompanied it in 
2000-2008 could be understood in the context of the avenging spirit of Nehanda, who, 
just before her execution, declared that “(her) bones shall rise”, intimating that she 
would invoke her spirit to punish the whites.25 Similarly, the intermittent and 
internecine violence in post-colonial Zimbabwe has been explained as ngozi by the 
national spirits that seek the nation to cleanse itself of the violence of the past, 
                                                 
22 John S Mbiti, African religion, p 83. 
23 See Tafataona Mahoso, “Ngozi: the philosophical foundation of African Living Law”, in The Sunday Mail, 
5-11 February 2012. 
24 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, p 5. 
25 The Standard, 23 May 2010, “Ngozi: primitive superstition or reality?” in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/24789-ngozi-primitive-superstition-or-reality.html, Accessed 05 
January   2011.  See also Rev Dr Leveee Kadenge, “No forgiveness without restitution” in The Standard, 10 
April 2010, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/letters/29218-no-forgiveness-without-restitution.html, 
Accessed 01 July 2010. 
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especially related to the Second Chimurenga, and to thank them for assisting the nation 
to gain independence.26 
Tirivangana sharpens Chivaura’s definition, and says “ngozi is essentially a crime of 
depriving one group of their asset/s (tangible or intangible) … it is to commit a crime 
especially of a sanguinary nature, that is, which involves the shedding of blood 
(archetypal ngozi).”27 Once blood has been shed the spirit of the murdered comes to 
demand compensation.28 Among the the pre-colonial Karanga and Korekore people this 
was usually in the form of women and cattle.  
A crucial aspect of ngozi is that it is linked to both social and economic productions. In 
this way murder for example is considered in terms of a loss of economic productivity to 
a family. At one and the same time it is again a loss in the family’s reproduction line. The 
same can also be said of other crimes which negate either of production or 
reproduction.  
The notion of ngozi is based on the belief that the “living dead” metamorphose into 
super-spiritual beings who become interlocutors between the living and god.29 It is thus 
linked to biological and economic production. Death represented the end of these 
productive lines. Because of this, the women and cattle used as compensation were 
supposed to revive economic and family [re]productive capacities. Because of this link, 
                                                 
26 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, pp 13-15.  
27 See Augustine Tirivangana, “The metaphysical scope of Ngozi”, in The standard, 29 May 2010, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/24857-the-metaphysical-scope-of-ngozi-.html, Accessed 01 July 
2011. 
28 See John S Mbiti, African religion and philosophy, Heinemann, London,1969, p 83. 
29 Ibid, p 83. The concept of the living-dead is properly explained by Tirivangana, who says that death in 
the African indigenous sense is not about “extinction” but is about “transition”. This is where “the rite of 
passage” occurs where the spirit leaves the body (flesh) and it (spirit) transcends into a “higher and purer 
form of existence.” And, this spirit is always around the living. See Augustine Tirivangana, “The 
metaphysical scope of Ngozi”, in The Standard, 29 May 2010, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/24857-the-metaphysical-scope-of-ngozi-.html, Accessed 01 July 
2011. See also Jens A Andersson, “Sorcery in the era of ‘Henry IV’: Kinship, mobility and mortality in 
Buhera District, Zimbabwe”, in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol 8, No 3, September 
2002, p 428, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3134534, Accessed 14 March 2011, who says that in the 
Shona cosmology when a person dies, he reincarnates as a spirit (mweya) that continues to influence the 
lives of the living. See also David Lan, Guns and Rain, who posits similarly. 
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in the pre-colonial Karanga and Korekore groups, female fecundity determined lineage 
reproduction and was mythically closely associated with the fertility of the land and rain 
making powers.30 Female fertility determined lineage reproduction, hence women 
“were key to the foundation of the kingdom or chiefdom.”31 At another level, “lineage 
sterility, or the failure to reproduce biologically, was associated with the sterility of the 
land.”32 Ultimately also the number of children a woman had also determined the 
family’s wealth production.   
Pathisa Nyati says that among the Ndebele, ngozi is usually manifested through the 
death of family members of the murderer until the perpetrator pays compensation.33 
However, ngozi manifests itself in several other ways. In some cases perpetrators or 
their families suffer innumerable misfortunes, like madness or loss of jobs, wealth and 
property such as cattle. They may also suffer divorces, ill luck, sickness or loss of 
spouses. For some, their children may fail to find marriage partners. In other instances 
ngozi manifests itself in dreams and visions that beset the perpetrator or perpetrator’s 
family member.34 At other times it manifests itself through possessing a relative of the 
perpetrator who then re-enacts the murder, which pushes the families of the 
perpetrator and victim into negotiations over compensation.35  
In Moses Chokuda’s ngozi story from Gokwe district in 2009-2011, various accounts also 
emanated about the ngozi. It is reported for example that the public prosecutor who 
tried to cover up the murder died mysteriously, while the presiding Magistrate went 
mad for the same reason. It was also alleged that at times the corpse would disappear 
from the morgue when the state wanted to perform a pauper’s burial. Yet other 
accounts say that as many as ten police officers failed to lift his coffin for the pauper 
                                                 
30 See Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, traders and wives, p 26-27. 
31 Ibid, p 26. 
32 Ibid p 27. 
33 Pathisa Nyati, cited in The Standard, 23 May 2010, “Ngozi: primitive superstition or reality?” in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/24789-ngozi-primitive-superstition-or-reality.html, Accessed 05 
January   2011.   
34 See also Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing silences, Baobab, Harare, 1997, pp 29, 30, and 36, for example 
in which Munashe constantly sees ghosts of the woman and baby he killed. 
35 See The Sunday Mail, 12-18 February 2012, “Kupemba’s lone battle”. 
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burial. Other accounts also state that the body still dripped fresh blood three years after 
his murder (he was murdered on 22 March 2009 and buried in 2011). Yet others point to 
the fact that at times Moses could be seen seated by the mortuary door.36 
The reason why ngozi affects other family members is because in the “traditional” 
Shona set-up, all assets, material, tangible and intangible (including ancestors and life), 
were shared by the family. In like manner, a deprivation of any asset, either through 
murder, injury or loss, signified a loss to the whole family and a curse to the ancestors.37 
Similarly, compensation also signified compensation to the whole family.38 In an answer 
to the central and polarising question: If ngozi exists, why can’t all people who were 
murdered haunt their killers? Nyati says:  
Ngozi is not in-born. It does not happen automatically. Certain things have to 
happen for it to take place…… The family has to resurrect the spirit of the 
deceased. They can do this by performing rituals on the corpse before burial or 
they can carry them on the grave. Medicine is involved. Others make sure that 
family members can always avenge for their murders by putting medicine 
through incisions (nyora) on their bodies when they are still alive.39 
While Nyati’s explanation holds water, there have also been cases where avenging 
spirits have wreaked havoc on the perpetrators’ families without being invoked. To this 
extent there have been cases where families of the deceased had to be sought out by 
the perpetrators in order to make amends; and these families knew nothing, up until 
that point, of the ngozi activity. In the literary work, Echoing Silences, Alexander 
Kanengoni, demonstrates this clearly when the Mungates from Mhondoro, the family of 
the former guerrilla Munashe who had brutally murdered a woman and her baby, 
sought out Rudo’s family from Nyanga to settle the ravaging ngozi.40 In other instances, 
as The Sunday Mail reported in the Gilbert Kupemba case, relatives of the perpetrators 
                                                 
36 Based on discussions held with Gokwe Town residents at Gokwe centre, October 2011.  
37 See Jocelyn Alexander, Joann Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory, p 11. They say that 
epidemics, droughts and outbreaks of diseases were ancestral curses. 
38 See Augustine Tirivangana, “The metaphysical scope of Ngozi”. 
39 The Standard 23 May 2010, “Ngozi: Primitive superstition or reality?” 
40 See Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing Silences, Baobab, Harare, 1997. 
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may also be possessed by the murdered’s ngozi spirit leading to its exposure.41 A similar 
case comes from Buhera where Sosana Mhongoyo also discovered her son’s murderers 
through one of the murderers’ (Basopo’s) sister being possessed by Chokuda’s spirit.42 
In Echoing silences, Kanengoni also discusses how the avenging spirit of Rudo possessed 
Munashe some 23 years after her murder.43 
The first theme that is cutting through the notion of ngozi is that it is not an esoteric 
belief system for Shurugwi and the Shona. As Nyati and Mbiti have shown, it is also an 
Ndebele, and an East African belief system. Secondly, and more importantly, its central 
ethos is the revelation of crimes and the desire to acquire justice for the victims 
especially through various forms of restitution, which help to buttress the notion that 
lasting peace is based on owning up and paying compensation or by appeasement which 
is the thesis of this chapter.  
As Augustine Tirivangani cited in The Standard, 22 May 2010, says, there are five types 
of ngozi. These are: archetypal ngozi, which is directly linked to murder; marital ngozi, 
which occurs when a woman commits suicide in her marital home; transactional ngozi, 
which is related to credits, for example in the past Shona societies men who could not 
pay lobola would work for several years as payment for their women in a practice called 
kutema ugariri. However, if they were to die before they received their women, they 
would come back as ngozi. Fourthly, is political ngozi, where territorial spirits 
encouraged guerrillas to fight during the Second Chimurenga; and, ethical ngozi, which 
occurs when children abuse their mother (kutanda botso.)44 Together with other occult 
                                                 
41 See The Sunday Mail, 12-18 February 2012, “Kupemba’s lone battle”. 
42 Walter Marwizi and Caiphas Chimhete, “Zimbabwe: Avenging spirits torment ZANU-PF terror militia” 
cited in http:www.africancrisis.co.za/Article.php?,ID=76100&, accessed 30 January 2011. 
43 Alexander Kanengoni, Echoing Silences, p 77. 
44 See Augustine Tirivangana, “Towards a theory of Africa centred metaphysics: A critical exploration of 
the Ngozi theme in selected Zimbabwe fiction”, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Zimbabwe, cited in 
The Standard, 23 May 2010. 
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practices of witchcraft and sorcery, ngozi is argued to be at the heart of “life forces”, 
that is, fertility, sex, disease and death in Zimbabwe.45 
On the whole, ngozi, by seeking restoration against unfair treatment for the victims, as 
Muwati, et al, perceive it, is an indigenous instrument symbolising the inevitable and 
indispensible demand for truth and justice.”46 In the current theme of this dissertation, 
this speaks to the crimes of political violence committed which demand to be revealed 
and told, and justice then served for the victims.  Regarding this, the central goal would 
be to target the delivery of justice at the family level, as well as the larger community 
level, which in the Shona setup, represents a larger family. As I demonstrated in 
Chapters Three and Four, it was at these levels that most of the violence was played out 
by local actors. 
 
KURIPA NGOZI AND THE EVERYDAY IN SHURUGWI 
The idiom “mushonga wengozi kuripa” is common in the everyday language in Shurugwi 
and it provides an important foundation of the social relations and constitutes an 
important aspect of the people’s worldview of this district, as in other larger parts of 
Shona-speaking Zimbabwe. In this way it is a strong constituent of the Gramscian 
common sense. Literally translated, it means that the only way to appease an avenging 
spirit is by accepting culpability and restoring previous relations. Taken in the everyday, 
it refers to the need to own up to one’s wrongs by acknowledging, showing contrition to 
and or compensating for the wrongs committed. While ngozi or avenging spirits affect 
people who would have killed other people, this idiom is extendable to any kind of 
crime or transgression that people commit on others in the everyday. Loosely extended 
it means, for example, that one has to pay for damages, or, replace what he destroys to 
retain previous balance.  
                                                 
45 See Jens A Andersson, “Sorcery, in the era of ‘Henry IV’”, p 425 
46 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, Echoing silence, p 11. 
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In this way it is a restorative justice mechanism that seeks to “restore damage, loss or 
harm engendered by criminal behaviour.”47 As we have already highlighted, ngozi and 
the related crimes are associated with loss of reproduction for which it becomes 
imperative they are atoned. While it focuses largely on the satisfaction of the victim’s 
needs, it also concerns itself with the “building of bridges” between the wrongdoer and 
the aggrieved through “cooperative and participatory efforts.”48 Thus while the essence 
of restoration is to enable victims to cope with loss, it is also aimed at the two parties to 
continue to live together in peace. Thus as Ani, cited in Muwani et al, has posited for 
other indigenous African conflict resolution mechanisms, kuripa ngozi is rooted in 
harmony. In his words “the determining mode of African worldview is harmony. The 
point is that of discovering the point of harmonious interaction, so that interferences 
become neutralised, allowing constructive energy to flow and be received.”49  
As already alluded to, in the pre-colonial past and in the case of murder under kuripa 
ngozi, for example, the family of the deceased was normally given livestock, or livestock 
plus an unmarried woman, as compensation. These restored the economic and social 
production and reproductive capacities lost with the murder. Cattle were paid to restore 
the economic value of the deceased. This was not surprising because cattle formed (and 
they still form) the basis of wealth among the Shona, and were also a measure of 
wealth. The young woman, it was assumed, would help with the [re]production, which 
helped to extend the deceased family line. The children born of the woman belonged to 
the deceased, who was assumed to continue living albeit in a spiritual form. The 
children were also supposed to continue the work the deceased was engaging in, hence 
continue the economic and social line of production of the slain victim. This is based on 
the Shona everyday philosophy that says munhu haarovi, meaning that death is not 
final. Instead, it represents a transition into a higher and purer spiritual life that looks 
                                                 
47 See Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences as a Paradigm for 
Restorative Justice in Post-conflict Zimbabwe: A Philosophical Discourse”, in Zambezia, XXXIII, p 4. 
48 Ibid, p 4. 
49 M. Ani, Let the Circle be Unbroken: The Implications of African Spirituality in the 
Diaspora“, cited in Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences”, p 5. 
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after the living.50 This completes the ubuntu transformation stages, from the unborn, 
the living and the living-dead.51 Although debatable, the livestock and the women in 
some sense enabled social and economic restoration between aggrieving families.  
Thus this form of justice was (and is) also assumed to appease both the living and the 
“living-dead”. The importance of pleasing the living-dead is well captured in the words 
of Ramose: 
The living dead are important to the upkeep and protection of the family of the 
living. This is also true with regard to the community at large. For this reason, it 
is imperative for the leader of the community, together with the elders of the 
community, to have good relations with their living dead. This speaks to the 
ubuntu understanding of cosmic harmony.52  
In this way kuripa ngozi rendered various possibilities besides restorative justice: firstly, 
it offered a coping mechanism for both the victims and perpetrators. Secondly, it 
allowed the two parties involved and their community spiritual healing. It also afforded 
the perpetrators the opportunity to reconcile with the victim’s family and themselves. It 
also enabled perpetrators to be reintegrated into their communities.  
However, in the unmediated form kuripa ngozi represented the problematic of the 
transfer of patriarchal control over fertile women. In the present such transfers would 
be illegal under the Domestic Violence Act. This illegality therefore, might make kuripa 
ngozi an unstable foundation for the development of a TJ system. However, I am not 
envisaging such unmediated importation of the concept. Rather, I am using ngozi in its 
broadest sense as defined by Chivaura as those crimes that require restitution for the 
basis of the TJ method of kuripa ngozi. In this regard, perpetrators acknowledge their 
wrongs, and for appeasement they would utilise forms of compensation that would not 
include women, girls or indeed any humans.  
                                                 
50 See Augustine Tirivangana, “The metaphysical scope of Ngozi”, for a nuanced discussion of this 
transition. 
51 Dani Wadada Nabudere, “Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation” p 4. 
52 M. Ramose, cited in Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences”, p 13. 
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This idiom, and the possible justice it espouses in terms of restoration is relevant in the 
context of the district (and country) that has recently emerged from the horror of 
militarised political violence where the violence had then cascaded to the lower tiers of 
society including neighbours and family members by 2008.53  In Chapter Four, I discuss 
how violence, although engineered by the JOC, was executed at the village level.54 This 
mechanism of kuripa ngozi seems suitable because it targets the provision of 
transitional justice at the village level. Its potential to target the majority of the cases 
makes it even more desirable. 
By trying to argue for a mechanism that targets the villages, I am positing for one that 
directly targets the theatre where the violence was played out. It is a historically 
transmitted transitional justice mechanism that is known, as already discussed, not only 
in Shurugwi, but in most parts of Zimbabwe as well as in other parts of Africa. In 
Shurugwi it is rooted in the village or community attempts at mediating in cases of 
disputes where all adults gather especially on chisi (rest days) and adjudicate on cases 
under the leadership of village heads, headmen or chiefs.55 In the pre-colonial past 
these assemblies had power over all cases emerging within their areas of jurisdiction, 
including, but not limited to, murder, domestic disputes, and disagreements of 
whatever kind, either civil or criminal cases.  It is vital to say that it was only chiefs who 
had power over life and death, with village heads referring to the chiefs such higher 
order cases. However, because of the fear of ngozi, the death sentence was sparingly 
                                                 
53 For a detailed discussion of this see Chapter Four of this thesis. 
54 See also Organ for national Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, (ONHRI), “Concept paper”, p 12. 
55 As discussed in the General Introduction, of the traditional leadership positions at headmen and chief 
levels in the district of Shurugwi are occupied by men. However, there are significant females who occupy 
positions within the headmen or chiefs councils and positions of village heads, which is a position lower in 
rank to the headmen. Participation at these community courts is also free and anyone is given the 
platform to contribute whether they are female or male. 
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used.56 In the colonial and post-colonial times, these assemblies have been divested of 
powers over murders and their jurisdiction has largely been restricted to civil matters.57 
It is also important to highlight the fact that besides the material compensation, the 
process of kuripa ngozi enables dialogue between the aggrieved and the perpetrator. 
This is usually at gatherings that bring together the two families, spirit mediums and the 
avenging spirit. This is in the form of Family Group Conferencing where the aggrieved, 
the perpetrator and the larger community interface and dialogue.58 In the process an 
account of what happened is laid out through the perpetrator accepting the crime. In 
the murder-based ngozi, the “truth” comes out through an ngozi host, who is usually a 
relative of the perpetrator who is possessed by the spirit of the victim, who re-enacts 
the murder scene.59 Following this re-enactment, the perpetrator accepts culpability. 
Perpetrators also ask for forgiveness, which, in Muwati et al’s words cited earlier, 
enables the “building of bridges” between the concerned parties that lays the 
foundation for the compensation and long lasting peace. In addition, the performance 
of certain rituals pertaining to cleansing also ensures that the ngozi spirit is brought to 
rest with its family whence it begins to look after the living, thus reuniting the hitherto 
avenging spirit with the living.60  
At another level the participation of communities in the search for lasting peace and 
justice renders them active, rather than as passive recipients of top-down government 
or NGO-sponsored healing methods. This subverts the “passive revolution” introduced 
by the government-sponsored ONHRI, and the other methods, such as “Tree of life” (to 
                                                 
56 Tafataona Mahoso, “Ngozi: the philosophical foundations of African Living Law” in The Sunday Mail, 5-
11 February 2012.  
57 The powers that traditional leaders have assumed between the colonisation of the country in 1890 and 
the present has largely been mediated by their relationship with the state. For a detailed discussion of the 
metamorphosis of this relationship, see G.C Passmore, Hidden Conflict: A Documentary record of 
Administrative Policy in colonial Zimbabwe, 1950-1980, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2002, and The 
Traditional Leaders Act, for more details.  
58 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, p 4. 
59 Tafataona Mahoso, “Ngozi: the philosophical foundation of African Living Law”, in The Sunday Mail, 5-
11 February 2012. 
60 See Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences”, p 14. 
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be discussed later) that NGOs are trying to import and adapt for the country, through 
the bottom-up participation at the villages. As Woodward, Hayes and Minkley have said, 
“performative acts like playing, dance, or metaphysical discourses of the marginalised or 
othered- curses, spells, spirit or ancestor connections- also incorporate their own 
genealogies of voices.”61 
As discussed in Chapter Five, during my field research it became clear there was pent-up 
anger and those who had been victimised needed to see that some measure of justice 
was done in the district. The formal end to the hostilities as enunciated in the GPA and 
its sequel, the GNU, were inadequate in ending the tensions that belied normalcy in the 
district. People still harboured hatred, grudges and suspicions against their neighbours. 
More importantly, many looked forward to some form of compensation, which 
visibilised justice. This was particularly strengthened by the need to mend and heal the 
wounds of that violence that occurred between close relatives and work-mates whose 
bonds remained ruptured by 2011.  
The CCJP/LRF words, although written primarily for Matebeleland and the Midlands 
following gukurahundi, encapsulate what I established: “there are many problems that 
remain in communities as a result of what happened, in particular from the murders and 
beatings…” Also, as the report proceeds:  
Some tell of how members of their families were taken at night and have never 
been seen again. Many individuals have to live with physical injuries, which 
means that they cannot work well in their fields, or travel easily on buses…And 
still others lost homesteads or possessions and have been poor ever since. There 
is still much pain in the communities as a result of what happened. This affects 
not only the bodies, but the hearts and minds of those who suffered. Some 
people are bitter….62 
                                                 
61 See Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, eds, “Introduction”, Deep HiStories: Gender 
and colonialism in Southern Africa, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, 2002, p xxiii.  
62 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Rights Foundation (LRF), Breaking the 
silence, Building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988, 
CCJP and LRF, Harare, 1995, p 8. 
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 Also, as the Heal Zimbabwe Trust says for the post-2008 violence, “thousands of people 
were traumatised and needed support urgently. They are failing to cope; some lost 
bread winners and children witnessed their parents being beaten to death.”63 These 
wounds in Shurugwi might be reopened in the envisaged elections, and in the future. 
Suffice to say that election times have witnessed the worst human rights violations, 
especially from 2000, though the genealogy can be traced from the 1980s through to 
the 1990s.64 This ugly pattern was worst seen in the 2000 parliamentary elections, the 
2002 presidential elections and the infamous June 2008 presidential election rerun, 
which saw a low-scale war declared on the population under Operation Mavhoterapapi 
(Operation who did you vote for)?, and Operation Tsuro negwenzi (Operation attack the 
hunted and those who shelter them).65 Such a legacy needs to be corrected through a 
transitional justice mechanism that caters for the needs of the community at various 
levels: their common sense beliefs, justice needs and above all, that helps to reconcile 
and reintegrate the communities. The traditional concept of kuripa ngozi might also be 
built upon the uneasy “negative peace”66 obtaining, under the auspices of the GPA, but 
one that has strong potential to rupture once elections scheduled to occur “soon” 
materialise. 
The demands by the victims for restorative justice which appeared reasonable, 
however, faced severe challenges. Chief of which were the problems that beset the 
Inclusive Government which appeared ambivalent and at times at odds with such 
demands. This is despite the fact that Article Seven and Article 18.5 of the Global 
                                                 
63 See Heal Zimbabwe Trust, cited in The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing 
formula”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-.html, 
Accessed 10 July 2011. 
64 See earlier discussion in Chapter Three on the correlation between elections and violence in Shurugwi. 
See also Daniel Compagnon and John Makumbe, Behind the smokescreen, and the numerous human 
rights reports including, Tony Reeler, Subliminal terror? p 6. 
65 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity: What prospects for a new beginning in 
Zimbabwe, 29 July 2008, Durban. 
66 Negative peace has been described by Yasmin Louise Sooka, “The politics of transitional justice” in 
Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The Dilemma of transitional Justice in Africa, 
UKZN Press, Scottsville, 2009, p 24, as aimed at ending violence without addressing the root cause of the 
conflict, as such does not promote lasting peace and it does not also promote lasting unity as the reasons 
for earlier conflict are not addressed. 
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Political Agreement called upon the government to establish some kind of transitional 
justice mechanism, and the prosecution of all offenders of the politically motivated 
violence between March and June 2008.67  
However, this should not be surprising because there has not been a complete political 
transition in the country.68 As the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF) aver, this 
incomplete transition is manifested through “the continued political tensions, the non-
reformed judiciary and security sectors, the continued existence of a partisan media and 
a general impunity for ZANU-PF supporters and members even for violations carried 
after the signing of the GPA.”69 At another level, looking at the GPA and the GNU as 
“passive revolutions” forced on the belligerent parties for various reasons offers 
invaluable insights into the tensions and contradictions in the GNU70 that was fraught 
with continuous contestations and reformations for levers of power between ZANU-PF 
and the MDCs.  
Confronted with the demands of the victims in the villages on the one hand, the 
attempts by NGOs to adapt healing methods for the country, and the state’s nebulous TJ 
spearheaded by the ONHRI, as well as the history of the absence of a state-led 
comprehensive TJ on the other hand, it is important to address some key questions. 
Notably: what sort of transitional justice method should be envisaged for Shurugwi 
under the conditions of negative peace in the era of the GNU’s passive revolution? What 
are its pros and cons? Is it practicable and will it achieve peace, justice and reconciliation 
in Shurugwi?  Under what framework should it operate? What should be the role, and 
extent of the local communities and government intervention in this process? What 
other alternatives are available?  
                                                 
67 See Articles 7 and 18 of the Global Political Agreement, Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary 
Affairs, Harare, 15 September 2008. 
68 For a nuanced discussion of this, see Ismael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition” in 
ACCORD, Issue 1, 2011, cited in http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_1.pdf, Accessed 19 
May 2011, pp 3-10. See also Church and Civil Society Forum, (CCSF), National Healing and Reconciliation 
Position Paper, July 2009, p 45. 
69 See CCSF, National Healing and Reconciliation Position Paper, 2009, p 45. 
70 This phenomenon was adequately addressed in Chapter Five. See also Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global 
political agreement as a passive revolution” 
 
 
 
 
 361 
 
 
 
 
These related questions stem from the fact that the state has never genuinely 
attempted a comprehensive TJ outside blanket amnesties. With that background in 
mind there is need to resuscitate and strengthen traditional bottom-up TJ methods like 
kuripa ngozi that incorporate a people’s common sense, hence incorporate tenets of 
their “everyday experience” that is, how people construe the world they inhabit.71 
These methods have many advantages over the statist approach under ONHRI. As 
witnessed elsewhere in Africa, for example, traditional methods cover larger numbers in 
less time and with less financial resources. In addition, these methods are restorative, 
and foster reconciliation quicker than trials.72 These methods have the added advantage 
of transcending the difficult binary between the need for peace on the one hand and 
the need for justice for the victims.73 More so, they can be used in combination with ICC 
and TRCs.74 
 Secondly, the questions emanated from the presence of a battery of transitional justice 
methods that could potentially be used in Zimbabwe opened by Article VII.I.C of the 
                                                 
71 See Clifford Geertz, “Common sense as a cultural system”, p 9. 
72 See Joe. A.D Alie, “Reconciliation and traditional justice: Tradition-based practices of Kpaa Mende in 
Sierra leone” in 
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Chapter_5_Reconciliation_and_traditional_j
ustice_tradition-based_practices_of_the_Kpaa_Mende_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf, Accessed 16 June 2011, p 
136. 
73 The dilemma of peace versus justice has been a perennial one for Zimbabwe dating to the end of the 
Second Chimurenga. However, the calls became acute following the Gukurahundi disturbances, see The 
CCJP/LRF, Breaking the Silence, Building Peace, for a nuanced discussion. In the present context following 
the violence that ended in 2008, see the differences of opinion between Mugabe and Tsvangirai in 
“Mugabe urges end to violence, Tsvangirai seeks justice”, in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com, Accessed 
18 April 2011.  The book, edited by Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The 
dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, gives a broader analysis of the transitional justice models that 
articulated either peace or justice, and the problems  associated with such models. Chandra Lekker 
Sriram, in the “Introduction: Transitional justice and peace building”, p 1, clearly foregrounds the 
dichotomy between proponents of peace and those for justice. To this end she says that victims, their 
families, NGOs and the international community demand accountability for atrocities and violations. On 
the other hand peace builders argue that such moves may destabilise states that are recently emerging 
from conflict situations. 
74 The use of the gacaca courts post-genocide has shown that traditional methods of addressing justice at 
the local levels can be used together with international trials for the differing levels of crimes committed. 
See the chapter by Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi, “Indigenous justice or political instrument?: 
The modern gacaca courts of Rwanda”, in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: 
The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, for a pithy understanding of this. See also Joe. A.D Alie, 
Reconciliation and traditional justice: Tradition-based practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone”. 
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GPA; and also proffered by the ONHRI. The debate was also widened by the calls by 
President Mugabe for peace, which potentially meant forgetting the past and casting 
bygones as bygones, and the calls by Prime Minister Tsvangirai for a mechanism that 
served justice and one where justice was seen to be served.75 However, both the 
Mugabe and Tsvangirai paradigms have fatal weaknesses in the current context. Briefly, 
the emphasis on peace over justice has promoted cyclic patterns of violence and 
impunity in post-independence Zimbabwe,76 while the call for unfettered justice faces 
the prospects of failure due to the asymmetrical balance of power in the GNU, (and 
potentially in the foreseeable future,) which Ismael Muvingi has already aptly described 
as “political pre-transition,” where ZANU-PF still holds the coercive arms of the state 
and the de facto powers of veto.  
Here, I am also informed by Mamdani’s insightful questions on transitional justice 
systems. Writing against “victors’ justice”, including the Versailles settlement, the 
Nuremburg trials, the post-genocide Rwanda trials and the post-holocaust Jewish 
treatment of the Palestinians, he asks two vital questions: Is a form of justice possible 
that is not at the same time victor’s justice? And, is a form of reconciliation possible that 
is not at the same time an absence of justice, and thus an embrace of evil?77 These are 
instructive questions that helped me in choosing kuripa ngozi as the most feasible one, 
and one that does not espouse excessive retribution, which has the potential of 
triggering another round of violence and counter-violence. This also accords with the 
                                                 
75 For a brief but insightful discussion of these two positions see “Mugabe urges end to violence, 
Tsvangirai seeks justice”, in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com, Accessed 18 April 2011. See also 
Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009. See also “Tsvangirai’s speech 
on National Healing” 24 July 2009, in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/politics/tsvangirais-speech-on-
national-healing, Accessed 18 April 2011. See also Sphosami Malunga, “Amnesty for Mugabe out of 
question”, in newzimbabwe.com, cited in http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/opinion265.16376.html, 
Accessed 23 June 2011. 
76 See Pamela Machakanja, “National healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and 
opportunities”, Zimbabwe Monograph Series, No 1, 2010, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Africa 
Programme, p 10, who lists the recurrent patterns of violence and impunity in the post-independence 
period. These are the 1980 amnesty, the 1988 Clemency Order, the 1995 Presidential Amnesty and the 
2000 Clemency Order. 
77 Mahmood Mamdani, When victims become killers: Colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, p 272. 
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ONHRI’s assertion that “there must be a degree of pragmatism that meets victims’ 
demands for justice without derailing the newfound peace and the Inclusive 
Government.”78 
I was also aware of, and given direction by, the two objectives for any transitional justice 
as given by the Chilean lawyer Jose Z. Alaquett, who stated that these mechanisms 
should help prevent the recurrence of past abuses, repair the damage caused and help 
to achieve national unity and reconciliation.79 This also accords with the five 
cornerstones of transitional justice, namely: trials, truth-seeking, reparations, 
institutional reform and memorialisation.80 This method is also in sync with the five 
cornerstones to a complete transitional justice by Alex Boraine, which are: 
accountability, truth recovery, reconciliation, institutional reform and reparations.81 
However, some of the aims highlighted, like trials, and institutional reforms, are beyond 
the scope of the mechanism for which I am arguing. 
This method (kuripa ngozi) could be very useful in solving the “not-so-big”, but certainly 
the most numerous, cases between close relations emanating from the political 
violence. These are cases that occurred between villagers, neighbours and family who, 
in various degrees were caught up in the intricate web of the violence of the period 
2000-2008. In addition, these are cases that are numerous. Some of these could be 
cases where people grazed cattle in other people’s fields as political punishment, cases 
of witchcraft which ordinarily have no jurisdiction in conventional western style courts; 
gender-based cases of violence, excluding rape, and similar cases. These are cases that 
might forever never be solved in the conventional state justice system, cases, which are, 
                                                 
78 ONHRI, Concept paper, p 13. 
79 See Jose Z Alaquett cited in Yasmin Loise SSoka, “ The politics of transitional justice” in Chandra Lekka 
Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, p 25. 
80 Church and civil society Forum, Initial national healing discussion paper, Harare, 2010. 
81 Alex Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A holistic interpretation”, in A Boraine and S Valentine, eds, 
Transitional Justice and Human Security, International Centre for Transitional Justice, Cape Town, 2006, 
cited in Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, mediation and the Prospects for transitional 
justice in Zimbabwe”, IDASA, November 2008, p 5. 
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to me, “small” enough to result in the paralysis of social and other relations in the rural 
areas that are generally based on communal social relations.  
My other contention is also that it was between the villagers that the violence was 
largely perpetrated.82 Thus ONHRI averred that whilst a “national process is useful”, it is 
also “important to organise community level truth-telling exercises, tribunals, dialogue, 
healing sessions and also reparations.”83 As such this could be an important starting 
point in the rebuilding of relations and the empowering of the locals in Shurugwi. In this 
way, by making perpetrators take responsibility the process will deter them from being 
willing tools for political violence. Other cases like murder, rape and others that relate 
to sexual violation can be dealt with at other levels.84 At the time of writing this chapter 
not much had been done with the “big cases” of sexual violations, rape, and murders. It 
also remains to be seen if such cases will ever be brought to book, if another amnesty 
will be deployed to protect the perpetrators, or whether we have to wait for a fuller 
democratic transition.85 
Arguing for a “historically constituted [justice] system”86 is, however, not meant to 
minimise the role for a TRC and or ICC tribunal. It is simply meant to posit that we can 
achieve healing, forgiveness and justice without raising too much fear and suspicion, 
especially at a time when Zimbabweans are looking for a transition to a democratic 
dispensation. This is at a time when there are key, but baby, steps to the crafting of a 
new constitution, and where several commissions87 have been set up under the 
auspices of the GPA that are meant to redress the recurrence of violence and the 
                                                 
82 See Chapter Four, “Agency and or victimhood”. See also ONHRI, Concept paper, p 12, for pithy 
discussions on how most violence was played out at the local/community levels. 
83 Ibid, p 12. 
84 These could be dealt with in the Common law courts, the ICC or through Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. This hybridity was used with some measure of success in Sierra Leone. See Joe. A.D Alie, 
“Reconciliation and traditional justice: Tradition-based practices of Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone.”He says 
transitional justice in Sierra Leone used a combination of a TRC, a Special Court and traditional justice 
methods. See pp 130 and 141 for example. 
85 See CCSF, National Healing and reconciliation Position Paper, p 7, which presents a similar argument. 
86 I borrow Jacques Ranciere’s phrase from The politics of aesthetics, p 50. 
87 These include the Human Rights Commission, the Zimbabwe Media Commission and the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission. 
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deliverance of credible elections. Other methods seem ominous and might frighten 
those in power. In a sense, ZANU-PF’s desire to retain state control at all cost could be 
seen partly in terms of fears emanating from calls for retributive transitional justice by 
the civil service organisations and to some extent the MDC.88 This fear can also be 
broadly analysed as a fear of trials at The Hague. This latter strand broadly feeds into 
the larger fears by African leaders that the ICC specifically targets African leaders.89 For 
Zimbabwe, however, an ICC trial may prove difficult because it is not a signatory to the 
Rome Accord.90 Discussing the possibility of kuripa ngozi in rural areas is not also meant 
to vitiate its potential even at the national level. Cases abound from Africa where 
somewhat similar common sense based “traditional” methods were adopted at the 
state level, albeit with ambiguous effects, in Rwanda, Uganda and Mozambique.91  
 
THE CONTEXT FOR A TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISM 
A) THE GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The signing of the historic Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008,92 
which established the Government of National Unity (GNU), provides the major 
                                                 
88 See Wikileaks cable in The Insider, “Goche negotiated Mugabe exit with MDC”, in 
http://www.insiderzim.com/stories/3200-goche-negotiated-mugabe-exit-with-mdc.html, Accessed 02 
February 2012. 
89 See BBC News, 12 December 2011, “Africa's Fatou Bensouda is new ICC chief prosecutor”, in 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16029121, Accessed 08 March 2012.    
90 See Newsday 28 June 2011, “CIO brute up for the Hague?” in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-
06-28-cio-brute-up-for-the-hague, Accessed 28 June 2011. The African Union also officially did not 
recognise the ICC, see The Herald 14 July 2012, “President leaves for summit”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47109:president-leaves-for-
summit&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 15 July 2012. 
91 See for example, the chapters by Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi, “Indigenous justice or 
political instrument?: The modern gacaca courts of Rwanda”, and  by Victor Igreja, “The politics of peace, 
justice and healing in post-war Mozambique” in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs 
Justice: The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, for a pithy understanding of this. 
92 The GPA was a tripartite agreement signed between ZANU-PF and the MDC formations, that is, the 
larger one led by Morgan Tsvangirai, popularly called MDC-T, and the splinter one led by Arthur 
Mutambara (now led by Welshman Ncube), the MDC-M. These parties that had won parliamentary seats 
in the 2008 harmonised elections agreed to form an inclusive government under the mediation efforts of 
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framework for the calling of a transitional justice mechanism. Article Seven states, 
among others, that the GNU: “shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism 
to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve 
national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre- and post-independence 
political conflicts”, and “will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect 
among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency 
irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation.”93  
In addition to this, Article 18 states that: “further recognising that violence undermines 
our collective independence as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in 
making political choices”, the parties agreed “to promote the values and practices of 
tolerance, respect, nonviolence and dialogue as a means of resolving political 
differences”, “to remove and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under 
whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends”. It was also agreed “that 
the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all 
perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book”, “to work together to ensure the 
security of all persons and property”. Also “to work together to ensure the safety of any 
displaced persons, their safe return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of 
the law”. Furthermore, “that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
and the principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the 
determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the 
prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically related offences 
arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections.”94 
From the preceding paragraph, we can discern that the GPA set out, albeit in 
ambiguous, but nonetheless milestone terms, the need for “some mechanism” to deal 
                                                                                                                                                 
President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. This was a historic moment because it was the first time for 
Zimbabwe that ZANU-PF had agreed to enter into a power-sharing agreement. Moreover, it was also 
historic for the SADC region that such an arrangement was effected. 
93 See Global Political Agreement, Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, Harare, 15 
September 2008, p 7. 
94 Ibid, p 11. 
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with transitional justice. Pursuant to this there was formed the seemingly dysfunctional 
state driven Organ for National Healing Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI).95 In 
some sense ONHRI represented the “Piedmont type function”96 in the search for a TJ by 
seeking to supercede, regulate and coordinate the efforts towards a TJ by the various 
players, including the civic organisations, political parties outside the GNU, and the 
general public. It did not also take into account the other earlier efforts by the civic 
organisations. 
 However, this was an historic formulation for post-independence Zimbabwe because it 
was the first time that political violence was officially acknowledged. It also marked the 
first instance that such a state-sponsored organisation as ONHRI had been formed to 
look into the need to heal the wounds of conflict. It too was a novel feature that called 
for the prosecution of perpetrators had been officially made under Article 18 where it 
also clearly mentioned the need to prosecute or keeping in custody all perpetrators of 
the March 2008 violence. ONHRI brought rays of hope to the victims and civil society 
alike because through it a window of opportunity for dialogue on national healing was 
opened .97 More importantly, it marked the first instance that ZANU-PF had acceded to 
                                                 
95 ONHRI was formed in 2009, and it had three ministers from all the three parties to the GPA, namely 
John Nkomo (ZANU-PF), Sekai Holland (MDC-T) and the late Gibson Sibanda (MDC-M who was replaced by 
Moses Mzila Ndlovu). Its work in 2011, when I was writing this chapter, seems to be heavily circumscribed 
by the death of Gibson Sibanda, the promotion of John Nkomo to be vice President as well as the endless 
squabbles especially between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF. Between February 2009 and February 2010 
ONHRI embarked on a nationwide campaign gathering people’s views on healing. However, nothing of 
this consultation has seen light of day. The major reason why the ONHRI seemed dysfunctional and a 
paper tiger is its lack of plan of action and that it has no legal force for its mandate. For more on this see 
Sekai Holland, “Realigning input markets to former needs as a strategy on national healing, reconciliation 
and integration at grassroots based communities in agricultural production in Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.farnpan.org/documents/d00738/presentation/Review_of_the_Organ_On_National_Healing_
Final.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
96 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, p 83, for the leading role that Piedmont 
played in the Risorgimento. For the ONHRI, I use it to denote the leading role it was assigned in the search 
for a TJ. 
97 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth? pp 
12-13. 
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promoting violence and the hope was that this would be translated into meaningful 
transitional justice under the GNU.98 
However, as discussed in Chapter Five, this was an ominous task for the GNU beset by 
serious tensions and struggles for state power; together with the unreformed judiciary, 
media and security service chiefs. In addition, the milieu of looking into both pre-
independence and post- independence violence was too onerous for the ONHRI, which 
was itself set in the context of the original temporary two-year GNU. ONHRI pondered 
how far it could go back in time without bringing ambiguities and different 
“interpretations and prescriptions.”99 This interpretation gridlock was clearly 
manifested, for example, by the contradictions between ZANU-PF and the MDC over 
how far the newly established Human Rights Commission would go in investigating 
human rights abuses.100 Potentially, the cyclic patterns of violence in Zimbabwe in the 
absence of comprehensive transitional justice mechanism will continue despite the 
formation of ONHRI as in the past.101 As Jonathan Moyo avers, this will continue in order 
to cover up for the violations of human rights by the state.102 
On the whole, by alluding to the need for some transitional justice mechanism the GPA, 
as the broad national signifier that it is, offers an important framework for the adoption 
of the indigenous based kuripa ngozi transitional justice method. The need for the 
                                                 
98 See Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, ACCORD, Issue 1, 
2011, cited in http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_1.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011, p 7. 
99 See ONHRI, Concept paper, p 17. 
100 See The Herald, 26 July 2011,” Parties’ differences disrupt Bill hearing”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16419:parties-differences-
disrupt-bill-hearing&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 26 July 2011. 
101 See Shari Eppel, cited in Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, mediation and the 
Prospects for transitional justice in Zimbabwe”, IDASA, November 2008. Tony Reeler, Sublimal terror?: 
Human rights violence and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008, Centre for the study of violence and 
Reconciliation, Cape Town, p 3, who discusses this at great length, and who also adds a fourth period of 
serious human rights violations as the 1998 period of the food riots. See also Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
Do Zimbabweans Exist?, p. 190, who posits that the history of Zimbabwe is one of violence coded under 
different names, such as wars between the Ndebele and the Shona in the pre-colonial period, the First 
Chimurenga, colonialism, The Second Chimurenga, Gukurahundi, and Third Chimurenga. See also Terence 
M Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and reconciliation processes”, p 21, for more 
details. 
102 See also Jonathan Moyo, Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe 
Publications, Harare, 1992, pp 22 & 28, on the 1980 and 1988 amnesties. 
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payment of reparations central to the chosen traditional method of kuripa ngozi ensures 
restorative justice rather than retributive justice. As the CCJP argues, the payment of 
compensation to the victims might be the missing basis for a permanent peace in 
Zimbabwe. The CCJP posits that in addition to healing and reconciliation so emphasised 
in the GPA there is need for victims to also receive justice where “their assets need to 
be restored as a matter of justice and also so that they can be able to stand on their 
own two feet again and fend for themselves. This is true where cattle, goats, chickens 
and other assets were taken with devastating economic and broader livelihood 
consequences for victims.”103 This also resonates with the findings of the RAU who 
stated that:  
When we were in the rural areas having a discussion with the people there, 
someone was saying, how can I forgive someone who wronged me if he or she 
hasn’t come to say I’m asking for forgiveness? How can I forgive somebody who 
killed my cow or took my cow still has it in his or her own kraal? And how can I 
forgive and forget a rape case of a child whom I’m nurturing? As long as justice is not 
seen to be done let’s forget about peace. Once justice is seen to be done then it 
becomes easy to talk about peace. Even the Bible says, ‘repent so that I can forgive 
you.’ So until someone comes out to say it’s me who torched your house on such 
and such a day please forgive me, and until the truth comes out in the open it’s 
really very difficult…. People are not coming in the near future to say, I’m sorry I 
raped your child, I torched your home, I did this, so if we wait for that to happen 
then we’ll have trouble and we’ll never have peace. 104 
 
B) THREE DAYS OF NATIONAL HEALING AND RECONCILIATION: CONFLICTING 
PERCEPTIONS ON THE TRANSITION 
Following in the spirit of the GPA, and in a proclamation President Robert Mugabe “set 
out and dedicate[d] the 24th, 25th, and 26th July 2009, as a period during which the 
nation may dedicate to the Inclusive Government, our new found peace, our freedom, 
our new spirit of nation building, National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration to 
                                                 
103 See CCJP, Graveyard governance: A report on political violence following the March harmonised 2008 
elections, Harare. 
104 RAU, When the going gets tough, p 15. 
 
 
 
 
 370 
 
 
 
 
inspire the nation going forward.”105 In the gazette, the President also called upon all 
political parties to use the three days to call for peace and refrain from fomenting 
hostilities and political intolerance.106 His speech was built upon the one he made in 
1994. In arguing against further probing into the gukurahundi atrocities, he said:  
if we dig up history, then we wreck the nation, we tear our people apart into 
factions, into tribes, and villagism will prevail over our nationalism and over the 
spirit of our sacrifices….We have sworn not to go by the past except as a record 
or register. The record…. will remind us what never to do. If it was wrong, if that 
went against the sacred tenets of humanity, we must never repeat….107  
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai went further to call for justice for the victims of the 
violence, not only the 2000-2008 episode, but also the pre-independence and post-
independence gukurahundi eras.108 In his words:  
These three days of dedication must herald the beginning of genuine, open and 
frank process that includes and incorporates the concept of transitional justice, 
truth and accepting responsibility for the hurt and pain inflicted upon so many 
Zimbabweans….There can be no truth without justice. And, no justice without 
truth …. National healing cannot occur without justice and justice must be done, 
as well as be seen to be done.109 
However, the opening ceremony and the long weekend set aside for the dedication 
came and went, vindicating Senator Obert Gutu’s prediction that the three days would 
merely be an “academic exercise that will do very little, if anything at all, in healing our 
                                                 
105 See Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009.The three days were 
collectively referred to as the National Dedication Ceremony- see Sekai Holland, “Realigning inputs 
markets to farmer needs”, p 3. 
106 Ibid. 
107 President Mugabe, cited in Terence M Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive healing and reconciliation 
processes”, p 23. 
108 See “Tsvangirai’s speech on National Healing” 24 July 2009, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/politics/tsvangirais-speech-on-national-healing, Accessed 18 April 
2011. 
109 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 371 
 
 
 
 
hurting nation.”110 For Gutu, national healing needed more than the gazetting of three 
days, “a few workshops and conferences…. in posh hotels and holiday resorts…”111  
The call by Prime Minister Tsvangirai for justice and for the visibilisation of justice 
remains instructive. However, what has changed is the prima facie unity of purpose 
displayed by the key principals of the GPA to promote the said values on the occasion of 
the launch of the period of dedication. As Raftopoulos has ably demonstrated, the 
adoption of the language of passive revolution is necessary to explicate the 
complications in the GNU.112 To this extent, the ZANU-PF’s dominant role in the GNU, as 
well as the constant bickering between ZANU-PF and the MDC-T which smacks of the 
tensions between progressive and retrogressive forces constitutive of passive 
revolutions, have made the search for a TJ mechanism remain a pipe-dream. Further to 
this, the hold on the coercive arms of the state by ZANU-PF  have also pushed the MDC-
T to vacillate between a justice-based transitional justice, and offering a blanket 
amnesty to lure ZANU-PF and the military to hand over power.113  
A closer analysis of the words and reasoning behind President Mugabe’s speech, reveals 
that rather than appeasing the victims and abating the culture of violence, not “digging 
up history” has, as already pointed out, promoted cycles of violence and impunity. 
Worse still has been the fact that their memories have not vanished. The spectre of the 
gukurahundi proves this more than any other historic moment in Zimbabwe. Starting 
with the calls by civic organisations for an inquiry into the gukurahundi in the 1990s, the 
calls have persisted into the 21st century. The lingering calls, including in cabinet, 
resulted in President Mugabe agreeing in 2011 to the setting up of another committee 
to lead the debate on the gukurahundi.114 Moreover these sentiments have taken more 
                                                 
110 See Obert Gutu, “National Healing impossible without truth commission”, 27 July 2009, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/gutu-national-healing-impossible-without-truth-
commission.htm, Accessed 18 April 2011. 
111 Ibid. 
112 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global Political Agreement as a passive revolution”. 
113 See Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, p 8. 
114 See “Gukurahundi splits cabinet” in The Standard 1 May 2011, in http://www.co.zw/local/29542-
gukurahundi-splits-cabinet.html, Accessed 8 May 2011. See also The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Nkomo calls 
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overt, radical and ethnic/regional-inclined political expressions including the ominous 
calls for secession by the Matebeleland Liberation Front.115 President Mugabe seemingly 
also spoke with a forked tongue because ZANU-PF went against the grain of his speech 
and went about “digging up” the history of the suffering of the Second Chimurenga.116 
However, it is clear that because of the asymmetrical power relations between Mugabe 
and Tsvangirai, Mugabe’s stance on enforced amnesia of the violence prevails. This 
potentially means enforcing the citizens to carry unacknowledged wounds of past and 
recurring wounds. 
This notwithstanding, amnesties have promoted national unity; have led to political 
transitions from governments underwritten by strong armies; and they have the 
potential to reduce violence.117 Arguably for Zimbabwe, amnesties were crucial for the 
difficult transitions: to independence in 1980 in the face of the threat of the Rhodesian 
JOC,118 and also in the ending of the gukurahundi.119 The signing of the Global Political 
                                                                                                                                                 
for dialogue on Gukurahundi” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13371:nkomo-calls-for-
dialogue-on-gukurahundi&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
115 See U Mhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi, “Restoration of Ndebele sovereignty”, letter written to the 
Constitutional Parliamentary Committee, 22 January 2010, cited in 
http://www.mthwakazian.com/attachments/393_UMHLAHLOWEpc-1.pdf, Accessed 5 may 2011. See also 
“Statement by Mthwakazi Liberation Front”, 3 February 2010, in 
http://www.forum.newzimbabwe.com/index.php?topic/28620-statement-by-mthwakazi-liberation-
front/,  Accessed 5 May 2011. See also http://mthwakaziblogspot.com, Accessed 5 May 2011, for more 
details. 
116 In April 2011 there have been the digging up of the evocative moments of the Second Chimurenga, 
literally through the digging up of supposed Second Chimurenga mass graves in Mashonaland Central. See 
the controversy of this in the digging up of over 600 human remains of Second Chimurenga victims at 
Chibondo Mine in Mount Darwin in April 2011, in “Preserve exhumed remains-Zipra” cited in Newsday 8 
May 2011 cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-08-preserve-exhumed-remains-zipra, 
Accessed 9 May 2011. See also Terence Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and 
reconciliation”, p 23 who discusses how the evocative second Chimurenga moments were fed daily in the 
2000 period in the form of radio and television programmes. 
117 See Yasmin Louise Sooka, “The politics of transition”, for a more nuanced discussion, pp 22-26. 
118 James Muzondidya, “’Our guns are our vote’”: The Political-Military Allience in Zimbabwe and the fate 
for Democratic Transition”, Paper presented at the European Conference on African Studies, University of 
Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009. 
119 A lot of controversy has emerged with regards the impact of these amnesties. On the one hand is the 
discourse that the amnesties were necessary and that they contributed to the unity of the country. On the 
other hand are those that claim that the amnesties served only to foster top leadership unions without 
necessarily benefitting those at the grassroots levels. For some of the debates see Terence Mashingaidze 
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Agreement (GPA) in 2008 also partly owes its existence to the vagueness regarding the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of violence. On the other hand, however, the stalling 
and intransigence by ZANU-PF’s towards the fuller implementation of the GPA has roots 
in the absence of guarantees of an amnesty in the future should it be ousted from 
power in an open election. Thus as Joe Alie, says, while retributive justice might 
potentially act as a deterrent, it may simultaneously make perpetrators to want to hold 
on to power and make the restoration of communal relations more difficult.120 
 
C)  CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CALLS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The other background for a TJ is the long-term call by the civil society in the country for 
the government to set up an equivalent of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Arguably, the civil society in Zimbabwe has the longest known genealogy for calling for 
transitional justice to solve the scourge of politically motivated violence. The first of 
such calls was made by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, and the Legal 
Resources Foundation, in their brave and ground-breaking report on the disturbances in 
Matebeleland provinces and parts of the Midlands province published in 1997.121 
Besides meticulously documenting abuses, the report proffered useful 
recommendations: the need for acknowledging conflict through truth-telling to ensure 
reconciliation; the removal of human rights violators from positions of authority; the 
institution of legal reforms to enable victims to claim compensation from the state; the 
setting up of community “Reconciliation/Uxoleiwano Trust” to spearhead communal 
reparations through fostering development projects in place of individual recompense; 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and reconciliation process” and Pamela Machakanja “National 
healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe”. 
120 See Joe JD ALie, “Reconciliation and traditional justice: Tradition-based practices of Kpaa Mende in 
Sierra Leone”, p 140. 
121 See The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and The Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the 
Silence, Building Peace. 
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and, for the government to make constitutional changes to avert future mass human 
rights violations.122  
The CSOs also made another call in September 2008, following the violence associated 
with the controversial presidential election rerun in June 2008, and more generally for 
the 2000-2008 period. Importantly, they set out “minimum demands” for the required 
TJ. These were: 1) No amnesty for crimes against humanity, rapes and other sexually-
based crimes, corruption and other crimes of greed; 2) Upholding of civil claims against 
the perpetrators or the state; 3) Removal from jobs of those found responsible for  gross 
human rights violations and corruption; 4) Comprehensive reparations to victims of 
human rights violations; 5) A comprehensive, credible and independent truth seeking 
inquiry into the conflicts of the past which holds perpetrators to account and which 
provides victims the opportunity to tell their stories with a view to promoting national 
healing; 6) reforming and depoliticisation of: the security sectors; administration of 
justice; food distribution and other organs of state; 7) Development of enforceable 
interim or transitional rules to guarantee the rule of law and upholding of all basic rights 
during the transition, including the right to engage in political activities; 8) Achieve 
gender equality in official bodies and for transitional justice initiatives to pay particular 
attention to marginalised communities in Zimbabwe.123  
Further attempts were from the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF), made up of 
twenty one organisations including heads of Christian denominations that produced a TJ 
framework in 2010.124 On its part the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance embarked on 
“community healing dialogue meetings and ‘healing of memory’” that brought together 
                                                 
122 Ibid, pp 31-32. 
123 These demands came out of a  conference of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum held at the 
Meikles Hotel Harare, 9-10 September 2008, see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, “Call by Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum on Parliamentarians attending the African Pacific Caribbean-European Union 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly”, cited in 
Http://www.hrforumzim.com/press/20090403ForumResolutionto17thJPA.pdf, accessed 23 January 2011. 
124 See Church and Civil Society Forum, Initial National Healing Discussion Paper, pp 20-24, discusses the 
various branches of transitional methods and the methods of achieving them. 
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victims of the violence.125 In 2009 the Catholic Church through the Zimbabwe Catholic 
Bishops also stated that:  
[f]or national reconciliation and healing to take place effectively, it is necessary 
that the entire nation participates in a comprehensive, all inclusive, holistic and 
clearly defined process underpinned by strong political will and desire to 
reconcile and heal the nation. We envision National Healing and reconciliation as 
a home grown inclusive process that will lay the foundations for a peaceful 
cohesive Zimbabwe society; where the dignity of individual is respected; where 
broken relationships are healed; where trust is restored; and where diversity is 
celebrated.126 
These are no doubt important salient points mapped out by the civic organisations. They 
offer important nexus points with kuripa ngozi in terms of holding individual (and also 
the state actors) to account and the calling for restoration through restitution and the 
incorporation of common sense-based justice mechanisms.  
While the recommendations are important, it is necessary to heed the caution from 
Eppel and Raftopoulos who state that there is need to factor in historical and structural 
factors in the search for a TJ. In their words: 
[s]uch transitional justice recommendations tend to gloss over the long term 
structural injustices that have engendered Mugabe’s authoritarian nationalism 
and the anti-colonial discourse that has constructed the human rights question 
as a Western imposition. In the context of the failures of neoliberal economic 
policies in Africa, the efficacy of transitional justice processes that are not 
connected to broader structural changes in the economy can very quickly be 
undermined by revived nationalist politics around the redistributive agendas.127 
 The crucial point raised by Eppel and Raftopoulos necessitates a look at the country’s 
historical trajectories and the inclusion of racialised structural inequalities ushered in by 
                                                 
125 See The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-.html, Accessed 10 
July 2011. This was a programme they ran under “positive vomiting” where it was hoped that victims 
would heal by interacting and sharing with other victims. 
126 Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, “National Healing and Reconciliation: God can heal the 
wounds of the afflicted”, Harare, 01 October 2009. 
127 Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, mediation”, pp 5-6. For detailed discussions on the 
redistributive justice issues in Zimbabwe, see Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe”.  
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colonisation, which benefitted the whites while disadvantaging the blacks.128 This 
renders the need to factor in the ZANU-PF demands for the inclusion of colonial-
structural violations.  
At another level TRCs have tended to be negatively perceived in Africa. Besides being 
associated with the engendering of the passive revolutions in Africa by the liberal West 
and paying scant regard to local conditions, they have also been viewed as being 
targeted at “rebel” African leaders who do not toe the line set by the liberal West.129 
They are also costly and demand a lot of top-level support.130 These limitations are clear 
in the Zimbabwe case where the government is struggling financially, as evidenced by 
the failure to raise about $9 billion to “jump start” the economy,131  and the perennial 
struggle to pay its workers who were earning below the poverty line.132 A TRC for 
example, would require significant funding, as well as a great deal of political support, 
which might be difficult to get under present conditions of incomplete political 
transition, in Muvingi’s terminology. Potentially, the squabbling in the GNU could reach 
                                                 
128 See comments on the structural explanations of the violence by the state by Slavoj Zizek, Sam Moyo, 
Paris Yeros and Mahmood Mamdani, for a more pithy discussion. Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections, Picador, New York, 2008, see also Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Intervention: The Zimbabwe 
question and the two lefts” in Historical Materialism, 15, 2007, p 199, see also,Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, 
“Zimbabwe Ten Years On: Results and Prospects” Pambazuka News, 419, 2009. See also Mahmood 
Mamdani, “Lessons of Zimbabwe” in London Review of books, 04 December 2008, contends that the 
independence obtained in 1980 did not alter the structure of the Zimbabwean society. He cites the willing 
buyer-willing seller land clause and the racial constitution that reserved for the 5% whites 20% seats in 
parliament in the Lancaster House Constitution as major drawbacks to unqualified independence.  
129 In Africa, there is a wide claim, for example that the ICC is being used by the West to target African 
leaders and might be contributing to long serving dictators staying in power to avoid prosecution, like 
what happened to Charles Taylor of Liberia, and the calls on the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir to be 
tried at the ICC in the Hague, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peace 
building”, in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional 
justice in Africa, pp 2-3, who avers that the ICC, besides promoting “victor’s justice”, it was also primarily 
viewed as targeting African leaders unfairly.  In Zimbabwe, there have been mild calls for the trial of 
Mugabe at the Hague for alleged crimes against humanity. See for example, Tony Reeler, Subliminal 
terror? 
130 ONHRI, Concept paper, p 11. 
131 See Fingaz, 08 July 2011, “President Mugabe launches MTP”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/8971-president-mugabe-launches-mtp.html, Accessed 08 
July 2011. 
132 Reports abound in the early months of 2011, for example, of civil servants through the Apex Council, 
threatening to go on strike, also magistrates and court interpreters having gone on a go-slow. See 
Newsday, 21 February 2011, cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw, accessed 21 February 2011.  
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fever pitch and might paralyse the already shaky GNU when it comes to such an emotive 
issue as the perpetration of violence, which also has far reaching consequences on 
senior people in government who might be indicted and jailed. Additionally, there is also 
no love lost between human rights NGOs calling for a TRC and the state in Zimbabwe.133  
Between February 2009 and February 2010, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 
embarked on TJ consultative meetings in fifty-one of the eighty-one constituencies that 
had witnessed high levels of violence between 2000 and 2008 to gather people’s views 
on transitional justice.134 For Shurugwi, this was held at Ironsides Community Hall on the 
3rd of February 2010, and was attended by a cross-section of society ranging from 
women, youths, local leaders, peasant farmers, political activists, perpetrators of, and 
victims of, violence and government workers.135 Among the agreed points at the 
meeting was the need to award reparations to the victims of political violence in 
accordance with their wishes because “it is the victims who know best what is 
appropriate for them.”136  
Further to this, the participants also felt it was the duty of individual perpetrators, and 
not the government, to pay restitution to their victims. Only in cases where the 
perpetrators were not known was the government to pay such compensation. This was 
aimed at freeing the government to concentrate on resuscitating the economy.137 While 
acknowledging the advantages of a TRC, the participants were of the opinion that 
instituting a TRC would scuttle peace and promote retributive justice and that 
                                                 
133 The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed the deterioration of relations between NGOs/civic 
society and the ZANU-PF government. Most have been characterised as agents of imperialism and have at 
different times faced various sanctions from the state. Others have been deregistered, threatened with 
deregistration, arrests of their workers and various other threats. See Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately 
seeking sanity, for a pithy discussion of this cat and mouse relationship. 
134 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the truth?, Vol 2, 
2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011, 
p 13. 
135 Ibid, p 119. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
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perpetrators might not come forward for fear of prosecution, which would result in 
people not forgiving each other resulting in unending cycles of violence.138 
The CSOs have also been calling for the overhauling of the constitution of Zimbabwe to 
institutionalise issues of transitional justice. To this end the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA), as early as 1997, started to make calls for a new constitution for the 
country.139 In the envisaged constitution, among other important changes, would be the 
purging of the government to rid it of the strong interpenetration with ZANU-PF and the 
security organs whose members have been seconded to key positions.140 More 
importantly, the NCA draft constitution included the need to incorporate a “Truth, 
Justice, Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention Commission.”141 
There have been other tenuous healing methods initiated by some CSOs, such as the 
“Tree of Life”.142  Tree of Life that brings survivors of violence together is “a healing and 
empowerment workshop that combines the concepts of story-telling, healing of the 
spirit, reconnecting with the body and re-establishing a sense of self-esteem and 
community.”143 The method is originally Native American, and was adapted to the 
Namibian victims of the war of independence.  Under this method, victims gather 
together, are put into smaller groups where they congregate in circles and share their 
experience and are empowered.144 On the whole however, the Tree of Life promotes a 
foreign concept derived from the Native American philosophy, one which has very little 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 See Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, ACCORD, Issue 1, 
2011, cited in http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_1.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011, p 6. 
140 See Zeff Sithole “Is the army taking over?” 
141 See Ishmael Muvingi, “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, p 6. See also the 
remarks by George Bizos in “Hot Seat Interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland, Glen Mpani and Mary 
Ndlovu: Reconciliation, justice and national healing”, cited in SW Radio Africa, 10 April 2009, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg090410swradio.asp?sector=DEMGG&year2009&range_start=75
1, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
142 See Tony Reeler, Kudakwashe Chitsike, Fungisai Maizva, Beverley Reeler, “The Tree of Life: a 
community 
approach to empowering and healing survivors of torture in Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.google.co.za/#q=TREE+OF+LIFE+HEALING+IN+ZIMBABWE&hl=en&prmd=ivns&ei=0NMjTojKJY
PSrQfNmISJAg&start=10&sa=N&fp=90e7b8f8b9d5966d&biw=1366&bih=627, Accessed 18 July 2011. 
143 Ibid, p 182. 
144 Ibid, pp 184-185. 
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connection with the communities of Zimbabwe, but one that communities of Zimbabwe 
are forced to imbibe. It thus represents a sort of imposition by the NGOs that ignores 
the “common sense” demands of the local communities. In a way, the NGOs that have 
been sponsoring it should instead have utilised the culturally-based or everyday 
philosophy-based traditional practices from Zimbabwe itself that would have been 
widely-known, easy to implement and possibly more cost-effective. 
 
D) MTHWAKAZI, SECESSION AND THE URGENT CALLS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The post-2000 also witnessed renewed calls by the Mthwakazi or Matebeleland 
Liberation Front (MLF) for a separate state for those areas that were ruled by the old 
Ndebele Kingdom.145 Basically, these are the groups of people that are collectively 
known as the Ndebele, but which include the Nambya, Kalanga, Venda, Sotho, Tswana 
and Tonga. Broadly speaking, these are people that are found in the Matebeleland 
provinces and parts of the Midlands province.146 Among other reasons for calling for the 
secession are allegations of deliberate underdevelopment in the post-independence 
period. There are also politics of fomenting regional-based identities and ethnic-based 
political mobilisation involved drawing in part from a [re-] “invented tradition” of the 
masculine Ndebele kingdom.  
A further analysis reveals also that the envisaged separate state coincides with areas 
that were largely affected by the menace of the gukurahundi. An underlying theme, as 
we have seen in the CCJP/LRF report,147 is that the victims of that violence have not 
been acknowledged, compensated and afforded the opportunity for closure. For many 
MLF activists, the gukurahundi is viewed as a part of ethnic cleansing of the Ndebele.148 
Because no justice was served, anger was bottled up and sustained for too long and 
                                                 
145 See U Mhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi, “Restoration of Ndebele sovereignty”, See also “Statement 
by Mthwakazi Liberation Front”. See also http://mthwakaziblogspot.com,  for more details. 
146 Ibid. See also the map attached on page 3 illustrating the areas that MLF claim to fall under Mthwakazi, 
which literally divides Zimbabwe into two almost equal halves. 
147 CCJP AND LRF, Breaking the silence. 
148 See CCSF, “National Healing and Reconciliation Position Paper”, July 2009, p 27. 
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found expression through calls to secede, which has put to serious question the idea of 
the nation-state of Zimbabwe.149 Potentially, this has larger ramifications, including 
large-scale bloodshed.   
Evidently therefore, the government’s top-down blanket amnesty for the perpetrators 
of the violence, both dissidents and state agencies, did not come any closer to the 
victims’ needs. Instead, there is need to do away with mentality of the elite, in the 
passive revolution style, determining the way forward for the majority. Instead, as 
Dumiso Dabengwa has rightly stated, there is need for victims’ concerns to be heard and 
prioritised. In his words: “We were the victims. We are the victims. We are the 
survivors. Only we can tell our story. Only we know how we want to be healed. 
Obviously, we need the rest of the people to assist us to put behind this horrible 
episode in our lives.”150  
Being heard is important enables some catharsis for the victims. Notwithstanding its 
shortcomings and widespread contestations, the TRC of South Africa, for example, was 
important in helping the victims to reach closure by merely being afforded the space to 
relay their horrific experiences under apartheid South Africa.151 This, however, went 
alongside the perpetrators acknowledging guilt. In Zimbabwe the CCJP/LRF report also 
highlighted the importance of such an opportunity to the victims, which was found to 
lead to “psychological healing.”152 Secondly, it affords the victims the opportunity to 
choose how they would want to be healed. For Shurugwi, as discussed at the Makusha 
meeting, and from the cases highlighted in Chapter Five, it is through the paying of 
restitution by the individual perpetrators to their victims which will constitute 
                                                 
149 See James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing silences: Ethnicity in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1980-2007”, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 7, Number 2, 2007, p 287. 
150 See Dumiso Dabengwa, President of the revived Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), in “ZAPU 
against secession of Matebeleland” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&Id=9203:zapu-against-
secession-of-matebeleland&catid=39:opinion&Itemid, Accessed 5 May 2011. 
151 See Terence M Mashingaidze, “Zimbabwe’s illusive national healing and reconciliation processes, p 21. 
152 See CCJP/LRF, Breaking the silence: Building true peace. A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland 
and the Midlands, p 5. 
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“survivors’ justice” in Mamdani’s terminology to bring closure, in Dabengwa’s words, to 
the “horrible episode.” 
 
THE CASE FOR A “TRADITIONAL” JUSTICE METHOD IN SHURUGWI 
The possibility of adopting a traditional or cultural-based TJ for local communities was 
highlighted in the ONHRI’s Concept paper, the Organ’s Green Paper. To this extent, and 
based on Zimbabwean and regional experiences, it posited that “long-lasting healing 
may not take root without national and local ceremonies by the people and their 
leaders, consistent with cultural timetables, practices and community participation.”153 
Somewhat similar approaches have been employed elsewhere in Zimbabwe and on the 
African continent in recent times. In Zimbabwe the exhumation and reburials in rural 
Matebeleland following the Second Chimurenga and the gukurahundi killings under the 
Amani Trust-sponsored project in the early 2000s provides a classic case. Despite using 
Latin American forensic expertise, the reburials relied heavily on African spirit-appeasing 
practices.154 David Maxwell, working among the Hwesa people of Katerere area of North 
East Manicaland, also established that the veneration of and the need to appease 
avenging spirits and other spirits by the Shona people was at the core of the people’s 
metaphysics.155   
Elsewhere on the continent, notable examples come from the magamba spirits 
following the Mozambican civil war in the 1990s, the Mato oput method by the Acholi of 
Northern Uganda, and also the gacaca in Rwanda.156 Arguably, there are limitations and 
criticisms in the methods highlighted from Uganda, Mozambique and Rwanda. 
                                                 
153 ONHRI, Concept paper, p 23. 
154 See Shari Eppel, “Healing the dead”. 
155 See David Maxwell, “Witches, prophets and avenging spirits: The Second Christian movement in North 
East Zimbabwe” in Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol 25, Fasc 3, August 1995, in 
http://www.jstor.org/Stable/1581363, Accessed 2 March 2011, for a detailed discussion of ngozi and 
other spirits that are feared by the Hwesa people, and how they dealt with them, both using the 
traditional methods and the Christian ways, which recast them as demons. 
156 See Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional justice in 
Africa. 
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However, they are useful dispositifs157 for this research. As a result of this realisation, I 
concur with the ONHRI’s call that “traditional means and cultural mechanisms of settling 
disputes or conflicts must be recognised and reinforced.”158 In furtherance to this, the 
Organ also mentioned the traditional practice of kuripa ngozi, as a basis for justice and 
long term peace for the surviving victims, as well as establishing peace with the spirits of 
the land.159  
Based on my field research in Shurugwi, people still live for others, and for the good of 
their communities. Thus the violence that was committed on the individuals is seen as 
violation against the community at large.160 In interviews in Shurugwi many informants 
kept referring to the need to cleanse the district, kugeza ropa161 in Shona. This also fits 
the contentions by Muwati et al, Bhebe, and Ranger, cited already that have called for 
the nation to cleanse itself of the ghosts of previous violence. In this regard, kuripa ngozi 
stands out as probably a profound method that would heal both the individuals and the 
community of Shurugwi that also places significance on strong social bonds. Like 
Gwanda, Shurugwi is also a rural area where the people have little knowledge of, and 
little regard for, Western concepts of post traumatic counselling.162  As already stated, 
the appeasing of spirits is one of the metaphysical foundations for a universal and long 
historical practice in Shurugwi with a long genealogy that links the living with the living-
dead. In this African metaphysics or “ontology of invisible beings”,163 the living-dead are 
venerated for their influence on the lives of the living. Its adoption will therefore not 
                                                 
157 See Louis Althusser, cited in Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p 42 who says that a dispositif is 
“a series of general theses on history which are literally contradictory, yet organised in such a way as to 
generate concepts not deducible from them, for the purpose of theorising an ‘object’ which in fact is a 
determinative object.” 
158 ONHRI, Concept paper, p 22. 
159 Ibid, p 24. 
160 See Shari Eppel, “Healing the dead to transform the living: Exhumation and reburial in Zimbabwe”, 
Amani Trust, Paper presented at the Regional and Human Rights’ Contexts and DNA, University of 
California, Berkeley, 26-27 April 2001, p 2, for a detailed discussion of this concept. 
161 Kugeza ropa has a much deeper meaning in Shona traditions than just cleansing. It also refers to 
appeasing district spirits that would have been angered by senseless spilling of blood as in the just ended 
violence. 
162 Ibid, the Amani Trust established that communities did not have the knowledge of modern 
psychological terms, and that they still valued their age old traditions of appeasing the spirits. 
163 See Ramose cited in Dani W Nabudere, “Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation”, p 3. 
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only render restorative justice to the victims, it will also connect the present with their 
historically bequeathed tradition.  
This method will not lessen the call for the top hierarchy, including senior army officers, 
MPs, senior government officials and the JOC, to be made accountable.164  The 
conditions, however, as already argued, do not allow for this at the present moment. In 
the future with a change in circumstances, and possibly a change in government, this 
might be possible. Still, however, the scale and pace of trials as recorded elsewhere on 
the continent is worryingly low. To exemplify, Sriram has established that ICC trials for 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone had yielded only 40 and 10 convictions for perpetrators, 
respectively, by 2009165 
Regarding TRCs, as Eppel and Raftopoulos have ably posited, there have been about 
twenty five truth commissions of inquiry into disappearance of people globally since 
1974, with disappointing degrees of failure.166 More relevant to Zimbabwe is the fact 
that there have been two government-sponsored violence fact-finding commissions in 
the post- independence period. These were the Dumbutshena (1981) and the 
Chihambakwe (1984) Commissions, into the Entumbane disturbances and the 
gukurahundi atrocities, respectively. Strikingly, none of the findings were made public, 
with the government, for example, claiming that the Chihambakwe Commission Report 
had been lost.167  
By 2011, as seen earlier, the calls by NGOs and to some extent the MDC-T for a TRC had 
not succeeded. This rendered the call for a TRC a project based on a “combination of 
strong moral fervor and weak political analysis.”168 At the time of writing this chapter, 
                                                 
164 See for example Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking Sanity”, p 25. 
165 See Chandra Lekker Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and peace building”, p 17. 
166 See Shari Eppel and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, mediation”, p 14. 
167 Ibid, p 16. See also Obert Gutu, National Healing impossible without truth commission”, 27 July 2009, 
in http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/gutu-national-healing-impossible-without-truth-
commission.htm, Accessed 18 April 2011. 
168 In a critique of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Mahmood Mamdani, 
“Reconciliation without justice”, Southern African Review of Books, November/December 1996, warned 
against high sounding processes that do not produce the intended results. 
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Mamdani’s analysis seemed cogent as there were also allegations in the country about 
the military going into the districts fanning the message of violence against the 
electorate, ahead of impending elections.169 Several reports were also made of violence, 
threats to violence or counter violence throughout the country in 2011.170 As a result, 
while such calls for a commission of inquiry may be relevant, they may not be practical 
under the current political dispensation where ZANU-PF wants to hang on to power by 
all means.  
As highlighted in Chapter 5, there is an asymmetrical distribution of power in the GNU 
with ZANU-PF controlling all the security-related ministries, despite sharing the Home 
Affairs ministry with the MDC-T. In addition, despite the division of executive powers 
between the President and the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai), the President (Mugabe) 
directly controls the Cabinet that has executive powers compared to the Prime Minister 
who heads the Council of Ministers, which does not have executive powers and which 
meets erratically compared to the cabinet that meets weekly.171 Tsvangirai has also 
been derogatorily referred to as a mere senior minister in ZANU-PF circles.172 In 
addition, as already discussed, ZANU-PF also has the unfair advantage of the state 
media, the security arms, a favourable judiciary (not least of which was the admission by 
the Attorney General Johannes Tomana that he supported ZANU-PF), and general 
immunity for its supporters.173  
This power balance is crucial to any transitional justice mechanism because of the role 
that ZANU-PF allegedly played in the violence, firstly as a party and as a government. 
                                                 
169 See The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, India, 29 January 2011, story titled: “Mugabe’s iron grip not about 
to loosen”, http://www.deccanherald.com, accessed 29 January 2011, which wrote that threats of 
violence were swirling in the countryside with senior military personnel and traditional leaders at the 
forefront in Mashonaland province. 
170 See Chapter Five, for an in-depth discussion of the recurrence of violence in the country post-2009. 
171 See Eldred Masunungure, “Zimbabwe’s agonising but irreversible political transition”, a paper 
presented at the European on African Studies 2009, Institute of African Studies, University of Leipzig, 
Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009.  
172 See Newsday, 23 June 2011, “Plot to arrest Tsvangirai” in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-
22-plot-to-arrest-tsvangirai, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
173 CCSF, “National Healing and Reconciliation Position Paper”, July 2009, pp 32 & 45. 
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Many reports point to the involvement of ZANU-PF in the violence. For example, it is 
accused of command responsibility where “the state, its officials, and members took no 
steps to prevent the violence … to react to the violence, and has subsequently made 
very poor efforts to investigate ...reports and prosecute offenders.”174 In addition, 
government vehicles and buildings were also used in the violence.175 There are also 
reports that it abused public officials in rural areas such as chiefs.176 Also, some 
statements by senior ZANU-PF party officials seem to be aimed at condoning violence. 
In this regard, President Mugabe, for example, warned white farmers of “very, very, 
very severe violence” if they tried to force farm invaders off the farms in 2000.177  
More importantly still, as discussed in Chapter Five, by 2011, the JOC continued to 
operate a “deep state” and continued to side-line the inclusive National Security Council 
(NSC) where both Mugabe and Tsvangirai were members.178 Because the JOC had not 
been disbanded the security sectors remained aligned to ZANU-PF, thus most 
institutions remained militarised and cases of impunity against human rights abusers 
continued.179 According to Deputy Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs, Obert Gutu, the 
MDC-T was powerless to stop the violence and bring the perpetrators to book because 
of the close links between the perpetrators and ZANU-PF and the securocrats.180 This 
serves to affirm the recidivist tendencies by ZANU-PF and the cosmetic changes that 
were brought by the passive revolution of the GNU. It was therefore not surprising that 
                                                 
174 “Subliminal terror?” p 34. 
175 “Subliminal violence?” p 34. 
176 See Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), “Pre-election update No3, 22 January-6 February 
2008”, cited in http://www.zesn.org, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
177 President Robert Mugabe quoted in an article titled “Mugabe threatens violence”, in The Daily News, 
29 March 2000. Of significance is that this statement came a few days after other senior ZANU-PF officials, 
notably Dumiso Dabengwa, Edison Zvobgo and Vice President Joseph Msika had castigated these farm 
invaders and calling for their removal from the farms. See also The Daily News: 3 March 2000, 24 March 
2000, for example. 
178 See CCSF, “National Healing and reconciliation position paper”, p 33. 
179 See Newsday, 17 January 2011, cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-01-16-security-
sector-still-partisan, Accessed 17 January 2011, for the larger piece of the article.  
180 See “MDC-T powerless over political violence” in Newsday, 28 February 2011, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-02-28-mdc-powerless-over-political-violence, accessed 01 
March 2011. Senior military figures also continued to ridicule the MDC-T and Tsvangirai in 2011, see for 
example comments by Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba, The Herald, 23 June 2011. 
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despite being in the GNU, the MDC structures, including ministers, continued to be 
subjected to systematic violence, harassment, arrests and intimidation. 
In addition to the above, ZANU-PF has also continued to ignore local and international 
court rulings that called on it to pay compensation to victims of state-led violence. Two 
examples from the international arena come from the now defunct SADC Tribunal. 
These two are, firstly, the ruling in the Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd vs the Republic of 
Zimbabwe case number 2 of 2007.181 The second case is the January 2011 
determination in the Barry Gondo and others vs the Government of Zimbabwe.182 In 
both cases the SADC Tribunal ruled that the government had to compensate these 
victims of violence. However, the government through the Minister of Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, claimed that it did not recognise the legality of 
the tribunal.183 The ZANU-PF structures continued to work against the SADC Tribunal 
until it was dissolved in May 2011.184 
Traditional mediation is also cheaper compared to Western-style courts. This makes it 
more accessible as it does not normally demand a lot of resources and expertise. In 
Shurugwi one needs only ten dollars (US $10) to have their case fully resolved by the 
headman and fifteen dollars at the chief’s.185 This is much more favourable when looked 
at against the court system where the process is not only more expensive, but is also 
complicated by the need for police reports, technical-legal jargon and the need for 
lawyers. Besides, such courts are mostly found in towns and cities. In Shurugwi the 
magistrates’ court is in Shurugwi town and the High Court is permanently situated in 
Harare and Bulawayo, and sessional one at Gweru, which are almost 400, 300 and 33 
kilometres away, respectively. The Western-style justice system in Zimbabwe is also 
                                                 
181 See Paidamoyo Muzulu, “Zimbabwe government should compensate violence victims-Tribunal”, in 
ZIMDIASPORA, cited in http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?, accessed 30 January 2011, for more on 
these cases. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 See “Summit dissolves Tribunal”, in The Herald, 20 May 2011, cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?,  accessed 21 May 2011. 
185 Figures based on information I gathered during my fieldwork especially between December 2009 and 
July 2010. People can also pay in kind using chickens if they do not have the required cash. 
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fraught with delays and postponements which not only lead to delayed justice but to 
increased costs as well because the parties involved have to visit the courts on several 
occasions.186 Because of the limited reach of the Western justice system, then 
traditional authorities have a big stake to play in the justice system of the people in the 
district at this crucial juncture of the transition from violence to a more democratic 
dispensation. However, the absence of legal representation may work to the 
disadvantage of the less eloquent or those who cannot properly argue their case.187 
The infrastructure also makes it worse. Between 2009 and 2010 I observed that the 
roads are badly damaged by neglect. There were again serious transport problems that 
made it very difficult to reach Western-style courts situated in towns. I have also 
established that the two police stations in the rural areas at Tongogara and Chachacha 
have a single vehicle, which makes their access to other parts very difficult. Besides their 
allocated bicycles, they do not have other means to get to other areas, except by the 
good will of the public.188 I was also informed that police officers were not expected to 
pay any fare in public transport. However, in time they have extended this to private 
vehicles, whether by agreement or by force. 
The “traditional” method of kuripa ngozi would also work for the rural area of Shurugwi 
because, like the other rural areas of Zimbabwe, it contains more people than the urban 
                                                 
186 Besides delays that have resulted in a serious backlog of cases, the justice system in the country has 
also been tainted with allegations of corruption. See for example, Newsday 17 January 2011,  “Magistrate, 
prosecutor breathe fire” in http://www.newsday.co.zw, Accessed 18 January 2011, which contains an 
article in which Provincial Magistrate for Harare, Mishrod Guvamombe and area Public Prosecutor, 
Andrew Kumire, lamented the vices that have gripped the magistrates courts in Zimbabwe. The same 
article goes on to cite the Deputy Chief Justice Luke Malaba, who lambasted the prosecution in the 
country for “abusing the court process by delaying setting down of criminal appeals before the High 
Court.” What the two situations highlighted in this article show are the weaknesses of the justice system. 
The question to ask is: What would possibly happen to this judiciary system that seems already 
overwhelmed if the several several thousands of politically connected cases are all brought to it? 
187 See Monica Matavire, “Interrogating the Zimbabwean traditional jurisprudence and the position of 
women in conflict resolution, A case for Shona tribes in Muzarabani district”, in International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, February 2012, http://www.ijhssnet.com/update/index.php/archives/16-
journalabstract/journal-abstract/810-vol-1-no-21-si-december-2011abstract29.html, Accessed 16 June 
2012. p 222. 
188 I observed that these police officers do not pay transport fares be it in a public vehicle or private 
vehicle, which to some extent compromises their work and on the positive side, makes their task 
bearable. 
 
 
 
 
 388 
 
 
 
 
area.189 As highlighted in the General Introduction, Shurugwi rural district has a 
population of 69 954 people compared to 16 866 for the urban area.190 Besides, rural 
areas have generally seen more violence compared to urban areas.191 The above 
accords with Gayatri Spivak’s who argues that the most silent victims of “pervasive 
rather than singular and spectacular” human rights violations are the poor villagers.192   
 
UNHU AND SURVIVOR JUSTICE 
The rural members of Shurugwi live under the Shona generic of unhu, a varied form of 
ubuntu where members have a duty to the community and where problems between 
members have to be solved through dialogue. In the Zulu formulation, it is defined as 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu meaning "a person is a person through other persons."193 
For Zimbabwe, unhu has been defined as “I am because you are, and without you there 
can be no me”194 that encapsulates the African collective identification and communalist 
identity and destiny. Tutu succinctly captures it by stating that “my humanity is caught 
up, bound up and inextricable in yours. When I dehumanise you I inexorably 
dehumanise myself.”195  
Under unhu among the Shona, one’s worth is thus relational, and measured against 
collective societal values. According to this philosophy therefore a person only exists as 
a part of a corporeal whole, the larger community. In this way, the violence that was 
committed on the individuals has to be seen as violation on the community at large or 
                                                 
189 Government of Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, 2002 Population Census Results. 
190 Ibid. 
191 I have in Chapter Three explained the association between ZANU-PF and the rural areas dating back to 
the days of the Second Chimurenga, and in the post 2000 period these rural areas have seen more 
violence compared to urban areas. The war veterans, Green bombers, and ZANU-PF youths first operated 
in rural areas before they were seen in the urban areas. Also bases were also established in rural areas 
earlier than in urban areas. See Tony Reeler, Sublimal terror, and Solidarity peace Trust, Desperately 
seeking Sanity, for more details. 
192 See Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak, “Righting wrongs”, p 528. 
193 Dani Wadada Nabudere, “Ubuntu philosophy: Memory and reconciliation”, p 3. 
194 ONHRI Concept paper, p 8. 
195 Desmond Tutu cited in Dani Wadada Nabudere, “Ubuntu philosophy”, p 5. 
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as violation against humanity or against “unhu hwedu” in Shona. When taken in the 
context of Shurugwi where the community represents a larger family the importance 
increases. This is the equivalent of the communalist adage: “an injury to one is an injury 
to all.” 
Related to this, under this unhu worldview, the search for a resolution to the violence is 
rooted in community means like kuripa ngozi, which, while placing greater emphasis on 
the victim also recognises the wrongdoer’s and community needs in an effort to foster 
continued mutual existence. As such, “once committed, violence and its consequences 
cannot be ignored for political expediency. It needs to be addressed in order for 
individuals, communities and the nation to realise peace and meaningful 
development.”196 What we also have to note is that the principle of the traditional 
African justice method lies more in the “arbitration and mutual concessions”197 rather 
than in the final acquisition of one’s rights, with the ultimate aim being the attainment 
or the restoration of peace.  In this regard, “conflicts are brought before courts but are 
resolved through reconciliation. If there is a trial each party has to make reciprocal 
concessions, so that it can, eventually, be terminated amicably.”198 Muwati, et al, sum it 
succinctly and observe that the African conflict resolution mechanisms put “emphasis 
on harmony, balance, peace, inclusion, restoration and participation.”199 Under kuripa 
ngozi, in the Shurugwi case, this will be after some form of dialogue and mutually 
agreed compensation. The underlining theme will be the give and take to both parties, 
which accords with the legal culture of most African societies as differentiated from, 
say, civil law, common law or Islamic traditions.200 
                                                 
196 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, p 10. 
197 Hoecke and Warrington, Ibid, p 508. 
198 Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, “Legal cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards 
a new model for comparative law”,  in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol 47, July 1998, 
The British institute of International and Comparative Law and Cambridge University Press, cited in 
http://www.jstor.org, p 506.  
199 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences”, p 5.  
200 Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, “Legal cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine, p 508. 
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By articulating survivor justice, kuripa ngozi transcends mere justice. It also opens up 
the opportunity for healing the communities affected by violence. In this case I am using 
the definition of healing given by David Maxwell, which is the “totality of activities and 
ideas which help both individuals and wider community to come to terms with the 
experience of violence and bereavement caused by war, in a manner which allows them 
to continue their daily existence.”201 What is particularly important about kuripa ngozi is 
its articulation of justice at both the physical and the metaphysical domains. In this 
cosmogony, while material compensation is paid at the physical level, the ngozi spirit 
“fights from the metaphysical front for truth, restoration and justice.”202 As Nabudere 
notes, the twinning of the metaphysical and the real-life forces should be understood in 
terms of ubuntu philosophy where there is an “inextricable bond between Umuntu 
[living person], the Ancestors [Living dead] and the Supreme Being [God].”203  
It is assumed that by paying restitution, the spirit of the dead or the wounded spirit is 
appeased because the restitution enables the continuation of the victim’s social and 
economic lines. Simultaneously, the living re-establish peace and also re-establish the 
important communal relations that are so vital in the rural communities such as 
Shurugwi. What we have to note is that these should not be taken as simply useless 
traditions or superstition, but rather as important common sense notions that inform 
the communities’ good sense that in turn regulate people’s experiences in the complex 
cosmogony of the indigenous Zimbabweans. 
Traditional authorities are still powerful in the district. As already pointed out earlier, 
despite undergoing some metamorphosis from their pre-colonial status under the 
colonial and post-colonial times, they continue to adjudicate over most civil cases.204 
                                                 
201 David Maxwell, “Witches, prophets and avenging spirits”, p 327. 
202 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, p 11. 
203 Dani Wadada Nabudere, “Ubuntu philosophy”, p 5. 
204 In the NAZ, Delineation Reports General: Selukwe District S2929/7/6, 1968, is found duties and 
functions of chiefs and headmen in Selukwe now Shurugwi. These were to mediate in “adultery, lobola 
disputes, quarrels between husband and wife, trespass, disputes as to property and fights.” The most 
common of the cases from the list are ‘disputes’ and ‘fights’ of various kinds, which makes them ready for 
‘disputes’ with a political root. 
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Regarding this, they have been adjudicating over marital disputes, land disputes, child 
maintenance cases and minor quarrels.205 As such, the addition of political cases might 
not necessarily be a complete disjuncture with their other everyday roles. In fact it 
might be a welcome development that might add to their status as leaders of their 
communities. It was on the basis of their long held authority in rural areas, as leaders of 
their communities and as the link between their communities and the spiritual world 
that chiefs and other traditional structures were chosen as heads of “Ward Centres” in 
the hierarchical structure of the ONHRI at the lower levels.206 Significantly, this derived 
in part to their re-invented role in the late post-colonial Zimbabwe. 
I also found that these community courts have a huge potential to aid the process of the 
re-establishment of peace and justice in the district, which can be a model for other 
rural districts of the country. During my field work I established that most of these 
“traditional” courts sit on Thursdays, which are chisi or rest days, and some occasionally 
sit on Sundays, another day most people take off from their fieldwork to attend church 
services. After attending up to ten such courts, I was left convinced that given the 
chance and space to help resolve petty political crimes and violence that occurred 
between neighbours and extended family during the violence of 2000 to 2008, these 
courts have the potential to be spaces for just conflict resolution. What might be 
needed is some form of standardisation with regard to the forms of compensation for 
the different levels of violations.  
At these courts, I found that people are given the platform to put forward their case, to 
respond and even to call upon their witnesses. The key aspect of this process is that the 
                                                 
205 The relationship between traditional chiefs and governments in both the colonial and post-colonial 
periods has been ambiguous, and has been characterised by a love-hate relationship, which relationship 
shifted with the demands that the respective governments wanted chiefs to play. See A.K.H Weinrich,  
Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia, Heinemann, London, 1971, see also G.C. Passmore, Hidden Conflict: A 
Documentary record of Administrative Policy in colonial Zimbabwe, 1950-1980, Praeger Publishers, 
Westport, 2002, and also J.F.Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, London, Oxford University Press, 
1969, for developments between chiefs and the colonial administration. See Amanda Hammar, “The 
Making and Unma(s)king of Local Government,” in Zimbabwe, in A. Hammar, et al, (eds), Zimbabwe’s 
Unfinished Business, Harare, Weaver Press, 2003, for the post-colonial relationships. 
206 ONHRI, “Concept paper”, p 14. 
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accused has to acknowledge culpability and show contrition. After this, the chief’s or 
headman’s ruling council would consult to determine the amount of restitution to 
compensate the victim. Again, before a final recommendation is made, both the 
aggrieved and the perpetrator are called to make submissions to the verdict of the 
village or community before the final verdict is announced to the villagers. As such, the 
process that is based on such a wide participation of the villagers and one that has been 
in place in the district helping to solve civil cases, would be a potential space for the 
establishment of peace, justice and reconciliation in an area paralysed by political 
violence.  
However, the close association of the chiefs and headmen with ZANU-PF might be their 
main weakness. They were a vital cog in the machinery that was responsible for 
spreading violence. Because of this they cannot play two roles: that of accused and 
adjudicator. Indeed from my research I established that in Shurugwi some chiefs’ cars 
were reportedly used to transport ZANU-PF thugs involved in violence against 
opposition supporters. This means that chiefs might also have a direct conflict of 
interest in the cases they are supposed to superintend and mediate. The danger might 
be situations of crony judgements, where relatives of traditional authorities could 
receive favourable outcomes. A similar line of argument comes from Wilfred Scharf who 
established that in Botswana outcomes of cases adjudicated by chiefs more often 
mirrored ties with the chiefs.207 Potentially, this might add to increased cases of 
extortion by the chiefs. In this regard alleged perpetrators and or the aggrieved might 
be made to pay huge sums by these leaders to get favourable outcomes for their cases. 
This notwithstanding, dissatisfied disputants can take leave to appeal in the magistrates 
courts. This shows that traditional courts are not completely divorced from the formal 
national Western justice system. Besides, the traditional courts are only allowed by law 
                                                 
207 See Wilfred Scharf, “Non state justice systems in Southern Africa: How should governments respond”? 
p 66.  
 
 
 
 
 393 
 
 
 
 
to levy fines that are not so huge. Headmen courts are allowed a maximum of US$ 100-
00, and the chiefs US$ 500-00.208 
Also all chiefs in Zimbabwe belong to the largely partisan Council of Chiefs, whose 
president Chief Fortune Charumbira does not hide his support for ZANU-PF. While this 
might be true, we ought to realise that virtually no structure was left unaffected or 
untainted by the political violence and political association including the judiciary.209 
Also, chiefs and headmen have traditionally had the important role of acting as 
intercessors between the dead and the living, hence in crisis situations and in good 
times they have led their communities in communication with the spirits. As such chiefs 
can be called upon to play this important role to help solve the cases of political violence 
between neighbours and families.  
In addition, most of the cases on political violence brought before the judiciary since 
2000 have not been finalised to date. Some of these include the thirty-eight MDC 
petitions to the High Court in 2000, and the one by Morgan Tsvangirai on the 2002 
disputed presidential election. All of these cases ran into 2005 and 2008, respectively, 
rendering them academic.210 Thus the case against the chiefs and headmen is not 
extraordinary. Thus given the chance they can still help mediate between many more 
cases, which will also be an opportunity to rescue their battered image. It will also be 
interesting to note that chiefs have had this sort of relationship with the colonial 
government, especially in the late 1960s and the 1970s,211 but managed to transform 
into close allies of ZANU-PF from the second decade of independence.   
                                                 
208 See Monica Matavire, “Interrogating Zimbabwean traditional jurisprudence”, pp 20-21. 
209 Among the cases that have been levelled against the judiciary have been allegations that senior 
appointments have been influenced by political patronage, also that judges have received rewards from 
ZANU-PF violence including farms, which makes them complicit as well. See The Herald, 07 July 2008, 
“Zimbabwe: Magistrates, law officers get cars”. The Attorney General, Johannes Tomana in 2008 also 
came out in the open about his ZANU-PF credentials- See CCSF, “National healing and reconciliation 
position paper”, July 2009, p 32. 
210 For a nuanced discussion see “Sublimal terror?”, pp 6-7. 
211 See Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and guerrilla war, see also David Lan Guns and Rain, 
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As evidenced by calls for the acknowledgement of the violations and calls for 
compensation discussed in Chapter Five for long-lasting peace to exist people should be 
allowed to coexist and compensate each other for the political violations against each 
other. On the whole, however, the parameters of these indigenous courts have to be 
clearly spelt out to avoid abuse of the privilege and to avoid street justice or vigilantism, 
such as that which rocked South Africa in Gugulethu in 1998 and Khayelitsha in 2000.212 
Regarding this, Advocate George Bizos’s words are instructive. Commenting on the 
debate on transitional justice in Zimbabwe, Bizos said: “I have heard that communities 
will start talking to one another. Yes, people within a divided community must start 
talking but they require, I think, some sort of structure in order to control the dialogue 
between them and offer some sort of apology, some sort of compensation for loss in 
order for the process to work.”213 These parameters that Bizos mentions should be able 
to deal decisively with cases of multiple and false accusations that may inadvertently 
crop up and complicate or even negate these attempts. 
 In addition, the traditional authorities dealing with these cases need to be empowered 
by law so that their judgements can carry authority, so that their mediations are 
enforceable. As Derrida, commenting on the relationship between force and justice, 
says, justice ought to resort to some form of force. He says, justice is not justice “if it 
does not have the force to be ‘enforced’; a powerless justice is also not justice in the 
sense of droit.214” He further contends that “force without justice is tyrannical. Justice 
without force is contradictory, as there are always the wicked; force without justice is 
                                                 
212 See Wilfred Scharf, “Non justice systems in Southern Africa: How should governments respond?” p28. 
See also, News24, 20 June 2011, “Vigilante Justice: 2 PE men necklaced”, in News24, 20 June 2011, 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Vigilante-justice-2-PE-men-necklaced-20110620, Accessed 
25 June 2011.  
213 See “Hot seat interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland, Glen Mpani and Mary Ndlovu: 
Reconciliation, justice and national healing”, cited in SW Radio Africa, 10 April 2009, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg090410swradio.asp?sector=DEMGG&year2009&range_start=75
1, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
214 Jacques Derrida, “Force of law: The mystical foundation of authority”, in Drucilla Cornell, Michel 
Rosenfeld and David Grey Carlson, eds, Deconstruction and the Possibility of justice, Routledge, New York 
and London, 1992, p 11. 
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accused of wrong. And so it is necessary to put justice and force together; and, for this, 
to make sure that what is justice is strong, or what is strong be just.”215 
The centrality of unhu in kuripa ngozi as administered by traditional Shona courts and 
the “traditional” justice they superintend has for long fostered the articulation of 
“survivor’s justice” over “victor’s justice” in Mamdani’s terms. For Mamdani, the 
Nuremburg trials, the post-holocaust Israel treatment of the Palestinians as well the 
Tutsi version of post-genocide justice, resemble “victor’s justice” which was based on 
vindictiveness, vengeance, characterised by wanton trials and rooted on the attainment 
of victory over the adversary.216 To him, this kind of justice has the potential of 
absorbing the state to the extent that it focuses on preserving that victory and 
neglecting other important issues, and more importantly, it has the danger of inciting 
the vanquished to want to seek revenge.217  
Survivor’s justice, on the other hand, is hinged on looking at the surviving victim and 
surviving perpetrator as survivors, thus “transcending the opposition between the two” 
who have the common blessing of a life after a violent epoch and who have to seek a 
shared future.218  The indigenous justice system of kuripa ngozi and other community 
courts in the district in their mediation of cases look into the future relations of the two 
parties living in shared spaces as they also try to consider mutual interests in seeking 
restoration. The indigenous justice system of kuripa ngozi fits the survivor justice billing 
because its mediation looks into the future relations of mutual interdependence for the 
two parties bound by a shared humanity. This is through the various processes 
undertaken: mutually inclusive dialogue, cleansing and reparations,219 which help the 
restoration of social and economic relations between the two parties involved and their 
families. Similarly, by bringing the offended and perpetrator to the same meeting at the 
village assemblies in an attempt to find a mutually acceptable solution, the traditional 
                                                 
215 Ibid, p 11. 
216 Mahmood Mamdani, When victims become killers, p 271. 
217 Ibid,p 272. 
218 Ibid, p 272. 
219 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, pp 4 and 14. 
 
 
 
 
 396 
 
 
 
 
version of justice in the district often leads to not only the two parties living there after 
in harmony, but their families as well.  
There could also be other ways of looking at the indigenous or traditional transitional 
justice methods other than kuripa ngozi. However, I believe that these traditional 
methods will not be paradigmatically different from the one I am proposing in their 
quest for peaceful resolutions to conflicts, and the desire for the restoration of justice 
and also the restoration of previously normal everyday relations.  
 
THREE LIGHTNING STROKES, AND OTHERS; AND THE CASE FOR KURIPA NGOZI IN 
SHURUGWI 
In this section I turn to discuss the cases that confronted me during the course of my 
research in the field that made me to think about kuripa ngozi as a means to 
transformative justice. Among others, I met victims of violence who were clamouring for 
compensation. There were also others that sought to pay compensation to those they 
had violated during the 2000 to 2008 violence period.  
The first set of cases that I would want to discuss as highlighted in Chapter Five, 
bordered on occult beliefs. These were the case in which the family’s three assets were 
struck by lightning; the cases where several perpetrators were affected by ngozi of their 
victims, including mysterious deaths in perpetrators’ families; unexplained illnesses; as 
well as cases of some alleged perpetrators who had gone mad. On the positive side is 
the fact that the recently amended Witchcraft Suppression Act (2006) now recognises 
witchcraft (and other occult practices). Under the amendments, with the right 
“evidence” there may be grounds for prosecution at the law courts.220 Important from 
the above is the state’s recognition of non-scientific belief systems, which may mean 
that the cases highlighted above can be freely deliberated upon at the village and 
                                                 
220 See extract of the amendement in the The Herald, 10 May 2006.  
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headmen’s courts. Potentially this may result in greater dialogue, restoration of 
relations and restitution. 
Traditional leaders themselves are also keen to see some form of closure to the political 
violence. In an interview with one headman I was made aware of this. He said that “the 
district and country has seen senseless violence. Much of it was not at all necessary. 
People strained their relations, forgetting that after political differences they would 
need each other. That violence should not be repeated.” When I asked him what he saw 
as the way forward, he categorically told me that “people needed to compensate each 
other for the wrongs committed.” He went to state that “leaders at various levels of 
power (traditional, political or religious) need[ed] to come together and cleanse the 
district of the blood that was shed, and to ask for forgiveness from district spirits for the 
violence. We need to return to tsika dzedu (our indigenous/traditional ways).”221 
Throughout our discussion, he constantly made reference to the need for cleansing the 
district, kugeza ropa or kuchenura dunhu. What is clear from this interview is that 
traditional authorities who have largely been turned into key agents of violence in rural 
areas see its negative impact. A reference to a “return to traditions” should be taken to 
mean among other things the adoption of kuripa ngozi strategies to defuse tensions and 
to heal the community of Shurugwi. 
Appeasing of spirits is not a new phenomenon in Shurugwi and Zimbabwe at large in the 
new millennium. Following a spate of vehicular accidents at Boterekwa pass, the 
Shurugwi traditional authorities, together with the District and Provincial government 
authorities organised a cleansing and ancestral appeasing ceremony at the pass site in 
August 2008. They meant to “cleanse” the blood that had been lost as a result of the 
accidents, and also to appease the district spirits whose anger was thought to be 
responsible for these accidents. Accounts obtained revealed that the Provincial 
Administrator, the Provincial Governor, the District Administrator, traditional chiefs and 
headmen were in attendance. As part of the rituals there were calabashes of traditional 
                                                 
221 Interview with a headman, 6 June 2010. 
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beer brew and food. Of interest is the fact that the beer was brewed using sorghum and 
maize donated by villagers, to show communality and as an affirmation of the age old 
practice where all have to contribute towards such ceremonies.222 
A similar ceremony was also held at the National Sports Stadium in the capital Harare in 
2003. This followed the death of about thirteen soccer fans following the Zimbabwe-
South Africa soccer match. In this incident the soccer fans died in a stampede after the 
police fired teargas to quell violence from the stands. In the aftermath of this tragedy, 
the Zimbabwe Football Association (ZIFA) and the ministry of Education Sports and 
Culture organised a national cleansing and appeasing ceremony. This was meant to 
appease the spirits of the dead soccer fans, and to cleanse the national stadium of bad 
spirits. The occasion was attended by senior government officials, traditional leaders, 
traditional healers, soccer fans and soccer administrators in the country. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that the ZANU-PF government might have tried to win the 
support of urbanites by engaging in such a ceremony meant to appease the spirits of the 
dead. Also in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government embarked on the 
reconstructions of important guerrilla sites outside Zimbabwe, such as Chimoio in 
Mozambique, in a bid to appease their spirits. This followed earlier similar ceremonies 
including reburials at former major refugee/guerrilla camps in Mozambique, Zambia and 
Tanzania in the late 1990s in which senior government officials, traditional healers and 
chiefs attended. 
There have also been cases where village heads and chiefs have invited traditional 
healers popularly called tsikamutandas to cleanse villages of witches and witchcraft 
omen.223 These have been seen in many areas including Gokwe, Chivi and Zvishavane in 
the Midlands province. The above reinforces the belief in occult witchcraft in Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
222 The same method of collecting contributions to common causes is clearly illustrated by the system of 
collecting mealie meal from all villagers in situations of funerals. Other occasions where this 
communalism is witnessed include the mukwerera ceremony, where the whole district contributes 
towards food and beer for a rain making party, and magadziro. 
223 See “Arrest tsikamutandas, police urged” in The Herald, 25 June 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13579:arrest-tsikamutandas-
police-urged&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 25 June 2011. 
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Residents of Shurugwi also recalled the operations of tsikamutandas in the 1980s and 
1990s in the district that targeted the weeding out of witches. 
Related to the violence in the period 2000 to 2008 in Shurugwi, The Standard 
newspaper in May 2010 reported that a prominent war veteran from Buhera had been 
terrorised by ngozi of the people he had allegedly killed in this period. As the story goes, 
the war veteran is said to have been going round the district offering sandals to the 
families of his victims as a form of appeasement.224 The African Crisis also mentioned 
Sosana Mhongoyo also of Buhera, who reportedly uncovered the killers of her son, 
Tedius Chokuda, through his avenging spirit after he was slain in the moment of the 
political violence.225 According to the story, Walter Marwizi, Caiphas Chimhete, and 
Patrick Basopo were discovered to have killed headmaster Tedius Chokuda just after the 
2002 Presidential elections when Basopo’s sister was possessed by Chokuda’s spirit. 
Eventually Chokuda’s family referred the matter to headman Mushumba for arbitration, 
whereupon Basopo’s sister was again possessed by Chokuda’s spirit that demanded 
compensation in asbestos sheets and a herd of cattle. A closer look at this case points to 
a strong resemblance to the cases that the magamba spirits revealed in Mozambique. 
Inside their courageous report, the CCJP/LRF, also discuss how some Fifth Brigade 
soldiers and other state operatives went back to parts of Matebeleland and the 
Midlands where they operated during the infamous gukurahundi period to seek 
forgiveness.226 
I have also established from my field research that the practice of appeasing spirits is 
still widely done in Shurugwi. Firstly, when a person dies the locals conduct a spiritual 
autopsy.227 They visit a traditional healer (n’anga) or prophet (diviners from African 
                                                 
224 See “Ngozi: Primitive superstition or reality?”, in The Standard, 23 May 2010, cited in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 21 June 2011. 
225 Walter Marwizi and Caiphas Chimhete, “Zimbabwe: Avenging spirits torment ZANU-PF terror militia” 
cited in http:www.africancrisis.co.za/Article.php?,ID=76100&, accessed 30 January 2011. 
226 CCJP/LRF Breaking the silence, p 9. 
227 See Jens A Andersson, “Sorcery in the era of ‘Henry IV’: Kinship, mobility and mortality in Buhera 
District, Zimbabwe”, in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol 8, No 3, September 2002, p 431, 
in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3134534, Accessed 14 March 2011, who qualifies the need for this 
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Christian churches) to confirm the cause of death, a process called kurova gata or 
kuvhunzira. It is usually after this that the dead can be buried. In other cases this is done 
immediately after burial. Should it be found that the deceased had been bewitched or 
aggrieved his or her spirit is invoked to avenge his death. A year after burial follows 
another process called kurova guva or magadziro, to bring the dead person’s spirit 
home, is conducted.228  
Again before magadziro, another process of kubvunzira is done to ascertain whether or 
not someone tampered with the spirit of the deceased. In Shurugwi, the Heroes’ and 
Defence Forces holidays in early August have become popular days for the practice of 
kurova guva. Taking advantage of the long weekend around these August holidays, 
urbanites stream to the rural area, where they maintain a rural home, to specifically 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘autopsy’ as rooted in the belief among the Shona (and Ndebele) that death is not natural, but is viewed 
as caused by “someone or something”. As such in addition to the modern bio-medical autopsy, they also 
conduct an occult based one, which tries more to find who was responsible than what the cause of death 
was. In this case, although an illness may be noted as a case of the death, still people want to know who 
was behind the illness. See also Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, “Witchcraft as an issue in the 
‘Politics of Belonging’: Democratisation and urban Migrants’ involvement with the Home village”, in 
African Studies Review, Vol 41, No 3, December 1998, Published by the African Studies Association, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/525354, Accessed 14 March 2011, p 78, have also established that the Bum 
of Cameroon share a similar perspective about death. They say that in cases of illnesses, misfortune, 
repeated setbacks and death, the Bum will visit a diviner to try to establish whether witchcraft was not 
behind these occurrences. See also Stephen Ellis, “Mystical weapons: Some evidence from the Liberian 
War”, in Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol 31, No 2, Religion and War in the 1990s, May 2001, p 226, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581517, Accessed 14 March 2011, who also says that to everything that 
happens: death, birth, misfortune or fortune, there had to be an explanation, that is, a cause for every 
effect. And, to all these witchcraft is a potential influence. 
228 This is similar to the Ndebele practice of umbuyiso, that is described by Shari Eppel, in “Healing the 
dead”, p 7. The spirit of the dead person will be thought of as in the wilderness, and by holding this 
ceremony it is hoped that it comes home and to start to look after the living. The basic aim is to link the 
living with the living dead who are supposed to keep watching over the living. In this way by bringing the 
spirit ‘home’ mean two things: welcoming the spirit that was thought to be wondering to the living, and 
also to join it with the other family spirits. I have also participated in these ceremonies, and what I have 
also established is that both have been adulterated. People no longer visit n’angas only, but others visit 
Christian prophets for kurova gata and before magadziro. This may be related to charges demanded by 
traditional nangas, compared to Christian based seers/prophets who normally do not demand payment 
(but they accept ‘gifts’/tokens of appreciation) as well as the spread of the Christian faith. The magadziro 
ceremony has also been infused with the Western concept of the unveiling of the tombstone, which 
means that people might have both a Christian ceremony and a traditional one in quick succession or on 
the same day. 
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participate in these rituals.229 This renders the appeasement of spirits and fear of ngozi 
universal in the district. People still believe strongly that if they do not perform these 
rituals they risk the wrath of such spirits, which are assumed to cause bad luck. The 
importance of these rituals is to show that even though people of the district are largely 
Christian and subscribe to “modern” or Western values; they are still linked to the 
practice of respecting their ancestral spirits in the “traditional” discourse.  
The above recalls the words of Nabudere who asserts that “through these invisible 
forces Africans seek explanations to certain happenings which cannot be explained by 
‘normal’ or rational means.”230 The case of the spiritual autopsy from Shurugwi certainly 
shows that although death is a common everyday occurrence it is still an “extra 
ordinary” event that cannot be “ordinarily” explained. Related to this, as Nabudere 
avers, conflicts are also a part of the “uncertainties of existence” that demand 
supernatural forces in the reconciliation process.231 On the whole, one can say that the 
veneration of spirits and the fear of ngozi are not alien but are the rock upon which 
social and other relations in Shurugwi are ballasted. 
Amani Trust, a now defunct NGO, conducted reburials of the victims of gukurahundi 
from about 1998 to the early years of the 2000s in selected villages of Gwanda in 
Matebeleland. These reburials surfaced key worldviews of these communities. Among 
these included the little regard the communities held for post-violence counselling. 
                                                 
229 The close association between the urbanites from Shurugwi cannot be overemphasised. Besides simply 
visiting the district for funerals or funeral rites of deceased relatives, the urbanites maintain close ties 
with the district for various political and economic reasons. To this extent, for example, Minister Francis 
Nhema partly used his ties as a close relative of paramount chief Nhema to launch his political career. In 
the same vein a lot others have used their rural ties to establish or strengthen their businesses, for 
example the late businessman and politician Marongwe, who maintained a fleet of buses in the district. 
There are numerous other examples. See Peter Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, “Witchcraft as an issue in the 
‘Politics of Belonging’”, pp 76-77, and also Jens A Andersson, “Sorcery in the era of ‘Henry IV’, for more 
details. Andersson, p 426, for example captures the central ethos of these ties, and says “Typically, an 
urban career ends with a return to the land and, if possible, with the occupation of a position in the 
lineage-based leadership structure. The sick and dying also seek to return to their rural home areas 
whenever possible. Kinship solidarity is perceived as automatic and natural in this social universe of 
circulatory migration and identification with ancestral land.” 
230 Dani W Nabudere, “Ubuntu philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation”, p 4. 
231 Ibid. 
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According to Eppel, while there could have been cases of Post Traumatic Disorder or 
mixed anxiety or depression, the rural people did not readily identify with the above 
mentioned standard psychological methods and terminologies.232 Secondly, the 
survivors and their families also perceived themselves as “primarily” members of their 
communities, rather than individuals. To them the violence of the gukurahundi and 
improper burials in mass or shallow graves and other such places, harmed first the 
community values, and later themselves.233 They alluded to the harming of the unity in 
the areas as well as community spirits, whose children were lying in “wrong places”.234 
These aggrieved spirits were and are still believed to be responsible for the natural 
disasters in Matebeleland (famine and droughts).235 Thus, any individualised healing had 
to take cognisance of the need to heal the larger communities as well. Overall, the 
reburials in marked graves, not only appeased and brought closure to the victims’ 
families, and “brought home” the spirits of the dead; but it also appeased the 
community at large. This is notwithstanding the fact that the forensic expertise relied on 
advanced technology that had been utilised in Latin America.  
Besides the occult-based cases, I also came across various cases of petty crimes that 
were committed between neighbours and between family members.236 These are cases 
that can be easily solved at the village or community level. Examples include a woman 
who claims that she was victimised because of her brother-in-law’s jealousy at her 
success as a cross border trader, cases where people grazed in each other’s fields as 
political punishment, as well as cases where people demanded payment for their 
chickens or goats that were stolen in the name of politics. These are cases that are 
“small”, and which might clog the justice system unnecessarily. They are also, if not 
checked, likely to keep the district paralysed.  
                                                 
232 Shari Eppel, “Healing the dead”, p 2. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid, p 7. 
236 See Chapter Three for more details on the cases summarised below. 
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Similar petty issues and contretemps have been reported elsewhere in the country. 
Shari Eppel, for example, discusses the issue of three dinner plates that have 
contributed to political paralysis in Matebeleland.237 For me, resolving these cases, 
through restoration, may lead to the restoration of the victims’ self-worth among their 
peers. This will also go a long way in the restoration of their production and 
reproduction capacities that will profoundly assist in rebuilding social relations and the 
diffusion of tensions. 
My discussion of kuripa ngozi is again informed by cases where perpetrators came out, 
to claim political party victimhood, and or to seek forgiveness from their victims. From 
Shurugwi, a case that I can highlight comes from one war veteran who told me that he 
participated in the violation of others because of his association with ZANU-PF. He thus 
claimed to be a victim through this association with ZANU-PF. He also claimed that he 
did what he did for the benefit of ZANU-PF so that he would not be labelled a sell-out.238 
He went on to also say that he was now bitter because after his role in the elections of 
2008 he had not been adequately paid for his services in ensuring that the MP, Senator 
and the President had won. The fact that other people other than him had received 
farming equipment like scotch carts, harrows and ploughs made him feel rejected, used 
and abused. What is worse is that in the aftermath of the violence he had been left to 
face the neighbours and or families that he violated, on his own.  
I also met other perpetrators who also claimed to have been coerced by their political 
parties to engage in this violence. Like the war veteran above, they also alleged that in 
the GNU era they had been abandoned by their respective political parties and were left 
to rebuild their social relations with their neighbours.239  According to Chipo, whose 
story was also highlighted in Chapter Three, she started off as an MDC supporter. She 
                                                 
237 See Shari Eppel, “A tale of three dinner plates”. 
238 See Chapter Three for the details of the interview that I had with him. 
239 See also Shari Eppel’s discussion on a similar issue for Gomoza village of Lupane in her thought 
provoking article titled “A tale of Three Dinner Plates”, p 13. She writes that “ZANU-PF…used people at 
the village level to attack their neighbours, and has now retreated and left local structures to face 
ostracism and retribution.” 
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was forced to switch allegiance to ZANU-PF because of the death of the MDC structures 
in her area, and the associational benefits for ZANU-PF supporters. She also told me that 
because of her previous association with the MDC she was forced to participate actively 
in the processes that led to the violation of MDC supporters so that she could be more 
“acceptable”. These processes include the keeping of registers of attendance at 
meetings, active singing and identification of those that had to be beaten or disciplined 
at the rallies. 
Another case involves Betty who also claimed that she was a victim of her associational 
membership of ZANU-PF. She claimed to have been in the team led by Jerry.240 She had 
been promised a job after the elections. However, she has since been overlooked. To 
make matters worse, she fell sick and had not received visits from her party supporters. 
She thus felt used and abandoned. 
These cases are similar to what war veteran Misheck Gora of Masvingo said “I am now 
alone and angry because these people abused us and they have now left us to face the 
people that we tortured in the name of Mugabe.”241 A notorious war veteran from 
neighbouring Mberengwa district, Biggie Chitoro, also claimed being used and dumped 
by ZANU-PF. He also sought the forgiveness of his victims.242  
There were also some cases where perpetrators initiated the paying of compensation to 
their victims. An example came from Bindura where the MDC chairperson for Bindura 
North, Tongai Jack, received a written apology and was also paid US$1 500 by four jailed 
ZANU PF supporters, Wellington Chitehwe, Anywhere Mavhangira, Phillip Magaso and 
                                                 
240 See Chapter Three for a nuanced discussion of Jerry. 
241 See Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity, See also, cases cited in The Daily Nation, also 
cited in the Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking Sanity, in an article headlined “Mugabe’s party 
deserts supporters”, p 24. 
242 See “I need forgiveness-Chitoro”, in The Zimbabwean, 6 May 2009, 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/20976/ai-need-forgivenessa-a-biggie-chitoro.html, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
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Jonah Nyakudya as compensation for his house in Chipadze that they had damaged. The 
compensation was not withstanding the jail sentence of 44 months.243 
Related to this and in reference to the Moses Chokuda’s ngozi from Gokwe, the 
avenging spirit was “laid to rest”, after three years, through the Machayas’ 
compensating the Chokudas. In this high profile case that involved the family of the 
Midlands Provincial Governor Machaya, and that of Isaac Gana, a ZANU-PF District 
Coordinating Committee Chairman, it was reported that the Machayas compensated the 
Chokudas an astounding US$15 000-00 and 35 herd of cattle.244  
Despite the rather outlandish restitution, the Chokuda case provides a strong case for 
kuripa ngozi in several important ways. Firstly, it involved a high ranking ZANU-PF 
official’s family accepting liability, dialoguing with, and compensating the family of a 
slain ordinary MDC member. This was notwithstanding the determined efforts by the 
ZANU-PF and state structures to coerce the Chokudas to bury their son, and the serious 
but failing efforts by the state to conduct a pauper burial for the victim. As highlighted 
earlier, the efforts at pauper burial were thwarted by the victim who at times 
“disappeared” from the morgue. Thirdly, the case highlights an important aspect of 
kuripa ngozi, that the only way to stop a ravaging spirit is by paying restitution. Of 
significance again is the fact that only cash and cattle were used, and no woman (or 
human) was involved in the transaction, which is within the constitutional framework. 
Fourthly, it also ran alongside the prosecution in Western-style courts that sentenced 
the three murderers to eighteen years in prison.245 The case too reveals the important 
                                                 
243 See http://changezimbabwe.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=2917, Accessed 27 
June 2011. 
244 See The Herald, 19 October 2011, “Governor pays US$15 000, 35 cattle compensation to deceased 
family” in http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24181:governor-
pays-us15-000-35-cattle-compensation-to-deceaseds-family&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 
19 October 2011. 
245 See Newsday, 26 September 2011, available on line at: http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-09-
26-zanu-pf-youth-gets-18-years-for-murder, accessed on 28 September 2012. See also The Herald, 28 
September 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22313:governor-accepts-
sons-jailing-for-murder&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed on 28 September 2012. 
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role traditional chiefs play in mediation. In this case it was through the mediation efforts 
of chief Njelele that the case was resolved.246 
Linked to the above, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum cited in Zimonline 10 
September 2011, reported that 76 percent of the 2000-2008 victims were still bitter or 
failing to cope. They also called for a “broad-based truth, recovery and reparation 
programme as the lasting solution to the national problem”, and importantly forty-nine 
percent of the victims wanted compensation.247  
A related call for the compensation of victims of past violence came from some 
members of parliament. For example, MP Felix Magagela Sibanda stated that 
reparations and damages should be paid to victims of past eras of violence, both at the 
local level through improving infrastructure, and at the individual level where surviving 
spouses or children received financial compensation.248 
 
NGOZI, THE LAW AND JUSTICE 
In arguing for kuripa ngozi I am not calling for an extra-legal transitional justice method 
for Shurugwi. Firstly, I am using kuripa ngozi in the widest sense, that of the payment of 
restitution to all those victimised by the perpetrators of the violence, and not the 
traditional use of the young women and young girls for appeasement. In this regard, the 
aggrieved spirits are symbolised by aggrieved victims who are seeking justice. Also, 
whilst the Zimbabwean constitution is silent on the use of women and girls in kuripa 
ngozi, the practice is technically illegal if we were to consider other laws contained in 
the constitution. The Sexual Offences Act, 9, 21, for example, states that: 
                                                 
246 See Newsday, 27 February 2012, “Machaya still to pay murder compensation balance”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2012-02-27-machaya-still-to-pay-murder-compensation-balance/, 
Accessed 27 February 2012. 
247 See Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum cited in Zimonline 10 September 2011, “Violence victims still 
bitter” in http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6809, Accessed 10 September 2011.  
248 See Newsday, 08 August 2011, “Put Transitional justice mechanisms in place” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-08-08-put-transitional-justice-mechanisms-in-place, Accessed 09 
August 2011. 
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Any person who, whether or not married to the other person, without the 
consent of that person- (a) with the male organ, penetrates any part of the other 
person’s body; or, (b) with any object other than the male organ, penetrates the 
other person’s genitalia or anus; or (c) engages in fellatio or cunnilingus with the 
other person; shall be guilty of an offence and liable, subject to Section 
Sixteen……to penalties provided by law for rape. Penetration to any degree shall 
be sufficient for the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b).249 
In addition Section 14 of the constitution states that “No person shall be held in slavery 
or servitude or required to perform forced labour.”250 
Again, the Domestic Violence Act (2007), also strongly argues against such violence 
against spouses in the home.251 Added to this, such a practice would not succeed in the 
face of strong lobby by women and gender equality groups in the country. Some of the 
powerful of these groups include Musasa project, Girl Child Network, Women and Law 
in Southern Africa.252 Indeed the Girl Child Network and the police at one time stopped 
the transference of five young girls who had been pledged by their families to appease 
Gibson Kupemba’s ngozi.253  
It should also be highlighted that even in the traditional or archetypal form of ngozi, its 
abuse was limited mainly because of the interventions of the spirits. As Maxwell says 
 ngozi cults memorialise the dead through the agency of the living, providing 
their families the opportunity to grieve and mourn their loss. Often in a war the 
families of ‘sellouts’ were unable publicly to attend to their dead for fear that 
they would be cast as sellouts. Moreover, the ngozi host, along with the 
                                                 
249 The Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
250 The Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
251 The Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
252 See Nyarai Kachere, “Virgins forced into marriage to “appease” evil spirits” in 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp? idnews=48630, Accessed  16 May 2011, who cites the pressure that the Girl 
Child Network provided in the kuripa ngozi case of the murdered Gibson Kupemba of Honde Valley in 
Manicaland in 2009. There has also been strong lobbying by some of these organisations at the 
International level, see for example, United Nations Human Rights Committee, “Equality Now: 
Submissions to the UN Human Rights Committee”, 62nd Session, March 1998, cited in 
http://www.equalitynow.org/english/campaigns/un/unhrc_reports/unhrc_zimbabwe_en.pdf, accessed 
31 January 2011. 
253 See The Sunday Mail, 12-18 February 2012, “Kupemba’s lone battle” 
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traditional healer, is in a prime position to mediate between the two families 
involved, and thus bring about reconciliation and restitution.254  
Although this would apply to a few of the cases recorded for Shurugwi, it brings out the 
checks and balances that affected the operation and use of the system of kuripa ngozi. 
 
ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCES OF COMMON SENSE BELIEFS 
The ontologies and epistemologies of the occult concepts of uroyi (witchcraft and 
sorcery) and ngozi intimated above are not to be taken as given. Rather, they are 
problematic, dynamic, unstable and controversial. This is largely due to their being 
rooted in metaphysics. However, such occult beliefs and practices serve an important 
purpose of opening up the philosophy of the ubuntu cosmos. As Nabudere explains, in 
this cosmos the living are combined with spirits who have an “existence and beingness” 
as “unknown” or as “invisible beings”,255 who, in a large measure, govern the social 
conduct of-, as well as defining the lived experiences of indigenous Africans. “Through 
these invisible forces” “Africans seek explanations to certain happenings, which cannot 
otherwise be explained by “normal” or “rational” means.”256 
Many studies on occult practices on the African continent have revealed that times of 
transition and potentially challenging moments have resulted in increased reference to 
witchcraft, sorcery and avenging spirits.  Andersson, for example, has shown that in 
Buhera there was a serious correlation between reported cases of witchcraft and a rise 
in the incidences of HIV/AIDS in the 1990s.257 To Andersson, therefore the discourse of 
witchcraft, in the Buhera case, and in the Second Chimurenga, was symbolic of 
                                                 
254 See David Maxwell, “Witches, prophets and avenging spirits”, p 328. 
255 Dani W Nabudere, “Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation” p 4.  
256 Ibid. 
257 See Jens A Andersson, “Sorcery in the era of ‘Henry IV’, pp 425, and 446. 
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insecurities people faced in times of huge threats and difficult moments that cause a 
rise in tensions and social insecurity.258  
Terence Ranger argues similarly and posits that many rural areas of Zimbabwe 
witnessed a flurry of tensions in the early 1980s following the mass killings of so-called 
witches by guerrillas during the Second Chimurenga, which necessitated a lot of witch-
finding and witch-cleansing activities.259 This sort of thought also recalls the works by 
Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh; and also Geschiere and Cyprian Fisiy, who posit 
for the centrality of jealousy in witchcraft accusations in situations of differential 
economic progress between kin, most notably between relatives living in rural areas.260  
In such situations elaborated above, the occult cases are useful in the understanding of 
the larger societal threats people are confronted with, and how their common sense 
interprets them. Also as Max Gluckman, cited in Geschiere and Fisiy, points out, the 
belief in these occult practices “emphasise the threat to the wider social order, which is 
contained in immoral sentiments” and these beliefs render the possibility of maintaining 
social order among communities by making people observe social virtues.261  
In Shurugwi, the threat has to be seen as political violence of the period 2000 to 2008 
that ruptured the social fabric in Shurugwi and the constellations it triggered. Ashforth, 
from his study of witchcraft in post-apartheid South Africa, also posits similarly. To him, 
increased reference to occult practices was rooted in “spiritual insecurity” that was 
closely linked to other insecurities: poverty, violence, political oppression and the 
scourge of HIV and AIDS. These insecurities resulted in the subversion of the ubuntu 
concept to “a person is a person through other people”, and added that, because 
                                                 
258 Ibid,  pp 425 and 445-446. 
259 See Terence Ranger, “Review: Healers and Hierarchies”, in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 13, 
No 2, Special Issue on the political and Economy of health in Southern Africa, January 1987, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2636862, Accessed 15 March 2011, for a nuanced explanation.  
260 See Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, “Witchcraft as an issue in the ‘Politics of Belonging’”; and 
Peter Geschiere and Cyprian Fisiy, “Domesticating Personal violence: Witchcraft, courts and confessions in 
Cameroon”, in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol 64, No 3, 1994, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1160784, Accessed 14 March 2011. 
261 Max Gluckman, cited in Peter Geschiere and Cyprian Fisiy, Domesticating Personal Violence”, p 325. 
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potentially “they can destroy you.”262 However, as Geertz shows, the rise in incidences 
of occult cases in crises is 
… in this respect at least, a kind of dummy variable in the system of 
commonsense thought. Rather than transcending that thought, it reinforces it by 
adding to it an all-purpose idea which acts to reassure the (locals) that their fund 
of commonplaces is, momentary appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 
dependable and adequate.263 
Importantly too, Ashforth’s compelling attempt at thinking justice for such people living 
under the shadow of witchcraft is illuminating to this study of ngozi in Shurugwi. He says 
his work was primarily “an attempt …. to think about connections between living in a 
world without justice and living in a world with witches and how these two features of 
life might affect the cause of democracy”264, and also what “justice means in a spiritually 
insecure world.”265 Taken together with the other threats to the existence of people in 
Soweto, that is HIV and AIDS, poverty, violence and political repression, that Ashforth 
also discusses, the issue of witchcraft as a factor affecting social relations in Soweto 
therefore plays a crucial mediating role in terms of how people conceive of justice.  
Further to this, I am of the view that justice should be based on what the people on the 
ground want and conceive in their everyday experiences as justicable. Thus the 
everyday practice and philosophy should form a backdrop upon which justice and or 
transitional justice is rooted. In the case of kuripa ngozi, it conforms to the normative 
standards of the view of justice in the district that have restoration at the heart of 
future engagements, as evidenced by demands of victims during field work and also in 
the meeting at Makusha hall, cited earlier. It also conforms to the traditional or cultural 
means that the ONHRI in its National healing and reconciliation position paper 
intimated. What, however, may be needed, as Advocate George Bizos quoted earlier, is 
the setting of parameters to regularise the procedures for this mechanism in dealing 
with post-conflict Shurugwi.  
                                                 
262 See Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, violence and democracy. 
263 Clifford Geertz, “Culture as common sense practice”, p 11. 
264 Ibid, p xiv. 
265 Ibid p 86. 
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There is also a need to transcend the binary introduced by colonialist and Marxist 
discourses about rational and non-rational practices especially as they are applied in 
relation to Third World countries and Third World cultures. This binary can be set 
broadly as “reason and humanism”, on the one hand, and “emotion and faith”, on the 
other,266 which brings the attendant binaries: “tradition/modernity, rational/non-
rational, intellect/emotion”.267 In this regard, these dominant discourses dismiss, and re-
inscript third world traditional or indigenous laws and social practices as largely 
superstitious.268 These discourses have their roots in the 18th century European 
enlightenment, which conceptualised anything that has reference to religion as non-
rational.269At another level Christianity also spread this hegemonic discourse and 
perceived and othered local beliefs as “stupendous”,270 which meant the inscription of 
illegality and their outlawing.271  
From the discussion above, one discerns a two-pronged approach that firstly deployed 
Christianity and education as hegemonic apparatuses; and secondly colonial legal 
enactments and coercion to exterminate indigenous belief systems, in a kind of a re-
enactment of the Gramscian hegemony and domination.272 Significantly these 
discourses persist in the postcolonies. In South Africa, for example the Witchcraft 
Suppression Act still survives as a carryover from the colonial period. For Zimbabwe, the 
same act thrived for twenty-six years after independence to 2006 when it was amended. 
This continued existence of such legislation also makes the binary of 
                                                 
266 Dipesh Charkrabarty, “Subaltern histories and post enlightenment rationalism”, in Vinayak Chartuverdi, 
ed, Mapping subaltern studies and the postcolonial, Routledge, London, 2000, p 24. 
267 Ibid, p 26. 
268 See Joseph Pugliese, “Rationalised violence and legal colonialism: Nietzsche contra Nietzsche” in 
CARDOZO Studies in law and literature, Fall/Winter, 1996, p3, see also Tejaswini Niranjana, Readers of 
current Indian thought, West Heavens, 2010, p 193, who discusses how religious practices of the Hindu 
and Moslems in India were denigraded for “their” “insecurity, mendacity, perfidy, and venality”, see also 
Dipesh Charkrabarty, “Subaltern histories”, pp 22-26. 
269 See also Dipesh Charkrabarty, “Subaltern histories”, pp 22-26. 
270 This is especially captured by the words of the Scottish Misssionary Alexander Duff, cited in Dipesh 
Charkrabarty, “Subaltern histories”, p 24, who, arguing against Hinduism in 1839, posited that it was “a 
stupendous system of error.” 
271 See Joseph Pugliese, “Rationalised violence”, p 3. 
272 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the prison notebooks, edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, Orient Longman, Chennai, 1998, p 12. 
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modernity/scientism versus religion/custom/ignorance persist. There is need therefore 
to move beyond this binary, and avoid engaging, in what Preserved Smith calls 
“propaganda of reason”.273  
In the context of the difficulties in Shurugwi, following the violence that has paralysed 
social relations, there could be some need to strategically make use of this not so 
modern or scientific mode of kuripa ngozi, but one that is culturally rooted and widely 
accepted in the district, to solve the problems.274 As the American Anthropological 
Association observed, there is need to value and equate cultures, not least because all 
cultures are supposed to be equal, but also because there is no scientific way of 
contesting the different “acceptable standards” in these cultures. Treating the common 
sense fear of ngozi as a cultural system with a “value and validity” in the Geertzian sense 
helps us too to understand this as a mode by which Shurugwi people engage with - and 
interpret - their worldview, penetrate modernity and, use it as a means of “coping with 
everyday problems in an everyday way with some effectiveness.”275 
We have to also emphasise that while this could be controversial and non-scientific, in 
the rural areas of Zimbabwe and the world over, belief systems are not based on 
secularism. Rather, they are based on religiosity, mythologies and lived experiences, the 
facets of common sense. This therefore enables one to imagine the communities of 
Shurugwi as people who are not “abstracted, autonomous, ahistorical actors” but are 
“embedded in a political landscape with a distinctive history”276 from which they derive 
meaning for their worldview. As such it might thus be useful to consider the link 
between the “spontaneous philosophy” around ngozi and mysterious deaths and the 
                                                 
273 Preserved Smith, cited in Dipesh Charkrabarty, “Subaltern histories”, p 25. 
274 See  Statement on Human Rights” Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations, by 
The Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, in American Anthropologist, Vol 49, No 4, 
Part 1, Oct-Dec 1947, cited in http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
7294%28194710%2F12%292%3A49%3A4%3C539%3ASOHR%3E2%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0, Accessed 21 January 
2011. 
275 Clifford Geertz, Common sense as cultural practice”, p 8. 
276 Sheila Meintjes, quoted in “Gender and truth and reconciliation commissions: Comparative 
reflections”, in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, (eds), Peace versus Justice: The dilemma of 
transitional justice in Africa, p 98. 
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various other misfortunes befalling those that were at the forefront of the violence at 
the grassroots level as a foundation for conceptualising transitional justice in Shurugwi.  
 
CONTINENT-WIDE MODELS OF “TRADITIONAL”JUSTICE: GACACA AND MAGAMBA 
The traditional courts in Shurugwi, and possibly in the whole of rural Zimbabwe, could 
draw important lessons from Rwanda’s gacaca, Mozambique’s magamba spirits and 
from the acholi of Uganda. While these were to a large extent expedient, they helped, 
among other things to expedite peace projects, reduce the work load of the Western-
style courts, and above all to prove that indeed traditional African methods can be 
integrated with the Western justice to bring lasting reconciliation and peace to 
previously conflict-ridden communities. Below I briefly discuss how the gacaca and 
magamba were vital in the TJs of Rwanda and Mozambique, as well as the lessons that 
Zimbabwe can draw. 
Gacaca 
Gacaca in Kinyarwanda is “lawn justice” or justice on the grass, which is based on pre-
colonial, community-based courts where respectable male elders known as 
Inyangamuguyo (men of honourable or exemplary conduct) acted as judges.277 These 
gacaca courts were re-established with the following objectives: to enable truth telling 
about the genocide; to promote reconciliation among the Rwandans; to eradicate a 
culture of impunity; to speed up the trial of genocide suspects; and, to demonstrate 
Rwanda’s own problem solving capacity.278 A very clear mandate was spelt out to these 
courts: they had to find justice for the genocide through stressing confession, 
forgiveness and reparations for the victims.279  
                                                 
277 See Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi, “Indigenous justice or political instrument?: The modern 
gacaca courts of Rwanda”, in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of 
transitional justice in Africa, UKZN Press, 2009, p 301. 
278 Ibid, p 302. 
279 Ibid, p 302. 
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These courts were very vital in speeding up the justice process for the victims in a 
country whose courts had been destroyed in the conflict. In this regard by 2007, there 
were established 12 000 such gacaca courts, which had resolved about 71 405 cases.280 
This was crucial because it would have taken the Rwandan judiciary above 150 years to 
solve these cases, because of the impact of the genocide.281 We should also not lose 
sight of the fact that the gacaca courts ran alongside the conventional Western-style 
courts and the broad judiciary system. In this scenario we have to understand the 
weaknesses of that judiciary system. As Scanlon and Motlafi posit, the judiciary was 
failing to cope and the prisons held in excess of 120 000 prisoners eight times their 
15 000 carrying capacity.282 In other words there was a lot of backlog in the justice 
system, and also the justice infrastructure lacked in capacity. An even relevant part of 
the post-genocide gacaca courts was the active participation of women. These gacaca 
courts were open to the participation of all Rwandans from the age of 21, and by 2007, 
there was a 29 percent women representation and also a woman who held the position 
of executive secretary in the national gacaca system.283 
Magamba spirits in Mozambique 
The Mozambique civil war was officially ended by the signing of the Rome Accord 
between the warring parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992. In many accounts this has 
been viewed as “negative peace”.284 It is also widely regarded as having reconciled the 
top leaderships without necessarily solving the local problems the communities had 
                                                 
280 Ibid, p 302. 
281 Ibid, p 303, in this regard they say that about 95 percent of the personnel had been killed or exiled, the 
judiciary had perennially been harmstrung by shortages of resources and had also been traditionally 
driven by the executive. 
282 Ibid, p 303. 
283 Ibid, p 307. 
284 Negative peace is defined by Yasmin Louise Sooka, “The politics of transitional justice” in Chandra 
Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice, p 24, as aimed at ending violence without addressing 
the root cause of the conflict, as such does not promote lasting peace and it does not also promote lasting 
unity as the reasons for earlier conflict are not addressed. In Mozambique, by drawing the line between 
the past and the new era demarcated by the peace treaty in 1992 left victims unreconciled through the 
policy of amnesty adopted. This might have been adopted because of the equilibrium in military power 
both sides had. See also Victor Igreja, “The politics of peace, justice and healing in post-war 
Mozambique”, in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs justice, p 278. 
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emanating from the conflict. Because of the paucity in the Rome accord, Magamba 
spirits were used by the local people of the Gorongosa district to achieve healing 
following harrowing years of conflict.  
Magamba spirits were spirits of victims which possessed especially female survivors of 
the war, who were themselves or their families responsible for killing them or using 
their body parts for protection from the war.285 Magamba spirits, in a way that 
reinforces the importance of ngozi and [re]production caused infertility among these 
females, which caused the females to consult traditional healers over their 
predicament.286 To resolve the misfortunes traditional healers would go into trance, 
invoked the magamba spirits to come out and speak out on who they were, what 
happened and what they wanted as compensation.287 In this way not only was the truth 
exposed, but the perpetrators and victims’ families came together and compensated 
each other thereby restoring social harmony. In addition to this, child soldiers were also 
reintegrated into their communities after some traditional rituals supervised by 
traditional healers and traditional authorities.  
Of importance and relevance to Shurugwi, is the fact that this method was adopted at a 
local scale, performed in front of all villagers, in the Gorongosa region to complement 
the General Peace Agreement (AGP), signed in Rome, which had ordered a general 
amnesty.288 Although the effectiveness of this method has not yet been properly 
evaluated, it no doubt helped to heal the district. 
 
 
                                                 
285 According to Igreja, besides killing victims people also mixed body parts of the victims in muti/herbs so 
that they could themselves not fall victim to the war, see Victor Igreja, “The politics of peace, justice and 
healing in post-war Mozambique”, in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs justice, p278. 
See also John L Hirsh, “Peace and Justice: Mozambique and Sierra Leone compared”, in Chandra Lekka 
Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs justice, p 208. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid, pp 288-9. 
288 See Victor Igreja and John L Hirsch, “Peace and Justice”, for more details. 
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ROLE OF WOMEN IN KURIPA NGOZI 
Under the ritual of kuripa ngozi, women have always played an indispensible role. 
Earlier, I highlighted how women and marriageable girls were used as part of the 
reparation transactions in situations of kuripa ngozi in the pre-colonial period. These 
marriages, which symbolised the patriarchal transfer of women’s reproductive 
capacities between the two families and some form of “blood pact” not only established 
peace, but also led to the   establishment of new relations between the families. The 
essence of this can be captured in the old Somali saying that “Where blood is shed, it 
must be soaked with birth fluids.”289 This meant that the women so given would bear 
sons for the deceased family and it also served to re-establish the bond between the 
families hence serve to avoid future conflict. At another level, however, this amply 
illustrates the passive role that women played in conflict resolution in pre-colonial 
Africa. The same practice, as already stated, also existed in many pre-colonial Zimbabwe 
Shona states, and it still exists, albeit in a discreet manner in Shurugwi district.290 
However, I am not envisaging this unmediated importation of the use of women in the 
transactions. Rather, other forms of compensation are envisaged. 
Other than this, women also played other active roles in peace building, conflict 
resolution, management and sustenance. In terms of conflict management women 
passively participated through their roles in child care, through the inculcation in the 
young children of values of “patience, tolerance, honesty, respect for elders, 
communality and mutuality, compassion, regard for due discretion, gentleness, 
modesty, self-control, moderation, flexibility and open mindedness.”291 Thus from an 
                                                 
289 See Mohamed Abdi Mohamed, “The role of Somali Women in search of Peace”, in UNESCO: Women 
and Peace in Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003, p 103. Positing similarly is Chinua Achebe, in his 
highly celebrated literary work, Things Fall Apart, Heinemann Educational Publishers, London, 1958, who 
wrote to say that it was uncommon for women to be given away for marriage following conflicts. 
290 See section where I have described how this practice of giving out women and girls is technically 
outlawed by other laws in the constitution, although it is not outlawed. 
291 Miriam Agatha Chinwe Nwoye, “Role of African women in peace building and conflict resolution in 
African traditional societies: A selected review” cited in 
http://www.afrikawold.net/afrel/chinwenoye.htm, accessed 26 January 2011. Her work is based on the 
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early age young children were introduced to desired values in the community by their 
mothers. In a similar passive way, it is the duty of women in the district of Shurugwi to 
impart these values to their children especially since the introduction of capitalism that 
left the women in the rural area as the males sought work in the towns, mines or on the 
farms. Again in the current depopulation of men as a result of the violence and 
subsequent economic meltdown, women have been left to socially raise children almost 
by themselves. More than this, I envisage for the women to go beyond this and actively 
participate in the process of seeking justice for the victims and in the fashioning of the 
outcomes of the mediation process. 
Elderly women have also been found to have played a key role in ending conflicts in the 
Central African Republic. These women, as Mathey et al, posit, in cases of war, they 
would be sent to the rival clan to negotiate peace or they would go between the fighters 
where they would demand the cessation of that war, if they were not listened to they 
would drop their clothes and expose their nakedness, which was a social taboo.292 In 
Burundi, women played a behind the scene influencing role on their husbands, where 
among other things, they would advise their husbands during intimate bed times.293 In 
other societies, like in Bakossi of Cameroon and the Igbo of Nigeria, women actively 
participated in the settlement of conflicts.294 Yet in other societies, like the Ovambo of 
Namibia,295 and the Mungo of Cameroon,296 women played a vital role in the spiritual 
solving of conflicts.  
                                                                                                                                                 
findings in six African countries: Tanzania, Somalia, Burundi, Namibia, Cameroon, and Central African 
Republic. See also RAU, When the going gets tough, p 14. 
292 M.J. Mathey, T.Dejan, M. Deballe, A. Koulaninga, and J. Moga, “The role played by the women of the 
Central African Republic in the prevention and resolution of conflicts”, in UNESCO: Women and Peace in 
Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003, p 14. 
293 J Ntahobari and B Ndayiziga, The role of Burundian women in peaceful settlement of conflicts” in 
UNESCO: Women and Peace in Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003, p 16. 
294 See Miriam Agatha Chinwe Nwoye, “Role of Women”.  
295 See Becker, “Women, Politics and Peace in Northern Namibia”, in UNESCO: Women and Peace in 
Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003, p 16. 
296 See Miriam Agatha Chinwe Nwoye, “Role of Women”. 
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Under kuripa ngozi in Zimbabwe, women can play a significant role in the mediation 
processes. As highlighted in the revelation of ngozi by Mahoso and Tirivangana for 
Zimbabwe, and in the magamba of Mozambique, women in the archetypal ngozi have 
always performed a ngozi host role. Regarding this, the women relatives of murderers 
have been found to have been possessed by the ravaging spirit of the deceased, re-
enact the murder scene. This came out clearly in the Chokuda case from Buhera, and in 
Kanengoni’s Echoing Silence, highlighted earlier. In the process they reveal the identity 
of the victim, if unknown, and help mediate the compensation.  
The above role in the spiritual revelation of crimes can be taken forward and juxtaposed 
with the role that women can perform in revealing the perpetrators of the 2000-2008 
violence. In this regard it is necessary to return to the situation raised in Chapter Three 
that the majority of the victims of the violence were women. This was primarily because 
in the increased depopulation of men as a result of emigration to the cities or to South 
Africa and Botswana, women assumed the “manly” political roles. This led to their 
upliftment in terms of local political participation and the roles they played. This also 
relates to their roles in the victimisation of other women through, for example, drawing 
and keeping lists, singing at rallies, the beating up, and the other violations of, women.  
Paradoxically the same space also led to the increased victimisation of women for their 
role in opposition politics or for the roles their sons or husbands played in the MDC. As 
such, by encouraging kuripa ngozi, women could also play a significant direct role in the 
mediation process as complainants, where they identify their violators, and also as 
defendants. Thus women may be afforded the opportunity to take a leading role in the 
establishment of peace in the district. Importantly, it will enable both the women 
victims and the perpetrators to receive counselling from the village elders who also play 
a leading role at these courts. 
The above dynamic resonates with the peace efforts of the Liberian Women 
Peacemakers (LWP). According to Tyrell, the LWP directly confronted President Charles 
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Taylor and rebels to lay down arms and end conflict. For example they sent the 
following message to the Pro Tem of the Liberian senate to forward to Tayor:  
… that the women of Liberia, including the IDPs [internally displaced persons], 
we are tired of war. We are tired of running. We are tired of begging for bulgur 
wheat. We are tired of our children being raped. We are now taking this stand to 
secure the future of our children because we believe as custodians of society, 
tomorrow our children will ask us, ‘Mama, what was your role during the 
crisis?’297  
This direct confrontation to implore peace by the women groups seriously undercut the 
“boomerang pattern” of international advocacy, which according to Keck and Sikkink, 
cited in Tyrrell, refers to a situation where “domestic NGOs bypass their state and 
directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from 
outside” because “international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, 
pry open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic 
arena.”298 On the whole, the actions by the LWP underscore the strength of the 
“grassroots … movements to enact change without heavily relying on external allies.”299 
Whilst the pressure that was exerted on the conflicting sides to the civil war was by local 
Liberians both inside and outside Liberia, some financing and organisation skills were, 
however, offered by international organisations.300 
It also positively reflects on the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1325 of 2000 that advocates for the “increased representation of women at all decision-
making levels in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for 
the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.”301 By and large, the resolution 
reiterated the vulnerability of women in conflict and post- conflict situations and the 
                                                 
297 See Katie Tyrrell, “In Support of their Sisters in Conflict: Understanding the Transnational Impact of the  
Liberian Women Peacemakers” in http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic853697.files/Tyrrell2011.pdf, 
Accessed 23 March 2012, p 13. 
298 Margaret E, Keck and Kathryn Sikkink Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in  
international politics, cited in Katie Tyrrell, Ibid, p 14. 
299 Katie Tyrrell, Ibid, p 2. 
300 Ibid, p 16. 
301 Ibid, p 2. 
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need to avail channels for them to convey their situations.302 The critical point here is 
about the possible high levels that direct action by the local women can attain if they 
put their efforts at attaining peace, and that there is a need at some point for outside 
help. 
Reflecting on this, and using the Mavedzenge headmanship in Shurugwi, I would like to 
posit that women can indeed play an active role in the mediation of cases under the 
kuripa ngozi system. Between 2007 and 2011 the council or dare for the Mavedzenge 
headmanship has been composed of seven members. These comprised the headman, 
and six councillors who were made up of three males and three females drawn from the 
various houses that constitute the Mavedzenge family tree. Thus in terms of gender 
representation there is a fifty percent female representation. This is crucial because the 
council advises the headmen in the mediation of cases that are brought before the 
court. From informal discussions with people close to the dare, I was informed that 
these women hold a powerful sway in the cases that the court administers. Here they 
engage in the deliberations, dialogue and exchanges on an equal footing with their male 
village counterparts. Theoretically it therefore means that the interests of women are 
going to be adequately represented. Related, in the Mudzengi headmanship, the head is 
a woman.  
Referring to the role women played in post-genocide Rwanda, gacaca is instrumental in 
pointing to the potentially similar role in the post violence Zimbabwe set up. As I have 
imagined for the kuripa ngozi, women in post genocide Rwanda acted in different 
capacities as complainants, the accused or as witnesses.303  In addition, and in a 
watershed moment, women also became judges at these courts.304 This was 
                                                 
302 Ibid, pp 2-3. 
303 See Adin Thayer, “Women in post-genocide Rwanda: Facing the past to build a future” in 
http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1413:women-in-post-
genocide-rwandafacing-the-past-to-build-a-future-&catid=169:multiple-intolerance-mounting-resistance , 
Accessed 24 March 2012. 
304 See “Strengthening the Role of Women in the Gacaca Tribunals –International Alert and 
Profemmes/Twese Hamwe”, in http://www.badgerdesigns.com/alert/v1/pdfs/Rwanda%20-
%20Gacaca%20meeting.pdf, Accessed 24 March 2012. 
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notwithstanding the threats and dangers, including social and security, when these 
positions opened up.305 On the whole, however, they helped to publicise the guilty and 
further justice.306 Crucially also, women constituted 26 percent of all provincial 
executives,307 29 percent of the gacaca courts,308 and the national Executive Secretary 
of the gacaca courts was also a woman.309 
Overall, this points to the increased role that women play in the administration of 
“traditional” justice. Significantly, it helps to subvert the passiveness of women in the 
search for justice for political victims. This increased role of women has to be taken 
together with the fact, as seen in the General Introduction, that there is a significant 
female political representation in Shurugwi district at both the Council and 
parliamentary level. This is also to be considered together with the fact that ordinary 
women are allowed to freely contribute at these dares. As such by encouraging the 
individual reparations superintended by village or headmen and chiefs in Shurugwi 
where women actively participate will help to significantly disrupt the passive revolution 
that the ONHRI is trying to impose regarding a TJ. It is also vital to highlight here that 
besides looking at the ONHRI as entrenching a passive revolution, it is also instructive to 
see the passive revolution that ZANU-PF is enforcing in ONHRI’s search for a TJ. This is 
through attempts to impose amnesia by encouraging the adoption of peace on the basis 
of “let bygones be bygones.” Hence, one can argue that the ONHRI is not well structured 
to represent the village women’s perceptions.  
As also discussed earlier, NGOs are also finding it difficult to engage communities to 
discuss the possible TJs in the face of suspicion and the circumscription of their activities 
by the ZANU-PF and by ZANU-PF aligned state security organs. The dissonance between 
the GNU partners for the control of state levers, itself a product of the passive 
                                                 
305 Adin Thayer, Ibid 
306 Ibid 
307 See Jeanne Izabiliza, “The role of women in reconstruction : Experience of Rwanda”, in 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Role-Women-Rwanda.pdf, Accessed 
24 March 2012, p 4. 
308 Ibid, p 7. 
309 Ibid, p 4. 
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revolution, as described in Chapter Five, also seriously hampered the operations of 
ONHRI. This also undermines the potential of ONHRI to deliver a credible TJ for 
Zimbabwe. Kuripa ngozi has the potential to promote the good sense that caters for the 
demands at the local level of the subalterns to contest the hegemony from Harare. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, by articulating the importance of common sense, I have argued for the 
adoption of kuripa ngozi as a TJ mechanism for Shurugwi in the absence of strong 
political will for a people-centred TJ mechanism following the violence of 2000-2008. 
The ONHRI, tasked with coordinating the efforts to heal the nation, among a battery of 
other healing mechanisms, also calls for the adoption of indigenous and community-
based healing mechanisms. Events on the ground also help buttress such a call. People 
are being affected by ngozi in various forms. More importantly, victims are calling for 
restorative justice for lost or damaged property. The possibility of the success of this 
method will be helped by the fact that it is a well-known and revered pre-existing 
common sense notion in the district where the ultimate goal in the mediation process is 
the acknowledgement of culpability, offering apologies to their victims and the payment 
of restitution. By involving the communities in the search for lasting justice-based peace 
, kuripa ngozi will also help to subvert the passivity of the locals enforced under the 
ONHRI initiative, and one that has a long genealogy in post-colonial Zimbabwe with a 
history of numerous top-down amnesties. On the whole, for Shurugwi, by encouraging 
people to own up to their violations and compensating their victims or through seeking 
restoring the previous balance, kuripa ngozi will greatly help to end the culture of 
impunity for political violations, especially at the local level where most of the violence 
has occurred and potentially will recur.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
The violence that plagued Shurugwi district in the period 2000 to 2008 and that targeted 
the opposition MDC structures was both spectacular and general. It was remarkable in 
the sense that it also affected most parts of the country. It thus assumed a national 
rather than the regional or ethnic dimensions of earlier conflicts like the gukurahundi1 
or other aggressions which targeted supporters of the opposition in urban settings.2 For 
Shurugwi, it was for the first time in the post-independence era that the district failed to 
escape the horror as it had managed in other early post-independence moments that 
engulfed other parts of the Midlands province. 
I have treated it in terms of its general nature. This universalization is to connect the 
Shurugwi violence to the national “pogrom” between 2000 and 2008. The “pogrom” 
was particularly organised around the seven elections the nation underwent.3 The state 
was also militarised which foregrounded the pre-eminence of the security forces and 
semi-military bodies. In addition, civilian programmes were increasingly coordinated 
under serving or retired security services personnel and were organised under various 
“quick-fix” military-style operations.4 At another level, the purpose has also been to 
situate it in a long genealogy of intolerant attacks that runs from the Second 
Chimurenga through to the other post-colonial moments. In the mode of a genealogy, I 
                                                 
1 See Jocelyn Alexander and Joanne Mcgregor and Terence Ranger Violence and Memory: One hundred 
years in the dark forests of Matebeleland, James Currey and Baobab Books, Oxford and Harare 
respectively, 2000. 
2See John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the smokescreen: The politics behind the 1995 
General elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2000, for a detailed discussion of this 
argument.  
3 See for example Norma Kriger, Guerilla Veterans in Post war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent Politics, 
1980-1987, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p 196, See also Tony Reeler, “Subliminal 
terror?: Human rights violence and torture in Zimbabwe during 2008”, Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation, Cape Town, pp 6-7. See also a discussion by Brian Raftopoulos, “Nation, Race and 
History in Zimbabwean Politics”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, eds, Zimbabwe: Injustice and 
political Reconciliation, Institute for Justice, and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004, p 164. 
4 See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe ten years on”, and Zeff Sithole, “Is the military taking over?” 
in www.afrika.no/Detailed/12358.html for a detailed discussion of the different military style operations 
between 2003 and 2008. 
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argued that it was more than part of a coercive mobilisation. Instead, its deployment by 
ZANU-PF should be seen as a part of the transfiguring of politics as continuation of war 
by other means directed against the opposition movements.  
In this modality, the struggles with ZAPU and ZIPRA both during and after the Second 
Chimurenga, where both sought to be the “sole” nationalist representative,5 was carried 
forward by ZANU-PF against other opposition political movements in the 1980s, such as 
ZANU-Ndonga, ZUM and FORUM party. As such the browbeating of the MDC structures 
in the first decade of the millennium was a carry-over strategy of treating opposition 
groups as “enemies to be annihilated rather than as political competitors”6 to be 
tolerated. This overall worked to create conditions that only allowed for the existence of 
a legitimising opposition. Simultaneously, the same process was useful to attain the 
passivity of the population due to the fear it created. 
Throughout the thesis the broad question that I grappled with was whether women 
were invisible victims of the 2000-2008 violence in Shurugwi district. Broadly, this 
emanates from the dominant Western feminist discourse that has set a priori and 
universalised relations between sexes. In Western feminism, female-ness is equated 
with femininity while male-ness is taken as a pre-condition for masculinity.7 Following in 
this trope, the people who inhabit the female body are universally regarded as socially 
and culturally inferior.8 The assumption is even worse for rural women who because of 
their “invisibility”, and limited economic, social, academic and political standing, are 
lowly regarded and are thought of as weak, powerless, and as perpetual victims.9 This is 
                                                 
5 Terence Ranger, cited in Brian Raftopoulos, “The State, NGO’s and Democratisation”, in Sam Moyo, John 
Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos, eds, NGO’s, the state and politics in Zimbabwe, SAPES Books, Harare, 
2000, p 25. See also Terence Ranger, “Introduction to Volume Two”, The historical dimensions of 
democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, p 5. 
6 See James Muzondidya, “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, 
eds, Becoming Zimbabwe, p 177. 
7 See Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, in Alexandra Shepard and Garthine, 
eds, Gender and History, Vol 20,Issue 3, November 2008, p 559. 
8 See Ifi Amadiume, cited in Jeanne Boydston, “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, p 565. 
9 See Oyeronke Oyewumi, “Visualising the body: Western theories and African subjects”, in Oyeronke 
Oyewumi, ed, African Gender Studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2005, p 11. 
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the same sort of inclination one gets when reading through the bulk of the human rights 
literature produced on the “crisis” period in Zimbabwe. Women are presented as 
vulnerable, weak, economically dependent, and indeed as victims. 
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter Four, the local conditions ensured that political 
agency transcended the sexed bodies of men and women. While socio-economic 
conditions were such that the rural women were vulnerable to abuse, especially in the 
home, they had by 2008 assumed important political duties. In these latter roles, which 
were helped by the depopulation of men and the ZANU-PF programme that promoted 
the participation of women in politics, women began to exert powerful influences on 
the extension of politically-related violence. Besides embedding the national party-
politics with their local jealousies and contests for power and resources, many women 
also took up village, Ward and Council positions. To this extent, there were twelve 
female councillors out of the twenty-four members Tongogara Rural District Council in 
2010. In addition, there was one female  out of three representing Shurugwi in the two 
houses of representatives.  
Many more too became involved in other duties that spurred the victimisation of their 
neighbours and fellow villagers and workers. These included informing and the keeping 
of lists. Many more were involved in singing, dancing, sloganeering, and ululating at 
rallies. These can be interpreted as being in service of violence because they sustained 
the morale and encouraged the violators. Crucially, there were some women who 
actively participated in the public humiliation and beating of opposition supporters. On 
the whole, this study of violence and conditions of women invites a contrapuntal 
analysis of the gendered relations in conflicts. It too troubles the general assumption of 
the atemporal victimhood of women in conflict situations. This dissertation also has to 
be read together with Foucault’s argument on the importance of spatio-temporalities10 
                                                 
10 Michel Foucault, History of sexuality, Vol1, pp 93-94. 
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in which agency is relational and is found in the doing and not in or at some authorising 
centre.11 
It is crucial, nonetheless, to emphasise that the different roles that women assumed in 
intimidating and harassing the opposition was made possible by the enabling conditions 
created by the authorising narrative from Harare. To this degree, I argue that the overall 
ZANU-PF narrative of economic liberation and indigenisation used for sanitizing the farm 
invasions, the factory and firm takeovers, the threatening and the physical lynching of 
MDC supporters, was a crucial foundation upon which was mapped localised conditions. 
The successful articulation of acute land shortages, local politics, petty jealousies, as 
well as the targeting of identifiable MDC supporters thus provided the discourse and 
provided the catalyst that drove the violence in Shurugwi district.  
The reverse is, however, also correct. The strength of the authorising narrative 
depended on the presence of land shortages that invited many in Shurugwi to invade 
white-owned farms. This in essence concretised the imperative. It also, among others, 
was buttressed by the marrying of local contests, local political relations and petty 
jealousies by the locals on to the larger party-politics, the existence of identifiable MDC 
supporters and locals who kept lists of those who supported the opposition. 
Following from the above thread, it is imperative to reinforce the point that the violence 
was therefore one of both planning and participation. This recalls Mamdani’s 
articulation of the Rwandan genocide. While he suggested that the Rwandan 
government simply planned and enabled the Hutu population to massacre the Tutsi,12 I 
argue instead that in Zimbabwe the state did more than plan and create enabling 
conditions for massive participation. More than this, the state, through the security and 
quasi-security organs, and through ZANU-PF structures, actively participated in the 
pogrom. Evidence from the many national human rights reports and the testimonies 
from Shurugwi reinforce accounts of the active beatings, abductions and humiliations of 
                                                 
11 Allen Feldman, Formations of violence, p 3. 
12 See Mahmood Mamdani, When victims become killers, pp 5-6. 
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MDC supporters by these structures. Others have showed that the state security agents 
also gave tactical guidance and equipment that was used by war veterans in the 
violence. 
However, as illuminated in Chapter Three, the depopulation of men and the increased 
space that was opened up for the agency of women to participate as political leaders 
and other duties in political parties brought with it increased violation of women, 
especially those who were engaged in MDC politics or those whose husbands and sons 
identified with the opposition. This process of victimisation happened following a set 
pattern. The stages involved identification, abduction, torture, and forced confessions. 
Identification was usually done by fellow workers, villagers or close family. They would 
secretly inform PISI (Police Internal Security Intelligence), ZANU-PF leadership and the 
Central Intelligence Organisation operatives of the names of MDC supporters. At other 
times, however, PISI officials attended MDC rallies and took note of all the key officials. 
They also took down names of known locals who attended these meetings. The vital 
point to note is that this “democratisation” of the surveillance and identification of 
opposition supporters besides signifying, in Foucault’s words, the devolvement of the 
sovereign’s “power of life and death” to large groups of people,13 also greatly extended 
the dimensions of violence.  
Once identified, victims would be abducted from their homes, townships, places of 
work, from social gatherings or from anywhere and were taken to the homesteads of 
village heads, bases or outskirts of villages where they would be subjected to different 
kinds of torture. These varied from beatings and assaults using logs, sticks, belts, and 
booted feet. At times the violations were undertaken at rallies in the presence of family 
and fellow villagers. Depending on the perpetrators involved, sometimes the violations 
were done in secret and the duration of abduction and “re-orientation” varied from a 
few hours to several days. As well, the effects of the punishments differed. More often 
                                                 
13 Michel Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976, Translated by 
David Macey, Picador, New York, 2003, p 259. 
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than not during the torture, the victims were made to confess, hence accept both their 
crime and the punishment, and to publicly recant from the political “sin” of being MDC 
supporters.  
The fifth chapter has also demonstrated that the conditions for the passivity of people 
did not end with the official end of the violence that was marked by the 15 September 
2008 agreement and the consummation of the GNU in February 2009. Rather, it showed 
that the GPA and the GNU symbolised other revolutions from above, which coerced the 
general citizenry to conform without taking into account their best interests.14 The 
major political belligerents were coerced by external and internal political and economic 
imperatives to sign the GPA and to work as partners in the GNU. To this extent, as 
Raftopoulos says, ZANU-PF was largely pushed into accepting the GPA and the GNU due 
to the serious political and economic meltdown in the country and the pressure from 
SADC and the AU. Whilst for the MDCs, in addition to SADC and AU pressure, it was the 
result of a combination of state repression and violence, their failure to assume state 
power after the March 2008 election “victory”, the limits of Western diplomacy and 
sanctions against ZANU-PF, ZANU-PF’s role in the SADC and the resonance of its pan-
African anti-colonial message in the AU, as well as the continued erosion of the MDC 
urban workers powerbase due to retrenchments.15  
At another level, the GNU was fraught with tensions based on member-belligerent 
political parties which refused to surrender their interests for the common good of the 
country. To this extent, there were high levels of intransigence from across the inclusive 
government spectrum. For example, there was ZANU-PF intransigence regarding the 
transformation of the coercive, security and media sectors, as well as the sharing of 
provincial governors, ambassadors, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and Attorney General’s 
                                                 
14 See Brian Raftopoulos, “The Global political Agreement as a passive revolution”. See also a pithy 
discussion of “passive Revolution” by Antonio Gramsci, Selections from prison notebooks, pp 59, 83, & 
119. 
15 Brian Raftopoulos, The Global Political Agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution’: Notes on Contemporary 
Politics in Zimbabwe”, in The Round Table, 2010, in http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-
political-agreement-as-a-passive-revolution/, Accessed 02 June 2011.  
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positions. This was countered by the MDCs ambivalent stance on sanctions, refusal to 
attend some national events, their continued hold on to government posts against 
numerous frustrations, as well as their demands for the full implementation of the GPA 
provisions.16 This resulted in the creation of an imperfect Zimbabwe state in place of a 
reformed one that promised a new beginning. The struggles between ZANU-PF and the 
MDCs, and at times between the MDCs, also represented the “class struggles” that 
characterise passive revolutions, which result in the Gramscian “revolution-restoration”, 
basically a “revolution without revolution.”17 
But, how then do we undercut the continuation of these passive revolutions that have 
been imposed and that have imposed cycles of violence and impunity on the people of 
Zimbabwe? The dissertation has sought to propose the adoption of the indigenous 
method of kuripa ngozi to help resolve the cases of political violence between villagers. 
The thesis has argued that kuripa ngozi, together with the numerous occult cases that 
emerged out of the violence, constitutes part of the Shurugwi people’s “common 
sense.”18 Basically, these cases inform us of how the residents of Shurugwi conceive of 
the world they inhabit, their fears, beliefs and myths, and what these tell about them. 
Under kuripa ngozi method, perpetrators and victims gather under conditions similar to 
Family Group Conferencing where the aggrieved, the perpetrators and the larger 
community interface and dialogue.19 In the process an account in which the perpetrator 
accepts culpability for the crime is given. In the classical murder-based ngozi, the “truth” 
comes out through an ngozi host, who is usually a relative of the perpetrator who is 
possessed by the spirit of the victim, who re-enacts the murder scene.20 Following this 
re-enactment, the perpetrator acknowledges culpability and asks for forgiveness. In 
                                                 
16 See The Sunday Mail, 5-11 February 2012, “PM Tsvangirai’s letter to President Mugabe” for a nuanced 
discussion of the impediments and frustrations that ZANU-PF-aligned structures have offered in stalling 
the vision of the full implementation of the GPA. See also Brian Raftopoulos, “The GPA as a passive 
revolution” 
17 Adam David Morton, Unravelling Gramsci, p66 
18 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from prison notebooks, p 419. 
19 Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing silences”, p 4. 
20 Tafataona Mahoso, “Ngozi: the philosophical foundation of African Living Law”, in The Sunday Mail, 5-
11 February 2012. 
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addition, certain rituals are performed to help cleanse the perpetrator and, crucially, to 
bring the aggrieved spirit back home. In the end, these processes enable the restoration 
of relations between the concerned parties which lays the foundation for compensation 
and long lasting peace21, not only between the living families but also between the living 
and the “living dead”.22  
At another level the active participation of communities in the search for lasting peace 
and justice renders them active, rather than as passive recipients of top-down 
government or NGO sponsored healing methods. This subverts the passive revolution 
introduced by the government-sponsored ONHRI, and the other methods, such as “Tree 
of Life” that some NGOs are trying to import and adapt for the country, through the 
bottom-up participation at the villages. As Woodward, Hayes and Minkley have said, 
“performative acts like playing, dance, or metaphysical discourses of the marginalised or 
othered- curses, spells, spirit or ancestor connections - also incorporate their own 
genealogies of voices.”23 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See Itai Muwati, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences”, p 14. 
22 See John S Mbiti, African religion and philosophy, Heinemann, London, 1969, p 83. 
23 See Wendy Woodward, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, eds, “Introduction”, Deep HiStories: Gender 
and colonialism in Southern Africa, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, 2002, p xxiii.  
 
 
 
 
 431 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 
Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe: Between a rock and a hard place: Women human 
Rights defenders at risk” in 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/assset/AFR46/017/2007/en/d9609e02-d38d-11dd-
a329- accessed 10 September 2010. 
Abioye, F.T. “Indigenous African institutions”, in upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-
1005201…/02chapter2.pdf, Accessed 04 June 2012. 
Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart, Heinemann Educational Publishers, London, 1958. 
Adorno, Theodor W. History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965, edited by Rolf 
Tiedmann, Trans by Rodney Livingstone, Polity, Cambridge, 2006. 
 
Africa Report No 117, 24 August 2006, “Zimbabwe: An opposition Strategy” 
inhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/media/Files/africa/southernafrica/zimbabwe/ZimbabweA
nOppositionStrategy.ashx, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
 
African Economic Output, in 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/southern-africa/zimbabwe/, 
Accessed 28 July 2011. 
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare life, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1998. 
Aletum, M.T. cited in http://africanhistory.about.com/od/kingdoms/Precolonial-
Africa.html Accessed 22 August 2012. 
 
 M.T Aletum, Political Sociology, Yaoundé, Pator Publishers, 2001. 
 
Alexander Jocelyn, and JoAnn Mcgregor, “Democracy, development and political 
conflict: Rural institutions in Matebeleland North after independence”, in Terence 
Ranger, ed, The historical dimensions of democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe: 
Nationalism, democracy and human rights, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 
2003. 
 
Alexander, Jocelyn, Joann Mcgregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory: One 
hundred years in the ‘Dark Forests ’of Matebeleland, James Currey: Oxford, Heinemann: 
Portsmouth, David Philip: Cape Town, Weaver Press: Harare, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 432 
 
 
 
 
Alexander, Jocelyn. “Squatters, veterans and the state”, in Amanda Hammar, et al, (eds), 
Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation in the context of 
crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003. 
 
Alie, Joe. A.D. “Reconciliation and traditional justice: Tradition-based practices of Kpaa 
Mende in Sierra leone” in 
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Chapter_5_Reconciliation_
and_traditional_justice_tradition-
based_practices_of_the_Kpaa_Mende_in_Sierra_Leone.pdf, Accessed 16 June 2011. 
Alvord, E.D. “The Progress of Native agriculture in Southern Rhodesia”, in The New 
Rhodesia, 15, 1948. 
 
Andersson, Jens. A. “Sorcery in the era of ‘Henry IV’: Kinship, mobility and mortality in 
Buhera District, Zimbabwe”, in Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol 8, No 
3, September 2002, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3134534, Accessed 14 March 2011. 
Ansell, Nicola.“‘Because it’s our culture!’ (Re) negotiating the meaning of lobola in 
Southern African Secondary Schools” in Journal of Southern African Studies, 27, 4, 
December 2001. 
Appointment of successor to late chiefs letters: Chief Native Commissioner’s Office: 
1915-1917, Government of Rhodesia Printers, Salisbury, 1917. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. On violence, Harcort, Brace and World Inc, New York, 1970. 
Arendt, Hannah. “Reflections on violence” in New York Review of Books, 27 February 
1969, cited in http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/arendt-hannah_reflectionsw-
on-violence.html, Accessed 06 May 2012. 
Ashforth, Adam. Witchcraft, violence and democracy in South Africa, Chicago University 
Press, Chicago, 2005. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and his world, Translated by Helene Iswolsky, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984. 
 
Barber, Karin. “Obscuring the exegesis in African oral praise poetry” in Duncan Brown, 
ed, Oral literature and performance in Southern Africa, Ohio University Press, Athens, 
1999. 
 
Baudzus, Roman. “Zimplats fighting Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policies” in 
http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2012/03/05/zimplats-fighting-zimbabwes-
indigenization-policie, Accessed 14 July 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 433 
 
 
 
 
Baxi, Uppendra. “Preliminary notes on transformative constitutionalism”, BISA 
Conference: Courting Justice 11, Delhi, April 27-29, 2008. 
 
Beach, David Norman. Zimbabwe before 1900, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1994. 
 
Beach, David Norman. “An innocent woman unjustly accused?: Charwe, medium of the 
Nehanda Mhondoro spirit, and the 1896-7 Central Shona rising in Zimbabwe” in History 
of Africa, Vol 25, 1998. 
 
Beach, David Norman. The Shona and Zimbabwe, 900-1850, Mambo Press, Gweru, 
1980. 
 
Becker, “Women, Politics and Peace in Northern Namibia”, in UNESCO: Women and 
Peace in Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003. 
Bennett, T.W. “Human rights and the African cultural tradition”, in Transformation, Vol 
22, 1993. 
 
Berlin, Isiah. “Two concepts of Freedom”, (1958) in Isiah Berlin, Four essays on liberty, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969. 
 
Bhebe, Ngwabi and Terence Ranger. The historical dimensions of democracy and human 
rights in Zimbabwe. Volume 1: Pre-colonial and colonial legacies. University of 
Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2001. 
 
Bhebe, Ngwabi. Benjamin Burombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-58, College 
Press, Harare, 1989. 
 
Bhebe, Ngwabi. The ZAPU AND ZANU guerrilla warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 1999. 
 
Blair, David. Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the struggle for Power in 
Zimbabwe, Continuum, London, 2002. 
 
Bloch, Ernst, George Lukacs, Berchtolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. 
Aesthetics and Politics, Translated by Ronald Taylor, Verso, 1977. 
 
Bond, Patrick and Masimba Manyanya. Zimbabwe’s plunge: Exhausted nationalism, 
neoliberalism and the search for social justice, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003. 
 
Boydston, Jeanne. “Gender as a question of historical analysis”, in Alexandra Shepard 
and Garthine, eds, Gender and History, Vol 20, Issue 3, November 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 434 
 
 
 
 
Bratton Michaeland Eldred Masunungure. “The anatomy of political predation: leaders, 
elites and coalitions in Zimbabwe”, Development Leadership Programme, in 
http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/Executive%20Summary%20-
%20An%20Anatomy%20of%20Political%20Predation%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf,  Accessed 
03 July 2010. 
Bratton, Michael and Eldred Masunungure. “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony”, Journal of 
Democracy, 19, 4, October 2008. 
 
 Brickhill, Jeremy. “Daring to storm the heavens: the military strategy of ZAPU 1976-
1979” in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terrence Ranger, eds, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s liberation war, 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1995. 
 
Brown, Wendy. “Rights, identity in late modernity: Revisiting the Jewish question”, in 
Austin Sarat and Thomas R Keams, eds, Identities, Politics and Rights, University of 
Michigan Press, 1995. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte and Niamh Reilly. Demanding Accountability: The Global Campaign 
and Vienna Tribunal for Women’s Rights, UNIFEM, New York, 1994. 
Campbell, Horace. Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The exhaustion of the patriarchal model of 
liberation, David Philip, Cape Town, 2003. 
Carswell, Grace. “Continuities in environmental narratives: the case of Kabale, Uganda, 
1930-2000”, in Environment and History, No 1, February 2003, in 
http://www.environmentandsociety.org/node/3143. Accessed 15 June 2012. 
 
Cawthorne, Maya. “The Third Chimurenga”, in Patricia Macfadden, (ed), Reflections on 
gender issues in Africa, SAPES, Harare, 1999. 
 
Chabwinja, Stewart. “GNU: ZANU-PF govt by another name”, in Zimbabwe Independent, 
24 May 2012, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/comment/35631-gnu-zanu-pf-govt-
by-another-name.html, Accessed 26 May, 2012. 
Chagonda, Tapiwa. “Dollarization of the Zimbabwean Economy: Cure or Curse? The Case 
of the Teaching and Banking Sectors.” Paper presented at the The Renaissance of 
African Economies, Dar Es Salam, Tanzania, 20-21 December 2010, organised by 
CODESRIA, in http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/papers14.pdf, Accessed 13 June 2011. 
Chakaodza, Bornwell. “GPA talks: One step forward, two backwards”, in Fingaz, 08 July 
2011, http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/comment/8955-gpa-talks-one-step-forward-
two-backwards.html, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
Charkrabarty, Dipesh. “Subaltern histories and post enlightenment rationalism”, in 
Vinayak Chartuverdi, ed, Mapping subaltern studies and the postcolonial, Routledge, 
London, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 435 
 
 
 
 
Charkrabarty, Dipesh. Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical 
difference, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000. 
 
Cheater, Angela. P. “The role and position of women in Colonial and Pre-colonial 
Zimbabwe” in ZAMBEZIA, Vol 13, No 11, 1986. 
 
Chinodya, Shimmer. Harvest of Thorns, Heinemann, Oxford, 1989. 
 
Chitiyo, Tapera Knox. “Land, violence and compensation: reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s 
land and war veterans debate” in Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Vol 9, No 1, May 
2000, in www.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
 
Chitiyo, Tapera Knox. “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history: The Zimbabwe defence 
Force from 1980-2005”, in 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/Evol_RevolOct05/Chapter13.pdf, Accessed 23 March 
2011. 
 
Christansen, Lene Bull. “Mai Mujuru: Father of the Nation?” in Kizito Muchemwa and 
Robert Muponde, (ed), Manning the Nation. 
 
Comaraff, John. L. “Colonialism, culture and the law: A foreword”, in Law and Spring 
Inquiry, American Bar Foundation, 2001 
 
Comaroff, John. L and Jean Comaroff. “Law and disorder in the postcolony”, in Jean 
Comaroff and John L Comaroff, eds, Law and disorder in the postcolony, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2006. 
 
Congressional Research Service (CRS). “Zimbabwe: 2008 Elections and the implications 
for US Policy”, 22 May 2008, cited in fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/106142.pdf, 
accessed 12 January 2010. 
 
COPAC Press Statement, 13 May 2011, in http://www.copac.org.zw/news/179-13-may-
2011.html, Accessed 26 June 2011. 
COPAC, 10 February 2011, “COPAC response to The Herald article:  COPAC data 
disappears”, in http://www.copac.org.zw/news/176-27-january-2011.html, Accessed 26 
June 2011.  
COPAC, 29 July 2010, “Women - Raise your voices in the Constitution Outreach!” in 
http://www.copac.org.zw/news/166-women-raise-your-voices-in-the-constitution-
outreach.html, Accessed 26 June 2011.  
 
Das, Veena. Life and words: Violence and the descent into the ordinary, University of 
California Press, Los Angeles, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 436 
 
 
 
 
 
Dagenaar, Johan. “The concept of violence”in Chabani Mangami and Andre du Toit, eds, 
Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa, Macmillan, London, 1990. 
Dangarembga, Tsitsi. Nervous Conditions, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1988. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. “Force of law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfield and David Gray Carlson, eds, Deconstruction and the 
possibility of justice, Routledge, New York and London, 1992. 
 
Drinkwater, Michael. “Technical development and peasant impoverishment: Land use 
policy in Zimbabwe’s Midlands province” in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 15, 
no2, Special issue on the politics of conservation in Southern Africa, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable2636804, Accessed 14 February 2011. 
 
Ellis, Stephen. “Mystical weapons: Some evidence from the Liberian War”, in Journal of 
Religion in Africa, Vol 31, No 2, Religion and War in the 1990s, May 2001, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581517, Accessed 14 March 2011. 
Eppel, Shari and Brian Raftopoulos, “Political crisis, mediation and the Prospects for 
transitional justice in Zimbabwe”, IDASA, November 2008. 
Eppel, Shari. “A tale of three dinner plates”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 35, 4, 
2009. 
 
Eppel, Shari. “Healing the dead to transform the living: Exhumation and reburial in 
Zimbabwe”, Amani Trust, Paper presented at the Regional and Human Rights’ Contexts 
and DNA, University of California, Berkeley, 26-27 April 2001. 
 
Fanon, Fanon. The wretched of the earth, Grove Press, New York, 1963. 
 
Feldman, Allen. Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in 
Northern Ireland, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991. 
 
Finnegan, Ruth. Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1992. 
 
Fontein, Joost. “Anticipating a tsunami: Rumours, planning and the arbitrary state in 
Zimbabwe,” in Africa: The Journal of the International Africa Institute, Vol 79, Number 3, 
2009, pp 369-398, in 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/afr/summary/v079/79.3.fontein.html, Accessed 21 May 
2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 437 
 
 
 
 
Foucault, Michael. Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-6, 
edited by Mauro Bertani and Alesandro Fontana, translated by David Macey, Picador, 
New York, 1997. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison, Translated by Alan 
Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York, 1998. 
Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings: 1972-1977, 
edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and 
Kate Soper, Pantheon Books, New York, 1980.  
 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, An Introduction, Volume 1, Translated by 
Robert Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978. 
Frederikse, Julie. Non but ourselves: masses vs. media in the making of Zimbabwe, Ravan 
Press, Johannesburg, 1982. 
 
Fujii, Lee Ann. Killing neighbours: Webs of violence in Rwanda, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca and London, 2009. 
 
Full text of Communique from the SADC summit held on 11 – 12 June 2011”, cited in 
  http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/8333-full-text-of-communique-from-the-
sadc-summit-held-on-11-%E2%80%93-12-jun.html, Accessed 03 June 2011. 
 
Gaidzanwa, Rudo. Images of women in Zimbabwean literature, College Press, Harare, 
1985. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. “Common sense as a cultural system”, in The Antioch Review, Vol 33, 
No 1, 1975, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/4637616, Accessed 6 March 2012. 
Gencarella, Stephen Olbrys. “Gramsci, Good Sense, and Critical Folklore Studies”, in 
Journal of Folklore Studies, Indiana University Press, Vol 47, No 3, 2010. 
Geschiere Peter, and Cyprian Fisiy. “Domesticating Personal violence: Witchcraft, courts 
and confessions in Cameroon”, in Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 
Vol 64, No 3, 1994, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/1160784, Accessed 14 March 2011. 
Geschiere, Peter, and Francis Nyamnjoh. “Witchcraft as an issue in the ‘Politics of 
Belonging’: Democratisation and urban Migrants’ involvement with the Home village”, 
in African Studies Review, Vol 41, No 3, December 1998, Published by the African 
Studies Association, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/525354, Accessed 14 March 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 438 
 
 
 
 
Gilman, Lisa. “Genre, agency, and meaning in the analysis of complex performances: The 
case of a Malawian political rally”, in Journal of American Folklore, Vol 122, No 485, 
Summer 2009. 
 
Gilman, Lisa. The dance of politics: Gender, performance, and democratisation in 
Malawi, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2009. 
 
Gilman, Lisa. “Traditionalisation of women’s dancing, hegemony, and politics in 
Malawi”, in Journal of Folklore Research, Vol 41, No 1, January-April 2004, p 33, cited in 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jfr/summary/v041/41.1gilman.html, Accessed 12 June 
2012. 
Goldblatt, Beth and Sheila Meintjes. “South African women demand the truth” in 
Meredith Turshen and Clotilde Twagiramariya, (eds), What women do in wartime: 
Gender and conflict in Africa. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the prison notebooks, edited and translated by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International Publishers, New York, 1971.  
 
Greene, Sandra. E. “Whispers and silences: Explorations in African oral History”, in Africa 
Today, vol 50, no2, Oral Heritage and Indigenous Knowledge, Autumn/Winter, 2003, 
Indiana University Press, cited in http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187571, Accessed 16 
August 2012. 
 
Grimm, Steven. R. “Kant’s argument for radical evil” in European Journal of Philosophy, 
10, 2, in http://faculty.fordham.edu/sgrimm/Site/Papers_and_Presentations_files/ejp-
kant-radicalevil.pdf, Accessed 20 September 2011. 
 
Guma, Lance. “Sibanda intimidation campaign backfires” in SW Radio News, 24 June 
2011, in http://www.swradioafrica.com/news240611/sibanda240611.htm, Accessed 27 
June 2011. 
Gutu, Obert. “National Healing impossible without truth commission”, 27 July 2009, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/gutu-national-healing-impossible-without-
truth-commission.htm, Accessed 18 April 2011. 
Gwaunza, Elizabeth C. “Social Attitudes-A hindrance to Women’s Advancement”, 
Southern African Political and Educational Magazine (SAPEM), August 1990. 
 
Hamilton, C.A. “The study of Southern African pre-colonial history: ‘Bantustan 
propaganda?’” in www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/remay82.6/remay82.6.pdf, 
Accessed 03 June 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 439 
 
 
 
 
Hammar, Amanda, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds. Zimbabwe’s Unfinished 
Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the context of Crisis, Harare, Weaver 
Press, 2003. 
 
Hammar, Amanda. “The Making and Unma(s)king of Local Government,” in Zimbabwe, 
in A. Hammar, et al, (eds), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business, Harare, Weaver Press, 2003. 
 
Hammond-Tooke, W.D. “Chieftainship in Transkei political development”, in Journal of 
Modern African Studies, vol 2, 1964. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the philosophy of history, Translated by J Sibree), Bell and 
Daldy, London, 1872. 
 
Hill, Geoff. What happens after Mugabe, Zebra press, Cape Town, 2005. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger, eds. The invention of tradition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
 
Hoecke, Mark van and Mark Warrington, “Legal cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a new model for comparative law”,  in International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol 47, July 1998, The British institute of International and Comparative 
Law and Cambridge University Press, cited in http://www.jstor.org, Accessed 13 
February 2012. 
Holland, Sekai. “Realigning input markets to former needs as a strategy on national 
healing, reconciliation and integration at grassroots based communities in agricultural 
production in Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.farnpan.org/documents/d00738/presentation/Review_of_the_Organ_On_
National_Healing_Final.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
Holleman, J.F. Chief, Council and Commissioner, London, Oxford University Press, 1969. 
 
Igreja, Victor. “The politics of peace, justice and healing in post-war Mozambique” in 
Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds. Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional 
justice in Africa, UKZN Press, 2009. 
IRIN Africa, “Zimbabwe resettled farmers returning to communal areas” in 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=45936, Accessed 19 February 2011. 
 
Izabiliza, Jeanne. “The role of women in reconstruction : Experience of Rwanda”, in 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Role-Women-
Rwanda.pdf, Accessed 24 March 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 440 
 
 
 
 
Jirira, Kwanele Ona. “Gender, Politics and Democracy: Kuvaka Patsva [Reconstructing]: 
The Discourse” in Patricia Macfadden, editor, SAFERE, Vol 1, No2, 1995. 
 
Kachere, Nyarai. “Virgins forced into marriage to “appease” evil spirits” in 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp? idnews=48630, Accessed  16 May 2011. 
Kadenge, Leveee. “No forgiveness without restitution” in The Standard, 10 April 2010, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/letters/29218-no-forgiveness-without-restitution.html, 
Accessed 01 July 2010. 
Kagoro, Brian. “Hot Seat Interview with Violet Gonda: Let’s hope this marriage of 
convenience will work” cited in Zimonline, 03 February 2009, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=4197, accessed 1 June 2011. 
Kanengoni, Alexander. Echoing silences, Heinemann, Sandton, 1997. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. Physische geographie, (Vol II), Konigsburg, 1802. 
 
Karlstrom, Michael. “On the aesthetics and dialogics of power in the postcolony”, in 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol 73, no1, 2003. 
 
Kazembe, Joyce. “The women issue”, in Ibbo Mandaza (ed). Zimbabwe: The political 
economy of transition 1980-1986, CODESRIA Book Series, London, 1987. 
 
Kremer, Eira. “A clash of economies: early centralisation efforts in colonial Zimbabwe, 
1929-1935”, in ZAMBEZIA, XXV, (i). 
 
 Kriger, Norma. Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and violent politics, 
1980-1987, Cambridge, University Press, Cambridge, 2003. 
 
Kriger, Norma. Zimbabwe’ Guerilla war: Peasant voices, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992. 
 
Lagardien, Ismael. “The space of militarisation that haunts the US” in 
http://www.thoughtleader.co.za, accessed on 19 April 2009. 
 
Lan, David. Guns and rain: Guerrillas and spirit mediums in Zimbabwe, James Currey, 
London, 1985. 
 
Lwanda, John. Promises, Power Politics, and Poverty: Democratic Transition in Malawi, 
(1961-1999), Dudu Nsomba Publications, Glasgow, 1996.  
Levinas, Emmanuel. Entre Nous: Thinking of the other, Translated by Michael B. Smith 
and Barbara Harshaw, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 441 
 
 
 
 
“Liberian Women Peacemakers” in 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic853697.files/Tyrrell2011.pdf, Accessed 23 
March 2012. 
 
Love Jeff and Johannes Schmidt, “Introduction” to FWJ Schelling, Philosophical 
investigations into the essence of human freedom, Dennis J Schmidt, ed, State University 
of New York Press, New York, 2006.  
 
Lyons, Tanya. Guns and guerrilla girls: women in the Zimbabwean National Liberation 
struggle, Africa World Press, Trenton, 1999. 
 
MacCandless, Erin. “Transforming and preventing polarisation by embracing strategy 
dilemmas: An outsider’s view on lessons from Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/1042/transforming-and-preventing-polarization/, 
Accessed 02 June 2011. 
 
Macfadden, Patricia. “Becoming postcolonial: African women changing the meaning of 
citizenship”, in Meridians, Vol 6, No 1, Indiana University Press, 2005, in 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338681, Accessed 05 October 2010. 
 
Machakanja, Pamela. “National healing and reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Challenges and 
opportunities”, in Zimbabwe Monograph Series, No 1, 2010, Institute for Justice and and 
Reconciliation Africa Programme, Wynberg, 2010. 
 
Machingaidze, Victor. E.M. “Agrarian Change from above: The southern Rhodesia Native 
Land Husbandry Act and African Response” in The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, Vol 24, No3, 1991, cited in http://www.jstor.org/stable/219092, 
accessed 14 February 2011. 
 
Madebwe Victor and Crescentia Madebwe. “An exploratory analysis of social, economic 
and environmental impacts on wetlands: the case of Shurugwi district, Midlands 
province, Zimbabwe” in Journal of Applied Sciences research, 1 (2), 2005. 
 
Madhuku, Lovemore, “Law, politics and the land reform process in Zimbabwe”, in M 
Masiiwa, ed, Post- independence land reform in Zimbabwe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
Harare, 2004. 
 
Mahoso, Tafataona. “Ngozi: the philosophical foundation of African Living Law”, in The 
Sunday Mail, 5-11 February 2012. 
Makumbe, John and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen: The politics behind 
the 1995 General elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 442 
 
 
 
 
Malunga, Sphosami. “Amnesty for Mugabe out of question”, in newzimbabwe.com, 
cited in http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/opinion265.16376.html, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
Mamdani Mahmood. Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late 
colonialism, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1996. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood, “Lessons of Zimbabwe: Mugabe in Context”, Concerned Africa 
Scholars, Bulletin No 82, Summer 2009. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Lessons of Zimbabwe” London Review of books, 04 December 
2008. 
 
Mamdani, Mamdani. “Reconciliation without justice”, Southern African Review of Books, 
November/December 1996. 
 
Mamdani, Mamdani. When Victims become killers When Victims become killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Fountain Press, David Philip, and 
James Currey, Kampala, Cape Town, and Oxford, respectively, 2001. 
Mandaza, Ibbo. “Draft constitution: Are we now almost home and dry?” in The 
Standard, 10 August 2012, Accessed 12 August 2012. 
Mandaza, Ibbo. “The one party state and democracy in Southern Africa: towards a 
conceptual framework”, in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, eds, The one party 
state and democracy: The Zimbabwe debate, SAPES Books, Harare, 1991. 
 
Mapimhidze, Ropafadzo. “Domestic violence most tolerated abuse”, in Newsday, 15 
October 2011, accessed 16 October 2011. 
 
Marongwe, Nelson. “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in 
Zimbabwe”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s 
unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation in the context of crisis, Weaver 
Press, Harare, 2003. 
Marwizi Walter, and Caiphas Chimhete. “Zimbabwe: Avenging spirits torment ZANU-PF 
terror militia” cited in http:www.africancrisis.co.za/Article.php?,ID=76100&, accessed 
30 January 2011. 
Masunungure, Eldred. “Zimbabwe’s agonising but irreversible political transition”, a 
paper presented at the European conference on African Studies 2009, Institute of 
African Studies, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009. 
Matavire, Monica. “Interrogating the Zimbabwean traditional jurisprudence and the 
position of women in conflict resolution, A case for Shona tribes in Muzarabani district”, 
 
 
 
 
 443 
 
 
 
 
in International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, February 2012, 
http://www.ijhssnet.com/update/index.php/archives/16-journalabstract/journal-
abstract/810-vol-1-no-21-si-december-2011abstract29.html, Accessed 16 June 2012.   
Mathey, MJ, et al. “The role played by the women of the Central African Republic in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts”, in UNESCO: Women and Peace in Africa, 
UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003. 
Matsa, Mark and Kudakwashe Muringaniza. “Rate of land-use/land cover changes in 
Shurugwi District, Zimbabwe: Drivers for change”, in Journal of Sustainable Development 
in Africa, Vol 12, No 3, 2010. 
 
Matshezi, M.J. Zimbabwe: With Robert Mugabe to the brink of the abyss, University of 
Fort Hare Press, Alice, 2007. 
 
Maxwell, David. “Witches, prophets and avenging spirits: The Second Christian 
movement in North East Zimbabwe” in Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol 25, Fasc 3, 
August 1995, in http://www.jstor.org/Stable/1581363, Accessed 2 March 2011. 
 
Mazarire, Gerald Chikozho. “Reflections on pre-colonial Zimbabwe, c.850-1880s”, in 
Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-
colonial period to 2008, Weaver and Jacana, Harare and Auckland Park, 2009. 
 
Mazarire, Gerald Chikozho. “The politics of the womb”: Women, politics and the 
environment in pre-colonial Chivi, Southern Zimbabwe, c1840-1900”, in ZAMBEZIA, XXX, 
(I), 2003. 
 
Mazrui, Ali. “Seek ye first the political kingdom” in Ali Mazrui and C. Wondji, eds, 
General History of Africa: Africa since 1935, UNESCO, Paris, 1993. 
 
Mbembe, Achille. “African Modes of Self Writing” in Public Culture, 14, 1, 2002. 
Mbembe, Achille. “Provisional notes on the post colony” in Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, vol 62, no1, 1992. 
 
Mbiba, Beacon. “Zimbabwe’s global citizens in ‘Harare North’: Some preliminary 
observations”, Paper presented at the Skinning the skunk-Zimbabwe Futures, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005, cited in 
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/...ef7a.../30+-+3+chapters.pdf,  Accessed 07 
June 2011. 
Mbiti, John.S. African religion and philosophy, Heinemann, London, 1969. 
Mcgregor, JoAnn. “Woodland resources, ecology, policy and ideology: An historical 
study of woodland use in Shurugwi communal area, Zimbabwe”, Doctoral thesis, 
 
 
 
 
 444 
 
 
 
 
Loughborough University of Technology, September 1991, in 
https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/, Accessed 14 March 2012. 
 
Mcgregor, Joann. “Conservation, control and ecological change: The Politics and ecology 
of Colonial conservation in Shurugwi”, Environment and History, vol 1, no3, October 
1995. 
Milchman, Alan and Alan Rosenburg, “Michel Foucalt: Crises and Problemisations”, The 
Review of politics, vol 67, no2, Spring 2005. 
Mondhlani, Peter Philip. “Zimbabwe’s agricultural policies fail to ensure food security” in 
Dateline: Southern Africa, Journalists Report a People’s perspective of poverty, in 
http://www.panos.org.zm/sites/www.panos.org.zm/files/PovertyReport.pdf, Accessed 
1 March 2011. 
 
Moore, David. “Zimbabwe’s triple crisis: Primitive accumulation, nation-state formation 
and democratisation in the age of neo-liberal globalisation”, in African Studies Quarterly, 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a2.htm, Accessed 19 May 2012. 
 
Moorman, Marissa. “Duelling bands and good girls: gender, music and the nation in 
Luanda’s musseques, 1961-1974”, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, 
37, 2, 2004. 
 
Morell, Robert. “Silence, sexuality and HIV in South African Schools”, in The Australian 
Educational Researcher, Vol 30, No1, April 2003, cited in 
http://www.aare.edu.au/aer/online/30010e.pdf, accessed 28 February 2011. 
 
Morton, Adam David. “Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the 
Global Political Economy, Pluto Press, London, 2007. 
 
Moyana, Henry. V. The political Economy of land in Zimbabwe, Mambo Press, Gweru, 
1984. 
Moyo, Jonathan. Voting for Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe, University of 
Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1992. 
Moyo, Painos. “Operation chikorokoza chapera bears fruit in Shurugwi”, in 
http://www.msu.ac.zw/cm/joomla/index2.php?options=com, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
 
Moyo, Sam and Paris Yeros, “Intervention: The Zimbabwe question and the two lefts” in 
Historical Materialism, 15, 2007. 
 
Moyo, Sam and Paris Yeros, “Zimbabwe ten years on” “Zimbabwe Ten Years On: Results 
and Prospects” Pambazuka News, 419, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 445 
 
 
 
 
Mtisi, Joseph, Munyaradzi Nyakudya and Teresa Barnes, “War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980”, 
in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the 
pre-colonial period to 2008, Weaver and Jacana, Harare and Auckland Park, 2009. 
 
Muchemwa Kizito, and Robert Muponde, eds. “Introduction: Manning the Nation”, in 
Manning the Nation: Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and Society, Weaver Press 
and Jacana, Harare and Johannesburg, 2007. 
Mudenge, Stanslaus I.G. A political History of Munhumutapa c 1400-1902, James Currey, 
Zimbabwe Publishing House and Heinemann Educational Books, London, Harare and 
New Jersey, 1988. 
 
Mudzonga, Evangelista and Tendai Chigwada. “Agriculture: Scenarios for Southern 
Africa: A case study of Zimbabwe’s Food Security”, in International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (IISD), Winnipeg, Canada, 2009, in 
http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/ag_scenarios_south_africa_zimbabwe.pdf, Accessed 2 
March 2011. 
 
Mugabe, Robert Gabriel. Inside the Third Chimurenga, Department of Information and 
Publicity, Harare, 2001.  
 
Mugabe, Robert. Our War Of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, and Interviews, Mambo, 
Gweru, 1980. 
 
Mujere, J. “‘Tsunami!’, Coping with the impact of Operation Murambatsvina in Harare: 
The case of elderly vendors and tuckshop owners in Mbare and Highfield suburbs”, 
Paper presented at the Conference on Ageing in African Cities: revisiting the issues, 
responses and outcomes, Nordic Africa Institute, Zomba, Malawi, 29 November-1 
December 2007. 
 
Mukundi, Tirivavi. “National healing and reconciliation”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk, 29 October 2010, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
Mupawose, R.M. and E.T Chengu, “Development of land policy: Determination of land 
policy in Zimbabwe”, in http://unu.edu/unupress/unubooks/80604e/80604E06.htm, 
Accessed 5 March 2011. 
 
Musiyiwa, Mickias and Memory Chirere, “The nature of fatherhood and manhood in 
Zimbabwean texts of pre-colonial and colonial settings” in Kizito Muchemwa and Robert 
Muponde, eds, Manning the Nation: Father figures in Zimbabwean literature and 
Society, Weaver Press and Jacana, Harare and Johannesburg, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 446 
 
 
 
 
Muvingi, Ishmael. “Transitional justice and political pre-transition in Zimbabwe”, 
ACCORD, Issue 1, 2011, cited in 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_1.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011. 
Muwati, Itai, Zifikile Gambahaya and Fainos Mangena, “Echoing Silences as a Paradigm 
for restorative Justice in Post-conflict Zimbabwe: A Philosophical Discourse”, in 
Zambezia, XXXIII 2006. 
 
Muzondidya, James. “From buoyancy to crisis, 1980-1997”, in Brian Raftopoulos and 
Alois Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, 
Weaver Press and Jacana, Harare and Auckland, 2009. 
 
Muzondidya, James. “Our guns our votes’: The Political-Military Allience in Zimbabwe 
and Prospects for Democracy”, Paper presented at the European Conference on African 
Studies 2009, Institute of African Studies, University of Leipzig, Germany, 4-7 June 2009. 
 
Muzondidya, James and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Echoing silences: Ethnicity in post-
colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007”, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 7, Number 2, 
2007. 
 
Muzulu, Paidamoyo. “Zimbabwe government should compensate violence victims-
Tribunal”, in ZIMDIASPORA, cited in http://www.zimdiaspora.com/index.php?, accessed 
30 January 2011 
Nabudere, Dani. W. “Ubuntu Philosophy: Memory and Reconciliation”, http://www.doc-
txt.com/Ubuntu-Themes.pdf, Accessed 12 March 2012. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. J. “Making sense of cultural nationalism and the politics of 
commemoration under the Third Chimurenga in Zimbabwe”, in Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol 35, No 4, December 2009, URL, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070903314226, Accessed 22 August 2012. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. J. “Nationalist-Military alliance and the fate of democracy in 
Zimbabwe”, in kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/98119/.../Chapter4.pdf, 
Accessed 21 May 2010.  
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. J. “Putting people first: from regime security to human 
security: A quest for Social Peace in Zimbabwe, 1980-2002” in 
http://ecalib.uneca.org/ipac20/ipac.jsp., Accessed 07 July 2009. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo.J. “Who ruled by the spear?: Rethinking governance in the 
Ndebele state”  in African Studies Quarterly, vol 10, nos 2 & 3, 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 447 
 
 
 
 
Neocosmos, Michael.“Reflections on Human rights Discourse and Emancipation in the 
Twenty-First Century”, in http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-
agreement-as-a-passive-revolution/, Accessed 02 June 2011. 
 
Nhongo-Simbanegavi, Josephine. For better or worse? Women and ZANLA in 
Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle, Weaver Press, Harare, 2000. 
 
Niranjana, Tejaswini. Readers of current Indian thought, West Heavens, 2010. 
Njovana, Eunice and Charlotte Watts. “Gender violence in Zimbabwe: A need for 
collaborative Action”, in Reproductive Health Matters, Vol 4, No 7, May 1996, p 47, cited 
in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3775350, Accessed 19 March 2011. 
 
Nkomo, Joshua. The story of my life, Methuan, London, 1984.  
 
Ntahobari, J and B Ndayiziga. “The role of Burundian women in peaceful settlement of 
conflicts” in UNESCO: Women and Peace in Africa, UNESCO Workshops, Paris, 2003. 
Nwoye, Miriam Agatha Chinwe. “Role of African women in peace building and conflict 
resolution in African traditional societies: A selected review” cited in 
http://www.afrikawold.net/afrel/chinwenoye.htm, accessed 26 January 2011. 
Nyamubaya, Freedom T.V. On the road again, ZPH, Harare, 1986. 
 
Nyangombe, Nyamutatamba. “Security reforms: The need to uproot the ‘deep state’”, in 
Zimbabwe Independent, 29 July 2011, http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31810-
security-reforms-the-need-to-uproot-the-deep-state.html, Accessed 31 July 2011. 
Nyathi, Pathisa. “Zimbabwe: Msika- a nationalist par excellence”, in The Herald, cited in 
http://allafrica.com/stories/2009081001.html?, accessed 5 March 2011. 
 
O’Meara, Michael. “Carl Schmitt’s The concept of the political” in 
http://www.toqonline.com/blog/carl-schmitts-concept-of-the-political/, Accessed 06 
June 2011. 
 
Office of the Prime Minister, “Zimbabwe: statement on the indigenisation of banks and 
private educational institutions”, in http://allafrica.com/stories/201207040159.html, 
Accessed 14 July 2012. 
Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI), “Concept Paper”, 
ONHRI, Harare, 2009. 
Oyewumi, Oyeronke. “Visualising the body: Western theories and African subjects”, in 
Oyeronke Oyewumi, ed, African Gender Studies: A reader, Pelgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 448 
 
 
 
 
 
Palmer, Robin. “Aspects of Rhodesia land Policy 1890-1936” in Central African Historical 
Association Pamphlet, Local Series, no22. 
 
Palmer, Robin. R. Land and Racial Domination in Zimbabwe, Heinemann, London, 1977. 
 
Pandian, M.S.S. The Image trap: MG RAmachandran in film and politics, Sage 
Publications, New Dehli, 1992. 
Pandya, Paresh. Mao Tse-Tung and Chimurenga: An investigation into ZANU’s strategy, 
Skotaville Publishers, Braamfontein, 1988. 
 
Parpart, Jane. L. “Masculinities, race and violence in the making of Zimbabwe”, in Kizito 
Muchemwa and Robert Muponde, eds, Manning the Nation: Father figures in 
Zimbabwean literature and Society, Weaver Press and Jacana, Harare and Johannesburg, 
2007.  
 
Passmore, G.C. Hidden Conflict: A Documentary record of Administrative Policy in 
colonial Zimbabwe, 1950-1980, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2002. 
Pateman, Carol. The sexual Contract, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988. 
 
Pendered, A. and W. von Memerty, “The Native Land Husbandry Act of Southern 
Rhodesia”, in Journal of African administration, Vol7, No3, London, 1955. 
 
Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark, Zimbabwe: Post Presidential Election March-
May 2002, 21 May 2002. 
Pugliese, Joseph. “Rationalised violence and legal colonialism: Nietzsche contra 
Nietzsche” in CARDOZO Studies in law and literature, Fall/Winter, 1996. 
Quashigah, Edward. K. “Legitimate governance: The pre-colonial African perspective” in 
E. K Quashingah and C Okafor, eds, Legitimate governance in Africa: International and 
domestic legal perspective, Kluwer, The Hague, London, Boston, 1999. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Current politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the crisis”, in David 
Harold-Barry, ed, Zimbabwe: the past is the future, Weaver Press, Harare, 2004. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Gender, Nationalist Politics and the fight for the city: Harare 1940-
1950s”, in Patricia Macfadden (ed), SAFERE, Vol1, No2, 1995. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Gender, Nationalist politics and the fight for the city: Harare 1940-
1950s”, in Patricia Macfadden, ed, Southern African Feminist Review (SAFERE), Vol 1, 
No2, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 449 
 
 
 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Nation, race and History in Zimbabwean politics” in Brian 
Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage, eds, Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004. 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Opinion: Beyond Livingstone”, in Zimonline, 28 June 2011, 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6740, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Problematising nationalism in Zimbabwe: A historiographical 
review”, Zambezia, Vol 26, No 2, 1999. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Response to the Mamdani debate” in Concerned Africa Scholars, 
Bulletin No 82, Summer 2009. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Sanctions regime strengthens Mugabe’s hand”, in The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 15-22 March 2012, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/international/34623-sanctions-regime-strengthens-
mugabes-hand.html, Accessed 20 March 2012. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008”, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois 
Mlambo, eds, Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, 
Weaver Press and Jacana, Harare and Auckland, 2009. 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “The global Political agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution”: Notes on 
Contemporary Politics in Zimbabwe,” The Round table, in 
http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/909/the-global-political-agreement-as-a-passive-
revolution/, Accessed 02 June 2011. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “The state in crisis: Authoritarian nationalism, selective citizenship 
and distortions of democracy in Zimbabwe” in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and 
Stig Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation 
in the context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003.  
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “The State, NGO’s and Democratisation”, in Sam Moyo, John 
Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos, eds, NGO’s, the state and politics in Zimbabwe, SAPES 
Books, Harare, 2000. 
 
Raftopoulos, Brian. “Zimbabwe crisis and the challenges for the left”, Journal of African 
Studies, Vol 32, No2, June 2006. 
 
Ranciere, Jacques, The politics of aesthetics, Translated by Gabriel Rockhill, with an 
afterword by Slavoj Zizek, Continuum, London, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 450 
 
 
 
 
Ranger, Terence, ed. “Introduction to volume Two”, The historical dimensions of 
democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe: Nationalism, democracy and human rights, 
University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2003. 
 
Ranger, Terence. “Historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the 
struggle of the past in Zimbabwe” in http://cas1.elis.rug.ac accessed 12 May 2009. 
 
Ranger, Terence. “Review: Healers and Hierarchies”, in Journal of Southern African 
Studies, Vol 13, No2, Special Issue on the political and Economy of health in Southern 
Africa, January 1987, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/2636862, Accessed 15 March 2011. 
Ranger, Terence. The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston, 1970. 
 
Ranger, Terence. “The Uses and Abuses of History in Zimbabwe”, Paper presented at the 
Skinning the skunk-Zimbabwe Futures, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2005, cited in 
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/...ef7a.../30+-+3+chapters.pdf,  Accessed 07 
June 2011. 
 
Ranger, Terence. O. Peasant Consciousness and guerrilla war in Zimbabwe: A 
comparative study, James Currey, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1985. 
 
Ranger, Terence. Revolt in Southern Rhodesia: 1896-7, A Study in African Resistance, 
North Western University Press, 1969. 
 
Ranger, Terence. Voices from the rocks: Nature, culture and history in the Matopos hills 
of Zimbabwe, Baobab, Harare, 1999. 
 
Reeler, A.P. “The role of militia groups in maintaining ZANU-PF political power”, in 
archive.niza.nl/docs/200303171414038719.pdf, Accessed 12 May 2011.   
 
Reeler, Tony, et al, “The Tree of Life: a community approach to empowering and healing 
survivors of torture in Zimbabwe”, in 
http://www.google.co.za/#q=TREE+OF+LIFE+HEALING+IN+ZIMBABWE&hl=en&prmd=iv
ns&ei=0NMjTojKJYPSrQfNmISJAg&start=10&sa=N&fp=90e7b8f8b9d5966d&biw=1366&
bih=627, Accessed 18 July 2011. 
Rukuni, Mandivamba and Stig Jensen, “Land, growth and governance: Tenure reform 
and visions of progress in Zimbabwe”, In Amanda Hammer, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig 
Jensen, eds, Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation in the 
context of crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 451 
 
 
 
 
Rupiya, Martin. “Contextualising the military in Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2004 and 
beyond” in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyron Savage (eds), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political 
reconciliation, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2004. 
 
Rupiya, Martin. “Evaluating the security sector as the Repressive Instrument for the 
state in Zimbabwe”, Paper prepared for the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape 
Town. 
 
Ruddick, Susan. “The politics of affect: Spinoza in the work of Negri and Deleuze”, in 
Theory, Culture and Society, cited in http://tcs.sagepub.co/, accessed 23 July 2012. 
Rutherford, Blair. “Belonging to the farm(er): Farm workers, farmers, and the shifting 
politics of citizenship”, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, eds, 
Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, the state and nation in the context of 
crisis, Weaver Press, Harare, 2003.  
Sachikonye, Lloyd. When a state turns on its citizens: 60 years of institutionalised 
violence in Zimbabwe, Jacana, Auckland Park, 2011. 
 
Saunders, Richard. “Zimbabwe: Liberation Nationalism, Old and Born Again” in Links 
International Journal of Socialist Renewal, in http://links.org.au/node/1831, Accessed 12 
January 2010. 
 
Scanlon, Helen and Nompumelelo Motlafi. “Indigenous justice or political instrument?: 
The modern gacaca courts of Rwanda”, in Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, 
Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, UKZN Press, 2009. 
Skaria, Ajay. “Gandhi’s politics: Liberalism and the question of the Ashram”, in South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 101:4, Fall 2002. 
Scarnecchia, Timothy. The urban roots of democracy and political violence in Zimbabwe: 
Harare and Highfields, 1940-1964, Rochester,New York, 2008. 
Scharf, Wilfred. “Non-state justice systems in Southern Africa: How should governments 
respond?”, Institute of criminology, cape Town, 2003. 
 
Schmidt, Elizabeth. Peasants, traders, and wives: Shona women in the history of 
Zimbabwe, 1870-1939, Heinemann, Baobab, James Currey, Portsmouth, Harare and 
London, 1992. 
 
Schmitt, Carl and G. Schwab, The concept of the political, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 452 
 
 
 
 
Scott, James. C. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of Peasant resistance, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1985. 
 
Shivji, I. “The life and times of Babu” in Review of African Political Economy, 99, 2003. 
 
Sibanda, Maxwell. “Explosive cocktail when music is mixed with politics”, in Music 
freedom Report No.5, p 6, Accessed 03 March 2012. 
 
Sithole, Zeff. “Is the army taking over?” in www.afrika.no/Detailed/12358.html , 
accessed 12 March 2009. 
Smith, Ian. Bitter harvest: The great betrayal, Blake, London, 1997. 
 
Sorenson, Paul. “Zimbabwe’s Security Services: Views from the Inside” in RUSI Journal, 
August/September 2010, vol 55, no 4. 
 
Southall, Roger. “Too soon to tell?: Land reform in Zimbabwe”, Africa Spectrum, 3, 2011, 
in hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewPDFInterstitial/.../487, Accessed 18 
June 2012. 
Spivak, Gayatri Charkravorty . “Subaltern studies: Deconstructing Historiography”, in R 
Guha and G Spivak, eds, Selected Subaltern Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Spivak, Gayatri Charkravorty. “Righting wrongs” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol 103, 
No 2/3, Spring/Summer, Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri. “Can the subaltern speak?” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 
eds, Marxism and the interpretation of culture, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1988. 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekker. “Introduction: Transitional justice and peace building”, in 
Chandra Lekka Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional 
justice in Africa, UKZN Press, Scottsville, 2009. 
SSoka, Yasmin Loise. “The politics of transitional justice” in Chandra Lekka Sriram and 
Suren Pillay, eds, Peace vs Justice: The dilemma of transitional justice in Africa, UKZN 
Press, Scottsville, 2009. 
“Statement by Mthwakazi Liberation Front”, 3 February 2010, in 
http://www.forum.newzimbabwe.com/index.php?topic/28620-statement-by-
mthwakazi-liberation-front/, Accessed 5 May 2011.  
 “Statement on Human Rights” Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, United 
Nations, by The Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, in American 
Anthropologist, Vol 49, No 4, Part 1, Oct-Dec 1947, cited in 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
 
 
 
 
 453 
 
 
 
 
7294%28194710%2F12%292%3A49%3A4%3C539%3ASOHR%3E2%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0, 
Accessed 21 January 2011. 
Stoneman, Colin and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter 
Publishers, London and New York, 1989. 
 
Straus, Scott. The Order of Genocide. Race, Power and War in Rwanda, Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press, 2006. 
 
Tambudzai, Zachary. “Zimbabwe’s military expenditure, 1980-2003: A study from the 
comparative SADC perspective”, in Africana Bulletin, No 53, 2005, in 
www.wgsr.uw.edu.pl/pub/uploads/ab05/7Tambudzai.pdf, Accessed 20 May 2012. 
 
Tangwa, Godfrey. “Democracy and development in Africa: Putting the horse before the 
cart” in Road companion to democracy and meritocracy, Kola Tree Press, Bellington, 
1988. 
 
Tekere, Edgar “2boy” Zivanai. A lifetime of struggle, SAPES, Harare, 2007. 
 
Thayer, Adin. “Women in post-genocide Rwanda: Facing the past to build a future” in 
http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1413:wo
men-in-post-genocide-rwandafacing-the-past-to-build-a-future-&catid=169:multiple-
intolerance-mounting-resistance, Accessed 24 March 2012. 
Thornycroft. P, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/06/mil-
080610-voa08.htm, Accessed 01 July 2011. 
Tibaijuka, Anna. Report on the Fact Finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and 
impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement 
Issue in Zimbabwe, United Nations, New York, 2005. 
 
Tirivangana, Augustine. “The metaphysical scope of Ngozi”, in The Standard, 29 May 
2010, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/24857-the-metaphysical-scope-of-
ngozi-.html, Accessed 01 July 2011. 
Tony Reeler, Tony. Subliminal terror?: Human rights violence and torture in Zimbabwe 
during 2008, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2009. 
 
Tungamirai, Josiah. “Recruitment to ZANLA: Building a war machine”, in Ngwabi Bhebe 
and Terence Ranger, eds, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s liberation war, James Currey, 
Heinemann, University of Zimbabwe Publications, London, Portsmouth and Harare, 
1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 454 
 
 
 
 
Turshen, Meredith. “Women’s war stories” in Meredith Turshen and Clotilde 
Twagiramariya (eds) What do women do in Wartime: Gender and conflict in Africa, ZED 
Books, London and New York, 1998. 
 
Tyrrell, Katie. “In Support of their Sisters in Conflict: Understanding the Transnational 
Impact of the Katie Tyrrell, “In Support of their Sisters in Conflict: Understanding the 
Transnational Impact of the Liberian Women Peacemakers” in 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic853697.files/Tyrrell2011.pdf, Accessed 23 
March 2012. 
Utas, Mats. “Agency of victims: Young women in the liberation civil war” in Alcinda 
Honwana and Felip de Boeck, (eds), Makers and Breakers: Children and youth in Post-
Colonial Africa, Africa World Press Inc, Trenton and Asmara, 2005. 
 
Uwakweh, Pauline Ada. “Debunking Patriarchy: The Liberational Quality of Voicing in 
Tsitsi Dangarembga’s ‘Nervous Conditions’” in Research in African Literature, Vol 26, No 
1, Spring 1995, in http://www.jstor.org/stable/3820089, Accessed 05 October 2010. 
 
U Mhlahlo we Sizwe sika Mthwakazi, “Restoration of Ndebele sovereignty”, letter 
written to the Constitutional Parliamentary Committee, 22 January 2010, cited in 
http://www.mthwakazian.com/attachments/393_UMHLAHLOWEpc-1.pdf, Accessed 5 
may 2011. 
Vail, Leroy and Landeg White, Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in 
History, University of Virginia Press, 1991. 
 
Vambe, Maurice T. “Popular songs and social realities in post-independence Zimbabwe”, 
in African Studies Review, vol 43, No 2, 2000. 
 
Vansina, Jan. Oral Tradition: A study in Historical methodology, University of Wisconsin 
press, Madison, 1965. 
 
Vera, Yvonne. Stone Virgins, Weaver, Harare, 2002. 
 
Vrey, Francois. “Strategic culture of Southern African Development Community: 
Militarised pathways to Security” in African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol 9, No1, 
2009. 
Wai-Teng Leong, Laurence. “Consuming the Nation: National Day Parades in Singapore” 
in New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 13, 2, December 2001. 
Weinrich,  A.K.H. Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia, Heinemann, London, 1971. 
 
 
 
 
 
 455 
 
 
 
 
Weinrich, A.K.H. “Changes in the Political and Economic Roles of Women in Zimbabwe 
since Independence, in Cultural Dialogue between the Peoples of the World, vol 8, No 4, 
1982. 
 
Weintraub, Jeff. “Zimbabwe, the land of dying children” in 
http://jeffweintraub.blogspot.com/2007/01/zimbabwe-land-of-dying-children-rw.html, 
Accessed 2 March 2011. 
 
Weiss, Ruth. The women of Zimbabwe, Kesho Publications, London, 1986. 
 
Werbner, Richard. Tears of the dead: A social biography of an African family, Edinburgh 
University Press, London, 1991. 
 
White, J.D. cited in http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/zulu-shaka.htm, 
Accessed 15 June 2011.  
 
White, Luise. The assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and politics in Zimbabwe, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2003. 
 
Win, Everjoice. “Open letter to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and other women in South 
African cabinet”, in Feminist Africa, Issue number 3, October/November, 2004. 
 
Wolmer William and Ian Scoones, “Agriculture: The mixed farming discourse in 
Zimbabwe”, African Affairs, (2000), 99, cited in 
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/99/397/575.full.pdf, accessed 12 February 
2011. 
 
Woodward, Wendy, Patricia Hayes and Gary Minkley, eds, “Introduction”, Deep 
HiStories: Gender and colonialism in Southern Africa, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, 
2002. 
Zizek, Slavoj, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, Picador, New York, 2008. 
Zurawski, Nils. “I know where you live’- Aspects of watching, surveillance, and social 
control in a conflict zone (Northern Ireland)”, in Surveillance and society, 2 (4), p 502, in 
http://www.surveillance-and-society.org, Accessed 28 May 2012. 
ZANU-PF Election Manifesto, 1995. 
 
 
ARCHIVAL MATERIALS 
 
NAZ, S2929/7/6, Delineation Reports General: Selukwe District, 1968. 
 
 
 
 
 456 
 
 
 
 
 
NAZ, N/1/24, Report of NC, Selukwe, for the year ended 31st Dec 1921. 
 
NAZ, Report of Agriculturalist for the instruction of Natives to Chief Agriculturalist, 
1/4/30. 
 
NAZ, S1007/7, Miscellaneous, Selukwe Reserve, NC, Selukwe to Superintendent of 
Natives, Bulawayo, 3/2/31. 
 
NAZ, S138/72 Appointment, duties and instructions in connection with Native farming 
demonstrators. 
 
NAZ, S235/504, Report of NC, Selukwe, for the year ended 31st Dec 1926.  
 
NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of the NC, Selukwe, for the year ended 31st Dec 1928. 
 
NAZ, S235/505-508, Report of the NC, Selukwe, for the year ended 31st Dec 1929. 
 
NAZ, S235/505-508, Reports of Native Commissioner, (NC), Selukwe, 1934. 
 
NAZ, S2386, E.D Alvord, Agricultural Position in Reserves, Selukwe Reserve-Report of the 
Agriculturalist for Natives, 1943. 
 
NAZ, S2929/7/6, Delineation Reports General: Selukwe District. 
 
NAZ, SRGI/INT4, Annual Report of Agriculturalist, 1928. 
 
S235/505-508, Report of NC, Selukwe, 1927. 
 
 
 
OTHER INTERNET SOURCES 
 
http://faculty.washington.edu/cbehler/glossary/commonsense.html, Accessed 4 March 
2012. 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-5440-201-1-DO-Topic.html, Accessed 16 June 2012.  
 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inqui
ry_report.pdf, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No2/Trends.pdf, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 457 
 
 
 
 
http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2009/06/zimbabwe/documents/2ndCropand
LivestockAssessmentRevised24April2008Final.pdf, Accessed 1 March 2011. 
http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/8333-full-text-of-communique-from-the-
sadc-summit-held-on-11-%E2%80%93-12-jun.html, Accessed 03 June 2011. 
 
 
 
NGO REPORTS 
 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Rights Foundation (LRF), 
Breaking the silence, Building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland 
and the Midlands 1980-1988, CCJP and LRF, Harare, 1995. 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Graveyard governance: A report on political 
violence following the March 2008 harmonised elections, 2009. 
Church and Civil Society Forum, (CCSF). “National Healing and Reconciliation Position 
Paper”, July 2009. 
Church and civil society Forum, “Initial national healing discussion paper” Harare, 2010. 
Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM) “Periodic Report, March to April 2010” in 
www.cisomm.org/index.php?option=com-, Accessed 12 May 2011. 
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. The military factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral 
affairs 3 June 2011 in http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The military Factor in 
zimbabwe.pdf, Accessed 12 August 2011. 
Human Rights Watch, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 8 March 2002, in 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c8c82df4.html, Accessed & March 2011. 
 
Human Rights Watch, Perpetual fear: Impunity and cycles of violence, March 2011, in 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/.../zimbabwe0311NoPage8Full.pdf, Accessed 14 June 
2012. 
 
IDASA, ICTJ and RAU, Women, politics and the Zimbabwe crisis, May 2010. 
 
Kubatana.net, 06 May 2008, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/080506ba.asp?sector=ELEC&year=0&range_s
tart=1, Accessed 01 August 2011. 
 
Relieweb, 19 March 2009, “Zimbabwe: Exiles start to return”, in 
http://reliefweb.int/node/302127, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 458 
 
 
 
 
Research and Advocacy Unit, ( RAU), “When the going gets tough the man gets going”: 
Zimbabwean women’s perceptions on politics, governance, political violence and 
transitional justice, Harare, November 2010. 
 
Solidarity Peace Trust, Discarding the filth”: Operation Murambatsvina. Interim report 
on the Zimbabwean government’s “urban cleansing” and forced eviction campaign, 
May/June 2005, 27 June 2005. 
Solidarity Peace Trust, Desperately seeking sanity: what prospects for a new beginning in 
Zimbabwe? Durban, 29 July 2008. 
 
Solidarity Peace Trust, Disturbing the peace: An overview of civilian arrests in Zimbabwe: 
February 2003-January 2004, July 2004. 
 
Solidarity Peace Trust, Operation Taguta/Sisuthi: Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe- Its 
impact on rural communities, April 2006. 
 
Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference, National Healing and Reconciliation: God can 
heal the wounds of the afflicted, Harare, 1 October 2009. 
 
Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), Pre-election Update No 5, 6-11 March 
2008, cited in http://www.zesn.org.zw, accessed 1 March 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Call by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum on 
Parliamentarians attending the African Pacific Caribbean-European Union Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly, cited in 
http://www.hrforumzim.com/press/20090403ForumResolutionto17thJPA.pdf, accessed 
23 January 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Human rights and Zimbabwe’s June 2000 
Election, January 2001. 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Only bruises on the soles of their feet: torture and 
falanga in Zimbabwe, Harare, 2009. 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who guards the guards?: Violations by Law 
Enforcement Agencies in Zimbabwe, 2000-2006, Harare, December 2006. 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who was responsible? Alleged perpetrators and 
their crimes during the 2000 Parliamentary Election Period, July 2001, in 
http://www..dogstoc.com/docs/17003921/Harare, Accessed 8 March 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 459 
 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Who will dare begin the process of recovering the 
truth? Vol 2, 2010, cited in http://www.hrforum.com/special_hrru/outreach-report-07-
10.pdf, Accessed 19 May 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), 18 March 2011, “Summary of politically-motivated 
Human rights and Food-related violations, February 2011”, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZPP_FEBRUARY__2011__REPORT_SUMMA
RY.pdf, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZPP Monthly Monitor(s), 
www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/ZPP300312.pdf , Accessed 12 July 2012. 
 
ZZZICOMP, “Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach Process: 26 July-1 August 2010”, in 
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg/100825zicomp.asp?sector=LEGSL&year
=2010&range_start=61, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
 
ZZZICOMP, “Weekly Report Shadowing the Outreach process”, 19-25 July 2010, in 
http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/WeeklyReport19-25July2010.pdf, Accessed 
12 May 2011. 
 
 
 
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS  
Global Political Agreement, Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, Harare, 
15 September 2008. 
Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009. 
Government of Zimbabwe, CSO, 2002 Population Census. 
 
Government Gazette Extraordinary, 15 July 2009, General Notice 92 of 2009. 
Government of Zimbabwe, 2002 Population Census Preliminary Results. 
 
Government of Zimbabwe, Response to the UN special envoy’s report on Operation 
Murambatsvina, 2005, Harare. 
 
Report of the Portfolio Committee on mines, energy, environment and tourism on the 
developments in Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park”, 8th June 2006, in Zimbabwe 
Parliamentary Debates: The Senate, Vol 15, No 23, cited in 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/cms\Hansards\Archives\Senate\15_2005-
2006/8June2006_15-23pdf, Accessed 10 February 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 460 
 
 
 
 
Report of the commission of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service 
(Riddell Commission), Harare, 1981. 
 
Report of the Pan African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Runoff and 
House of Assembly By-elections, Republic of Zimbabwe, 27 June 2008. 
Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee on the implementation of the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme, 2000-2002 (The Utete Report). 
 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe (Revised Edition), Harare, Government Printer, 1996. 
 
UN AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) REPORTS  
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (UNSCR1820), 2008. 
 
United Security Council “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo”, 16 October 2002. 
 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, “Equality Now: Submissions to the UN Human 
Rights Committee”, 62nd Session, March 1998, cited in 
http://www.equalitynow.org/english/campaigns/un/unhrc_reports/unhrc_zimbabwe_e
n.pdf, accessed 31 January 2011. 
 
“Sexual violence and armed conflict: United Nations response”, Women 2000, United 
Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 18 April 1998. 
 
“Statement on Human Rights” Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, United 
Nations, by The Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, in American 
Anthropologist, Vol 49, No 4, Part 1, Oct-Dec 1947, cited in 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
7294%28194710%2F12%292%3A49%3A4%3C539%3ASOHR%3E2%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0, 
Accessed 21 January 2011. 
 
“Truth, reconciliation and justice in Zimbabwe: Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
Appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation 
to examine the observance by the Government of Zimbabwe of the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87), and the 
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98), December 2009, 
cited in 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/harare/download/commission_of_inqui
ry_report.pdf, Accessed 22 May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 461 
 
 
 
 
 
OTHER UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 
Alexander, Jocelyn and Kudakwashe Chitofiri, “The consequences of violent politics in 
Norton, Zimbabwe”. [Undated] 
 
AANGIRFAN Blogspot, 08 April 2011, in http://aangirfan.blogspot.com/2011/04/deep-
state.html, Accessed 01 August 2011. 
Eppel, Shari. “Initial Thoughts on the Matebeleland Constitutional Outreach 
Experience”. 
http://mthwakaziblogspot.com, Accessed 5 May 2011. 
Mulinda, Charles Kabwete,“A space for genocide: Local Authorities, local population and 
local histories in Gishamvu and Kibayi (Rwanda), Unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University of the Western Cape, September 2010. 
National AIDS Council, Tongogara District AIDS Action Committee: Second Quarter 
Report, April-June 2005. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. J. “Giving Africa voice within global governance: oral history, 
human rights and the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council”, Unpublished paper 
presented at the International Conference on Human Rights and Social Justice: Setting 
the Agenda for the United Nations Human Rights Council, 23-25 February 2007, 
University of Winnipeg, Canada. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo. “The meanings of Mugabeism in the postcolonial African 
present: Beyond the polemics” Unpublished paper presented at the Re-Imagining 
Postcolonial Futures: Knowledge Transactions and Contests of Culture in the African 
Present Colloquium, organised by the Centre for Humanities for Research of the 
Western Cape, and The Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies of the Open 
University, UK, 8-11 July 2009, UWC, Cape Town. 
 
Neocosmos, Michael. “Analysing political subjectivities: naming the post-developmental 
state in Africa today”, Unpublished paper presented at The Social Theory Colloquium at 
The Centre for Humanities Research, University of the Western Cape, 20-21 August 
2009. 
 “Strengthening the Role of Women in the Gacaca Tribunals –International Alert and 
Profemmes/Twese Hamwe”, in 
http://www.badgerdesigns.com/alert/v1/pdfs/Rwanda%20-
%20Gacaca%20meeting.pdf, Accessed 24 March 2012. 
T5 Programme of the Ministry of Health and Child welfare, Midlands Province, 
Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 462 
 
 
 
 
NEWSPAPERS 
“Fuming Mugabe rattled by hecklers” in 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7583128.stm  Accessed 26 August 2008. 
“Has Zimbabwe's Runaway Inflation Been Tamed?” in 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887809,00.html, Accessed 13 June 
2011. 
“Hot seat interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland, Glen Mpani and Mary Ndlovu: 
Reconciliation, justice and national healing”, cited in SW Radio Africa, 10 April 2009, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg090410swradio.asp?sector=DEMGG&year200
9&range_start=751, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
“Hot Seat Interview with George Bizos, Sekai Holland, Glen Mpani and Mary Ndlovu: 
Reconciliation, justice and national healing”, cited in SW Radio Africa, 10 April 2009, in 
http://kubatana.net/html/archive/demgg090410swradio.asp?sector=DEMGG&year200
9&range_start=751, Accessed 21 May 2011. 
“MDC’s Dumbu preaches peace”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/34794/mdcs-dumbu-preaches-peace.html, 
Accessed 27 June 2011. 
 
“Mugabe urges end to violence, Tsvangirai seeks justice”, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com, Accessed 18 April 2011. 
 “Tsvangirai reviews his 100 days in office” in http://www.zimgreats.com/index.php?, 
accessed on 09 June 2009. 
“Tsvangirai’s speech on National Healing” 24 July 2009, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/politics/tsvangirais-speech-on-national-healing, 
Accessed 18 April 2011. 
“Undoing two decades of neglect”, in Prime Minister’s Newsletter, 2 September 2009, in 
http://davidcoltart.com/?p=829#respond, Accessed 22 May 2011. 
 
“US rubbishes Mugabe sanctions petition” in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6595, Accessed 04 March 2011. 
“Zimbabwe: Anti-sanctions campaign kicks off” in 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92090, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
“Zimbabwe’s comatose economy: Enemy number one is Gono”, in 
http://www.gonogonow.com/?p=388, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 463 
 
 
 
 
“Zimbabweans speak against sanctions”, in 
http://redantliberationarmy.wordpress.com/category/zimbabwe/, Accessed 11 June 
2011. 
BBC News, 12 December 2011, “Africa's Fatou Bensouda is new ICC chief prosecutor”, in 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16029121, Accessed 08 March 2012.    
Byo24News, 18 January 2011, in http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-business-sc-economy-
byo-751-article-Zimbabwe+December+inflation+slows+to+3.2+percent+.html, Accessed 
11 June 2011. 
CNN.Com.world cited in 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/12/14/mugabe.zimbabwe/, Accessed 20 
February 2011. 
Financial Gazette, 01 July 2011, “GPA negotiators in crucial poll meeting”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/8887-gpa-negotiators-in-crucial-poll-
meeting.html, Accessed 02 July 2011.  
Financial Gazette, 18 August 2011, “Lawmakers to form national healing organ”, in 
http://eu.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/9507-lawmakers-to-form-national-healing-
organ.html, Accessed 26 August 2011. 
Fingaz, 01 July 2011, “PM Tsvangirai versus the army”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/8867-pm-tsvangirai-versus-the-
army.html, Accessed 02 July 2011. 
 
Fingaz, 01 July 2011, “Why has Sibanda found a new home in Masvingo?” in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/8871-why-has-sibanda-found-a-
new-home-in-masvingo.html, Accessed 02 July 2011. 
 
Fingaz, 04 August 2011, “Defence forces under spotlight”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/9317-defence-forces-under-
spotlight.html, Accessed 06 August 2011. 
 
Fingaz, 08 July 2011, “President Mugabe launches MTP”, in 
http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/8971-president-mugabe-launches-
mtp.html, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
http://.zimbabwesituation.com/results.html, Accessed 15 December 2009. 
http://changezimbabwe.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=2917, 
Accessed 27 June 2011. 
http://swradioafrica.com/News290710.htm, Accessed 15 May 2011. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=92090, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 464 
 
 
 
 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/electoral20317984.html, Accessed 19 February 
2011. 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/elliot-manyika-dies-in-mysterious-accident  
Accessed 07 November 2010. 
http://www.zimdiaspora.com, Accessed 31 January 2011. 
http://www.zimonline.co.za, Accessed 19 June 2011. 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx, Accessed 28 January 2011. 
 Independent.ie cited in http://www.independent.ie/world-news/mugabe-bids-to-
strike-fear-into-the-heart-of-the-whiteman, Accessed 20 February 2011. 
Mail and Guardian online, 10 July 2011, “DRC villagers spurn raped wives”, in 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-06-drc-villagers-spurn-raped-wives,  Accessed 10 July 
2011. 
 
Mail and Guardian, 10 June 1999.  
metrozimbabwe, 03 June 2011,“Commander Chiwenga to take over from Mugabe”, in 
http://www.zimbabwemetro.com/news/commander-chiwenga-to-take-over-from-
mugabe/, Accessed 03 July 2011. 
 
News24, “Zimbabwe Monitors: Destroy Bases”, 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/Zimbabwe-monitors-Destroy-militia-bases-
20110601, Accessed 02 June 2011. 
 
News24, 20 June 2011, “Vigilante Justice: 2 PE men necklaced”, in 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Vigilante-justice-2-PE-men-necklaced-
20110620, Accessed 25 June 2011. 
Newsday 13 July 2012, “Bank takeover scares away investors”, in 
http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-07-13-bank-takeover-scares-away-capital, Accessed 
15 July 2012. 
Newsday 17 January 2011, “Magistrate, prosecutor breathe fire” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw, Accessed 18 January 2011. 
Newsday 18 May 2011 “New template delays Copac process”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.za/article/2011-05-17-new-template-delays-copac-process, 
Accessed 18 May 2011. 
Newsday 24 June 2010, “ZANU-PF roots for longer presidential term for Mugabe” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-06-24-as-zanu-pf-roots-for-longer-
presidential-term-mugabe, accessed 14 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 465 
 
 
 
 
Newsday 24 June 2010, “ZANU-PF roots for longer presidential term for Mugabe” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-06-24-as-zanu-pf-roots-for-longer-
presidential-term-mugabe, accessed 14 June 2011. 
Newsday 27 May 2011, “Service Chiefs a security threat-PM”, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-27-service-chiefs-a-security-threat-pm, 
Accessed 27 May 2011.   
 
Newsday 28 June 2011, “CIO brute up for the Hague?” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-28-cio-brute-up-for-the-hague, Accessed 
28 June 2011. 
Newsday 8 May 2011 cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-08-preserve-
exhumed-remains-zipra, Accessed 9 May 2011. 
Newsday, 04 July 2010, “Coalition government fails to stem out killlings”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-07-04-coalition-government-fails-to-stem-
killings, Accessed 27 June 2011.  
 
Newsday, 06 March 2011, “National healing organ a paper tiger”, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-03-06-national-healing-organ-a-paper-tiger, 
Accessed 21 May 2011. 
Newsday, 08 August 2011, “Put Transitional justice mechanisms in place” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-08-08-put-transitional-justice-mechanisms-in-
place, Accessed 09 August 2011. 
Newsday, 08 December 2011, “Zimbabweans too afraid of elections”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-12-09-zimbabweans-too-afraid-of-elections--
research/, Accessed 08 December 2011. 
 
Newsday, 10 October 2011, “Political parties must stop violence against teachers — 
PTUZ”, in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-10-10-political-parties-must-stop-
violence-against-teachers-ptuz, Accessed 10 October 2011. 
Newsday, 16 September 2011, “Comment: Sibanda must be tamed” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-09-16-comment-sibanda-must-be-tamed, 
Accessed 17 September 2011. 
Newsday, 17 January 2011, cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-01-16-
security-sector-still-partisan, Accessed 17 January 2011.  
Newsday, 21 February 2011, cited in http://www.newsday.co.zw, accessed 21 February 
2011.  
 
 
 
 
 466 
 
 
 
 
Newsday, 22 June 2011, “ZANU-PF engages in primitive accumulation of wealth”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-zanu-pf-engages-in-primitive-
accumulation-of-wealth, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
Newsday, 22 June 2011, “ZANU-PF engages in primitive accumulation of wealth”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-zanu-pf-engages-in-primitive-
accumulation-of-wealth, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
 
Newsday, 23 June 2011, “Plot to arrest Tsvangirai” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-plot-to-arrest-tsvangirai, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
Newsday, 23 June 2011, “Plot to arrest Tsvangirai” in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-22-plot-to-arrest-tsvangirai, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
Newsday, 25 May 2012, “President bemoans the suppression of women”, in 
http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-05-25-president-bemoans-suppression-of-women, 
Accessed 26 May 2012. 
Newsday, 27 February 2012, “Machaya still to pay murder compensation balance”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2012-02-27-machaya-still-to-pay-murder-
compensation-balance/, Accessed 27 February 2012. 
Newsday, 27 June 2011, “Ncube blasts army generals”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-27-ncube-blasts-army-generals, Accessed 
27 June 2011. 
 
Newsday, 27 May 2011, “Security chiefs a security threat-PM”, cited in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-27-service-chiefs-a-security-threat-pm, 
Accessed 29 May 2011. 
Newsday, 05 June 2012, “Tsvangirai address to Sadc in full”, in 
http://newsday.co.zw/article/2012-06-05-tsvangirai-adress-to-sadc-in-full/, Accessed 11 
June 2012. 
Newsday, 29 June 2011, “Tsvangirai alarmed over attack on Biti”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-06-29-tsvangirai-alarmed, Accessed 29 June 
2011. 
 
Newsday, 29 May 2011, “Army must not dabble in politics”, 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-05-29-army-should-not-dabble-in-politics, 
Accessed 29 May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 467 
 
 
 
 
Newsday, 8 November 2011, “Let’s go for polls”, in 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-11-08-lets-go-for-polls, Accessed 08 
November 2011. 
Newsday, 26 September 2011, available on line at: 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-09-26-zanu-pf-youth-gets-18-years-for-
murder, accessed on 28 September 2012. 
The Daily News 16 March 2000 
The Daily News, 1 April 2002. 
The Daily News, 1 March 2000. 
The Daily News, 12 September 2002. 
The Daily News, 13 January 2000 
The Daily News, 17 February 2000, “Referendum results rock ZANU-PF foundations”. 
The Daily News, 24 June 2000. 
The Daily News, 29 March 2000, “Mugabe threatens violence”. 
The Daily News, 29 March 2000. 
The Daily News, 3 March 2000. 
The Daily News, 30 March 2000. 
The Daily News, 7 March 2000. 
The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, India, 29 January 2011, “Mugabe’s iron grip not about to 
loosen”. 
 
The Herald 14 July 2012, “President leaves for summit”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47109:pres
ident-leaves-for-summit&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 15 July 2012. 
The Herald, 01 August 2011, “Army presence in countryside normal — ZNA chief “, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17017:arm
y-presence-in-countryside-normal-zna-chief&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, 
Accessed 02 August 2011. 
 
The Herald, 11 June 2011, “President, Zuma thrash out issues”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12385:pres
ident-zuma-thrash-out-issues&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 11 June 
2011. 
 
 
 
 
 468 
 
 
 
 
The Herald, 13 February 2011, “Zimbabwe opposition working with the West on 
Sanctions–Wikileaks”, in http://herald.co.zw, Accessed 11 June 2011.   
The Herald, 17 June 2011, 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12831:ann
ual-inflation-declines&catid=41:business&Itemid=133, Accessed 17 June 2011. 
The Herald, 18 July 2011, “New constitution to be negotiated: Ncube”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15605:new
-constitution-to-be-negotiated-ncube&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 14 
August 2011. 
The Herald, 18 June 2011, “Indigenisation not punishing foreigners: PM”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12947:indi
genisation-not-punishing-foreigners-pm&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 18 
June 2011. 
The Herald, 19 January 2001. 
The Herald, 19 October 2011, “Governor pays US$15 000, 35 cattle compensation to 
deceased family” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24181:gov
ernor-pays-us15-000-35-cattle-compensation-to-deceaseds-family&catid=38:local-
news&Itemid=131, Accessed 19 October 2011. 
The Herald, 20 July 2011, “Brig-gen entitled to own opinions”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15867:brig
-gen-entitled-to-air-own-opinions&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 08 
August 2011. 
 
The Herald, 20 May 2011, “Summit dissolves Tribunal”, cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php? Accessed 21 May 2011. 
The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba responds to Tsvangirai”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13369:gen
erals-respond-to-tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Brigadier-General Nyikayaramba responds to Tsvangirai”, 
cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13369:gen
erals-respond-to-tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
 
The Herald, 23 June 2011, “Nkomo calls for dialogue on Gukurahundi” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13371:nko
mo-calls-for-dialogue-on-gukurahundi&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 23 
June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 469 
 
 
 
 
The Herald, 25 July 2011, “Violent protests an option: Tsvangirai”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16281:viol
ent-protests-an-option-tsvangirai&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 25 July 
2011. 
The Herald, 25 June 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13579:arre
st-tsikamutandas-police-urged&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 25 June 
2011. 
The Herald, 26 July 2011,” Parties’ differences disrupt Bill hearing”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16419:part
ies-differences-disrupt-bill-hearing&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 26 July 
2011. 
The Herald, 27 January 2011, “COPAC data disappears”, 
The Herald, 27 June 2011, “Sibanda to stay in Masvingo” in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13699:siba
nda-to-stay-in-masvingo&catid=38:local-news&Itemid=131, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
The Herald, 28 April 2011 “Zim now fed up with sanctions”, in, cited in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8707:zim-
now-fed-up-with-sanctions&catid=48:blogs&Itemid=155, Accessed 09 June 2011. 
The Herald, 28 September 2011, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22313:gov
ernor-accepts-sons-jailing-for-murder&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130,  Accessed on 
28 September 2012. 
The Herald, 31 May 2012, “Tsvangirai meets NATO commander”, in 
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43079:tsva
ngirai-meets-nato-commander&catid=37:top-stories&Itemid=130, Accessed 31 May 
2012. 
The Insider, “Goche negotiated Mugabe exit with MDC”, in 
http://www.insiderzim.com/stories/3200-goche-negotiated-mugabe-exit-with-
mdc.html, Accessed 02 February 2012. 
The Standard 23 May 2010, “Ngozi: Primitive superstition or reality?” in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 01 July 2011. 
The Standard, 06 May 2010, “National healing has no clear mandate- Holland”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw, Accessed 21 June 2011.   
 
 
 
 
 470 
 
 
 
 
The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-
.html, Accessed 10 July 2011. 
The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-
.html, Accessed 10 July 2011. 
The Standard, 10 July 2011, “Organ struggles to find healing formula”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30468-organ-struggles-to-find-healing-formula-
.html, Accessed 10 July 2011. 
 
The Standard, 12 February 2006, “Top chefs exposed: 66 000 litres of diesel for former 
CIO Boss”. 
The Standard, 12 June 2011, “Sunday View: Blaming Tsvangirai for sanctions baseless 
politics”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/30068-sundayview-blaming-
tsvangirai-for-sanctions-baseless-politics.html, Accessed 13 June 2011. 
The Standard, 17 July 2011, “From the Editor's Desk: Obsession with polls stifles 
development”, in http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/30620-from-the-editors-desk-
obsession-with-polls-stifles-development.html, Accessed 25 July 2011. 
The Standard, 21 January 2007. 
The Standard, 29 May 2011 “Brigadier throws ZANU PF into crisis”, in  
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/29820-brigadier-throws-zanu-pf-into-crisis.html, 
Accessed 1 June 2011. 
 
The Standard, 29 May 2011, “Brigadier throws ZANU PF into crisis”, in 
http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/29820-brigadier-throws-zanu-pf-into-crisis.html, 
Accessed 1 June 2011. 
The Sunday Mail, 04-10 March 2012, “SABC blackout coming soon” 
The Sunday Mail, 12-18 February 2012, “Kupemba’s lone battle”. 
The Sunday Mail, 5-11 February 2012, “PM Tsvangirai’s letter to President Mugabe” 
The Zimbabwe Independent, 1 July 2005. 
The Zimbabwe Independent, 21 July 2011, “All eyes on the military ahead of Zim 
elections”, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31762-all-eyes-on-military-
ahead-of-zim-elections.html, Accessed 25 July 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Independent, 25 February 2010, “Editor's Memo: Hate-slogans cannot win 
the day anymore”, in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/comment/25491-hate-
slogans-cannot-win-the-day-anymore.html, Accessed 02 August 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 471 
 
 
 
 
The Zimbabwean, “MDC supporters harassed”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/human-rights/32543/mdc-supporters-
harassed.html, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
 
The Zimbabwean, “Nyikayaramba causes havoc”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/human-rights/35729/nyikayaramba-causes-havoc-
.html, Accessed 27 June 2011. 
 
The Zimbabwean, 08 May 2012, “China and Zimbabwe trade doubled”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/58106/china-and-zimbabwe-trade-
doubled.html, Accessed 13 July 2012. 
The Zimbabwean, 09 July 2011, “AIPPA not necessary: Matonga”, in 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/50762/aippa-not-necessary-
matonga.html?utm_source=thezim&utm_medium=homepage&utm_campaign=latestar
ticles, Accessed 10 July 2011. 
 
The Zimbabwean, 19 February 2009, “Govt is broke, says Coltart as he asks teachers to 
end strike”, in http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?=option=com, Accessed 22 
May 2011. 
 
The Zimbabwean, 6 May 2009, http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/20976/ai-need-
forgivenessa-a-biggie-chitoro.html, Accessed 23 June 2011. 
Wikilikeaks”, in http://redantliberationarmy.wordpress.com/category/zimbabwe/, 
Accessed 11 June 2011. 
Zimbabwe Independent, 08 July 2011, “Army, police, CIO talks divide negotiators”, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31646-army-police-cio-talks-divide-
negotiators.html, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
Zimbabwe Independent, 21 July 2011, “All eyes on the military ahead of Zim elections”, 
in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31762-all-eyes-on-military-ahead-of-zim-
elections.html, Accessed 25 July 2011.  
Zimbabwe Independent, 27 May 2011, “Army demands elections in 2011, in 
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31062-army-demands-elections-in-2011.html, 
accessed 03 July 2011. 
 
Zimbabwe Independent, 30 June 2011, “Military wants parly seats for retired soldiers”, 
in http://www.theindependent.co.zw/local/31581-military-wants-parly-seats-for-
retired-soldiers.html, Accessed 03 July 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 472 
 
 
 
 
Zimbabwean Mail, 27 March 2011, in “Mugabe no longer in charge, Tsvangirai confirms 
Zimbabwe coup”in http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/7657-mugabe-
nolonger-in-charge-tsvangirai-confirms-zimbabwe-coup.html, accessed 03 July 2011. 
 
Zimonline 06 July 2011, “Volatile situation in five Zim provinces”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6747, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
Zimonline 10 September 2011, “Violence victims still bitter” in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6809, Accessed 10 September 2011. 
Zimonline, “Interview: We are still under arrest”, 24 April 2009, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=4538, Accessed 29 June 2011. 
 
Zimonline, 02 June 2011, “ZANU shifts into election mode”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6714, Accessed 03 June 2011. 
 
Zimonline, 06 April 2011, “Rallying region against Mugabe: Zuma’s test”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6656, Accessed 28 June 2011. 
 
Zimonline, 08 July 2011, “Gov’t lunges towards dysfunction: PM”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6748, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
Zimonline, 08 July 2011, “Gov’t lunges towards dysfunction: PM”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6748, Accessed 08 July 2011. 
 
Zimonline, 13 February 2012, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6905, Accessed 16 February 2012. 
 
Zimonline, 19 January 2011, “Military plot to keep Mugabe in power”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6529, Accessed 20 January 2011. 
Zimonline, 19 January 2011, cited in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6529, Accessed 20 January 2011. 
 
Zimonline, 21 June 2011, “Fresh row stalls Zim reforms”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=6731, Accessed 21 June 2011. 
Zimonline, 30 November 2010, “Soldiers hold drills in villages”, in 
http://www.zimonline.co.za/, Accessed 1 June 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 473 
 
 
 
 
Apendix 
 
 Types of violations committed between 2001 and 2008 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals 
Abductions 116 223 52 62 18 11 19 137 638 
arrest & 
detention 
670 274 627 389 1286 2611 2766 922 9545 
Assault 0 86 388 401 530 486 865 1914 4670 
attempted 
murder 
0 2 10 10 1 3 0 8 34 
death threats 0 12 80 35 9 7 7 51 201 
disappearance 0 28 4 0 0 0 0 19 51 
displacement 0 11 208 189 609 55 0 629 1701 
Freedoms 12 39 809 760 1036 1866 3500 2532 10554 
Murder 34 61 10 3 4 2 3 107 224 
Political 
discrimination  
194 388 450 514 476 288 980 2787 6077 
property 
violation 
356 807 153 132 61 55 16 396 1976 
Rape 0 7 6 3 4 1 0 6 27 
school closure 0 45 1 0 0 0 0 26 72 
Torture 903 1172 497 389 136 366 603 723 4789 
Total 2285 3155 3295 2887 4170 5751 8759 10257 40559 
Monthly 
average: 
380.8 262.9 274.6 240.6 347.5 479.3 729.9 854.8  
Source: Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, adapted from “Sublimal terror?” p 12. 
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